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Abstract 
Hearing the Tonality in Microtonality 
Michael Bruschi 
2021 
 In the late 1970s and 1980s, composer-pianist Easley Blackwood wrote a series of 
microtonal compositions exploring the tonal and modal behavior of a dozen non–twelve-tone 
equal temperaments, ranging from 13 to 24 tones per octave. This dissertation investigates a 
central paradox of Blackwood’s microtonal music: that despite being full of intervals most 
Western listeners have never heard before, it still seems to “make sense” in nontrivial ways. 
Much of this has to do with the music’s idiosyncratic approach to tonality, which I define as a 
regime of culturally conditioned expectations that guides one’s attentional processing of 
music’s gravitational qualities over time. More specifically, Blackwood configures each tuning’s 
unfamiliar elements in ways that correspond to certain schematic expectations Western 
listeners tend to have about how tonal music “works.” This is why it is still possible to hear the 
forest of tonality in this music, so to speak, despite the odd-sounding trees that comprise it. 
 Because of its paradoxical blend of expectational conformance and expectational 
noncompliance, Blackwood’s microtonal music makes for a useful tool to snap most Western-
enculturated listeners out of their ingrained modes of musical processing and reveal certain 
things about tonality that are often taken for granted. Accordingly, just as Blackwood writes 
conventional-sounding music in unconventional tunings, this dissertation rethinks several 
familiar music-theoretic terms and concepts through the defamiliarizing lens of microtonality. I 
use Blackwood’s microtonal music as a prism to shine a light on traditional theories of tonality, 
scale degrees, consonance and dissonance, and harmonic function, arguing that many of these 
theories rely on assumptions that are tacitly tied to twelve-tone equal temperament and 
common-practice major/minor music. By unhooking these terms and concepts from any one 
specific tuning or historical period, I build up a set of analytical tools that can allow one to 
engage more productively with the many modalities of tonality typically heard on a daily basis 
today. 
 This dissertation proceeds in six chapters. The four interior chapters each center on one 
of the terms and concepts mentioned above: scale degrees (Chapter 2), consonance and 
dissonance (Chapter 3), harmonic function (Chapter 4), and tonality (Chapter 5). In Chapter 2, I 
propose a system for labeling scale degrees that can provide more nuance and flexibility when 
reckoning with music in any diatonic mode (and in any tuning). In Chapter 3, I advance an 
account of consonance and dissonance as expectational phenomena (rather than purely 
psychoacoustic ones), and I consider the ways that non-pitched elements such as meter and 
notation can act as “consonating” and/or “dissonating” forces. In Chapter 4, I characterize 
harmonic function as arising from the interaction of generic scalar position and metrical 
position, and I devise a system for labeling harmonic functions that is better attuned to 
affective differences across the diatonic modes. In Chapter 5, I synthesize these building blocks 
into a conception of fuzzy heptatonic diatonic tonality that links together not only all of 
Blackwood’s microtonal compositions but also more familiar musics that use a twelve-tone 
octave, from Euroclassical to popular styles.  
 The outer chapters are less explicitly music-analytical in focus. Chapter 1 introduces 
readers to Blackwood’s compositional approach and notational system, considers the question 
of his intended audience, and discusses the ways that enculturation mediates the cognition of 
microtonality (and of unfamiliar music more generally). Chapter 6 draws upon archival 
documents to paint a more detailed picture of who Blackwood was as a person and how his 
idiosyncratic worldview colors his approach to composition, scholarship, and interpersonal 
interaction. 
 While my nominal focus in these six chapters is Blackwood’s microtonal music, the 
repertorial purview of my project is far broader. One of my guiding claims throughout is that 
attending more closely to the paradoxes and contradictions of Blackwood’s microtonality can 
help one better understand the musics they are accustomed to hearing. For this reason, I 
frequently compare moments in Blackwood’s microtonal music to ones in more familiar styles to 
highlight unexpected analogies and point up common concerns. Sharing space with 
Blackwood in the pages that follow are Anita Baker, Ornette Coleman, Claude Debussy, and 
Richard Rodgers, among others—not to mention music from Curb Your Enthusiasm, Fortnite, 
Sesame Street, and Star Wars.  
 Ultimately, this project is a testament to the value of stepping outside of one’s musical 
comfort zone. For not only can this reveal certain things about that comfort zone that would 
not be apparent otherwise, but it can also help one think with greater nuance, precision, and 
(self-)awareness when “stepping back in” to reflect upon the music they know and love. 
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Chapter 1   |   Hearing the Forest for the Trees 
“[W]e are too apt to identify music with the sound to be elicited from the piano.” 
– Alexander J. Ellis  1
Background, Rationale, and Aims 
The notes on the piano are not the only notes that exist—a fact that is often taken for granted 
given how ubiquitous the piano’s 12-tone equal temperament (henceforth “12-TET”) has 
become in Western musical culture over the past century.  In recent decades, however, 2
technological advances have made it possible to compose in alternate tunings that have never 
before been used or heard. These so-called “microtonal” tunings tend to be regarded as 
unexplored, uncharted sonic territory—a blank canvas of sorts, onto which can be written an 
infinite number of musical possibilities. As a result, microtonal music is typically discussed in 
terms of what is pathbreaking or forward-looking about it. The growing subfield of microtonal 
scholarship, moreover, is generally dominated by mathematical, acoustical, and scale-theoretic 
considerations that sometimes downplay or erase the consequential effects that the ubiquity of 
 Qtd. in Stock, “Alexander J. Ellis and His Place in the History of Ethnomusicology” (2007), p.1
319.
 I say “over the past century” because of the seminal role of William Braid White’s Modern 2
Piano Tuning and Allied Arts (1917) in standardizing, to a degree of mathematical and scientific 
precision never before attained, the method of tuning a piano. For more on White’s role in 
standardizing 12-TET as we know it today, see Jorgensen, Tuning (1991), p.538, and Duffin, 
How Equal Temperament Ruined Harmony (and Why You Should Care) (2008), p.112.
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tonal music in 12-TET has on those who engage with microtonality, whether as composers or as 
listeners.  3
 What might it mean to hear microtonal music as “tonal”? To what extent can the 
constructs and frameworks that orient listeners in their native tuning transfer over to other, 
unfamiliar tunings without conceptual loss? This dissertation addresses these interrelated 
questions through the lens of Easley Blackwood’s microtonal music.  Blackwood (1933–) is a 4
composer-pianist who taught music theory at the University of Chicago for over half a century. 
He composed all of his microtonal music between 1978 and 1981 as “illustrations of a research 
project funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities. The project was to explore the 
tonal and modal behavior of all the equal tunings of 13 through 24 notes (to the octave), devise 
a notation for each tuning, and write a composition in each tuning to illustrate good chord 
progressions and the practical application of the notation.”  His rationale seems 5
straightforward enough on the surface, but it is couched in language that warrants further 
 See for instance Balzano, “The Group-Theoretic Description of 12-Fold and Microtonal Pitch 3
Systems” (1980); Chalmers, “Construction and Harmonization of Microtonal Scales in Non-12-
Tone Equal Temperaments” (1982); Rapoport, “The Structural Relationships of Fifths and Thirds 
in Equal Temperaments” (1993); Krantz and Douthett, “A Measure of the Reasonableness of 
Equal-Tempered Musical Scales” (1994); Erlich, “Tuning, Tonality, and Twenty-Two–Tone 
Temperament” (1998); Werntz, “Adding Pitches: Some New Thoughts, Ten Years after 
Perspectives of New Music’s ‘Forum: Microtonality Today’” (2001); and Narushima, 
Microtonality and the Tuning Systems of Erv Wilson (2018).
 Blackwood’s microtonal output consists of his Twelve Microtonal Etudes for Electronic Music 4
Media, Op. 28; the “Fanfare in 19-note Equal Tuning,” Op. 28a; and the four-movement Suite 
for Guitar in 15-note Equal Tuning, Op. 33. All of these compositions are collected on a 56-
minute–long CD released in 1994 by the Chicago-based label Cedille Records. Blackwood 
himself performs Op. 28 and Op. 28a on a retunable Polyfusion synthesizer, and Jeffrey Kust 
performs Op. 33 on a modified acoustic guitar.
 Liner notes to Blackwood’s Microtonal Compositions (1994), Cedille CDR 90000 018, n.p.5
3
prodding. Writing as an experimental composer-performer, Blackwood is concerned with 
framing his compositions in terms of their ability to break new musical ground. He goes on to 
say: “My purpose was to express what is inherent in each tuning by the most attractive possible 
musical design, to discover the most appealing arrangements within each tuning.”  But what 6
makes a chord progression “good,” a musical design “attractive,” and an arrangement 
“appealing” in the first place? Are these even properties of musical objects per se? A certain 
short-circuitry is at work here. There are two elephants in the room, both lurking behind these 
value judgments: [1] the agency of listeners, and [2] the regime of expectations associated with 
“tonality” as configured in 12-TET. 
 My dissertation thus explores how Blackwood’s microtonality might be understood by 
listeners enculturated in this regime. To flesh out the provocations that open the previous 
paragraph: what might it mean to parse music written in 13- through 24-TET through the 
referential filter of the 12-tone octave? To what extent are things like scale-degree qualia, 
consonance/dissonance, and functional tonality transferrable from 12-TET to these other equal 
tunings? I am therefore not so much interested in the new musical territory Blackwood’s 
compositions explore as I am interested in the ways they engage with “old” musical terrain. In 
short, I investigate how it is still possible to hear the “forest” of tonality in this music, so to 
speak, despite the odd-sounding trees and branches that comprise it. 
 In viewing Blackwood’s microtonality through the prism of 12-TET, my research pushes 
back against several theorists who suggest that microtonal tunings should be understood on 
their own terms. Gerald Balzano, for instance, laments that “[so] many attempts at microtonal 
 Ibid.6
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music—music using some more finely divided pitch system—too easily slide into sounding like 
out-of-tune versions of our familiar 12-fold system.”  Julia Werntz, moreover, advocates for a 7
compositional style she calls “‘atwelve-tone’ microtonalism,”  in which composers are 8
encouraged to “remov[e] the prescriptions of tonality” and “start from scratch” when exploring 
new tunings.  And William Sethares argues rather forcefully that each unfamiliar tuning should 9
“ha[ve] its own ‘music theory,’”  even sketching out what “a ‘music theory’ for 10-TET” might 10
look like in Chapter 14 of his book Tuning, Timbre, Spectrum, Scale.  But while Sethares’ 11
methods are imaginative and his aims admirable, the ecological validity of his approach is 
questionable. Sure, it might be possible for listeners to check their enculturative baggage at 
the door and eventually internalize the nuances/affordances of another tuning on independent 
terms. But this process does not happen overnight. Howard Becker reminds us that “[t]he 
connected ‘package’ of practices and relationships which make up an art world, such as the 
world of music making, creates a powerful inertia” that is not so easily displaced.  By 12
downplaying the inertial force of 12-TET tonal music in modern Western society, Sethares’ 
account does not fully capture the veritable “culture shock” of hearing music in an unfamiliar 
tuning for the first time (and even beyond that). 
 Balzano, “What Are Musical Pitch and Timbre?” (1986), p.298.7
 Werntz, “Adding Pitches: Some New Thoughts, Ten Years after Perspectives of New Music’s 8
‘Forum: Microtonality Today’” (2001), p.199.
 Ibid., pp.184–85.9
 Sethares, Tuning, Timbre, Spectrum, Scale (2005), p.xiv.10
 Ibid., pp.291–302.11
 Becker, “The Power of Inertia” (1995), p.301.12
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 By paying more attention to the constraining and mediating roles that enculturation 
plays in music processing, my research also notably pushes back against Blackwood’s own 
avowed skepticism of “the popular theory that musical perception is strictly the result of 
conditioning or training.”  It is interesting to note that certain other remarks by Blackwood 13
seem to call this skepticism into question, whether implicitly (“To my ear, the most disagreeable 
discords that exist are badly out of tune triads, or put another way, discordant tunings of 
harmonies that exist in smooth, consonant versions in other tunings” ) or explicitly (“When 14
investigating a tuning for which there is little or no repertoire or tradition, the most illuminating 
approach is to look for similarities between the new tuning and the familiar 12-note equal 
tuning” ). Either way, however—and this is the larger point—Blackwood’s focus remains 15
primarily on how composers might marshal these tunings to produce so-called “appealing” 
music,  not on how/why certain listeners might come to find such music “appealing” (or not) 16
in the first place. I thus address this imbalance by zeroing in on what it might be like, and what 
it might entail, to hear tonality in microtonality. 
 Viewed in one way, this project is a study of Blackwood’s idiosyncratic approach to 
microtonality and its implications for traditional theories of tonality. Viewed in another, it is a 
project about the regulative power of comfort zones: about how these comfort zones came to 
be in the first place, and about the entrenched tendency to seek refuge inside of them 
 Blackwood, “Research Notes: NEH Grant R0-29376-78-0642” (1979–81), Folder 2, p.354.13
 Ibid., Folder 2, p.324.14
 Ibid., Folder 1, p.1.15
 Blackwood, Microtonal Compositions (1994), Cedille CDR 90000 018, n.p.16
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whenever they are challenged or put under pressure. In the four interior chapters of this 
dissertation, I probe what Blackwood’s microtonal music can reveal about the cultural comfort 
zone furnished by 12-TET itself. Since this tuning forms the tacit basis for modern music theory, 
analysis, and pedagogy, it follows that several widely ingrained assumptions in these discourses 
are tied to the particulars of that tuning. Accordingly, these four inner chapters pump new life 
into some of the most commonly used musical terms and concepts—scale degrees (Chapter 2), 
consonance/dissonance (Chapter 3), harmonic function (Chapter 4), and tonality (Chapter 5)—
by reconsidering them through the defamiliarizing lens of microtonality. Chapter 6, on the 
other hand, focuses more on Blackwood’s own cultural “comfort zone,” unpacking certain 
distinctive aspects of his character, worldview, and personal archive that have yet to receive 
scholarly attention and relating these to the way he went about his work as a music theorist, 
composer, and departmental colleague. 
 In many ways, as we will see, this is a project about the generative power of 
contradiction. It is my firm conviction that, by attending more closely to the paradoxes and 
contradictions of Blackwood’s microtonality, one can gain a more robust picture of how tonality 
typically operates in the musics they know and love. For this reason, in the ensuing chapters, I 
frequently juxtapose microtonal examples from Blackwood with more familiar examples from 
non-microtonal repertoires in order to highlight unexpected analogies and point up common 
concerns. Over two dozen pieces not written by Blackwood—spanning R&B, pop/rock, film 
music, video game music, jazz, rap, music from TV shows, and Western Euroclassical  music—17
 The term “Euroclassical” is borrowed from Philip Tagg’s Everyday Tonality II: Towards a Tonal 17
Theory of What Most People Hear (2014), passim.
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are mentioned at some point in the pages that follow. Readers who might have expected a 
more focused study of microtonal equal temperaments on their own terms are encouraged to 
look elsewhere. For while Blackwood’s microtonal compositions may sound very much like 
music on the vanguard, they also fundamentally rely upon a highly specific and historically 
contingent set of terms, conditions, and constraints for their intelligibility—and one cannot 
responsibly discuss this music without first grappling with its enabling conditions. This chapter 
sets out to do just that. 
Enculturation (I) 
One of my central claims in this dissertation is that enculturation mediates the cognition of 
microtonality (and of unfamiliar music in general), insofar as listeners subconsciously [1] take 
stock of statistical regularities in the music they hear, [2] form expectations based on these 
regularities about how future music will go, and [3] bring these expectations to the table when 
listening to unfamiliar music. Yet, as I will argue, this process involves a good deal of bending 
acoustic reality to fit preconceived auditory desires—in short, it involves cognitive bias. The 
heuristics that listeners employ to make sense of music are by nature imperfect, and this leads 
to gaps in knowledge and cracks in expectation that microtonal music exposes rather well. 
Faced with such gaps and cracks, I contend, listeners must do something to fill them if they are 
to make sense of the music. This is to say, tonal cognition—whether in microtonality or not—is 
often overcompensatory in nature, originating in the impulse to impose a sense of order and 
control on a highly variable sonic environment. Hearing tonality is therefore a procedural 
merging of biological instinct and culturally conditioned choice. 
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 Mark Reybrouck likens music listening to “a process of sense-making that reduces the 
virtual infinity of information of the perceptual flux to a manageable and limited set of 
perceptual categories.”  This process is structured by the principle of cognitive economy: the 18
disposition to seek out a “maximum of information with the least cognitive effort.”  When the 19
music is in a finely-grained microtonal tuning, the stakes are only raised: listeners must find a 
way to attend to it in a framework that optimizes predictive accuracy while streamlining 
cognitive load, or else they will experience negative feelings of frustration, bewilderment, and/
or downright irritation. How far will listeners go in order to avoid these feelings? Just how far 
can preestablished auditory categories stretch to accommodate novel occurrences? 
 Listening to music involves both cognitive categorization and the experience of 
emotion, and wherever these two coexist, cognitive misattribution tends to lurk nearby. David 
Huron defines misattribution as “[t]he psychological tendency to attribute or associate feelings 
or emotions with any distinctive or noticeable stimulus or environment.”  I want to make the 20
 Reybrouck, “A Biosemiotic and Ecological Approach to Music Cognition: Event Perception 18
Between Auditory Listening and Cognitive Economy” (2005), p.248.
 Ibid., p.256. Reybrouck, here, appears to be subconsciously quoting Eleanor Rosch, 19
“Principles of Categorization” (1978), p.28.
 Huron, Sweet Anticipation: Music and the Psychology of Expectation (2006b), p.417. The 20
literature on cognitive misattribution dates back to Schachter and Singer, “Cognitive, Social, 
and Psychological Determinants of Emotional State” (1962). One well-known subsequent 
contribution to this discourse is Dutton and Aron, “Some Evidence for Heightened Sexual 
Attraction under Conditions of High Anxiety” (1974), which features the famous Capilano 
footbridge experiment. Few commentators outside of Huron, however, have applied this 
phenomenon to music processing; notable exceptions include Reber, Schwarz, and 
Winkielman, “Processing Fluency and Aesthetic Pleasure: Is Beauty in the Perceiver’s 
Processing Experience?” (2004) and Gridley and Hoff, “Do Mirror Neurons Explain 
Misattribution of Emotions in Music?” (2006).
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case that misattribution is far more fundamental to music cognition than has previously been 
thought. To start, the qualitative feelings and emotions evoked by music are mediated by the 
expectational and predictive capacities of listeners, which themselves are contingent upon the 
particularities of their respective enculturations. But all of these mediating factors are shaped 
by a great deal of implicit learning that occurs below a conscious level of awareness, and as a 
result, it is extremely difficult to describe musical emotions/feelings precisely in words, or to 
associate them definitively with explicit causal sources. In the face of this difficulty, listeners 
often compensate by pinning these sensations on the nearest available “concrete” candidate—
the music itself.  As I will argue, a wide variety of musical qualia—from consonance/21
dissonance to scale degrees to harmonic functions—can be explained under cognitive rubrics 
of misattribution and (over)compensation, operating in the name of economical processing. 
Readers are invited to think of Blackwood’s microtonality as a sort of musical Rorschach test, a 
set of sonic “inkblots” that activates certain predispositions, tendencies, and reactions in 
enculturated listeners. 
 What is an enculturated listener? In short, one who has been exposed to the music of a 
particular culture. As Marcus Pearce writes, “Musical enculturation depends on two cognitive 
processes: (1) statistical learning, in which listeners acquire internal cognitive models of 
statistical regularities present in the music to which they are exposed; and (2) probabilistic 
prediction based on these learned models that enables listeners to organize and process their 
 Huron calls these musical proxies “convenient bystanders.” [Huron, Sweet Anticipation 21
(2006b), p.138.]
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mental representations of music.”  These two processes, crucially, take place whether one is 22
aware they are happening or not. This is to say, one does not need to be a music theorist, or 
even a musician, to develop and hold a breadth of implicit musical knowledge that results from 
enculturation. As a result, I venture the broadstroke claim that most nonmusicians know more 
about music than they think they do. Just because this knowledge is not explicitly verbalizable 
or technical does not mean that it does not exist. 
 The enculturation process begins early. Annabel Cohen suggests that many of its 
“sophisticated building blocks are in place in the first year of life,”  a claim that is borne out 23
by empirical evidence. Erin Hannon, for instance, has found that “infants can perceive rhythm 
and meter by attending to the same statistical properties that underlie adults’ perception[s],”  24
and that “[w]ithin the first year after birth, infants are sensitive to relationships between meter 
and pitch.”  More complex representations of culture-specific tonalities, however, emerge 25
later on in childhood. One way to track the time course of this development is by measuring 
brain responses to violations of musical syntax. A common response to measure is the early 
right anterior negativity (or ERAN), which is “one electrophysiological correlate of music-
syntactic processing” that tends to be used in “experiments investigating the processing of 
 Pearce, “Statistical Learning and Probabilistic Prediction in Music Cognition: Mechanisms of 22
Stylistic Enculturation” (2018), p.378.
 Cohen, “Development of Tonality Induction: Plasticity, Exposure, and Training” (2000), p.437.23
 Hannon, “Musical Enculturation: How Young Listeners Construct Musical Knowledge 24
Through Perceptual Experience” (2010), p.133.
 Rosenthal and Hannon, “Cues to Perceiving Tonal Stability in Music: The Role of Temporal 25
Structure” (2016), p.611.
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chord functions with chord-sequence paradigms.”  Stefan Koelsch has found that children as 26
young as two and a half display a very slight ERAN in response to unexpected chords, 
“suggesting that the development of the neural mechanisms underlying the generation of the 
ERAN commence around, or not long before, this age.”  By twice this age, the ERAN is more 27
pronounced; by age nine, it “appears to be very similar to the ERAN of adults,” and by age 
eleven, it is “practically indistinguishable from the ERAN observed in adults.”  28
 However, there are two caveats that require further comment and open out onto more 
foundational lines of inquiry. The first is that trained musicians tend to display a more 
pronounced ERAN than do nonmusicians, which shows that even though most listeners register 
syntactic violations, musicians display greater sensitivity (and thus stronger responses) to them. 
This, in turn, leads to a broader question: what kinds of enculturated listeners are there, and 
how do they differ? The second caveat is that ERAN activation is linked to developmentally 
neurotypical language-processing abilities, which raises age-old debates about the relationship 
between language and music.  More specifically: is music processing distinct from linguistic 29
processing—making it “modular” and “domain-specific” in the sense of Jerry Fodor —or 30
does it arise from more domain-general capacities? I will address these caveats in order before 
 Koelsch, Brain and Music (2012), p.109.26
 Ibid., p.151.27
 Ibid., p.152.28
 See Besson and Friederici, “Language and Music: A Comparative View” (1998) for an 29
overview of these debates, which are also famously treated in Diana Deutsch’s article 
“Speaking in Tones” (2010).
 See especially Fodor, The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology (1983). 30
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returning to Blackwood’s microtonal project, considering some illustrative musical examples, 
and outlining the chapters to come. 
Enculturation (II) 
Enculturation involves implicit learning, so implicit measures must be used to test its effects in 
listeners. One experimental paradigm of this sort is called harmonic priming, wherein listeners 
are expected to process chords that are related to a preceding context more quickly than they 
are expected to process chords unrelated to that context. The challenge with this method is 
that it must test for something whose existence is subconscious and non-verbalizable for most 
listeners. Luckily, though, harmonic priming experiments tend to leverage misattributive 
tendencies to their advantage in order to indirectly measure internalized knowledge. Frederic 
Marmel and Barbara Tillmann, for example, ask participants to judge the intonation of a target 
tone, with the expectation that their response times will be quicker for contextually expected 
tones than for contextually unexpected ones.  In such a manner, listeners think they are 31
making a surface-level judgment about intonation, but they are actually evincing internalized 
knowledge about how statistical regularities influence musical expectation. This is the basic 
rationale behind the paradigm: that “previous chord[s] prime harmonically related ones so that 
their processing is speeded up.”  32
 Marmel and Tillmann, “Tonal Priming Beyond Tonics” (2009). 31
 Tillmann, Bigand, and Bharucha, “Implicit Learning of Tonality: A Self-Organizing 32
Approach” (2000), p.890.
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 But what is it that makes one chord harmonically related to another? There has been 
some debate as to whether harmonic priming is primarily a sensory or a cognitive phenomenon
—that is, whether chords sound related to one another because of spectral overlap between 
their component tones or because they tend to follow one another in a particular style. 
Adherents of the former position include Richard Parncutt, whose sensory model of chord 
relatedness is based on pitch commonality,  and Mark Schmuckler, who argues that “a chord 33
sharing overtones with a preceding chord will be more highly anticipated than a continuation 
containing no overlapping frequencies with its predecessor.”  These models do not require 34
any abstract knowledge of a particular musical idiom, making them appropriate foils to the 
positions of Emmanuel Bigand, Timothy Justus, and Jamshed Bharucha, among others. Bigand 
has investigated the respective roles of sensory and cognitive components in harmonic 
priming, finding that “[h]armonic priming involves a very robust cognitive component” that 
outweighs the sensory component and “does not need explicit training.”  Similarly, Justus and 35
Bharucha have argued that musical expectancies are “generated at a cognitive level, by 
activation spreading through a representation of harmonic relationships (spreading activation 
hypothesis) rather than by perceptual priming of specific frequencies (overlapping spectra 
 See especially Parncutt, Harmony: A Psychoacoustical Approach (1989).33
 Schmuckler, “Expectation in Music: Investigation of Melodic and Harmonic 34
Processes” (1989), p.134.
 Bigand et al., “Sensory Versus Cognitive Components in Harmonic Priming” (2003), p.167. 35
This finding is replicated in Bigand and Poulin-Charronnat, “Are We ‘Experienced Listeners’? A 
Review of the Musical Capacities that Do Not Depend on Formal Musical Training” (2006). 
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hypothesis).”  Bharucha has even modeled this process using artificial neural networks. His 36
connectionist MUSACT model (short for “MUSical ACTivation”) contains three tiers of 
interlinked units that represent pitch classes, chords, and keys; reverberations at lower levels of 
the network activate higher levels and vice versa, meaning that the model merges bottom-up 
and top-down cognitive processes.  The amount of activation for each unit is proportional to 37
that unit’s hierarchical importance in a particular context; these weightings “arise from a 
learning process that occurs automatically when the neural network is exposed to Western 
music.”  38
 On the whole, several harmonic priming studies provide converging empirical evidence 
that implicit musical knowledge can be learned by passive exposure to the statistical 
regularities of a particular style, regardless of one’s level of musical skill or training. An early 
study by Bharucha and Keiko Stoeckig, for example, finds that “even untrained subjects were 
able to reach the criterion of accuracy” for intonation judgments of target chords, leading them 
to conclude that there is “no significant correlation between priming and musical training.”  39
Bigand, similarly, finds that both musicians and nonmusicians alike process tonic chords faster 
 Justus and Bharucha, “Modularity in Musical Processing: The Automaticity of Harmonic 36
Priming” (2001), p.1002 [emphasis in original]. This restates the main finding of Bharucha and 
Stoeckig, “Priming of Chords: Spreading Activation or Overlapping Frequency 
Spectra?” (1987). 
 Bharucha, “MUSACT: A Connectionist Model of Musical Harmony” (1987).37
 Bigand and Poulin-Charronnat, “Tonal Cognition” (2011), p.67. One drawback of Bharucha’s 38
model, however, is that it only represents major and minor triads at the chord level, and only 
major keys at the key level. See also Tillmann, Bigand, and Bharucha, “Implicit Learning of 
Tonality: A Self-Organizing Approach” (2000) for a detailed discussion of the MUSACT model.
 Bharucha and Stoeckig, “Reaction Time and Musical Expectancy: Priming of Chords” (1986), 39
p.410.
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than subdominant chords at the ends of phrases, demonstrating that “nonmusicians’ brains 
process Western musical structures in a sophisticated way and sometimes very similarly as do 
musicians’ brains.”  And Tillmann has conducted experiments showing that both musically 40
trained and untrained listeners are “sensitive to changes in musical function of target [chords] 
due to the prime context”—even including a “patient with severe amusia,” who nevertheless 
displays “spared implicit knowledge of music.”  41
 As revealing as these findings are, however, they should not be taken to mean that 
every listener processes music in the same underlying way. Indeed, there is a large host of 
neuroscientific evidence to the contrary. A study by Takashi Ohnishi, for example, shows that 
musicians rely more on the left hemisphere of the brain when processing music passively, 
whereas nonmusicians display a right hemispheric dominance.  Moreover, it has been 42
demonstrated that “[m]usicians with AP [absolute pitch] reveal a stronger leftward planum 
temporale asymmetry than nonmusicians or musicians without AP.”  There also exist 43
differences in musical processing that are contingent upon the idiosyncrasies of particular 
instruments and their conventions of performance. For instance, an electrophysiological study 
by Koelsch, Erich Schröger, and Mari Tervaniemi presents listeners with major triads whose 
thirds are slightly lowered in frequency and finds that professional violinists (who are 
 Bigand et al., “Sensory Versus Cognitive Components in Harmonic Priming” (2003), p.169.40
 Tillmann, “Implicit Investigations of Tonal Knowledge in Nonmusician Listeners” (2005), pp.41
100 and 105.
 Ohnishi et al., “Functional Anatomy of Musical Perception in Musicians” (2001).42
 Bigand and Poulin-Charronnat, “Are We ‘Experienced Listeners’?” (2006), p.123. See also 43
Keenan et al., “Absolute Pitch and Planum Temporale” (2001).
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accustomed to intoning their thirds high) display a distinct mismatch negativity (MMN),  44
whereas nonmusicians do not.  An appropriate follow-up to this study might compare 45
professional violinists to, say, professional brass players, who generally intone their thirds 
relatively low (that is, closer to pure). If it could be demonstrated that violinists display a more 
pronounced MMN than do brass players to triads with lowered thirds, it would reveal that 
differences in processing exist not only between musicians and nonmusicians, but also among 
musicians of different instrument families. 
 In general, musicians and nonmusicians may possess surprisingly similar levels of 
implicit musical knowledge, but musicians tend to display brain responses that are stronger 
(and occasionally faster as well) because of their additional level of explicit expertise. In 
Bigand’s aforementioned investigation of sensory versus cognitive components of harmonic 
priming, for instance, “The only difference between [musicians and nonmusicians] concerned 
their performance accuracies in the consonant-dissonant judgments: correct responses were 
more numerous and faster in musicians.”  This is perhaps an unsurprising finding, given that 46
“[this] experimental task taps into a perceptual competence that is explicitly trained in music 
education classes.”  Perhaps Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer’s two-factor theory of 47
 According to Bigand and Poulin-Charronnat, “The MMN is assumed to reflect the cortical 44
pre-attentive detection of change in a repetitive pattern.” [Bigand and Poulin-Charronnat, “Are 
We ‘Experienced Listeners’?” (2006), p.124.] It is thus associated with the real-time processing 
of auditory oddballs.
 Koelsch, Schröger, and Tervaniemi, “Superior Pre-Attentive Auditory Processing in 45
Musicians” (1999).
 Bigand et al., “Sensory Versus Cognitive Components in Harmonic Priming” (2003), p.167.46
 Ibid.47
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emotion can explain such a result: both trained and untrained listeners experience a similar 
base physiological arousal when listening to music (indicative of implicit knowledge), but 
trained listeners are better able to attach precise cognitive labels to these experiences (explicit 
knowledge), because they have a more varied set of technical terms at their disposal to name 
(and consequently reify) what they hear.  This is essentially the idea behind Bigand and 48
Bénédicte Poulin-Charronnat’s hypothesis that “musically trained listeners [can] better 
discriminate subtle differences in musical expressiveness” than can their musically untrained 
counterparts (though the authors do not cite Schachter and Singer in their article).  49
 It is likely that a longstanding conception of “knowledge” as being exclusively explicit 
and verbalizable has led to the discounting of the musical intelligence of the musically 
untrained. What is colloquially invoked as a difference between knowledge and its lack might 
instead be more productively (re)framed as a difference between implicit and explicit forms of 
the same underlying thing. Hannon and Laurel Trainor, along these lines, distinguish between 
“enculturation processes” that involve implicit knowledge gained through passive everyday 
exposure, and “formal musical experience/training” that makes this knowledge explicit and 
“invokes domain-specific processes that affect salience of musical input and the amount of 
cortical tissue devoted to its processing.”  This may explain why musicians display a more 50
pronounced ERAN to syntactic violations than do nonmusicians, even though both groups are 
 Schachter and Singer, “Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional 48
State” (1962).
 Bigand and Poulin-Charronnat, “Are We ‘Experienced Listeners’?” (2006), p.117.49
 Hannon and Trainor, “Music Acquisition: Effects of Enculturation and Formal Training on 50
Development” (2007), p.466.
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capable of cognitively registering such violations. The role of conscious attention is also 
significant in distinguishing the trained from the untrained. In an experiment addressing these 
matters, Psyche Loui and David Wessel find that all their participants, regardless of their level 
of training, rate harmonic progressions in such a way that demonstrates their sensitivity to 
manipulations of harmonic expectations.  However, they also find that “[m]usically trained 51
participants form harmonic expectations independent of attention, whereas attention is 
required for the modulation of harmonic expectation in non-musicians.”  52
 Koelsch makes a useful distinction between aware and unaware expectancy to 
characterize the different levels of specificity at which trained and untrained listeners, 
respectively, form musical expectations and predictions. In his words, 
 The syntactic expectancy of listeners (particularly of those not formally trained) is  
 usually an unaware expectancy rather than an aware expectancy, meaning that [these]  
 individuals do not consciously (or effortfully) anticipate the sound of a critical chord (or  
 tone). Moreover, the musical sound expectancy is often a probabilistic one, rather than  
 a very specific one. Finally, non-musicians expect a sound, rather than a chord function.  
 For these reasons I usually use the term musical sound expectancy to refer to music- 
 syntactic expectancies of [untrained] listeners. By contrast, I prefer the term prediction  
 for the more specific (and high-probability) expectations and forecasts that involve  
 conscious awareness.  53
It is worth dwelling on one sentence in particular from the above: that nonmusicians tend to 
expect particular sounds rather than specific configurations of scale degrees or specific 
instantiations of harmonic functions. This seems highly sensical—after all, is it not wrongheaded 
 Loui and Wessel, “Harmonic Expectation and Affect in Western Music: Effects of Attention 51
and Training” (2007), p.1084.
 Ibid., p.1088.52
 Koelsch, Brain and Music (2012), p.137 [emphasis in original].53
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to generalize that most listeners who hear a contextually prepared V7 would then explicitly 
expect something called a “tonic” (or a “I chord”) to follow, particularly given that most 
everyday listeners do not know the names of specific harmonic functions or chord labels? They 
may know that particular types of sounds tend to follow others in certain culturally 
circumscribed contexts—and some might even be able to correctly sing the expected tonic 
degree as a synecdochic stand-in for the anticipated event. But many do not know what these 
sounds are called, or how to describe them further. And this leads seamlessly into what is 
perhaps the principal danger involved in doing music theory and analysis: that generalized 
invocations of “a listener” (or worse yet, “the listener”) more often than not serve as solipsistic 
proxies for the author’s own hearing. 
 Is there a way out of this linguistic mess? After all, this very dissertation might be 
charged as falling into the same trap: it makes several claims about the implicit knowledge of 
listeners enculturated to the 12-tone octave, and how such 12-enculturated listeners might 
draw upon this knowledge (however subconsciously) to make sense of music in unfamiliar 
tunings. How can one make explicit claims about implicit processes, or consciously generalize 
about what the subconscious is like? Of course, it is important to bear in mind that there is no 
such thing as an “ideal” 12-enculturated listener, nor is any group of 12-enculturated listeners 
more prototypical than any other. One could even go so far as to say that no two 12-
enculturated listeners process music in exactly the same way. Pearce reminds us that “[l]isteners 
exposed to different musical styles will differ in their psychological processing of music.”  54
 Pearce, “Statistical Learning and Probabilistic Prediction in Music Cognition: Mechanisms of 54
Stylistic Enculturation” (2018), p.378.
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What is more, differences in levels of training, topological/instrumental points of reference, 
attentional capacity, neuroanatomical structure and neurotypicality, demographic constraints, 
and linguistic relativity, among other factors, can cause individual listeners to vary widely in 
their mental representations of music and the specificity with which they can access, describe, 
and metaphorize them. Yet all of these differences are scaffolded and undergirded by the same 
foundational processes: statistical learning, expectation formation, and probabilistic prediction. 
This is the bedrock upon which music cognition is built, and crucially, it is there whether one 
chooses to notice it or not. As Koelsch writes, “[M]usical syntax is processed even when a 
listener is not paying attention to the music (and the brains of listeners register music-syntactic 
irregularities even when listeners are not aware of these irregularities).”  Similarly, Megan Long 55
states that “we are taught to hear tonally by regularities in the repertoires we know well 
(statistical learning), and we don’t have to understand that we are hearing tonally to hear that 
way.”  In speaking explicitly about these implicit processes, I am not arguing that they are, or 56
should be, verbalizable for any listener who has been exposed to Western tonal music or the 
twelve-tone octave. But by bringing these oft-overlooked processes to the forefront, I am 
arguing that we can stand to learn a great deal about how the myriad inflections of tonal 
cognition grow from the same basic substratum of fundamental mechanisms. 
 Koelsch, Brain and Music (2012), p.149.55
 Long, Hearing Homophony: Tonal Expectation at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century 56
(2020), p.21.
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Modularity and Expectation 
Having provisionally addressed the issue of enculturation, I now turn to the question of 
modularity: the extent to which musical perception and cognition are innate adaptations that 
operate independently of perception and cognition in other domains, such as language or 
action. The notion that there is a unique “music faculty” consisting of core music-specific 
capacities that have evolved through natural selection was once a widespread, even dominant, 
viewpoint.  But more recent studies in modern cognitivism have challenged this view, arguing 57
for the interconnectedness of most all psychological processes.  According to one such 58
perspective, “[H]ighly specialized knowledge of music in adulthood arises through simple 
perceptual learning mechanisms that build increasingly specific representations from domain-
general capacities.”  This approach, according to Hannon, “emphasizes the role of perceptual 59
experience and statistical learning that is domain-general, operating in tandem with simple 
constraints that arise from properties of the sensory organs and the nervous system.”   60
 Indeed, there is mounting neuroscientific evidence that multiple spheres—ranging from 
music and language/speech to emotion, action, and even mathematics—are linked by shared 
 Proponents of this viewpoint include Peretz and Morais, “Music and Modularity” (1989); 57
Janata et al., “The Cortical Topography of Tonal Structures Underlying Western Music” (2002); 
Trehub, “The Developmental Origins of Musicality” (2003); and Hauser and McDermott, “The 
Evolution of the Music Faculty: A Comparative Perspective” (2003). The concept of 
“modularity” to which these authors subscribe derives from Fodor’s Modularity of Mind (1983).
 See especially Trehub and Hannon, “Infant Music Perception: Domain-General or Domain-58
Specific Mechanisms?” (2006) and Hannon and Trainor, “Music Acquisition: Effects of 
Enculturation” (2007).
 Hannon, “Musical Enculturation: How Young Listeners Construct Musical Knowledge 59
Through Perceptual Experience” (2010), p.132.
 Ibid., p.149.60
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cognitive processes. This is a major conclusion of Koelsch’s most recent book: that “overlaps 
[among] cognitive operations (and neural mechanisms) underlying music and language 
processing indicate that ‘music’ and ‘language’ are two poles of a single continuous domain.”  61
Several studies have empirically confirmed the existence of such processual overlap,  pointing 62
to particular brain regions and neural populations as common denominators mediating a 
variety of scenarios. For example, it appears that “Broca’s area is involved in the processing of 
hierarchically organized sequences in general, be they musical, linguistic, action-related, or 
mathematical.”  Patients with Broca’s aphasia have been shown to demonstrate impairments 63
in their processing of musical syntax when presented with chords that reside in keys outside a 
prime harmonic context.  Broca’s area is also active during the processing of mathematical 64
formulas, particularly ones that involve “long-distance dependencies on a phrase-structure 
level.”  65
 But an important clarification is in order. Even though there is ample evidence to 
disprove the hypothesis that music processing is wholly distinct from processing in other 
 Koelsch, Brain and Music (2012), p.244. Koelsch calls this the “music-language 61
continuum” (244).
 See in particular Koelsch et al., “Interaction between Syntax Processing in Language and 62
Music” (2005); Slevc, Rosenberg, and Patel, “Making Psycholinguistics Musical: Self-Paced 
Reading Time Evidence for Shared Processing of Linguistic and Musical Syntax” (2009); and 
Fedorenko et al., “Structural Integration in Language and Music: Evidence for a Shared 
System” (2009).
 Koelsch, Brain and Music (2012), p.133. Koelsch calls this the “Syntactic Equivalence 63
Hypothesis” (133).
 Patel et al., “Musical Syntactic Processing in Agrammatic Broca’s Aphasia” (2008).64
 Koelsch, Brain and Music (2012), p.145. See Friedrich and Friederici, “Mathematical Logic in 65
the Human Brain: Syntax” (2009) for an experimental confirmation of this claim.
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spheres, this does not preclude the possibility that certain kinds of musical processing operate 
independently of one another. This is to say, modularity can and does exist within the realm of 
music cognition, even as its existence is dubious between music cognition and other 
processual realms. Perhaps the most famous example is how listeners can continue to be 
surprised by music they already know well. This paradox has been explained by positing a 
distinction between veridical expectation on the one hand, which engages specific episodic 
memories of actual pieces, and schematic expectation on the other, which engages semantic 
memories of auditory generalizations.  The two kinds of expectation are said to be 66
independent of one another; the former relates to how specific pieces of music actually go, 
whereas the latter relates more abstractly to how pieces in a particular style or cultural idiom 
generally tend to go. A classic situation often marshaled to explain this distinction is the 
deceptive cadence, which after multiple hearings continues to provide schematic surprise even 
as it becomes veridically predictable,  since dominants in Western tonal music overwhelmingly 67
tend to proceed to I or i chords (rather than vi or VI). Bharucha describes the scenario as 
follows: “Even when a piece has been heard often enough to be familiar, it cannot completely 
override the generic, automatic expectations. Surprises in a new piece thus continue to have a 
 Huron’s Sweet Anticipation (2006b), pp.221–27, provides a good overview of these types of 66
expectation and the kinds of memory on which they rely. See also Bharucha, “Tonality and 
Expectation” (1994).
 This situation is discussed in numerous sources, such as Tillmann, “Implicit Investigations of 67
Tonal Knowledge in Nonmusician Listeners” (2005), p.101; Ockelford, “Implication and 
Expectation in Music: A Zygonic Model” (2006), p.134; and Huron, Sweet Anticipation (2006b), 
pp.225–27. 
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surprising quality [even after repeated exposures] because they are heard as surprises relative 
to these irrepressible expectations.”  68
 Just how automatic and irrepressible are these schematic expectations? A study by 
Justus and Bharucha investigates “the modularity of harmonic expectations that are based on 
cultural schemata despite the availability of more predictive veridical information,” and finds 
that “processing [is] facilitated when a schematically probable target chord follow[s] the 
prime”—an effect that is “independent of all manipulations of veridical expectation.”  This is 69
to say, even when participants are explicitly primed to expect specific contextually anomalous 
chords, they are still faster and more accurate at processing contextually related ones anyway. 
One can try to stack the deck in favor of veridical expectancy, so to speak, but the culturally 
ingrained automaticity of harmonic priming is such that schematic expectancy usually wins out. 
To be clear, this does not mean that veridical expectation plays no role whatsoever in musical 
processing; on the contrary, it is intimately linked with associational memory, affective arousal, 
and emotional valence.  Huron also astutely notes that “all semantic memories begin as 70
episodic information,” meaning that schematic expectations themselves grow forth from 
veridical soil.  But the larger point remains: these two expectational pathways operate 71
 Bharucha, “Tonality and Expectation” (1994), pp.215–16. W. Jay Dowling and Dane Harwood 68
refer to this phenomenon as “Wittgenstein’s paradox” in their book Music Cognition (1986).
 Justus and Bharucha, “Modularity in Musical Processing: The Automaticity of Harmonic 69
Priming” (2001), p.1000.
 See for instance Storbeck and Clore, “Affective Arousal as Information: How Affective 70
Arousal Influences Judgments, Learning, and Memory” (2008).
 Huron, Sweet Anticipation (2006b), p.225.71
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independently of one another, and as a result, there exists a degree of modularity among the 
processual “parts” that comprise the “whole” of music cognition. 
 Koelsch makes the same distinction between schematic and veridical processes, but he 
refers to them as implicit musical expectancy formation and on-line knowledge-free structuring, 
respectively.  As he argues, “[Implicit] musical expectancies are different from the 72
expectancies (or predictions) formed due to knowledge-free structuring, because the latter are 
formed on the basis of acoustic similarity, acoustic regularity, and Gestalt principles, without 
long-term memory representations of statistical probabilities being required.”  The two 73
processes are not only distinguished by the types of memory they engage (long-term versus 
auditory sensory memory, respectively), but also by the brain regions and brain responses 
associated with them. Implicit expectancies primarily engage frontal regions (such as the frontal 
cortex), whereas knowledge-free structuring primarily engages temporal regions (such as the 
temporal lobe and the primary auditory cortex). There is thus a “crucial difference between the 
neural mechanisms underlying music-syntactic processing (as reflected in the ERAN) on one 
side, and the processing of acoustic irregularities (as reflected in phMMN and afMMN) on the 
 Koelsch, Brain and Music (2012), p.106 [emphasis in original].72
 Ibid., p.107 [emphasis in original].73
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other.”  Now, to be clear, Koelsch is careful to note that there do exist overlaps in the 74
processes that elicit ERAN and MMN; both “require extraction of auditory features and the 
formation of auditory Gestalten,” for instance.  This is resonant with Huron’s caveat, quoted in 75
the paragraph above, that schematic and veridical expectations share a common episodic 
origin. But crucially, the two branch off at the stage that Koelsch terms “model establishment,” 
supporting the notion that they grow into complementary processes that are independent of 
one another.  I will return to these findings in Chapter 5 when I discuss how multiple senses of 76
“tonal salience” can coexist. 
 For now, suffice it to say that expectation and prediction play central roles in tonal 
hearing, regardless of one’s awareness of their operation. The syntactic and behavioral 
regularities of Western tonal music might be conceived as wearing expectational/predictive 
“grooves” into the brains of enculturated listeners—lubricated, efficient pathways that guide 
their processing and sense-making of unfamiliar music. But of course, the most deeply 
ingrained phenomena in society tend to be the most taken for granted and the most difficult to 
challenge or view in a different light from what is customary. This is why Blackwood’s microtonal 
 Ibid., p.133. The phMMN refers to physical deviance within a repetitive auditory 74
environment, whereas the afMMN deals with abstract feature mismatches “that do not 
necessarily have to be physical in nature.” [Koelsch, “Music-Syntactic Processing and Auditory 
Memory: Similarities and Differences Between ERAN and MMN” (2009), p.179.] The distinction 
between these two types of MMN was first made in Saarinen et al., “Representation of Abstract 
Attributes of Auditory Stimuli in the Human Brain” (1992). Subsequent studies that report 
afMMNs include Korzyukov et al., “Processing Abstract Auditory Features in the Human 
Auditory Cortex” (2003) and Schröger et al., “Processing of Abstract Rule Violations in 
Audition” (2007).
 Koelsch, Brain and Music (2012), p.135.75
 Ibid.76
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music is such a useful tool to expose some of tonality’s most overlooked truths: because it 
exhibits what Thomas Turino calls “the play around the edges of convention that wakes us from 
habit and calls our attention to the moment.”  Or, to borrow the words of Gary Kemp, it 77
“snap[s us] out of our customary or habitual trance of encountering things” and helps us “open 
our eyes” (and ears) to what has always been there—even if we have trouble seeing/hearing it 
at first.  78
Blackwood’s Project 
It is time to take a closer look at exactly what Blackwood was up to in composing these 
microtonal pieces, and how he went about bringing them to life. Blackwood is still alive at the 
time of my writing this, but due to recent changes in his living circumstances, it became 
necessary to consolidate his papers. The Easley Blackwood Papers are currently housed in the 
Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center at the University of Chicago Library, 
and they sum to over one hundred boxes of scores, recordings, reviews, correspondence, 
unpublished materials, and personal diaries. At first, a rather modest set of thirteen boxes 
arrived in 2013 and was inventoried the following year; these mostly contain materials from 
Blackwood’s childhood up until the 1970s, and as a result, they have little to do with his pivot 
to microtonality at the turn of the 1980s. But a much larger set of boxes, received in 2016 and 
 Turino, Moving Away from Silence: Music of the Peruvian Altiplano and the Experience of 77
Urban Migration (1993), p.113.
 Kemp, “Wittgenstein and the Inner Character of Musical Experience” (2017), p.256.78
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inventoried in 2018, contains a veritable treasure trove of materials relating to his microtonal 
period (and the decades that followed). 
 Before visiting the Blackwood archive in the summer of 2019, I had my eyes on two 
unpublished items in particular: a 1992 manuscript entitled A Practical Musician’s Guide to 
Tonal Harmony and three folders of research notes (spanning 1979–81) that document the 
major findings of his NEH-funded microtonal project. The importance of the latter item to my 
project is self-explanatory—and indeed, it was vastly illuminating, containing not only detailed 
descriptions of the structural affordances of each tuning but also meticulous measure-by-
measure analyses of each microtonal etude. I assumed the former manuscript would be 
similarly helpful, a way of seeing how Blackwood’s microtonal experimentation in the previous 
decades came to influence his later views on harmony and tonality more broadly. Notoriously 
few complete copies of this manuscript exist, and its inclusion in the bibliography of William 
Mathieu’s Harmonic Experience originally piqued my interest in locating it.  As it turns out, 79
however, A Practical Musician’s Guide to Tonal Harmony contains no mention of Blackwood’s 
previous experience with microtonality, nor any references to tunings other than 12-TET—which 
is somewhat surprising, given its date of completion.  Instead, the manuscript reads like an 80
old-school harmony textbook in the French figured-bass tradition; its structure, method, and 
 Mathieu, Harmonic Experience: Tonal Harmony from Its Natural Origins to Its Modern 79
Expression (1997), p.532. Mathieu was a former student of Blackwood’s, and the latter’s 
presence is often strongly felt throughout this book.
 Indeed, just the year prior, Blackwood not only published an article about some of the 80
microtonal tunings he had been studying but was also featured as an interview subject in an 
article by Douglas Keislar on microtonal composition. [See Blackwood, “Modes and Chord 
Progressions in Equal Tunings” (1991) and Keislar, “Six American Composers on Nonstandard 
Tunings” (1991).]
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contents all stem from his studies with Nadia Boulanger in the mid-1950s. Given this influence, 
it is perhaps less surprising that the text contains no references to microtonality (even as 
Blackwood’s reputation at the time was increasingly tied to his work with alternate tunings). 
One aspect of the text, however, that is at least abstractly reflected in his microtonal music is 
his sensitivity to register and distribution when voicing harmonies, which can be leveraged as a 
means to finesse chordal dissonances or hide away certain discordant combinations of notes.  81
 Blackwood originally planned for his three folders of research notes to become a full-
length book, but that plan never came to fruition. Instead, portions of these notes are featured 
in the last three chapters of his only published book, The Structure of Recognizable Diatonic 
Tunings,  as well as in a later article in Perspectives of New Music.  But these do not 82 83
approach the painstaking systematicity with which he originally went about cataloguing his 
process and findings. In order to render these little-known tunings audible, Blackwood first had 
to write out the etudes “with the aid of a performing instrument called the Scalatron (made by 
Motorola), and [then] record them by playing a Polyfusion synthesizer.”  Both of these are 84
 Blackwood makes a similar comment about timbre in his research notes: “It is truly 81
remarkable how judicious choice of timbres can conceal roughness of this nature. It is not only 
that the beats are hidden—they are simply not there, no matter how hard one tries to hear 
them.” [Blackwood, “Research Notes: NEH Grant R0-29376-78-0642” (1979–81), Folder 2, p.
348.] This is resonant with William Sethares’ later proclamation in Tuning, Timbre, Spectrum, 
Scale (2005) that “[i]t is possible to make almost any interval reasonably consonant, or to make 
it wildly dissonant, by properly sculpting the spectrum of the sound” (3).
 See in particular Blackwood, The Structure of Recognizable Diatonic Tunings (1985), pp.193–82
314.
 See Blackwood, “Modes and Chord Progressions in Equal Tunings” (1991). This article only 83
discusses four of the twelve tunings that Blackwood studied: 19-, 18-, 16-, and 15-TET.
 From an anonymous review of Blackwood’s Twelve Microtonal Etudes for Electronic Music 84
Media, Op. 28 in Fanfare (May/June 1981 issue), p.59.
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retunable keyboard instruments invented in the 1970s and containing two ranks of the familiar 
Halberstadt layout (that is, seven white and five black keys to the octave), as shown below:
Image 1.1: Brochure advertisement for the Motorola Scalatron (1974) 
Image 1.2: Magazine advertisement for the Polyfusion Series 2000 modular synthesizer (1979) 
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As is clear from the above, Blackwood did not use, say, a keyboard with 13 tones to the octave 
to record his 13-TET etude, another keyboard with 14 tones to the octave to record his 14-TET 
etude, and so on. Rather, he programmed these instruments in such a way that the familiar 
intervallic shapes of the 12-TET keyboard no longer corresponded to the familiar sounds that 
they typically generate (and vice versa). Thus, for 13-TET, the sounding octave above middle 
C4 would not be C5 but actually C#5 on these keyboards; similarly, for 14-TET, the sounding 
octave above C4 would be D5 (and so forth). Only in 24-TET would the sounding octave above 
middle C actually be another C—but in this case it would be C6, with the intervening C5 acting 
as the tritonal midpoint of the tuning. 
 Therefore, unit intervals in each tuning correspond to semitones on the Scalatron/
Polyfusion synth, making Blackwood’s pitch mapping system a case of what Jonathan De Souza 
calls “voluntary self-sabotage,” since it introduces a form of “altered auditory feedback” that 
affects the customary coupling of action and sound.  Sketchbooks from the Blackwood archive 85
reveal that this mapping process involved a good deal of trial and error, for while it is a 
relatively straightforward matter to know where to map each microtonal pitch in each tuning, 
the question of what to call these pitches is far more complicated. Indeed, notating music—
whether microtonal or not—is a political, interpretive act that points up certain features of the 
music at the expense of others. By choosing to retain the familiar look of five-line staff notation 
and introducing no new letter names outside of the familiar A through G, Blackwood 
encourages what I call a Euroclassical interpretive epistemology for his microtonal music: a 
 De Souza, Music at Hand: Instruments, Bodies, and Cognition (2017), p.82. See in particular 85
Chapter 4 of this book (pp.82–108) for a more detailed treatment of these types of situations.
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framework for parsing it that is fundamentally “12-analogous.”  This dovetails with a remark 86
Blackwood makes in an interview with Douglas Keislar: “The aspect that intrigues me most 
[about composing in nonstandard tunings] is finding conventional harmonic progressions, or at 
least coherent progressions found by extension to their analogues in the most familiar 
tunings.”  By notating his music in a way that points up these analogies (while simultaneously 87
downplaying many of the ways in which nonstandard tunings are expectationally discrepant), 
Blackwood seems keyed into the fact that “[c]ulturally unfamiliar modalities are perceived 
through the framework of the cultural system with which one is already familiar.”  88
 Blackwood writes that his notational system has two major goals: [1] to “reveal the tonal 
and modal configurations inherent within each tuning” and [2] to “conform to the habits of a 
trained musician.”  With respect to the first goal, Blackwood strategically chooses note names 89
and enharmonic equivalences so that each tuning’s closest approximations to familiar triads, 
 To be clear, the commercially available score for the Twelve Microtonal Etudes, published by 86
Schirmer in 1982, is not the score that Blackwood played from while recording these pieces. 
For this, he made an intermediary score in which each microtonal pitch was converted to the 
conventional key name on the Scalatron / Polyfusion synth with which it was associated. This 
was painstaking work—all written out by hand, one part at a time—and the finished 
intermediary score looks nothing like the surprisingly tonal music that it ultimately stands for. 
But it was the most efficient way for Blackwood, a pianist accustomed to the Halberstadt 
layout, to render his music playable given the spatial limitations of the technology at his 
disposal. When I first encountered these intermediary sketches, I was tempted to refer to them 
as “wrong-note scores”—a reasonable characterization from the perspective of a listener. But 
considering Blackwood’s unique perspective as the translator-performer of this music (not to 
mention the sole audience for these intermediary sketches), I suppose it might be more 
accurate to refer to them as “right-key scores.”
 Qtd. in Keislar, “Six American Composers on Nonstandard Tunings” (1991), p.184.87
 Curtis and Bharucha, “Memory and Musical Expectation for Tones in Cultural 88
Context” (2009), p.365.
 Blackwood, Microtonal Compositions (1994), Cedille CDR 90000 018, n.p.89
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sevenths, and scales can look like familiar triads, sevenths, and scales on the staff. In his words, 
“If it sounds like a diminished-seventh chord [or] a whole-tone scale, it should look like one.”90
With that quote in mind, consider the two layouts below:
Fig. 1.1: Spelling 16-TET as four interlocking <0 4 8 12>16 diminished-seventh chords; 
slurs denote relationships of enharmonic equivalence 
Fig. 1.2: Spelling 18-TET as three interlocking <0 3 6 9 12 15>18 whole-tone scales 
Both layouts demonstrate how Blackwood’s notational decisions are meant to highlight what 
Jason Yust calls the “harmonic qualities”  particular to each tuning—diminished quality in 16-91
TET and whole-tone quality in 18-TET. Of course, these qualities stand out precisely because 
they match the centwise distribution of their analogs in 12-TET; each diminished-seventh chord 
 Qtd. in Keislar, “Six American Composers on Nonstandard Tunings” (1991), p.189.90
 Yust, “Special Collections: Renewing Set Theory” (2016), passim. Yust’s “harmonic qualities” 91
are represented by six independent and one-dimensional “phase spaces” that are equivalent 
to the “Fourier balances” discussed by Ian Quinn in his earlier multi-part article “General 
Equal-Tempered Harmony” (2006/7).
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in 16-TET consists of a fourfold division of the octave into 300-cent components, and each 
whole-tone scale in 18-TET consists of a sixfold division of the octave into 200-cent 
components. The only difference is that there are more notes than usual within these 
component parts: each 300-cent span in 16-TET measures four unit intervals (rather than the 
typical three semitones), and each 200-cent span in 18-TET measures three unit intervals (rather 
than the typical two semitones). Yet even these “extra” notes are labeled according to familiar 
conventions of chromatic raising/lowering—a sharp still raises a pitch by a unit interval, and a 
flat still lowers a pitch by a unit interval.  Enharmonic equivalences, however, often depart 92
from 12-TET convention; observe that C# and Db, for instance, represent two different notes in 
the above tunings. Yet the equivalences that do exist occur in systematic and purposive 
locations: on all the notes of exactly one of the four diminished-seventh chords in 16-TET, and 
on all the notes of exactly one of the three whole-tone scales in 18-TET. This optimizes the 
transpositional flexibility of Blackwood’s notation—a quality that mirrors the egalitarian 
transpositional affordances that are characteristic of equal temperaments in general. 
 By prying apart the usual enharmonic equivalences of 12-TET, Blackwood is able to 
represent all the pitches of 16- and 18-TET without introducing any new accidental symbols. 
But this is not always the case. In seven of his twelve tunings (14-, 15-, 20-, 21-, 22-, 23-, and 
24-TET), Blackwood employs a new kind of accidental symbol that I like to call a “circle-
arrow.”  In some of these tunings (particularly 22- and 23-TET), it is deployed on an ad hoc 93
 To find the size of the unit interval in any tuning, simply divide 1200 (the number of cents in 92
an octave) by the cardinality of the tuning.
 In 20-TET, Blackwood even employs a double circle-arrow—but this is the only tuning of the 93
twelve in which such a symbol appears.
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basis, mainly to aid in labeling certain notes that fall, as Charles Ives memorably puts it, 
“between the cracks” of traditional sharp/flat/natural designations. But in most cases, 
Blackwood deploys these symbols with a high degree of systematicity, as another way of 
“reveal[ing] the tonal and modal configurations inherent within each tuning.”  Consider the 94
notational layout of 15-TET, for instance:
Fig. 1.3: Spelling 15-TET as three interlocking  
<0 3 6 9 12>15 fivefold equal divisions of the octave 
Here, circle-arrows perform the same chromatic raising/lowering function that sharps and flats 
do in those tunings where circle-arrows are not present. An up arrow raises a pitch by a unit 
interval (1200/15 = 80 cents), whereas a down arrow lowers a pitch by the same amount. Sharp 
and flat symbols therefore do not furnish the same sort of incremental alteration in 15-TET as 
they do in 16- and 18-TET; F and F#, for instance, are separated by not one but three unit 
intervals in Fig. 1.3 above (same with B and Bb). The enharmonic relationships of 15-TET, 
furthermore, appear quite counterintuitive at first. As Blackwood describes, “[A]ny interval that 
appears to be a diatonic minor second is actually an enharmonic unison—a state of affairs that 
 Blackwood, Microtonal Compositions (1994), Cedille CDR 90000 018, n.p.94
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takes some getting used to.”  What sort of clarity is gained from such a scheme, which on the 95
surface does not seem to “conform to the habits of a trained musician”?96
 The following diagram, which maps out the nature of fifth space in 15-TET, is revealing:
Fig. 1.4: Reorganizing 15-TET into three distinct  
<0 3 6 9 12>15 fivefold equal divisions of the octave 
As is clear from the above, each fivefold division (which Blackwood refers to in his research 
notes as the “pi chord” ) is equally spaced and generated by fifth. But since the fifth in 15-TET 97
measures nine unit intervals, and nine and fifteen share a common factor of three, this means 
that there is not one circle of fifths but three non-overlapping “fifth stars” (my term), each of 
which is diacritically distinguished from the others. Such a reorganization of 15-TET’s pitches 
clarifies the role of the circle-arrows in the notational scheme: all the down arrows are located 
in the leftmost fifth star, whereas all the up arrows are located in the rightmost one. The 
remaining pitches of the tuning, which contain no circle-arrows, comprise what I call “plain-
space.” 
Blackwood, “Modes and Chord Progressions in Equal Tunings” (1991), p.188.95
 Blackwood, Microtonal Compositions (1994), Cedille CDR 90000 018, n.p.96
Blackwood, “Research Notes: NEH Grant R0-29376-78-0642” (1979–81), Folder 1, pp.11–12 97
and 17–18.
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 What might a musical motion through one of these spaces sound like? Consider the 
excerpt below from Blackwood’s 15-TET etude, which is simply titled “15 Notes”:
Ex. 1.1: An ascending-fifths sequence in 15-TET (bass voice bracketed in red);  
excerpt begins at 1:09 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIYXm-CJqUo
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The bass notes in mm.16–18 traverse the rightmost fifth star, beginning and ending on 
equivalent chromatic pitches. Fig. 1.5 tracks this motion as a clockwise path through up-space:
Fig. 1.5: Bass-voice motion in mm.16–18 of “15 Notes” 
Notice that this ascending-fifths sequence, if it were to iterate further, cannot reach any new 
bass notes due to the enharmonic properties of 15-TET; it is spatially confined to a single fifth 
star. The 720-cent  fifth itself does not sound egregiously offensive in its 20-cent sharpness 98
relative to 12-TET; in fact, it falls at the upper bound of what Blackwood calls the “range of 
recognizability” for this interval.  But when this 720-cent interval is iterated five times in 99
sequence (as corresponding to the five connective arrows of Fig. 1.5), a resulting “extra” 100 
cents accumulates relative to 12-TET expectations—a perceptual scenario that is neatly 
encapsulated by the semitonally spelled enharmonic relationship between the bounding bass 
notes of the progression. In short, pursuant to Blackwood’s claim that his microtonal 
That is, 80 cents per unit interval times nine unit intervals.98
 Blackwood, The Structure of Recognizable Diatonic Tunings (1985), p.199. According to 99
Blackwood, the range of recognizability for the perfect fifth lies between 4/7 (686 cents) and 
3/5 (720 cents) of the 1200-cent octave. It is interesting to note that circle-arrows appear in the 
notation of all those tunings whose fifths lie at either extreme of this range, whether low (14- 
and 21-TET) or high (15- and 20-TET).
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compositions “make new organizations of familiar-sounding harmonies,”  the present excerpt 100
amounts to a new organization (owing to the fact that nine and fifteen are not relatively prime) 
of a familiar-sounding type of harmonic sequence. Indeed, the effect is so disorienting that it is 
difficult to tell the sequence begins and ends on the same harmonic root, even when listening 
with a score. I like to call this a “Pac-Man moment,” since it simulates the experience of 
proceeding for a while in a single direction until a portal instantaneously returns one right back 
to the area where they started. 
 A diligent reader may point out that the three tunings I have discussed thus far (16-, 
18-, and 15-TET) are all notable for the way their notational schemes bring out particular equal 
divisions of the octave—fourfold, sixfold, and fivefold, respectively. But how do such 
symmetrical collections square with what Norman Carey memorably calls the “characteristic 
asymmetry of tonality”?  Is not the “stuff” of Western tonality contained in collections, like 101
major/minor triads and diatonic scales, that divide the octave nearly (but not exactly) evenly?  102
I will revisit this issue of tonality’s physiognomy in subsequent chapters, but for now, it is worth 
considering a complementary musical example from one of the tunings that Blackwood 
characterizes as containing “recognizable diatonic scales.”  Four of his twelve chosen tunings 103
meet this standard: 17-, 19-, 22-, and 24-TET. To be recognizably diatonic, according to 
 Qtd. in Keislar, “Six American Composers on Nonstandard Tunings” (1991), p.197.100
 Carey, “Review Article: Tonality and Transformation by Steven Rings” (2012), p.223.101
 This position is espoused by Dmitri Tymoczko, who argues in his book A Geometry of Music 102
(2011) that “the basic sonorities of Western tonal music are optimal [because] they divide the 
pitch-class circle nearly evenly,” a property that allows them to be “connected to their 
transpositions by efficient voice leading” (63–64, emphasis mine).
 Blackwood, The Structure of Recognizable Diatonic Tunings (1985), p.254.103
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Blackwood, a tuning must have a fifth that lies within the “range of recognizability” as well as a 
relatively simple integer ratio between the step sizes of W and H in the scalar-intervallic 
ordering <WWHWWWH> (where 5W + 2H equals the cardinality of the tuning).104
 The excerpt in question comes from the end of “19 Notes,” Blackwood’s 19-TET etude. 
His notational layout for this tuning is reproduced below for reference:
Fig. 1.6: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 19-TET 
This scheme is designed with the recognizable diatonicity of 19-TET in mind. More specifically, 
all nineteen notes can be written as the root of a <0 6 11>19 major triad (<0 5 11>19 for minor), 
or as the tonic degree of a diatonic (major) scale with intervallic pattern <3323332>19, thanks to 
the enharmonic relationships of the tuning. Note that the perfect fifth in 19-TET measures 11 
unit intervals, and since 11 and 19 are relatively prime, one can accordingly construct a single 
circle of fifths by iterating this group generator. Fig. 1.7 represents this space as a circular clock 
face with 19 hours: 
Ibid., p.199. This ratio, which Blackwood calls “R,” is 2:1 in 12-TET and 24-TET, 3:1 in 17-104
TET, 3:2 in 19-TET, and 4:1 in 22-TET. One might provisionally glean from this that a “relatively 
simple” integer ratio is one in which both terms sum to no more than five (when in its most 
simplified form).
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Fig. 1.7: A circle of nineteen 11–unit-interval fifths, numbered in fifth order 
As with the previous passage from “15 Notes,” the forthcoming excerpt from “19 Notes” also 
involves ascending, clockwise motion through fifth space. But the nature of that fifth space—
not to mention the size of the actual fifth—differs widely between the two tunings, leading to 
two contrasting sonic outcomes. Consider the two measures boxed in red below:
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Ex. 1.2: The closing gambit of “19 Notes”; excerpt begins at  
3:44 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8lK38I1Anc
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 Fig. 1.8 provides a succinct illustration of the situation. The two measures sequentially 
unfold a fundamental motion from tonic to predominant in C ionian whose subsidiary harmonic 
waystations are equally spaced on the circle of 19 fifths. Note how this voice leading sequence
—where the third of each major triad becomes the fifth of the next—cannot produce a string of
Fig. 1.8: 19-TET and 12-TET versions of the same progression 
distinct and nonoverlapping triads in 12-TET, since the size of the interval cycle (3) divides the 
cardinality of the tuning (12). But in 19-TET, all nonzero interval cycles exhaustively generate 
the tuning’s pitches (since the tuning’s cardinality is prime), and so Blackwood iterates the 
sequence over the enharmonic seam until it lands on the rhetorically emphatic F major triad, 
which points back to the overarching C ionian frame. This particular harmonic sequence seems 
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to be one of Blackwood’s favorites, appearing in reduced form not only in his unpublished 
research notes but also in the last chapter of his subsequent published book.  It appears that 105
Blackwood’s model for this sequence is an omnibus-like passage in Liszt’s Ce qu’on entend sur 
la montagne (Symphonic Poem No. 1) that begins 16 bars after Rehearsal X and extends up 
until the start of Rehearsal Y.  Interestingly, however, Blackwood only cites Liszt’s model in his 106
research notes, not in The Structure of Recognizable Diatonic Tunings.  107
 The two musical examples just discussed, from “15 Notes” and “19 Notes,” make for 
an appropriate pair in ways other than their featuring of ascending (clockwise) motion through 
fifth space. For one thing, they are neatly complementary in the ways they flout 12-conditioned 
expectations about interval behavior: for whereas the perfect fifth can generate all the pitches 
of 12-TET (but not of 15-TET), the minor third cannot generate all the pitches of 12-TET (but 
can of 19-TET). Furthermore, both leverage the regularities of sequential motion to end up at 
surprising destinations in a rather slick and sneaky manner. As Blackwood writes, “Sequences 
which are identifiable variants of 12-note sequences, but which come out in an unexpected key, 
are about the most fascinating aspect of the various different equal tunings.”  Sometimes, as 108
these two excerpts demonstrate, the most unexpected destination can be the very point of 
departure itself—the same chord in “15 Notes,” and the same key in “19 Notes.” 
 See Blackwood, “Research Notes: NEH Grant R0-29376-78-0642” (1979–81), Folder 1, p.21, 105
and The Structure of Recognizable Diatonic Tunings (1985), p.308.
 Listen in particular to 21:38–21:58 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5G-OmiUPIN0.106
 I will return to the topic of Blackwood’s idiosyncratic approach to citation in Chapter 6, 107
unpacking it in light of the “solitary genius” image he tried to cultivate for himself.
 Blackwood, “Research Notes: NEH Grant R0-29376-78-0642” (1979–81), Folder 3, p.388.108
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* * * 
 The larger purpose of my introducing these musical teasers now is twofold: [1] to initiate 
readers into Blackwood’s notational universe, and [2] to demonstrate that notation has agency. 
Notation, put plainly, is something that disposes listeners to hear certain things in certain ways, 
prioritize certain things over others, and expect certain things over others. It is not to be taken 
for granted; it always-already comes with an agenda, whether one consciously notices it or not. 
To quote Fred Lerdahl, it is as if Blackwood’s notational choices specify a sort of “listening 
grammar” through which one can better understand his “compositional grammar.”  109
Therefore, the 12-analogous Euroclassical interpretive epistemology that I posit earlier in this 
chapter is not only the case for reasons related to auditory enculturation and cognitive 
economy. Crucially, it is also the case because Blackwood’s notational system visually 
encourages it through the priming of familiar “looks.” 
What Are We to Make of This Music? 
At this point, readers should have a basic idea of how Blackwood’s music looks, how it sounds, 
and how it works. But one important question has yet to be addressed: who is this music for? 
Answering this question is not so simple. One place we might begin is with Lerdahl’s claim that 
“[t]he best music arises from an alliance of a compositional grammar with the listening 
grammar.”  Notice the placement of an indefinite article before “compositional grammar” 110
but a definite one before “listening grammar.” Are there really several compositional grammars 
 Lerdahl, “Cognitive Constraints on Compositional Systems” (1992), p.99.109
 Ibid., p.119.110
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but only one listening grammar? What is the scope of this allegedly generalizable listening 
grammar, and to whom does it belong? Of course, any “listening grammar” is always-already 
historically constructed and culturally contingent, and no two are exactly the same—though 
music theory, analysis, and pedagogy sometimes reify this construct as an ideal type. Whether 
Lerdahl’s intention is to reify or not, his language is telling nonetheless, implying that there are 
certain nontrivial aspects of music listening and processing that are shared across individuals. I 
have begun to address these matters in previous sections of the chapter. Because tonal music 
in 12-TET is so ubiquitous in Western musical culture, those exposed to it will accrue roughly 
similar kinds of implicit knowledge about how tonal music “works” and draw on roughly similar 
schematic expectations that guide their conceptions of how tonal music “should sound.” This 
is why most listeners who hear Blackwood’s microtonal music for the first time will immediately 
judge it as something like “out of tune” or “off key,” even if they have never received any 
formal musical training in their life. The ability to form these judgments does not require 
conscious awareness, skill on a particular instrument, or a certain number of college credits. 
And for this reason, I believe that Blackwood’s music can be a useful and uniquely powerful 
tool to tap into the implicit musical knowledge held by untrained “everyday” listeners. 
 But while this may be true, Blackwood’s microtonality is also far from music made for the 
everyday listener. Yes, it plays on a broad swath of ingrained, implicit knowledge shared by 
statistical learners of tonality. But at the same time, it is fundamentally music whose full 
understanding requires notational literacy and explicit knowledge of Eurocentric music theory
—in short, a very specific type of musical training that most do not have. These are two very 
different types of “listening grammars,” to say the least, and their stark contrast complicates 
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the question of Blackwood’s intended audience. Of course, one could conceivably argue that 
this music is more accessible than most microtonal music, and that its visceral capacity to arrest 
both musicians and nonmusicians alike makes it capable of reaching a larger audience than was 
typical of most Western art music at the time. This seems to have been by design: Blackwood 
often voiced concern about the alienating nature of what he called the “nihilistic” atonal, 
aleatoric, radical music of the 1950s and 1960s,  and he viewed his microtonal compositions 111
as a way to connect with a broader listening audience while still continuing to push the 
boundaries of what was musically possible. But does this make his music any less “elite” at its 
core? It is still, after all, Western art music, made possible by expensive technology, written by 
an academic composer with an extremely specialized understanding of Western Euroclassical 
tonality, and principally geared towards an in-group of trained listeners who largely share in this 
understanding. And so, while his music undoubtedly pushes boundaries in certain areas, it also 
re-erects them in others.  
 In particular, Blackwood’s neoclassical, conservative approach to microtonal 
composition and notation creates the appearance that a very specific kind of tonality—the 
Western Euroclassical functional tonality of the common-practice period—constitutes the most 
“natural,” viable form of musical organization. His microtonal project might thus be regarded 
as reinscribing culturally dominant ideologies of musical Eurocentrism wherein common-
 The Easley Blackwood Papers, Box 91 (in “Tuning Stuff: Correspondence and Publications, 111
1982–2011”).
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practice functional tonality is discursively framed as absolute, ahistorical, and transcendent.  112
(In this case, moreover, the transcendence is double: withstanding not only the test of time but 
also the test of tuning.) Of course, “tonality” is far from a monolithic category that is unmoored 
from the particularities of culture and history. To this point, Mark Rodgers has recently argued 
for a rethinking of tonality “as a form of culture” that is “redolent of historicity” rather than 
“fixity.”  Brian Hyer, writing several years prior, similarly frames tonality as “an ideological as 113
well as a theoretical construct,” noting that “from the very beginning, the term has been used 
primarily for historiographical purposes.”  And Thomas Christensen, in his latest book, 114
describes tonality as a “construct born of alterity and anxiety.”  Indeed, Christensen’s study of 115
François-Joseph Fétis serves as a particularly potent reminder that even notions of tonality 
cloaked in the surface language of cultural plurality/relativity are not immune from being 
mobilized for the purposes of place- and race-based nationalisms. 
 It is in this ideological nexus that I want to consider the implications of replicating 
Euroclassical functional behaviors across 13- through 24-TET. That Blackwood takes the 
customs and practices of a dominant cultural tradition and transfers them systematically to a 
series of historically “untapped” (or “underdeveloped”) tunings is an act that ostensibly 
 As Alex Ross writes in a recent New Yorker article, “[T]he entire music-education system 112
rests upon the assumption that the Western tonality, with its major-minor harmony and its 
equal-tempered scale, is the master language,” despite the fact that “[v]ast tracts of the world’s 
music fall outside that system.” [Ross, “Black Scholars Confront White Supremacy in Classical 
Music” (2020)].
 Rodgers, “Renaissance Formalisms in the Cultural Archive of Tonality” (2019), pp.8 and 11.113
 Hyer, “Tonality” (2002), p.747.114
 Christensen, Stories of Tonality in the Age of François-Joseph Fétis (2019), p.xi.115
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recreates the dynamics of colonialism and recalls Kofi Agawu’s characterization of tonality as “a 
colonizing force.”  Under this interpretation, Blackwood treats microtonal composition not 116
simply as a matter of exploring untouched musical space, but of domesticating it: effectively 
demonstrating that even the wildest sonic beasts can be tamed, made tonal (and thus 
respectable), and made tractable to Eurocentric music-analytic methods (thereby earning them 
the title of “nonthreatening”). This domesticating impulse can be observed not just across 
Blackwood’s dozen tunings, but also within them. Because each tuning is equal-tempered, this 
maximizes its number of “usable” tonal destinations and ensures that any unit interval, in any 
tuning, can be a potential tonic. But while this rhetoric may seem to paint equal temperament 
as “a thoroughly democratic musical system in which all notes are created equal and every key 
is given equal opportunity,”  Ross Duffin also reminds us that equal temperament is deeply 117
implicated in capitalist and imperialist regimes of the late 19th and 20th centuries—“when the 
American vision of democracy was spread worldwide.”  It might be more appropriate, then, 118
to phrase the matter thusly: that by optimizing the transpositional and modulatory potential of 
all his tunings, Blackwood ensures that even their most distant and unknown corners can be 
reached by the force of tonality and brought under its sphere of influence. It is in this light that 
Sumanth Gopinath’s characterization of tonal harmony as a “regime” comes most sharply into 
 Agawu, “Tonality as a Colonizing Force in Africa” (2016), passim. See also Akrofi, “Tonal 116
Harmony as a Colonizing Force on the Music of South Africa” (2003).
 Duffin, How Equal Temperament Ruined Harmony (and Why You Should Care) (2008), p.140.117
 Ibid., p.141.118
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focus—a characterization that adds a consequential political and ideological dimension to my 
understanding of tonality as a regime of culturally conditioned expectations.  119
 So what are we to make of this music, in the end? It certainly occupies a multiply 
paradoxical space—in terms of its intended audience, its musical nuts and bolts, its ideological 
implications, and more—and different listeners/readers are bound to understand it in different 
ways. But however one understands Blackwood’s microtonal project, I want to reiterate that 
many of its paradoxes arise because of the way it engages with tonality. What some may see as 
the music’s most accessible quality—its troping of familiar Western 12-TET tonal praxes—
others may see as its most elitist. Or, to frame things differently (and in terms particularly 
relevant to the present political moment), some listeners may regard Blackwood’s microtonal 
compositions as an assertion that “all tunings matter,” whereas others may regard them as a 
systematic demonstration that only one tuning—12-TET—really does in the end. Of course, 
there will always be listeners/readers who simply regard Blackwood’s microtonality as highly 
interesting music, and who are less invested in these broader claims. The ensuing chapters will 
have much to say about the fascinating musical nuts and bolts of these pieces. But there are 
also listeners/readers who will hear these musical nuts and bolts through a raced and gendered 
lens: that by propping up the supremacy of a very specific Western Euroclassical conception of 
tonality, Blackwood is also propping up the implied supremacy of the white male. In Chapter 6, 
I will delve more deeply into Blackwood’s own personal history of racism and sexism, to 
demonstrate that he was more than silently complicit in advancing these cultural ideologies of 
exclusion. 
 Gopinath, “Diversity, Music Theory, and the Neoliberal Academy” (2009), pp.74–75.119
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 On the whole, Blackwood’s microtonal music raises a host of intriguing questions that 
cannot all be answered adequately within the bounds of a single dissertation. (Indeed, some of 
them are not exactly “answerable” at all.) What I have done, in the chapters that follow, is 
simply to address those questions that I find the most compelling, with the hope that future 
scholars will build on this work, challenge it, or perhaps pursue different questions altogether 
to fill in some of its gaps. With that in mind, let us now survey the terrain to come. 
Where Are We Going? 
The principal task of this dissertation is to advance a more flexible conception of diatonic 
tonality that is not reducible to any one specific tuning and whose assumptions do not proceed 
from a tacit privileging of major and minor keys. Doing so will involve rethinking several 
foundational music-theoretic terms and concepts—scale degrees, consonance/dissonance, 
chords, harmonic function, meter, and more—through the unconventional prism of Blackwood’s 
microtonality. These terms are so ubiquitous in musical discourse that they have all but become 
floating signifiers. While I do not claim to have solved all their linguistic problems in the 
following pages, I nevertheless propose some sensible solutions as to how these terms might 
be used with more precision in the future. Each of the interior chapters, to this end, proffers 
one or more terminological interventions, identifying what I see as some common 
misattributions and misconceptions that persist in how these basic concepts are typically 
framed/discussed in literature and taught in classrooms. As I will soon outline, Chapters 2 and 3 
primarily propose terminological disentanglements, whereas Chapters 4 and 5 primarily 
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propose terminological syntheses. We will have to take things apart first, in other words, so that 
we can eventually put them back together later. 
 Music’s effects are undeniably abstract, and this can trigger an impulse to associate such 
effects with concrete causes—to trace them back to their “source,” as it were.  While the true 120
sources are usually the idiosyncrasies of our enculturation and the attendant particularities of 
our expectational/predictive capacities, these things are exceedingly difficult to describe 
explicitly (as I mention earlier), because they rely so heavily on subconscious processes of 
implicit learning. As a result, there is a widespread tendency to project these sensations onto 
musical proxies, and to talk about these proxies as if they were concrete entities/objects (such 
as “notes” and “chords”) rather than abstract relations among these objects (such as 
“intervals” and “progressions”). This is not to say that musical entities do not exist; the 
frequency of a sound, for instance, is one. But tonal hearing necessarily involves the cognition 
of musical relationships, and so any descriptions or judgments resulting from this mode of 
listening are always-already relational at their core. This tendency to talk about relations as if 
they were entities is so deeply ingrained and widespread that it occurs not just in academic 
music scholarship but also in casual descriptions of music by nonspecialist listeners.  Indeed, 121
 This is not unlike the impulse to associate “acousmatic” sounds with the bodies or sources 120
that produce them. See in particular Schaeffer, Traité des objets musicaux (1966), Chion, The 
Voice in Cinema (1999), and Kane, Sound Unseen: Acousmatic Sound in Theory and Practice 
(2014) for more on this point.
 It goes without saying that this tendency also extends to nonmusical contexts. Because 121
cognition intimately involves acts of categorization, humans are constantly thinking of the 
“entities” they encounter in terms of their relationships to constructed prototypes. Thus a 
sentence as seemingly straightforward as “I like this apple” can be (re)read as “I like [how] this 
apple [compares to the others that I have previously encountered/seen/tasted/etc.].”
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statements like “this note sounds out of tune” or “that chord sounds weird” are relatively 
common even among musical laypersons, whereas formulations like “the musical/temporal 
context in which this note (or chord) occurs makes it sound expectationally anomalous” are not. 
 As a result, I treat the building blocks of tonal cognition in strictly relational terms: as 
qualia  that capture information about how alleged musical “entities” fit into their respective 122
musical/temporal contexts of occurrence, and how these contexts, in turn, square with 
culturally conditioned expectations. This guiding principle characterizes my framing of scale-
degree qualia, consonance/dissonance qualia, and harmonic function qualia all as “[cognitive] 
misattributions that originate in limbic responses to expectation.”  This is easily the most 123
controversial and suggestive of the several definitions of “qualia” that Huron offers in Sweet 
Anticipation, but curiously, he never pursues this particular formulation in more detail, nor does 
he specify what sorts of musical sensations qualify as qualia. The subsequent chapters might 
therefore be regarded as taking Huron’s provocation seriously and demonstrating its 
widespread utility through the lens of a music that demands the workings of expectation and 
prediction in unique and distinctive ways. 
 This sets the stage for the more targeted interventions that I make within each building 
block itself. In Chapter 2, I argue that when scholars invoke the notion of scale degrees, they 
typically conflate two subcomponents of scale-degree experience—which I call “generic scalar 
 I will discuss the concept of qualia in more detail in Chapter 2, but for now, suffice it to say 122
that this term, originally of philosophical origin, refers to what it is like to undergo certain 
subjective experiences, such as tasting an apple, seeing the color red, or hearing a particular 
interval/progression in a piece of music. 
 Huron, Sweet Anticipation (2006b), p.167.123
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position” and “specific modal character”—and treat them as if they were one composite thing. 
In response, I propose an original notation for labeling scale degrees that insists upon the 
representational separation of these two subcomponents and relies upon a conception of 
tonality whose essence is heptatonic diatonicism in general (rather than major and minor scales 
more specifically). I then demonstrate through a series of analytical vignettes that conceiving of 
scale degrees in this manner can shed new light on a variety of common musical scenarios, 
from local tonicizations to large-scale modulations to moments of tonal/modal ambiguity. My 
scale-degree notation is intentionally designed for a flexible domain of application, and my 
analytical vignettes are strategically selected to reflect this repertorial diversity. 
 The main claim of Chapter 3 is that the gamut of connotations historically indexed by 
the terms “consonance” and “dissonance” is uniquely linked by the concept of expectation. I 
advance an expectational account of musical consonance and dissonance that draws on the 
social-psychological concept of cognitive dissonance, and I argue that Blackwood’s 
microtonality makes the expectational underpinnings of consonance/dissonance judgments 
startlingly clear in ways that traditional 12-TET music cannot. The fact that so many of 
Blackwood’s intervals and intervallic collections seem to straddle the line between established 
auditory categories creates unique cognitive demands for 12-enculturated listeners, who must 
face the expectational dissonances wrought by these anomalous occurrences. Such 
occurrences are cognitively dissonant precisely because of the difficulties they present to 
processes of categorization, being so fundamentally equivocal that they seem to call up 
multiple plausible interpretations at once, while also resisting categorical contextualization 
altogether—as if they were two different things at the same time, yet somehow neither fully 
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one nor the other. Any interpretive choice thus leaves behind a reasonable alternative and 
exacerbates the sense that there is no truly “correct” answer that can magically make all the 
dissonance permanently disappear. Throughout the chapter, I discuss kinds of (cognitive) 
consonance and dissonance that involve elements of musical experience other than pitch, such 
as meter and notation. I also discuss how judgments of musical consonance and dissonance, 
which largely originate in subconscious, lower-level musical exposures, can trickle up to inform 
more complex appraisals of centricity, stability, and even preference and value. 
 The primary terminological intervention of Chapter 4 is to do away with the 
conventional connotation of a “chord” as a static, vertical entity. In its place, I propose the 
alternative term “intervallic collection” (or “IC”), which has more desirable connotations of 
contextually embedded relationality. The goal of this substitution is to achieve greater 
ecological validity: to be able to talk about harmonic function in a way that aligns more closely 
with the relational dynamics of tonal cognition. One major through-line of this chapter is that 
harmonic function qualia primarily emerge from the interaction of generic scalar position (or 
scale-degree content) and metrical position (or temporal context). A corollary of this is that 
“harmonic function” is not something that inheres in musical entities the second they sound—
an assumption that tacitly falls out of the way function is taught in classrooms—but rather is 
something that is only fully consolidated/confirmed once an IC stops sounding (i.e., once it is 
followed by another IC). Building off the deliberate modal democratism of my scale-degree 
notation from Chapter 2, I establish a color-coding system for harmonic-functional labels that 
communicates information about contextual modal flavor. This system can also be applied to 
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Roman numerals, allowing analysts to more precisely capture the qualitative subtleties of ICs 
that escape the major/minor binary. 
 Chapter 5 takes these building blocks and synthesizes them into a conception of fuzzy 
heptatonic diatonic tonality that links together all the musical examples discussed in this 
dissertation, microtonal or otherwise. The first half of the chapter revisits the distinction 
between entities and relations in a discussion of tonal salience. I argue that theories of tonal 
hierarchy and intervallic rivalry—often framed as incompatible and mutually exclusive takes on 
the same phenomenon—can actually be regarded as complementary and coexisting. This is 
because tonal salience is not a unitary phenomenon; there exist different kinds of tonal salience 
that operate independently of one another, drawing on distinct pathways of expectation and 
forms of memory. In the second half of the chapter, I synthesize ten broad takeaway lessons 
that Blackwood’s idiosyncratic approach to (micro)tonality can teach us about tonality in 
general. I focus on how his microtonal music can nuance what is already known or typically 
assumed about tonality, and how it challenges several ingrained assumptions about tonality’s 
alleged “ingredients,” its scope and various inflections, its supposed methods of parsing, and 
its limits. Many of these lessons summarize interventions and findings that cut across multiple 
previous chapters of the dissertation, such as the crucial roles played by enculturation and 
cognitive bias, the pervasiveness of misattribution, and the centrality of rhythm and meter in 
creating, influencing, and temporally regulating tonal sensations. 
 Chapter 6 is a deep dive into Blackwood’s archive of personal papers, focusing in 
particular on those materials that ostensibly have nothing to do with his microtonal music. And 
yet, as I argue, they have everything to do with his microtonal music. By piecing together 
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documentary evidence of Blackwood’s alarming racism, sexism, and homophobia, I make the 
case that his music and his approach to scholarship must be understood in the context of these 
unfortunate views.  Drawing on correspondence, personal diaries, non-musical writings, and 124
compositions “for the drawer,” I paint Blackwood as an especially vested stakeholder in (and 
gatekeeper of) what Philip Ewell calls “music theory’s white racial frame.”  In doing so, I break 125
the scholarly cycle of discussing Blackwood’s music without any consideration of his 
personhood and worldview, and I problematize the “isolated genius” trope that is often 
attached to his name and reputation. One major purpose of this chapter is to consider how the 
dissertation’s principal music-theoretic findings/lessons might be applied to music lying outside 
of the discipline’s “white racial frame.” I close the chapter with a close analysis of Ornette 
Coleman’s “All My Life” (1971) to demonstrate that the analytical tools developed in previous 
chapters can be applied in ways that expressly resist music theory’s longstanding Eurocentrism 
and hegemonic whiteness. 
 I envision this dissertation as speaking to multiple audiences at once, both musical and 
extramusical. On the one hand, its retreading of “familiar” musical ground through an 
unfamiliar repertorial lens leads to fresh perspectives on commonly discussed topics that will 
be of interest to future generations of music theorists, analysts, historians, pedagogues, 
 In other words, I make it a point not to separate Blackwood’s music from the more unsavory 124
aspects of his personality. For more on the dangers of separating art from artist, see Hess, 
“How the Myth of the Artistic Genius Excuses the Abuse of Women” (2017).
 See Ewell, “Music Theory’s White Racial Frame” (2019), “Music Theory and the White Racial 125
Frame” (2020a), and “Music Theory’s White Racial Frame: Confronting Racism and Sexism in 
American Music Theory” (2020b). Ewell borrows the concept of “white racial frame” from 
sociologist Joe Feagin’s book The White Racial Frame: Centuries of Racial Framing and 
Counter-Framing (2009).
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composers, and microtonal enthusiasts. And on the other hand, its positioning of these 
interventions within the broader landscape of dominant historical ideologies and cultural 
currents makes the project’s findings relevant to a wider interdisciplinary audience of humanists 
and social scientists. I believe there is something in this document for the social psychologist, 
the cognitive neuroscientist, the media theorist, the philosopher of mind, the critical race 
theorist, the historian of culture, and the postcolonial theorist, among other potential 
stakeholders. At bottom, I consider this dissertation to be a study of contradiction on many 
simultaneous levels of operation: the individual, the musical, the sociocultural, and the 
aesthetic-ideological. And this is to say nothing of the fundamental disciplinary contradiction at 
the heart of the project: that to discuss music as a liberal art is to intimately reckon with all the 
ways that humans, as musicking subjects, are anything but “free”—from biases, from 
prejudices, and from participation in systems of oppression.
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Chapter 2   |   Right in the Feels  
To name a historical period often requires having sufficient temporal distance to put its 
idiosyncrasies into perspective. Whatever the temporal boundaries of the common-practice 
period might be, its endpoint had certainly passed when Walter Piston coined the term 
“common practice” in 1941.  Even more time has passed between Piston’s coinage and the 1
present day. Yet certain characteristic features of this period—traces of the regime’s apex, one 
might say—remain entrenched in contemporary music-theoretic, music-analytic, and music-
pedagogical discourses as normative “defaults.” The interior chapters of this dissertation 
critically interrogate one in particular: the longstanding conception that “tonality” consists only 
of music in major and minor keys that derive from a 12-tone octave.  In this chapter specifically, 2
I argue that this limited conception of tonality still serves as the tacit basis for how numeric 
scale-degree labels are used and discussed. I first explore some of the problems and 
contradictions that arise when these labels are applied to music that is colloquially “modal.” I 
then propose a flexible system for labeling scale degrees that does not privilege any particular 
diatonic modes (or any particular tuning) over any others. Readers expecting Blackwood’s 
microtonality to be at the center of this discussion throughout should be warned that his music 
will not come into play until the illustrative analytical vignettes towards the end of the chapter, 
 Piston, Harmony (1941), pp.1–2. On the dissolution of the common practice, see Harrison, 1
Pieces of Tradition: An Analysis of Contemporary Tonal Music (2016), Chapter 1.
 Of course, not all common-practice music confines itself exclusively to major and minor keys, 2
particularly in the 19th century. For more on this, see Biamonte, “The Modes in Romantic 
Music” (1998) and Lam, “Relative Diatonic Modality in Extended Common-Practice 
Music” (2019).
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where it is placed alongside other musical examples in more familiar tunings. This is deliberate: 
for while Blackwood’s microtonal compositions are indeed useful tools to illustrate this chapter’s 
major claims, the purview of such claims extends far beyond his set of experimental pieces. 
Mise en place 
Contemporary Western listeners frequently encounter diatonic tonal music that escapes the 
major/minor binary. By “diatonic,” here, I mean music whose scalar structure derives from the 
iteration of seven consecutive perfect fifths that are then collapsed within the range of an 
octave; this results in a heptatonic (i.e., seven-note) scale with five major seconds and two 
minor seconds. While such a process produces familiar major (ionian) and natural minor 
(aeolian) sales, it also produces the remaining diatonic modes: dorian, phrygian, lydian, 
mixolydian, and locrian. These latter modes have become increasingly prevalent in the popular 
music of the last century or so, as artists have sought to draw on scales outside the major/minor 
binary for expressive compositional resources. Recent studies have shown that the slight 
structural differences between these modes—which essentially boil down to where the two 
minor seconds are located relative to the scale’s tonic—are qualitatively consequential even for 
casual listeners. Daphne Tan and David Temperley, for instance, conclude in a recent empirical 
account that “Western listeners without music training are able to internalize diatonic modal 
frameworks.”  This builds on an earlier study by the same two authors that finds untrained 3
listeners to be so sensitive to “the subtle distinctions between modes” that the authors reject 
 Tan and Temperley, “Perception and Familiarity of Diatonic Modes” (2017), p.362.3
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the possibility that their participants interpreted the modal melodies they heard through a 
major/minor “common-practice” lens.  4
 While such findings are notable, they are not necessarily reflected in the scale-degree 
terminology that the authors use. Consider, for instance, the following quote from Tan and 
Temperley: “In Aeolian mode, the flattened sixth degree is a half-step above 5̂ […] in Dorian, 
the raised sixth degree is a whole-step above 5̂.”  What is the purpose of the words 5
“flattened” and “raised” here? To me, they seem superfluous; the sentence would make 
perfect sense without them. And furthermore, since these two degrees are naturally occurring 
in their respective modes, it seems odd to refer to them with the language of chromatic 
lowering and raising. I highly doubt that Tan and Temperley actually regard the aeolian sixth as 
an altered form of the ionian sixth, or the dorian sixth as an altered form of the aeolian sixth. 
(Indeed, this would contradict their conclusion of modal independence.) Yet their language 
speaks to a broader tendency in music-theoretic discourse to refer to modal scale degrees as 
chromatic deviations from an implicit major-scale—or sometimes minor-scale—norm.  Of the 6
two, ionian bias is far more widespread. It is not unusual, for instance, to see the third, sixth, 
and seventh degrees in an aeolian scale represented as “b3̂,” “b6̂,” and “b7,̂” respectively—
and the fourth degree in a lydian scale represented as “#4̂”—even though these are all 
 Temperley and Tan, “Emotional Connotations of Diatonic Modes” (2013), p.250.4
 Tan and Temperley, “Perception and Familiarity of Diatonic Modes” (2017), p.362.5
 These two kinds of implicit bias often operate simultaneously. It is not uncommon for 6
textbooks to introduce the dorian, phrygian, lydian, and mixolydian modes as major or minor 
scales with a single distinguishing chromatic alteration. See, for example, Ottman and Rogers, 
Music for Sight Singing, 8th Edition (2011), p.358.
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naturally occurring degrees in their respective modes.  Aeolian bias, while less common, still 7
occurs at times during colloquial discussions of modes with minor thirds above tonic. Accounts 
that highlight the “lowered”  or “flat”  second of the phrygian mode, for instance—but do not 8 9
make this same comment about its third, sixth, or seventh—are ones that proceed from an 
implicit aeolian frame of reference. 
 To be clear, such informal language is eminently understandable when considering that 
music in major and minor keys still statistically outnumbers music in the other diatonic modes—
even in the 21st century. But what is gained in heuristic accuracy, I argue, is lost in qualitative 
precision. Applying sharp and flat signs to non-ionian degrees in blanket fashion  can obscure 10
some of the experiential subtleties that differentiate instances of the same-named degree 
across multiple modes. Consider the following diagram, for example, which appears in both of 
the aforementioned articles by Tan and Temperley: 
 See, for instance, Temperley and de Clercq, “Statistical Analysis of Harmony and Melody in 7
Rock Music” (2013), p.201 and Lilja, “Dealing with the 3rd: Anatomy of Distorted Chords and 
Subsequent Compositional Features in Classic Heavy Metal” (2015), p.399.
 See for instance Code, “Debussy’s String Quartet in the Brussels Salon of ‘La Libre 8
Esthétique’” (2007), p.271.
 Yang, “Review of Harmonic Experience: Tonal Harmony from Its Natural Origins to Its Modern 9
Expression by W.A. Mathieu” (2000), p.689.
 As occurs in Larson, “The Value of Cognitive Models in Evaluating Solfege Systems” (1993), 10
p.90 and Brent, Modalogy: Scales, Modes, & Chords: The Primordial Building Blocks of Music 
(2011), p.11, among other sources.
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Fig. 2.1: The “line of fifths,” reprinted from Temperley and Tan (2013, p.241 and 2017, p.361) 
In this diagram, “b7”̂ is common to mixolydian, dorian, aeolian, and phrygian. But does 
experiencing this degree feel the same in each of these four modal contexts? In this chapter, I 
want to explore the possibility that this quartet of “b7ŝ” may actually represent four different 
scale degrees. While such differences are no doubt slight, I believe that they warrant further 
analytical attention—particularly in an era when modality is garnering an increasingly nontrivial 
market share in Western musical culture. In other words, the time is ripe for a conception of 
scale degrees that is more sensitive to the wider range of contextual modalities in which they 
can occur. 
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 In order to make this case, I draw on the concept of qualia. This term has a complicated 
history—one that begins not on contemporary musical terrain, but instead with 20th-century 
philosophy of mind. Clarence Lewis was the first to define “qualia” as a plural noun,  calling 11
them “recognizable qualitative characters of the given, which may be repeated in different 
experiences, and are thus a sort of universals.”  In other words, qualia are those ineffable 12
aspects of subjective experience that are repeatable across contexts. Familiar examples include 
the pain of a paper cut, the blueness of a clear sky, and the taste of a peach.  But, as always, 13
definitions like these which aspire to capture such a foundational concept themselves 
necessitate foundational follow-up questions. What exactly is “the given,” for instance? Can 
qualia really be ineffable if we can communicate our experience of them to others (however 
imperfectly and circuitously)? And how can we be sure that others perceive qualia in the same 
way that we do? From its philosophical inception nearly a century ago, the term has been 
 Invocations of the singular “quale” can be found in earlier works, such as Peirce, “Lowell 11
Lecture, ix” [1866] (1982) and Tolman, “Nerve Processes and Cognition” (1918). For a 
comprehensive overview of the term’s early history, see Keeley, “The Early History of the Quale 
and Its Relation to the Senses” (2009).
 Lewis, Mind and the World-Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (1929), p.121.12
 Regarding this last, it is difficult not to think of the following memorable quote from Donald 13
Tovey: “Tonality is a thing which you can no more describe except by metaphors and 
comparisons than you can describe the taste of a peach.” [Tovey, A Musician Talks, Volume 1: 
The Integrity of Music (1941), p.47.]
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highly controversial,  and when it eventually gained currency in recent musical discourses on 14
phenomenology, perception, and cognition, that controversy far from disappeared. 
 Several 21st-century scholars have turned to the concept of qualia when discussing 
what it is like to hear and experience scale degrees.  Scale-degree qualia provide a 15
foundational point of entry into processes of tonal hearing, being the primary sensations 
through which listeners apprehend their musical position, orient themselves towards particular 
kinds of musical events over others, and maintain their bearings when things change. But 
exactly how these sensations arise, what they are “made of,” how many distinct types of them 
exist, and who is privy to experiencing them remain subject to debate. In the next section, I 
survey some of the ways that scholars have talked about scale-degree qualia, and I argue that 
despite their differences of opinion, all of their accounts are underpinned by [1] an implicit bias 
towards major/minor keys from a 12-tone octave (particularly major ones) as the proper 
“bearers” of tonality, and [2] a problematic method of attaching “sharp,” “flat,” and (implied) 
“natural” labels to careted numerals that leads to misrepresentations and obfuscatory 
redundancies when dealing with non-ionian modes. To combat this, I advance an original 
 Indeed, the notion of qualia is intimately bound up with the hard problem of consciousness, 14
which was first formulated under this name in Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of 
Consciousness” (1995). For more on the relation between qualia and the hard problem, see 
Crane, “The Origins of Qualia” (2000), Robbins, “Form, Qualia, and Time: The Hard Problem 
Reformed” (2013), and Loorits, “Structural Qualia: A Solution to the Hard Problem of 
Consciousness” (2014). For a theory of consciousness that hinges on a critique of qualia, see 
Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991).
 Prominent contributions to this discourse include Huron, “Are Scale-Degree Qualia a 15
Consequence of Statistical Learning?” (2006a) and Sweet Anticipation (2006b); Dowling, 
“Qualia as Intervening Variables in the Understanding of Music Cognition” (2010); Rings, 
Tonality and Transformation (2011); Hansberry, “What Are Scale-Degree Qualia?” (2017); and 
Arthur, “A Perceptual Study of Scale-Degree Qualia in Context” (2018).
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conception of scale degrees as chromatic species of diatonic genera that can be represented 
as ordered triples (x, y, z). Under this notation, x is a careted numeral indicating generic scalar 
position, y is a solfège syllable in re-based dorian (a modal extension of la-based minor) 
indicating specific modal character, and z is an uncareted numeral indicating unit-intervallic 
position in an n-tone octave (i.e., pitch class). The generic/specific and diatonic/chromatic 
distinctions invoked above will be familiar to readers of diatonic set theory.  Essentially, 16
generic intervals span a fixed letter-name distance in diatonic space, whereas specific intervals 
span a fixed pitch-class distance in chromatic space. For instance, all intervals that ascend from 
a spelled form of B to a spelled form of C can be regarded as seconds, but this generic interval 
can take on a variety of specific forms, including but not limited to B#–C (diminished second), 
B–C (minor second), Bb–C (major second), and Bb–C# (augmented second)—all of which have 
different chromatic lengths. 
 This system has several advantages. First, it pushes back against the dominant historical 
conception that tonal music can only consist of major and minor keys, instead locating the 
essence of Western tonality in heptatonic diatonicism more broadly, which can take on a variety 
of rotational shapes, forms, and colors—what I call “modalities of tonality.” Second, it solves a 
persistent labeling issue—namely, whether to call (for instance) the seventh degree in 
mixolydian “b7”̂ or just plain “7”̂—by relocating the onus of indicating natural versus auxiliary 
degrees onto the re-based dorian (i.e., sol-based mixolydian) solfège syllables, thereby 
 See especially Clough and Myerson, “Variety and Multiplicity in Diatonic Systems” (1985); 16
Carey and Clampitt, “Aspects of Well-Formed Scales” (1989); Clough, Engebretsen, and 
Kochavi, “Scales, Sets, and Interval Cycles: A Taxonomy” (1999); and Carey, “On Coherence 
and Sameness, and the Evaluation of Scale Candidacy Claims” (2002).
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obviating the need for conventional “sharp” and “flat” labels. And lastly, though generic scalar 
position (x) and specific modal character (y) are richly interactive in practice, their strategic 
representational separation in ordered-triple notation affords one the flexibility to model 
certain subtleties of scale-degree hearing that would otherwise continue to be obscured by 
their tacit representational fusion. As I illustrate through a series of analytical case studies 
spanning folk hymns, show tunes, 1990s R&B, and Blackwood’s microtonality, ordered-triple 
scale-degree notation furnishes a clearer way to representationally distinguish between 
tonicization and modulation, while also providing an innovative take on the cognitive 
mechanics underlying situations of tonal/modal ambiguity. A recurring theme throughout is 
that the genus/species framing allows for greater nuance and precision in capturing the subtle 
ways that harmonic and metrical context can influence one’s sense of musical position. This 
puts pressure on two widespread (and interrelated) discursive tendencies: [1] to paint scale-
degree qualia as if they pertained to isolated musical entities rather than contextually/
temporally embedded relations, and [2] to talk about them as if they were the exclusive 
province of melody, rather than the product of interaction among several domains—both 
musical and otherwise. 
The State of the Discourse 
Where do scale-degree qualia come from? For David Huron, they result from implicit processes 
of statistical learning.  Huron has tested this hypothesis by asking a group of musicians to 17
 See Huron, “Are Scale-Degree Qualia a Consequence of Statistical Learning?” (2006a) and 17
Sweet Anticipation (2006b).
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imagine hearing certain scale degrees and to describe the feelings they evoke. He finds “a 
notable association between the subjective qualia reported by musicians and the basic 
statistical properties of scale tones for Western music.”  More specifically, degrees described 18
as “stable” (such as 1)̂ have high probabilities of ending a phrase or work, degrees described 
as “unexpected” (such as b2̂) have low probabilities of occurrence, and degrees described as 
“leaning” (such as #5̂) tend to be the most constrained in terms of how they are typically 
followed by other degrees.  This overarching contention—that statistical learning and 19
probabilistic prediction play crucial roles in musical processing and the subconscious formation 
of style- and culture-specific auditory generalizations—has been borne out by a long line of 
cognitive-expectational literature stretching from Leonard Meyer to the more recent 
computational models of Marcus Pearce.  But certain aspects of Huron’s experimental design 20
have tended to raise more questions than they answer. These can be summed up threefold: his 
directive that participants “please think of pitches rather than chords,” the homogenous profile 
of his participant pool, and the restriction of his survey “to the major scale only.”  21
 With regards to the first, is this something that is in principle even possible—to 
conceive of pitches in isolation, without any traces of context, convention, or relationality? 
Take, for instance, some of the sample responses associated with the supertonic: “transitory, 
 Huron, “Are Scale-Degree Qualia a Consequence of Statistical Learning?” (2006a), p.1679 18
[emphasis in original].
 Ibid., pp.1677–79.19
 See in particular Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music (1956) and Pearce, “Statistical 20
Learning and Probabilistic Prediction in Music Cognition: Mechanisms of Stylistic Enculturation” 
(2018).
 Huron, “Are Scale-Degree Qualia a Consequence of Statistical Learning?” (2006a), p.1676.21
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moderate expectancy of more to come, part of a flow.”  These responses seem to highlight 22
one feature of the supertonic in particular: its location between two degrees of the tonic triad. 
It is not a stretch to imagine that participants may have conceived of this degree in terms of its 
helping role in tonic-prolongational progressions such as I–viio6–I6 or I–V4/3–I6, both of which 
feature a stepwise 1–̂2̂–3̂ bass. This demonstrates just how difficult it is to jettison the vestiges 
of relational thinking that mark tonal cognition and to zero in on pitches by themselves 
(whatever that might entail). Not only do these participants appear to be thinking about 
chords, despite Huron’s injunction otherwise—they also appear to be thinking about particular 
chord progressions and the roles that certain scale degrees tend to play within them. Such 
cognitive slippage points up the limits of talking about scale-degree qualia as if they were 
descriptors of entities, since they always-already encode information about relations and 
conventions of usage. In a sense, this vindicates Huron’s hypothesis that scale-degree qualia 
result from implicit learning of statistical regularities. But at the same time, it plainly shows how 
these regularities take place over temporal contexts that are larger than the isolated present. 
 Another limiting factor of this study is its sample size: there are only ten main 
participants, and all are experienced musicians. The lack of nonmusicians means that Huron is 
unable to test whether scale-degree qualia are capable of being heard and experienced by the 
musically untrained (and if so, the extent to which their sensations are similar to those of the 
musically trained). This is a central preoccupation of Claire Arthur’s recent empirical study of 
scale-degree qualia, which builds on Huron’s while also addressing some of its aforementioned 
 Ibid., p.1677.22
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methodological drawbacks.  Arthur’s pool of participants is much larger (41 musicians, 22 23
nonmusicians) and more widely varied in terms of its spread of musical backgrounds and levels 
of experience/training. Moreover, by prompting her participants to respond to actual musical 
stimuli, rather than asking them to merely imagine certain scale degrees and reflect upon their 
properties, Arthur’s experimental design is better able to capture the kinds of implicit 
knowledge that people hold about scale degrees. 
 Arthur plays each of her participants a series of short and varying key-defining chord 
progressions, all of which are followed by an isolated probe tone. She then asks participants to 
rate these probe tones on a set of oppositional descriptors (tense/relaxed, happy/sad, 
complete/incomplete, etc.) by adjusting a group of sliders towards one or the other pole. Her 
findings ultimately indicate that “even when listeners have limited musical experience, [they] 
came up with similar types of descriptive terms (that could be categorized in similar ways)”; 
however, “those with music training certainly appear more consistent” in their scale-degree 
judgments than do nonmusician listeners.  These differences notwithstanding, Arthur’s study 24
remains noteworthy for its ability to demonstrate that untrained listeners are in fact capable of 
forming consistent judgments about scale-degree qualia at a level above chance. 
 Arthur, “A Perceptual Study of Scale-Degree Qualia in Context” (2018).23
 Ibid., p.311.24
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 Another major aim of this study is to investigate “how the role of harmonic context 
might shape certain aspects of scale-degree qualia.”  Arthur does this by adopting the probe-25
tone methodology of an earlier experiment by Carol Krumhansl and Edward Kessler,  but with 26
one crucial difference: all of Krumhansl and Kessler’s key-defining progressions end on the 
tonic, whereas each of Arthur’s progressions ends on a different diatonic triad. This allows her 
to test whether local harmonic context influences qualia ratings, and in short, it does. Her 
results reveal “a significant interaction for scale degree and progression (all p < .01),”  which 27
leads her to conclude that “a large part of a scale degree’s ability to influence qualia may be 
tied to a harmony (or perhaps harmonic function) with which it is most closely attached.”  Like 28
Huron before her, Arthur advances an account of scale-degree qualia as statistically learned. 
But her experimental design allows her to argue for this position in a manner that is more 
sensitive to the contextual embeddedness of scale degrees  and more attentive to the diverse 29
populations of listeners who can hear and describe them. However, Arthur’s study does also 
 Ibid., p.298. Indeed, Arthur acknowledges up front that “in real musical contexts—at least in 25
Western [ones]—a melody is most commonly embedded in a harmonic context” (295). While 
her study does not explicitly focus on the influence of rhythmic/metrical context on scale-
degree judgments, this is the topic of Chapter 5 of her Ph.D. dissertation, “When the Leading 
Tone Doesn’t Lead: Musical Qualia in Context” (2016), pp.96–130.
 Krumhansl and Kessler, “Tracing the Dynamic Changes in Perceived Tonal Organization in a 26
Spatial Representation of Musical Keys” (1982).
 Arthur, “A Perceptual Study of Scale-Degree Qualia in Context” (2018), p.303.27
 Ibid., p.312.28
 As Arthur writes, scale-degree qualia “are not ‘absolute’ but in fact only exist in relation to 29
something else” (296, emphasis in original).
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replicate Huron’s study’s restriction to a major-mode purview—and this recurrent ionian bias is 
something that my ordered-triple notation will expressly resist. 
 Perhaps the most foundational debate surrounding qualia concerns whether they are 
experienced properties of things or subjective (mis)attributions to things. The former position is 
more characteristic of the way qualia have historically been invoked in philosophy of mind, 
whereas the latter is more typical of the term’s 21st-century application to cognitive psychology 
and neuroscience. Huron exemplifies this more recent position, claiming that “‘scale degree’ is 
how minds interpret physically sounding tones, not how tones are in the world.”  And yet the 30
view that scale-degree qualia are immanent properties of notes remains hard to shake, 
particularly in the moment of listening. As Steven Rings points out, “Some listeners may in fact 
experience tonal qualia so vividly that they seem to infuse the sounding medium itself.”  This 31
is cognitive misattribution in action. It all begins with the fact that humans have evolved to 
instinctively seek out concrete causes when they experience abstract effects.  But this effort to 32
pin down explicit sources is not always so easy, particularly in the case of scale-degree qualia, 
considering all the implicit knowledge/learning that feeds into listeners’ subconscious 
conceptions of what scale degrees are. As I argue in Chapter 1, these are things that are 
extremely difficult to describe in words, and in the face of such difficulty, listeners can be prone 
to respond by pinning their expectational sensations onto elements of the music itself, which 
act as convenient “concrete” proxies that appear to be the true root cause of their emotions 
 Huron, Sweet Anticipation (2006b), p.143.30
 Rings, Tonality and Transformation (2011), p.42.31
 Huron, personal communication, 11/9/2019.32
73
and feelings. And so, if someone says that a particular note (say, ionian-mode 7)̂ sounds 
restless, incomplete, or like it is pointing upwards,  two interrelated misattributions are taking 33
place. First, the judgment is more about that listener’s expectations than it is about the note 
itself.  And second, those expectations pertain not just to that one note in isolation, but to the 34
larger contexts in which that note is embedded, as compared to the larger contexts in which it 
typically (i.e., statistically or probabilistically) tends to occur. 
 Not all recent commentators share this view of scale degrees, however—particularly 
those who are more committed to upholding the native philosophical sense of qualia. 
Benjamin Hansberry, for one, puts forth an account of qualia that is rooted in the term’s “home 
discipline [of] philosophy of mind,” contrasting this understanding with the more 
“psychological” accounts of commentators like Huron who typify “the way qualia are discussed 
in music theory.”  Though in the end Hansberry argues for a “phenomenological extension of 35
Huron’s psychological account of scale-degree qualia,”  he also articulates two main points of 36
 It has been noted in the burgeoning literature on image schemas and cognitive 33
categorization that these sensations of musical tendency, motion, attraction, and the like—so 
often associated with scale-degree “behavior”—are metaphorical projections that originate in 
recurrent bodily experiences, such as moving towards a destination, maintaining one’s balance, 
and being subject to the force of gravity, among others. See in particular Johnson, The Body in 
the Mind (1987); Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (1987); Saslaw, “Forces, 
Containers, and Paths” (1996); Zbikowski, Conceptualizing Music (2002); Johnson and Larson, 
“Something in the Way She Moves” (2003); Brower, “Paradoxes of Pitch Space” (2008); Cox, 
“Embodying Music: Principles of the Mimetic Hypothesis” (2011); and Larson, Musical Forces: 
Motion, Metaphor, and Meaning in Music (2012).
 This is precisely the logic behind Huron’s characterization of qualia as “misattributions that 34
originate in limbic responses to expectation.” [Huron, Sweet Anticipation (2006b), p.167.]
 Hansberry, “What Are Scale-Degree Qualia?” (2017), p.198.35
 Ibid., p.183.36
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disagreement. The first is that, by treating scale-degree qualia as unconscious phenomena that 
result from automatic judgments based on implicit statistical learning, Huron’s account cannot 
reckon fully with the complex phenomenological character of scale degrees. The situation is 
more flexible and intricate than a theory of automatic and non-conceptual attribution lets on, 
Hansberry argues, because “we can sometimes control [scale-degree] attribution, [and so] we 
cannot account for this aspect of conscious experiences as cleanly as a psychological 
explanation might prefer.”  The second point of disagreement pertains to Huron’s view that 37
qualia can be understood as misattributions. Hansberry states rather forcefully that “qualia are 
not the kinds of things we can misattribute. They are as they appear, and we simply cannot be 
mistaken about what it is like to have an experience.”  But, I argue, we are often mistaken 38
about what causes these experiences to be like they are and to feel like they do—and these 
misattributions are part and parcel of what it means to experience musical qualia in real time. I 
am thus more interested in embracing and extending the recently emergent cognitive-
psychological sense of qualia than I am in trying to steer the term back into its original 
philosophical clamshell. As W. Jay Dowling notes, it is not necessarily a problem that 
contemporary music-centric accounts of qualia often carry this term far from its “traditional use 




psychology, especially if we seek a psychology that tries to understand the mechanisms by 
which we perceive and understand the world.”  39
 Regardless of one’s stance on the origin, scope, or essence of scale-degree qualia, a 
few basic commonalities link practically all accounts of scale degrees, and these center on 
conventions of labeling. In most scholarship and pedagogy on Western tonality, it is customary 
to see the careted numerals 1̂ through 7̂ deployed in conjunction with sharp/flat symbols that 
indicate chromatic raising/lowering. My proposed scale-degree labeling system does not 
eschew these careted numerals, which I believe communicate useful information about a pitch’s 
generic position in a referential diatonic collection. Where I diverge from previous scholarship, 
however, is that I do not make any a priori assumptions about the specific shape of this 
referential diatonic collection. The key to my intervention, again, is the distinction between 
“generic” and “specific”—and this essentially boils down to a difference of opinion over 
exactly what those seven careted numerals, in their unaltered form, represent. To me, they 
denote generalized slots in a heptatonic diatonic scale with a tonal center; it does not matter 
where this center is located or what the ensuing arrangement of major and minor seconds is. 
To many other commentators, however, they tend to denote specific intervallic relationships to 
the tonic of a tacitly ionian scale. As I have already begun to unravel, this can lead to problems 
when sharp and flat symbols enter into the mix, since these do not always reliably mark 
distinctions between natural and auxiliary degrees. Cases like the dorian sixth only compound 
such problems further: this degree shares the same specific intervallic size as the ionian sixth, 
 Dowling, “Qualia as Intervening Variables in the Understanding of Music Cognition” (2010), 39
pp.12–13.
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but it is often referred to as “raised”  or even “sharp”  because of ingrained aeolian bias. 40 41
This gives rise to pertinent questions about how to properly label such a degree: should it be a 
“sharp” 6̂, as such language implies? Should it be a “natural” 6̂; that is, a 6̂  preceded by a 
natural sign? Or should it be just a plain old 6̂, with no diacritic modifications whatsoever? This 
situation illustrates rather pointedly the need for a scale-degree labeling system that avoids 
such orthographic traps altogether. After all, if musical qualia are truly about capturing the “raw 
feels” of musical experience,  then it is critical that scale degrees be labeled in ways that do 42
not mask the nuanced modalities of this experience. Replacing sharps and flats with equivalent 
symbols, such as pluses and minuses,  does little to rid scale-degree thinking of its historical 43
bias towards major and minor keys at the expense of other heptatonic diatonic rotations—
which are no less capable of producing sensations of tonal centeredness. What is necessary, 
instead, is a way of representing scale degrees that not only treats the various modal “flavors” 
of tonality in equitable fashion, but also does away completely with the entrenched practice of 
attaching diacritic symbols of modification to careted numerals. Ordered-triple notation is 
designed to accomplish both of these tasks at the same time. 
 Plude, “Creative Musical Training: Learning from the Inside Out” (1996), p.13.40
 Pike, “Tallis—Vaughan Williams—Howells: Reflections on Mode Three” (1984), p.10.41
 This stock phrase, also of early 20th-century origin, has recently been applied to musical 42
qualia in Gleason, “Compositional Qualia in the Princeton School” (2019), p.287, and to scale-
degree qualia more specifically in Rings, Tonality and Transformation (2011), p.43 and 
Hansberry, “What Are Scale-Degree Qualia?” (2017), p.182. According to Hansberry, Edward 
Chace Tolman may have been the first to use “raw feel” in a published work. [See Tolman, 
“Nerve Processes and Cognition” (1918), p.436.]




To model scale degrees as chromatic species of diatonic genera, I propose representing them 
as three-place ordered sets (x, y, z). The principal purpose of this notation is to disentangle two 
distinctive aspects of scale-degree experience—what I call “generic scalar position” (x) and 
“specific modal character” (y)—that are typically conflated together or fused into a 
representational singleton. As stated previously, what is “generic” about x is that it makes no 
assumptions about a referential scalar collection other than [1] that one exists, [2] that it is 
diatonic, and [3] that it is centered on one of those seven notes. The x-component is always a 
careted numeral and just that; it is never modified with sharps, flats, cautionary natural signs, or 
other symbolic prefixes. The y-component, on the other hand, supplies more precise 
information about how a particular note fits into a governing modal context. This is what is 
“specific” about y: its primary concern is the actual intervallic pattern of a reference scale, and 
whether a particular note is naturally occurring in that scale or auxiliary to it. As mentioned 
earlier, y is always a solfège syllable reckoned in movable do with re-based dorian (meaning mi-
based phrygian, fa-based lydian, etc.). The taxonomical relationship between x and y can be 
expressed as follows: naturally occurring ionian 2̂ (y=re), dorian 2̂ (y=mi), and phrygian 2̂ (y=fa) 
all represent distinct modal species of the superordinate genus “x=2̂.” And on another level, 
the major-mode pitches that would conventionally be labeled as “b2̂” (y=ra), “2̂” (y=re), and 
“#2̂” (y=ri) all represent distinct chromatic species of the superordinate genus “ionian x=2̂.” 
This latter example shows exactly how ordered-triple notation offloads the burden of indicating 
chromatic raising/lowering onto the solfège-syllabic y-component—and in a manner that 
bypasses the need for accidental symbols altogether. As for the remaining component in the 
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triple, z, this is always an uncareted numeral that indicates a note’s pitch class, as outlined prior. 
It is most commonly represented by an integer modulo 12 (with C=0, following traditional 
pitch-class convention). However, in more finely grained microtonal tunings (as we will soon 
see), z can take on a range of values larger than the typical 0 to 11, increasing in accordance 
with the number of pitch classes per octave. 
 My formalism builds on the work of several scholars who have modeled tonal pitches as 
ordered sets on the grounds that they are multidimensional phenomena. An important 
predecessor in this regard is Rings’s Generalized Interval System (GIS) for heard scale degrees, 
which employs an ordered-pair notation (sd, pc) such that “the left hand element in the pair 
denotes a [careted, sensed] scale-degree quale,” whereas “the right-hand element 
correspond[s] to the acoustic signal” and “denotes what psychologists call a chroma: the 
perceived ‘color’ shared by all pitches related by octave.”  Rings’s model, along with what he 44
calls the “formally identical models of the diatonic system presented by Eytan Agmon (1986, 
1989) and Alexander Brinkman (1986),”  all share the premise that two pieces of information 45
are needed to represent a tonal pitch.  46
 Rings, Tonality and Transformation (2011), p.44 [emphasis in original]. The first usage of the 44
term “chroma” to refer to pitch class is found in Bachem, “Various Types of Absolute 
Pitch” (1937), p.147.
 Rings, Tonality and Transformation (2011), p.45. The “formally identical models” he cites are 45
Agmon, “Diatonicism, Chromaticism, and Enharmonicism: A Study in Cognition and 
Perception” (1986) and “A Mathematical Model of the Diatonic System” (1989), and Brinkman, 
“A Binomial Representation of Pitch for Computer Processing of Musical Data” (1986).
 Conceptual predecessors to the work of Agmon and Brinkman include Longuet-Higgins, 46
“Letter to a Musical Friend” (1962a), “Second Letter to a Musical Friend” (1962b), and “Review 
Lecture: The Perception of Music” (1979); Regener, Pitch Notation and Equal Temperament: A 
Formal Study (1973); and Shepard, “Structural Representations of Musical Pitch” (1982).
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 Later in his book, Rings explores the possibility that his left-hand “sd” component is 
itself multidimensional, and this results in an ordered triple (accn, sdn, pc) for “diatonically 
oriented heard scale degree[s]” that is very similar to my proposed system—roughly equivalent 
to my (y, x, z).  Indeed, Rings’s “accn” formalizes a way to represent whether a heard scale 47
degree is a naturally occurring member of a diatonic scale or an auxiliary inflection of one of its 
referential pitch classes. Rings even allows for the possibility that this diatonic collection can be 
modal —but he ultimately chooses to focus on major/minor music in his work. Where my 48
approach differs from Rings’s, in addition to my explicit pursuit of modal democratism, is that 
my y is not identical to his “accn.” Rings uses accidental symbols to label this component, 
whereas I prefer solfège syllables. Now, to be clear, Rings’s accidental symbols “represent 
chromatic inflections of heard scale degrees, not notated sharps, flats, or naturals” —and this 49
is certainly a welcome improvement to traditional labeling practices. But because his 
formalization of key is separate from his formalization of scale degree, his ordered triples 
themselves do not give any indication of governing diatonic collection or specific chromatic 
length. For example, the triple ( , 7,̂ 2) would represent the apperception “naturally occurring 
7̂ inheres in acoustic signal D” under Rings’s notation, but this representation does not specify 
the modal identity of the referential diatonic collection or whether such a collection is centered 
on Eb or E. My proposed notation reads analogously but bakes in more specificity: (7,̂ ti, 2), for 
instance, represents the misattribution “generic scalar position 7̂  and leading-tone quality 




inhere in acoustic signal D.” From this triple alone, one can infer not only that the referential 
diatonic collection is ionian but also that it is centered on Eb. Only in the ionian mode, 
however, would naturally occurring x=7 ̂call for the upward-vectored y-component of ti; in an 
aeolian (i.e., natural-minor) context, by contrast, its y-component would be the more 
directionally neutral sol, and in a mixolydian context, it would be the downward-vectored fa 
(and so on in the remaining modes). I am far from the first scholar to tout the utility of re-based 
dorian  or to propose a more expansive conception of tonality that encompasses what is 50
usually othered as “modality.”  But I may well be the first to combine these two convictions 51
under the aegis of a single scale-degree labeling system. 
 While certainly indebted to the work of these aforementioned scholars, my proposed 
system actually has far older historical and conceptual roots. One could trace back its 
conceptual underpinnings to “Guidonian”  solmization (as Rings does with his own system ), 52 53
 For some recent perspectives, see Lam, “Relative Diatonic Modality in Extended Common-50
Practice Music” (2019) and “Modal Spelled Pitch Class, La-Minor Solfège, and Schubert’s Third 
Relations” (2020), and de Clercq, “Lobbying for a La-Based Approach to the Minor Tonic in 
Popular Music Harmony” (2020). Both authors refer to this solfège system as “la-based minor.”
 See for instance Gordon, Learning Sequences in Music: Skill, Content, and Patterns (1988); 51
Thomson, Tonality in Music: A General Theory (1999); Hansen, Layers of Musical Meaning 
(2006); and Tagg, Everyday Tonality II: Towards a Tonal Theory of What Most People Hear 
(2014).
 I use scare quotes here, because Eurocentric musicological bias has led to the longstanding 52
assumption that such a system was the invention of Guido d’Arezzo, when in fact he may have 
learned it from earlier Arabic music theory. For more on this, see La Borde, Essai sur la musique 
ancienne et moderne (1780); Farmer, Historical Facts for the Arabian Musical Influence (1930); 
Saoud, “The Arab Contribution to Music of the Western World” (2004); and Chami, 
“Deconstructing a Mediæval Legend: Guido d’Arezzo, the ‘Arabian Influence,’ and the Role of 
the ‘Historical Imagination’” (2014). I thank Bronwen Garand-Sheridan for bringing this to my 
attention in 2017.
 See Rings, Tonality and Transformation (2011), p.45.53
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in which pitches are represented by littera/vox (roughly z/y) pairings such as “G sol re ut,” 
indicating the different hexachordal contexts in which the note G can occur: as sol in the C-
centric naturale mode, re in the F-centric molle, and/or ut in the G-centric durum. Of course, 
there are more than just three possibilities for vox in heptatonic diatonic music; accordingly, the 
following table lays out the basic space for x/y permutations that can occur within an (x, y, z) 
ordered triple:
Table 2.1: 49 basic permutations of scale-degree genus (x = numeral) and species (y = syllable)
The table is organized such that each modal collection cuts diagonally across the space, 
downwards and to the right (modulo do). I have chosen to list the solfège syllables in 
ascending scalar order (i.e., do re mi fa sol la ti), rather than as an ascending line of fifths (i.e., fa 
do sol re la mi ti), in order to make these modal collections more literally connected and 
visually clear. Note that the z-component of the ordered triple is nowhere to be found in Table 
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2.1. This is intentional; the idea is that any one of these x/y pairs can theoretically “accrue” to 
any acoustic signal (qua pitch class) z. Notice, also, that the table does not cover any 
possibilities of chromatic inflection (this is what makes the space “basic”). Indeed, it only 
contains the seven degrees that are natural to each of the seven diatonic modes, and thus, 
none of the forty-nine rectangles houses an auxiliary degree (where “auxiliary” is understood as 
“lying outside the boundaries of a particular modal collection”). To reach these auxiliary 
degrees, as I have already teased above, solfège syllables must be altered in accordance with 
traditional conventions for chromatic raising/lowering. For example, the leading-tone seventh is 
technically an auxiliary degree in the aeolian mode, and so it would have to be represented by 
(7,̂ si, z) whenever it occurs in that context. Likewise, a perfect fourth above the tonic is 
naturally occurring in every mode except for lydian, where it is actually a diminished fourth—an 
auxiliary degree that would garner the label (4̂, te, z). And a perfect fifth above tonic would 
only be considered auxiliary in a locrian context, where it would necessitate the ordered triple 
(5̂, fi, z). So on and so forth; by now, the general idea should be clear. 
 All in all, this notation provides a handy way to clearly distinguish among the varied 
tonal/modal contexts in which any given generic scalar position x can occur. But some of these 
contextual distinctions—such as the difference between 2̂  in ionian (y=re) and 2̂  in lydian 
(y=sol)—are admittedly rather minute. Indeed, I can imagine some readers being skeptical that 
they even exist at all. For this reason, it is important to clarify exactly what my ordered triples 
are (and are not) doing. Temperley posits a useful distinction between “descriptive” music 
theory, whose purpose is “to describe the way people hear pieces already,” and “suggestive” 
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music theory, whose purpose is “to find and present new ways of hearing pieces.”  I intend my 54
ordered triples to align more with the latter pole than the former. That is to say, I regard them 
as qualitative “hats” that listeners can try on for size in order to experience familiar tonal 
phenomena in new/unfamiliar frameworks (that nevertheless have the potential to be revelatory 
in certain ways). They are not claims about how listeners already hear such phenomena. Now, 
this does not rule out the possibility that some readers might find descriptive value in certain of 
my analytical claims—or find that such claims tap into latent knowledge they hold about tonal 
hearing. Indeed, Temperley allows for the possibility that “a theory might be descriptive in 
some aspects, but suggestive in others [….] A theory might also have a different status for 
different people, or for the same person at different times.”  But the larger point here is that 55
the purpose of my ordered triples is to suggest how certain musical situations might be heard, 
not to dictate how they are (or should be) heard. David Lewin’s apt remark comes to mind: 
“One should not ask of a theory that every formally true statement it can make about musical 
events be a perception-statement. One can only demand that a preponderance of its true 
statements be potentially meaningful in sufficiently developed and extended perceptual 
contexts.”  56
 Temperley, “The Question of Purpose in Music Theory: Description, Suggestion, and 54
Explanation” (1999), p.70.
 Ibid., p.75.55
 Lewin, Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations (2007), p.87 [emphasis in original].56
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Illustrative Vignettes (I): Initiation and Tonicization 
Ordered-triple scale-degree notation is repertorially flexible in its intended domain of 
application, and it can bring greater analytical clarity to a variety of common musical scenarios. 
As we will see in the forthcoming examples, two of its primary advantages are that [1] it 
provides a more intuitive way to represent the differences between tonicization and 
modulation, and [2] it models tonal/modal ambiguity in a manner that succinctly captures both 
the experiential differences that separate competing hearings and the (typically under-
discussed) experiential commonalities that link them together. Both of these advantages would 
not exist without a genus/species framing of scale-degree qualia. Disentangling generic scalar 
position (x) from specific modal character (y), I maintain, makes explicit something that often 
bubbles below the surface of discourses surrounding scale degrees, but that has yet to be 
acknowledged notationally: that while these two components do obviously correlate in 
practice, they also often diverge from one another in ways that are quite revealing. This is most 
apparent during moments of tonal transformation that involve attentional negotiations among 
multiple referential diatonic collections. More specifically—and here I finally tip my hand—for 
all common tones z shared across such collections, local tonicizations usually involve changes in 
y (but not in x), large-scale modulations usually involve changes in both x and y, and instances 
of tonal/modal ambiguity usually involve changes in x (but not in y). I illustrate these insights 
through a diverse triptych of analytical case studies: a moment of tonicization from “Amazing 
Grace,” a moment of modulation from Blackwood’s “17 Notes,” and a moment of tonal/modal 
ambiguity that opens Anita Baker’s “Body and Soul” (1994). 
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 Before delving into this triptych, however, I proffer the following amuse-bouche. It is 
intentionally straightforward and uncontroversial; its purpose is to ease the reader into my 
labeling system and to set the stage for the more complicated scale-degree scenarios that 
follow in its wake:
Ex. 2.1: Applying ordered-triple notation to a familiar ionian melody 
There is likely nothing that will come across as jarring or surprising about the way I label these 
first four measures of “Happy Birthday”—particularly for those who are accustomed to 
movable-do solfège (and pitch class integer notation). The excerpt contains no instances of 
tonicization, modulation, or ambiguity, and its crystal-clear F ionian orientation allows for the 
customary pairing of x=1 ̂and y=do. But though things may look rather tame now, we will soon 
see how different musical situations call for certain representational tweaks that may come 
across as disorienting or unusual at first. By employing movable do with re-based dorian, for 
instance, not every tonal/modal center (i.e., every naturally occurring x=1)̂ will be represented 
as do (this will only be the case in ionian). 
 Consider the following excerpt, for instance—also the first four measures of a familiar F-
centric melody in 3/4, but this time, one whose tonal orientation shifts subtly midway through: 
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Ex. 2.2: During tonicizations, y changes to match the qualia of the local key  
whereas x remains rooted in the global key (for all common tones z shared  
between both), creating the appearance of a “parallel” modal shift 
My analysis postulates the existence of a secondary dominant in m.2. Of course, not all 
accompaniments to this hymn play a literal V7/IV at this juncture; many opt to stay on the tonic 
for the first two bars. But even a notional “I” in m.2 has traces of latent dominant function on 
the local level (i.e., as a V/IV), given how it seems to “resolve” into the hypermetrically stronger 
m.3. This demonstrates two things: [1] the important role that meter plays in influencing scale-
degree qualia, and [2] the fact that the melodic A in m.2 is somehow experientially different
from the melodic A in m.1—much like how the F on the downbeat of m.3 is experientially 
different from the F on the downbeat of m.1. 
 Because these qualitative differences boil down to local matters of specific contextual 
character, the aforementioned pairs of pitches differ only in the y-components of their 
respective ordered triples. This accomplishes a few things. First, it registers the subtle sense of 
upwards striving that accompanies the word “Grace” by modeling this degree as a mixolydian, 
rather than an ionian, third—a ti rather than a mi.  Second, it allows for a neat solfège-syllabic 57
parallelism between “how sweet” and “the sound” (both “la sol”), which matches their more 
One could certainly read this moment hermeneutically for its obvious religious subtext—but 57
then again, one would also have to explain the fact that this latent upwards striving is thwarted 
by the counterbalancing force of downwards melodic gravity.
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obvious parallels in contour, rhythm, and meter. But most importantly, it gives analysts a novel 
way to suggestively model those elusive nuances of scale-degree hearing that separate 
moments of transitory tonicization from ones of outright modulation: the former typically 
involve interpreting the same z with a different y (but the same overarching x), whereas the 
latter typically involve interpreting the same z with both a different y and a different x. By 
disentangling generic scalar position from specific modal character, ordered-triple notation can 
more cleverly portray those situations in which the local harmonic context shifts, but not 
enough to disturb one’s global sense of governing centricity.  58
 This analytical clarity, however, comes at a price. During the tonicization of Bb ionian, 
my scale-degree labels are drawn not from this collection but from (the y-equivalent) F 
mixolydian collection instead. This creates the appearance that tonicizations are equivalent to 
modal shifts—a state of affairs that is likely to be quite disorienting for many readers. In fact, it 
completely reverses the conventional understanding of local major-key tonicizations in a global 
 Observant readers may point out that the melody of “Amazing Grace” is completely 58
pentatonic and accordingly wonder why I do not reflect this reduced scalar cardinality with a 
truncated range of possible x-values (i.e., from 1 ̂to 5̂ rather than 1 ̂to 7)̂ in Ex. 2.2. In short, I 
stick with a heptatonic diatonic conception of x because my hearing of the melody hinges on 
an argument about its (diatonically based) accompaniment, which always uses more than five 
notes. If I were to model this hymn melody in purely pentatonic terms, however, a few 
representational tweaks would result: each C would be labeled as (4̂P, sol, 0) rather than (5̂, sol, 
0), and each D would be labeled as (5̂P, la, 2) rather than (6̂, la, 2). (The superscripts are meant 
to distinguish these degrees from the x/y-equivalent dorian fourth and dorian fifth, 
respectively.) These labels probably seem counterintuitive and disorienting to the diatonically 
accustomed reader. But they are intended to be more consistent with the implicit knowledge of 
those whose musical enculturation is primarily pentatonic. Restricting x from 1 ̂to 5̂ simply 
reflects the mental equalization of scale steps that are of different sizes—something that, let us 
not forget, is part and parcel of diatonic hearing as well. On this last point, see Shepard, “One 
Cognitive Psychologist’s Quest for the Structural Grounds of Music Cognition” (2009), pp.138–
40 and Dowling, “Qualia as Intervening Variables in the Understanding of Music 
Cognition” (2010), pp.9–12.
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major-key context: typically, these involve changes in centricity but no changes in mode, 
whereas here, my scale-degree labels suggest a change in mode but no change in centricity. 
Such labels, however, are merely artifactual byproducts that fall out of my conception of 
tonicization as affecting y (local qualia) but not x (global tonal positioning); they are not, again, 
claims that listeners (ought to) hear tonicizations as modal shifts wholesale. Of course, if 
readers wish to imaginatively conceive of tonicization as an abstract sort of generalized modal 
shift, they certainly can; perhaps there is even something to be gained from “making the 
familiar strange” in such a manner.  But this apparent conflation of tonicization with modal 59
shift, simply put, is the conceptual cost one must bear when thinking of tonicization’s unique 
relation to x and y in the way I propose. Odd things will inevitably happen when theorists try to 
transport concepts like tonicization—which are so intimately tied to our familiar major/minor 
tonal system—onto modally democratic terrain. My hope, though, is that the analytical clarity 
gained from being able to simultaneously represent the competing pull of local and global 
tonal forces during moments of tonicization within a single scale-degree representation can 
outweigh this cost (and result in a net analytical profit). 
 Readers are invited to think of the relationship between F ionian and F mixolydian in Ex. 
2.2 in terms of a “parallel” shift between two referential scalar collections that share the same 
center (and the same cardinality) but differ in their constituent pitches. This generalizes the 
notion of parallel keys beyond the binaristic confines of major/minor thinking and onto a 
 Here I am quoting Novalis’s conception of Romanticism as “mak[ing] the familiar strange and 59
the strange familiar,” as Alexander Rehding translates it in “Three Music-Theory 
Lessons” (2016), p.251. [For the original passage, see Novalis, Schriften (1837–46), iii, p.236.] 
This phrase has since acquired wide currency as a rallying cry for disciplines ranging from 
semiotics to cultural anthropology.
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broader landscape that is inclusive of the other diatonic modes. Such shifts engage the 
horizontal relationships in Table 2.1—those among occupants of the same row, which are linked 
by a common x but vary in their respective y-components. We will shortly encounter the 
notational inverse of these situations in ones of tonal/modal ambiguity, which feature “relative” 
shifts among referential diatonic collections that contain identical constituent pitches but differ 
in their centers. This will provide an analogous generalization of the relative-key concept 
beyond the major/minor binary, and as one might have guessed by now, such shifts will engage 
the vertical relationships in Table 2.1—those among occupants of the same column, which are 
linked by a common y but vary in their respective x-components. 
Illustrative Vignettes (II): Modulation 
Before making good on this promise, however, I must first fulfill another one previously made: 
to demonstrate exactly how ordered-triple notation distinguishes between local tonicizations 
and large-scale modulations. I now turn to an example of the latter from Blackwood’s “17 
Notes.” This is no ordinary modulation. To start, it features not just a change in centricity (from 
G to E) but also a change in mode (from dorian to aeolian)—and this latter shift, which would 
typically be downplayed by traditional scale-degree labeling conventions, figures prominently 
in my interpretation of the passage. Of course, the excerpt is also in 17-TET, and this increase 
in octave cardinality means that z must now take on an expanded range of values, from 0 to 16 
rather than the customary 0 to 11. Thanks to Blackwood’s unusually neoclassical approach to 
microtonal composition and notation, however, the other two ordered-triple components can 
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actually be applied quite fruitfully to the passage without any need for modification (such as 
expanding the range of x or inventing new names for y). 
 Part of the reason for this is that 17-TET is particularly well equipped to simulate the 
characteristic sound of heptatonic diatonicism. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 1, it is one of 
only four out of Blackwood’s dozen tunings (along with 19-, 22-, and 24-TET) that contains what 
he calls “recognizable diatonic scales.”  Fig. 2.2 below shows how 17-TET meets both of 60
Blackwood’s conditions for recognizable diatonicity:
Fig. 2.2: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 17-TET
First, the fifth in 17-TET measures ten unit intervals, or (1200/17)*10 = 705.88 cents. Since this 
size falls right near the middle of Blackwood’s “range of recognizability” for the perfect fifth,61
the first condition is met. Moreover, 17-TET allows for a simple 3:1 ratio between the step sizes 
of W and H in the scalar-intervallic ordering <WWHWWWH> (again, where 5W + 2H equals the 
octave cardinality)—thus meeting the second condition and leading to diatonic scales that 
sound strikingly similar to their counterparts in 12-TET. It is worth pointing out that despite 
 Blackwood, The Structure of Recognizable Diatonic Tunings (1985), p.254.60
Ibid., p.199.61
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Blackwood’s phrasing of this second condition in a manner that privileges the ionian ordering 
<WWHWWWH>, any z in 17-TET can act as the tonic not only of a <3313331>17 ionian scale, 
but also of a <3133313>17 dorian scale, a <1333133>17 phrygian scale, and so on. As I explain 
in Chapter 1, Blackwood’s notational system is designed to visually prioritize familiar shapes 
such as these and visually optimize the transpositional/modulatory affordances they enjoy as a 
result of equal temperament. 
 I am not the first scholar to apply an original scale-degree labeling system to 
Blackwood’s microtonal music. Daniel Cox and William Ayers have recently extended Rings’s 
ordered-set notation to make some fascinating observations about the workings of “19 
Notes.”  But both of their approaches replicate the familiar practice of merging sharp and flat 62
symbols with careted numerals, and as a result, they perpetuate the tradition of referring to 
scale degrees in a way that conceptually fuses x-information with y-information. Ostensibly, my 
ordered-triple notation would seem to be most helpful whenever it can capture those musical 
situations where these two components diverge: where one changes while the other remains 
constant. This was the case with “Amazing Grace,” and it will be the case again with “Body and 
Soul.” But I want to submit the following modulatory passage from “17 Notes” as evidence 
that disentangling x from y can still reveal rewarding analytical insight even in those cases 
where both components change together. And further, the passage demonstrates that 
ordered-triple notation can still be useful outside of 12-TET, since the system is built on an 
intentionally broad definition of “diatonic” that is unsutured from the 700-cent perfect fifth. 
 Cox, “The Emancipation of Discordance” (2014); Ayers, “Microtonality and Transformation: 62
Analyzing Easley Blackwood’s ’19 Notes’ with a Modified Tonal GIS” (2017) and “Structural 
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 The double bar in Ex. 2.3 acts as an unexpected phrasal boundary that ushers in a 
striking hypermetric realignment: the last measure of the excerpt is retrospectively 
reinterpreted as “strong” rather than “weak.”  Also reinterpreted is the governing centricity 63
and mode; two potential pivot junctures are marked in the penultimate measure with vertically 
aligned ordered triples. The exact location where this pivot occurs, however, is less important 
than the larger point: that modulation—provided that it is not to a “parallel” or “relative” tonal 
area (in the expansive sense outlined above)—entails interpreting each common tone z with 
both a different x and a different y. This occasions a reexamination of John Muniz’s view, 
building off of Rings,  that modulations can be conceived as “scale-degree reassignments.”  64 65
One might qualify this view accordingly: that for every common tone z, parallel modulations 
(e.g., F ionian to F dorian) entail reassignments of y but not of x, relative modulations (e.g., B 
aeolian to G lydian) entail reassignments of x but not of y, and all other modulations (including 
conventional moves to the dominant, the flat submediant, etc.) entail reassignments of both x 
and y. 
 Ex. 2.3 modulates from G dorian to E aeolian, and I want to make the case that this 
change in mode is a much more consequential aspect of the passage than it may seem to be at 
first. Indeed, those listening through a strictly major/minor lens might regard the only 
 I use scare quotes here because these labels, too, are misattributions. What is really “strong” 63
(or “weak”) is not the measure itself, but rather the expectation that certain kinds of things—
like phrasal beginnings—tend (or tend not) to occur at these particular junctures.
 See especially Rings, Tonality and Transformation (2011), pp.41–49.64
 Muniz, “A Tendency-Transformational Model of Enharmonic Modulation and Related 65
Phenomena” (2019), p.3.
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consequential tonal shift in this passage to be one of mere centricity: from a G-centric “minor” 
key to an E-centric one. This would likely lead to a sense of surprise that a move from the flat 
side of the tonal spectrum to the sharp side could sound like a “darkening”—a shift in color/
energy that matches Blackwood’s parenthetical marking but contradicts mounds of key-
characteristic and sound-symbolic wisdom.  Sure, there are a slew of factors that configure to 66
make the last measure of Ex. 2.3 sound “darker” than the previous ones, from timbre to 
dynamics to register. But not to be forgotten, I contend, is the concomitant shift to a “darker” 
mode—from the comparatively brighter dorian to the less bright aeolian. The only difference 
between these two modes is their sixth degree, which is two 17-TET unit intervals lower in 
aeolian than it is in dorian, thereby making the latter relatively “brighter” than the former.  67
Furthermore, as shown by the y-components in Ex. 2.3, these telltale sixth degrees point 
tendentially in opposite directions: the dorian 6̂  is an upward-vectored (and thus colloquially 
“bright”) ti, whereas the aeolian 6̂ is a downward-vectored fa. This tendency reversal cannot be 
overlooked in accounts of why the double bar precipitates a “darker” soundscape—and 
 See for instance Köhler, Gestalt Psychology (1929); Steblin, A History of Key Characteristics in 66
the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries (1983); Brower, “Paradoxes of Pitch 
Space” (2008); de Götzen, “Association of Sound Movements in Space to Takete and Maluma” 
(2014); and Murari et al., “Is Vivaldi Smooth and Takete? Non-Verbal Sensory Scales for 
Describing Music Qualities” (2015).
 This notion of relative brightness/darkness among the diatonic modes has been discussed in 67
Sugiura, Electronic Musical Instruments Having Automatic Ensemble Function Based on Scale 
Mode [U.S. Patent 4,450,742] (1984), Miller, Modal Jazz Composition and Harmony, Volume 1 
(1996), and Mathieu, Harmonic Experience: Tonal Harmony from Its Natural Origins to Its 
Modern Expression (1997), among several others. More recently, it has been formalized in 
Sailor, “Modality and Alternative Functional Harmony in Diatonic and Non-Diatonic 
Scales” (2018) and Sherrill, “Partial Orders of Modal Brightness” (2019).
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ordered-triple notation makes this explicit in ways that conventional scale-degree notation 
does not. 
Illustrative Vignettes (III): Tonal/Modal Ambiguity 
Another useful feature of ordered-triple nomenclature is its ability to capture the dynamics of 
tonal/modal ambiguity with greater precision and nuance. More specifically, it provides a way 
to simultaneously register not only those aspects of scale-degree experience that separate 
potential interpretations during such moments of ambiguity, but also those aspects that remain 
constant regardless of which interpretation one chooses. The opening of Anita Baker’s “Body 
and Soul” is an instructive case study in this regard. As seen in Ex. 2.4 below, the introductory 
eight-bar vamp to this recording consists of what Philip Tagg would call a harmonic “shuttle”  68
between a C#-rooted chord and an F#-rooted chord. Two-chord shuttles typically carry great 
potential for ambiguity—particularly when the chords are related by fourth/fifth, since this 
combines a local sense of directionality with a global sense of figure/ground ambivalence. As a 
result, the tonic of “Body and Soul” is initially unclear; three plausible hearings are listed 
below:  69
 See in particular Chapter 12 of Tagg, Everyday Tonality II (2014).68
 These particular hearings are chosen because the most statistically probable motions by 69
fourth/fifth in tonal music are those between V and I, I and IV, and ii and V. Other hearings of 
the shuttle are in principle possible—the next most likely would probably be vi <—> II in E 
lydian—but this hearing is not given structural/metrical support, and in any case, lydian pop/
rock tunes are exceedingly rare. On this last point, see Moore, Rock: The Primary Text: 
Developing a Musicology of Rock (2001), Biamonte, “Triadic Modal and Pentatonic Patterns in 
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I have already hinted that this situation amounts to the notational inverse of local tonicization, 
in that tonicizations generally involve representing each common tone z with the same x but a 
different y,  whereas moments of tonal/modal ambiguity involve representing the same z with 70
the same y but a different x. In other words, whether one chooses to hear the above passage in 
C# dorian, F# mixolydian, or B ionian, the corresponding succession of solfège syllables, in 
every case, is identical. 
 One could argue that this finding is not actually special at all, being merely a fallout of 
my reliance on movable do with re-based dorian. Such an objector would, technically, be 
correct. After all, this form of solfège guarantees that all naturally occurring minor seconds are 
represented by mi-fa and ti-do (regardless of mode)—and since Ex. 2.4 does not contain any 
modulations or tonicizations, the z-location of these minor seconds remains fixed throughout, 
being an acoustic fact that is independent of auditory interpretation(s). However, while some 
may regard the resultant y-component consistency across potential hearings as anticlimactic 
and incidental, I want to argue that it can also be quite revelatory. Traditional accounts of tonal/
modal ambiguity tend to focus on interpretational differences: that each potential hearing 
contains no careted-numeral overlap with the other(s).  But what ordered-triple notation can 71
do is to register these differences while also highlighting the interpretational commonalities 
 The one exception to this rule, which I treat in the chapter’s closing gambit, is when a 70
“relative” tonal area is being tonicized—in which case both x and y remain the same for all 
common tones z.
 Examples of such accounts include Carpenter, “Grundgestalt as Tonal Function” (1983); 71
Chapter 7 of Rings, Tonality and Transformation (2011); Attas, “Sarah Setting the Terms: 
Defining Phrase in Popular Music” (2011); and Richards, “Tonal Ambiguity in Popular Music’s 
Axis Progressions” (2017).
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that are shared across hearings, and crucially, that contribute to the ambiguity in the first place. 
I therefore hold that tonal/modal ambiguity is more than a mere binary matter of acoustic 
sameness (z) meets auditory/interpretive difference (x). More accurately, these situations also 
involve a third element of auditory/interpretive sameness—encapsulated in the y-component—
that cannot be discounted, since this thread links together the multiplicity of interpretive 
possibilities and reflects the sense in which they are conceivably interchangeable. 
 A brief word about harmonic function is warranted at this juncture. To start, my 
functional labels follow the example of scholars such as Kevin Swinden in distinguishing 
between tonic-prolongational subdominants (cf. the C# dorian hearing) and dominant-
preparing predominants (cf. the B ionian hearing).  But even without this distinction, an 72
intriguing fact about Ex. 2.4 would still stand: that at any one given moment, the operative 
harmonic function in one potential hearing is wholly distinct from those in the two others. 
Notice how all of these non-overlapping harmonic-functional possibilities are abstractions of 
the same succession of y-components (and, obviously, z-components) but different successions 
of x-components. This suggests that harmonic function may have more to do with generic 
scalar position than it does with specific modal character, since function appears to 
demonstrate covariance only with x and not with y. The view that harmonic functions result 
from confederations of scale degrees has gained wide currency over the past few decades, 
particularly in the wake of Daniel Harrison’s influential work on the subject.  But moments of 73
 Swinden, “When Functions Collide: Aspects of Plural Function in Chromatic Music” (2005).72
 See especially Chapter 2 of Harrison, Harmonic Function in Chromatic Music: A Renewed 73
Dualist Theory and an Account of Its Precedents (1994).
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ambiguity such as the one above neatly point up the possibility that function may actually 
depend more on certain aspects of scale-degree experience than it does on others. I will return 
to this line of reasoning (and this particular musical example) in Chapter 4 on harmonic 
function. For now, however, the foregoing teaser will have to suffice. 
* * * 
 Brian Hyer writes that the term “tonality” primarily “refers to the orientation of melodies 
and harmonies toward a referential (or tonic) pitch class.”  If this is the case, then what should 74
stop us from considering, say, the theme song from The Simpsons (1990), Miles Davis’s “So 
What” (1959), or Wendy Carlos’s “Just Imaginings” (1986) as properly “tonal”? Why should 
these first two be marked with an ontological asterisk simply because they use certain 
heptatonic scales of 12-TET and not others? And why should this last incur the same treatment 
simply because it uses more pitch classes per octave than the customary twelve? Do not all 
three meet Hyer’s abovestated definition anyway? 
 I doubt that many of us, if asked to define “tonality” today, would include an explicit 
provision that it be limited exclusively to 12-TET music in major and minor keys. Yet the scale-
degree language that we overwhelmingly continue to use in our analyses and pedagogies of 
tonal music remains implicitly tied to the major/minor system and to the modern piano 
keyboard. The present chapter begins to combat these biases by proposing an alternative way 
to think about scale degrees (and tonality) that can circumvent these recurrent linguistic/
labeling issues and lead to more rewarding analytical engagements with music in any of the 
heptatonic diatonic modes. By resisting the tacit conflation of generic scalar position (x) and 
 Hyer, “Tonality” (2002), p.726.74
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specific modal character (y), my genus/species account of scale-degree qualia unhooks the 
concept of “scale degree” from its historical dependence on the dominant particulars of 
common-practice tonality and provides more nuance and flexibility in reckoning with the 
various inflective colors, flavors, and repertorial instantiations of tonality. To this end, I have 
been choosing my illustrative vignettes strategically: to underscore my contention that tonality 
is not just something that transcends the historical major/minor binary, but also something that 
transcends tuning itself. Now, to be sure, ordered-triple notation is not a panacea that can 
resolve all of tonality’s problems and contradictions in one fell swoop. It certainly has its 
drawbacks, and these will receive further attention later in the chapter. But the notation can 
address many of these problems and contradictions with a level of precision and insight not 
typically afforded by traditional labeling practices. Tonal hearing inevitably involves attentional 
shifts—whether these be momentary (as in local tonicization), large-scale (as in global 
modulation), or theoretically simultaneous (as among competing potential hearings during 
moments of ambiguity).  What ordered-triple notation can do especially well is to suggestively 75
 I am certainly not the first scholar to formalize these three particular kinds of transformations 75
among diatonic collections. Ian Bates, for instance, proposes three categories of “fixed-domain 
diatonic relationship[s]”—“fixed-tonic relationships,” “fixed scale-type relationships,” and 
“fixed key-signature relationships”—that are conceptually related to the way I model 
tonicizations, mode-preserving modulations, and tonal/modal ambiguities, respectively. [Bates, 
“Vaughan Williams’ Five Variants of ‘Dives and Lazarus’: A Study of the Composer’s Approach 
to Diatonic Organization” (2012), pp.35–36.] An important predecessor to Bates’s work is Julian 
Hook’s distinction among “field transposition” (e.g., G ionian to G lydian—analogous to my 
conception of “parallel”), “spc-structure transposition” (e.g., G ionian to D ionian), and “dpc-
structure transposition” (e.g., G ionian to A dorian—analogous to my understanding of 
“relative”). [Hook, “Spelled Heptachords” (2011), p.91 (particularly Fig. 1).] Hook’s work in this 
area also influenced Nathan Lam’s concepts of “relative diatonic modality” and “modal spelled 
pitch class,” the former of which is similar in many respects to the way I model tonal/modal 
ambiguities. [Lam, “Relative Diatonic Modality in Extended Common-Practice Music” (2019) 
and “Modal Spelled Pitch Class, La-Minor Solfège, and Schubert’s Third Relations” (2020).]
101
model, during moments such as these, exactly which components of scale-degree experience 
might be shifting (and which are not). 
 That this notation is at its most revealing during times of positional flux is no accident. 
For tonality is not simply a matter of the apparent stability of a certain tonal area during a 
certain musical span. Rather, it is just as much about those moments that challenge, unseat, or 
otherwise unsettle that sense of stability—since these serve to frame and consolidate such 
apperceptions of stability in the first place. Harrison remarks that it is typically “much easier [to] 
examine something when it is at rest than when it is in motion.”  My hope is that ordered-76
triple notation can ultimately make it easier for analysts to capture (and thereby examine) those 
experiential liminalities that invariably result when tonality itself is in motion. 
But What About All Those Extra Notes? (I): Categorical Stretchiness 
Readers may feel that, in unrolling ordered-triple scale-degree notation with an eye to its 
stylistic flexibility, I have downplayed the many visceral ways in which microtonality—even 
Blackwood’s uniquely conservative brand—necessarily challenges established auditory 
categories. Simply put, some may find it an oversimplistic cop-out to imply that only the z 
component appreciably changes when labeling tonal pitches in Blackwood’s music, whereas x 
and y can continue to be applied without modification. This is worth dwelling on further, for it is 
a basic fact of microtonality that there exist so-called “extra” notes that fall “between the 
cracks” of expectation and do not neatly fit preexisting categorical boundaries. 
 Harrison, Pieces of Tradition (2016), p.8.76
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 And yet, as I argue in the previous chapter, there is a strong tendency to domesticate 
these anomalous occurrences by filtering them “through the framework of the cultural system 
with which one is already familiar.”  In other words, there is a limit to the number of scale-77
degree categories that listeners can hold in their mind at once, and this number is contingent 
upon their enculturation. By repeatedly being exposed to music that draws from a fixed 
number of tones, listeners become conditioned to expect that future music will also proceed 
along those lines. When listening to something unfamiliar, then, listeners are often inclined to 
throw a variety of cognitive tools at the music in order to mentally simplify and “tame” it—and 
categorization is at the forefront of this process. This streamlines processual activity by [1] 
reducing the number of “things” one needs to listen for in order to make sense of what they 
hear, and [2] directing cognitive activity towards the more efficient goal of parsing the 
unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. 
 Several scholars are in agreement on this front. Lawrence Zbikowski, for instance, 
speaks of a functional counterbalance between an “efficiency principle, according to which 
people prefer to minimize the number of categories they need to consider in making a 
categorization,” and an “informativeness principle, according to which people tend to 
maximize the informativeness of their categorizations.”  Hasan Tekman and Nuran Hortaçsu 78
 Curtis and Bharucha, “Memory and Musical Expectation for Tones in Cultural 77
Context” (2009), p.365.
 Zbikowski, Conceptualizing Music (2002), pp.32–33 [emphasis in original]. Zbikowski’s work in 78
this area draws heavily on previous scholarship on cognitive categorization by Eleanor Rosch, 
Carolyn Mervis, and Lawrence Barsalou, among others. See for instance Rosch, “Principles of 
Categorization” (1978), Mervis and Rosch, “Categorization of Natural Objects” (1981), and 
Barsalou, Cognitive Psychology: An Overview for Cognitive Scientists (1992), particularly pp.
181–84.
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discuss the adaptive benefits of striking such a balance: “Dividing the world around us into 
categories of items that we can treat in similar ways facilitates our lives by providing cognitive 
economy and directing future learning.”  And Brian Bridges frames categorization as “a 79
cognitive [process] whose form maps a relatively complex set of relationships whilst minimizing 
cognitive load due to the derivation of its parsing/organization process from familiar 
environmental models and activities.”  All of these scholars outline the same basic process of 80
optimization: to draw upon prior knowledge to make sense of future events by thinking in 
terms of the fewest number of categories that can provide the most useful kinds of information. 
To hear any kind of music in a tonal framework, put simply, is to perform this balancing act. But 
to hear the tonality in microtonality, given all the additional challenges such music engenders, 
is to walk an even more demanding cognitive tightrope. 
 Microtonal music reminds its listeners that pitch is a continuous phenomenon: a basic 
fact that the 12-TET piano keyboard’s cultural ubiquity tends to obscure. Yet microtonality 
reveals the continuous nature of pitch in a way that conflicts with the imperatives of discrete 
and efficient categorization. Much of what it means to hear microtonality in a tonal framework, 
then, lies in the effort to contextualize expectationally discrepant events by fitting them into 
more familiar frameworks. This entails stretching existing auditory categories—not creating 
entirely new ones—to accommodate novel occurrences. Mark Reybrouck has argued that “[i]f 
there are more elements in the music than there are representations in the listener’s mind, the 
 Tekman and Hortaçsu, “Aspects of Stylistic Knowledge: What Are Different Styles Like and 79
Why Do We Listen To Them?” (2002), p.28.
 Bridges, “Towards a Perceptually-Grounded Theory of Microtonality: Issues in Sonority, Scale 80
Construction, Auditory Perception, and Cognition” (2012), pp.382–83.
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listener must accommodate by creating new representations.”  On my account, Reybrouck’s 81
statement can only be true if these “new” representations are based on, or are extensions of, 
old/familiar ones. Ayers, in his aforementioned paper on “19 Notes,” restates the problem 
thus: “When Blackwood uses more than 12 notes in a single passage, a listener must either 
associate two separate pitch classes with a singular chromatic function or count one of the 
pitch classes as functionally ambiguous, lying in a state outside of traditional scale-degree 
functions.”  I suspect that the former is more likely to be the case than the latter: that it is 82
more economical to stretch an existing category than to leave some novel event lingering 
outside category boundaries altogether. What’s more, according to Deepti Navaratna, this 
(former) process engages the intraparietal sulcus, the part of the brain that acts as “the 
substrate for creation of new mental representations that are directly linked to prior knowledge 
or previous experience of sensory events.”  83
 Admittedly, the previously discussed modulatory excerpt from “17 Notes” does not 
require an inordinate amount of cognitive “stretching” to understand through the framework of 
heptatonic diatonicism. But there are obviously several other moments in Blackwood’s 
microtonal music that demonstrate quite pointedly just how elastic auditory categories can be 
in practice. One short passage is especially illustrative in this regard, occurring in the first 
 Reybrouck, “A Biosemiotic and Ecological Approach to Music Cognition” (2005), p.243.81
 Ayers, “Microtonality and Transformation: Analyzing Easley Blackwood’s ’19 Notes’ with a 82
Modified Tonal GIS” (2017), p.15.
 Navaratna, “The Alchemy of Musical Memory: Connecting Culture to Cognition” (2017), p.83
193.
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movement of Blackwood’s four-movement Suite for Guitar in 15-note Equal Tuning, recorded in 
1994 by Jeffrey Kust. For reference, the pitches of 15-TET are given below:
Fig. 2.3: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 15-TET 
I want to focus on the relationship between D natural and D-down (z=3 and z=2, respectively), 
which sound rather like the same pitch class in the following excerpt, despite their being 80 
cents apart:
Ex. 2.5: A “stretchy unison” in mm.26–27 of the Suite for Guitar, 1st movement;  
excerpt begins at 0:18 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h89I8-
wWrWs&list=OLAK5uy_mUM6_6q6J4VL8gSrPIesFNU9FCGfmRL9g&index=14
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The two circles in Ex. 2.5 above are the same color to indicate the momentary impression of 
pitch-class equality between D natural and D-down in mm.26–27, an impression that obtains 
even despite the fact that these two pitches are not enharmonically equivalent in Blackwood’s 
15-TET. That two pitch classes separated by 80 cents in such close quarters might be cognized 
as “the same” seems an unlikely proposition on the surface. How does such auditory 
“stretching” occur—and why might one’s ears be especially flexible at this particular juncture? 
 The moment in question occurs in the middle of a sequence that stretches from m.25 to 
the end of m.30. This sequence might be classified by its recurring root motion (which in this 
case is the same as its bass motion): down a fourth, up a minor third. But quickly one realizes 
that this designation warrants a bit of categorical elasticity, for the two motions “up a minor 
third” are of different sizes. In the first case (mm.26–27), the ascent from B-down to D-down 
spans three unit intervals (240 cents), whereas in the second case (mm.28–29), the ascent from 
A-down to C natural spans four unit intervals (320 cents). The melodic motion across these 
barlines also differs: three unit intervals separate D and F in the former case (mirroring the 
ascent in the bass), whereas five unit intervals, or 400 cents, separate C and E-down in the 
latter (leading to the first major triad in the sequence). The irony of the situation is that, across 
mm.26–27, the same-sized ascent in bass and melody (3 unit intervals) results in the notational 
inequality of the pitches circled in red, whereas across mm.28–29, the differently sized ascents 
in bass (4 unit intervals) and melody (5 unit intervals) result in the notational equality of the 
pitches enclosed by purple diamonds (both z=0). 
 My overarching contention is that, despite being literally unequal, the two pitches 
circled in red in Ex. 2.5 come across as notionally z-equivalent in real time. (The same 
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impression of equality, of course, also goes for the two literally z-identical pitches boxed in 
purple.) These pairs of pitches occur in analogous positions of the sequence, and they undergo 
the same voice-leading transformation: chordal minor third (mm.26,28) becomes chordal root 
(mm.27,29). For listeners accustomed to this type of sequence in 12-TET, such a transformation 
typically acts upon a single pitch class—a common-tone “hinge” between sequential 
waystations, as it were:
Ex. 2.6: 12-TET version of mm.25–30 of the  
Suite for Guitar, 1st movement (harmonic reduction) 
But this is only true of the boxed C-naturals in mm.28–29 of Ex. 2.5. There are no common 
tones between the governing triadic harmonies of m.26 and m.27; the chordal third (D) in the 
former is a different note than the chordal root (D-down) in the latter. Yet such a common-tone 
hinge [1] is expected in general, and [2] actually occurs across mm.28–29. Might this 
confederation of schematic and veridical evidence be strong enough to cause one to 
retrospectively postulate a pitch-class equivalence where none exists? If so, it would make for 
an impressive feat of mental gymnastics. In the next chapter, I discuss how the auditory 
category of “perfect fifth” admits around 75 cents of variance across Blackwood’s etudes. Now, 
an even larger bandwidth—80 cents—separates a notional unison within the same brief span of 
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music! Perfect intervals evidently have much more contextual flexibility than previously 
thought.  84
But What About All Those Extra Notes? (II): Categorical In-Betweenness 
So how does this categorical elasticity figure into scale-degree judgments during some of the 
more expectationally interstitial moments in Blackwood’s microtonality? The previous example 
from the Suite for Guitar involves sequential motion, of course, but what of those moments 
when the governing key is unambiguously clear, yet an interval within it seems to straddle the 
line between two established auditory categories? What becomes of ordered-triple notation 
then? 
 The following example from “20 Notes” illustrates this situation rather well. It contains a 
pointed instance of what I call “notal” ambiguity: an ambiguous interval whose categorical in-
betweenness challenges the operation of what Bridges calls the “particularly efficient chunking 
 See for instance Vos, “The Perception of Pure and Mistuned Musical Fifths and Major Thirds: 84
Thresholds for Discrimination, Beats, and Identification” (1982), Hall and Hess, “Perception of 
Musical Interval Tuning” (1984), and Chapter 10 of Blackwood, The Structure of Recognizable 
Diatonic Tunings (1985)—all of which suggest that major/minor intervals (i.e., thirds, sixths, 
seconds, and/or sevenths) display more centwise flexibility in practice than do perfect intervals 
(i.e., unisons, octaves, fifths, and/or fourths). In other words, Western listeners, when presented 
with (say) a perfect fifth that is twenty cents sharper than pure and a major third that deviates 
from pure by that same amount, are more likely to judge the former as mistuned than the latter.
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mechanisms” that attend “the cognitive experience of microtonal practice.”  More specifically, 85
in Ex. 2.7 below, the circled D-down (z=3) in the “noble baritone solo” seems to lie exactly in 
the middle of two familiar scale-degree qualia, dorian 6̂ and dorian 7:̂
Fig. 2.4: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 20-TET 
 Bridges, “Towards a Perceptually-Grounded Theory of Microtonality: Issues in Sonority, Scale 85
Construction, Auditory Perception, and Cognition” (2012), p.284. See also McAdams, 
“Psychological Constraints on Form-Bearing Dimensions in Music” (1989), for a discussion of 
microtonality that routes its inquiry through George Miller’s famous “7 +/-2” capacity limit for 
short-term memory. [See Miller, “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits 
on Our Capacity for Processing Information” (1956).] Bridges, however, parts company with 
McAdams on the issue of this putative “magical number,” arguing that “musical pitch is a 
significant exception to the Miller limit” (291) because it is contextual and multidimensional—
not the decontextualized and unidimensional phenomenon that Miller allegedly treats it as in 
his study.
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Ex. 2.7: A microtonal “blue note” (or rather, “blue interval”) that confounds established 
auditory categories; excerpt begins at 0:11 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K7EdfaaUQeI




It is worth pointing out that thirteen of the twenty notes in the tuning appear in this excerpt; 
these correspond to the pitch classes numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, and 19 in 
Fig. 2.4. A cursory look at this list reveals that the {1, 2, 3, 4} subset has the greatest potential 
for “notal” ambiguity, since it is the longest span of consecutive unit intervals used in Ex. 2.7. 
Indeed, this 180-cent span  contains four pitches in a space even smaller than most Western 86
listeners are accustomed to hearing three. This presents a unique categorization dilemma for 
those enculturated to the 12-tone octave, who are thrust into a scenario where they must 
somehow account for an “extra” note.  
 I contend that the circled D-down in m.5 above is this “extra” note. Given the E-down 
centricity of the passage, C-up (z=1) reasonably approximates a minor sixth above tonic, C–
double-up (z=2) approximates a major sixth, and D natural (z=4) a minor seventh. But D-down 
(z=3) forms an interval with the E-down tonic that resists straightforward characterization. This 
“blue interval” seemingly occupies the exact midpoint between dorian 6̂  and dorian 7,̂ as if 
merging two generic scalar positions and two specific modal characters into an uncanny alloy. 
So how might the fundamental equivocality of this interval—what Rings might call its 
“apperceptive multiplicity” —be captured in ordered-triple notation? In other words, does the 87
circled D-down in Ex. 2.7 sound more like a (6̂, ti, 3) in this particular context, a (7,̂ do, 3), or 
some neological portmanteau of the two? 
 That is, 1200 [cents to the octave] / 20 [unit intervals to the octave] = 60 [cents per unit 86
interval], and 60 x 3 [the unit-intervallic distance between z=1 and z=4] = 180 cents.
 Rings, Tonality and Transformation (2011), p.21.87
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 In short, either scale-degree interpretation of the D-down is theoretically possible, but 
both cannot be heard simultaneously. The auditory situation is therefore analogous to the 
famous duck-rabbit illusion reproduced below:
Image 2.1: Unattributed 1892 drawing first discussed by Joseph Jastrow in 1899  
and then popularized by Ludwig Wittgenstein in 195388
Put another way, one can theoretically flip back and forth between hearing the D-down as a (6̂, 
ti, 3) or as a (7,̂ do, 3) across successive hearings, simply by performing the requisite mental
gymnastics. But one cannot hear it as something like a “( , to, 3).” The D-down thus brings 
about a momentary fork in the road of scale-degree interpretation, presenting listeners with 
two potential paths—neither of which is perfectly equipped to deal with such an expectational 
anomaly. 
 This is not to imply that both paths will always sound equally plausible for any given 
listener. In my own listening experience, for example, I tend towards hearing the D-down more 
 See Jastrow, “The Mind’s Eye” (1899), p.312 and Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 88
(1953), p.194.
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as a (7,̂ do, 3) than as a (6̂, ti, 3). This is primarily due to the presence, in m.5, of C–double-up 
(z=2) in accompanimental parts 9 and 15, which ascends unit-intervallically to D-down in both 
cases. On my hearing, this motion establishes a more clear ti-do relationship/distinction 
between C–double-up and D-down, which helps me tip the scales slightly in favor of the (7,̂ do, 
3) interpretation of the circled D-down in the solo part. But even in making this interpretational 
choice—and this is the larger point—I am still aware of its fundamental inadequacy to fully 
capture the novelty of the situation. There will always be traces of upward-straining ti-ness that 
persist in this D-down whenever I choose to hear it as a do, and likewise, there will always be 
traces of 6̂-ness that persist whenever I choose to hear it as a 7̂ (and vice versa). This is to say, 
either interpretive choice necessarily leaves behind a viable alternative and points up the fact 
that no single “cure-all” interpretation can fully eliminate the cognitive uneasiness that results 
from encountering categorical in-betweenness. In the next chapter, I make the case that such 
uneasiness can be understood in terms of the social-psychological phenomenon of cognitive 
dissonance, which leads to a rethinking of musical consonance and dissonance under the 
banner of culturally conditioned expectation. As we will see, this reframing accomplishes three 
principal goals: [1] it productively illustrates how “consonance” and “dissonance” are culturally 
relative qualia and not just reflections of immutable psychoacoustic laws, [2] it uncouples these 
terms from a historical overemphasis on the pitch domain, and [3] it opens out onto a broader 
discussion of what drives our musical preferences, tastes, and value judgments. 
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Digestif 
Before turning to consonance and dissonance in earnest, I would like to close this chapter with 
one final analytical vignette that is more lighthearted—and less microtonal—in temperament. It 
is difficult to think of a song more explicitly concerned with the matter of scale-degree labeling 
than “Do-Re-Mi” (1965) from The Sound of Music. But though the song is ostensibly employed 
to teach the Von Trapp children the seven solfège syllables for an ionian scale, its melody 
features a few notes that fall outside of that collection. These additional notes start to appear 
during the second half of Maria’s scalar exposition, once the harmonic rhythm doubles in pace. 
It is here that the referential diatonic collection shifts for the first time away from Bb ionian, as a 
result of a series of successive tonicizations that prepares the arrival of the final do. More 
specifically, the introductions of sol, la, and ti all occur over secondary dominants (that resolve 
to global IV, V, and vi, respectively). How might these local shifts in harmonic context affect the 
y-components of this trio of newly introduced syllables? In other words—and here I beg the 
reader’s indulgence—if Maria Von Trapp somehow knew ordered triple notation, would she still 








































 In short, not quite. Even though “Do-Re-Mi” never modulates away from its global Bb 
ionian orientation, the sequential tonicizing tilts in Ex. 2.8 are enough to momentarily unhook 
the customary relationship of x and y in ionian. As a result, while x never fundamentally shifts—
Bb remains 1 ̂throughout the song—the z-location of y=do changes rather frequently, to reflect 
how tonicizations typically involve shifts in the referential diatonic collection (and thus shifts in 
where its naturally occurring minor seconds are located). In the opening measure of the excerpt 
above, for instance, I postulate that the lyric “So[l]” is better understood as a re in light of its 
participation in a tonicization of Eb ionian.  In a similar vein, I label the lyric “La” in the third 89
measure as another re because of its analogous role in a tonicization of F ionian. Ordered-triple 
notation therefore deftly clarifies how the relationship between Maria’s “So[l]” and “La” is 
simultaneously one of stepwise ascent (in the x sense) and one of contextual equivalence (in 
the y sense). Perhaps, in a parallel universe (but over the same music), she could have 
introduced the notes of Bb ionian numerically rather than syllabically, as generic scalar 
positions rather than specific modal characters. This would necessitate some serious lyrical 
revisions, of course—possibly a golf-related pun on the homophonous relationship between 4̂ 
 Of course, one could also conceivably hear the first two measures of Ex. 2.8 in a framework 89
that is wholly native to Bb ionian (i.e., as a I–IV), which would result in a y-matching label of sol 
on the lyric “So[l].” This interpretation is plausible because none of the preceding music in 
Maria’s scalar exposition has left a Bb ionian frame of reference—even on the local level. 
(Accompaniments that do not include a literal Ab during the first bar of Ex. 2.8, moreover, 
make this hearing even more plausible.) But what such an interpretation misses is the harmonic, 
melodic, and sequential parallelism of the first three two-bar units in Ex. 2.8, which call out for 
similar analytical treatment as local tonicizations. The scale-degree hearing I propose for “So[l], 
a needle pulling thread” is therefore one that consciously privileges the coming sequential 
inertia over the preceding tonal/modal consistency. That Ex. 2.8 begins on a strong hyper-
downbeat only further solidifies the sense that it is the start of something new (despite its 
rhetoric of sentential continuation).
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and “fore”?—but it would ultimately make for a more accurate introduction to the diatonic 
scale. Alternatively, she could keep the solfège syllables as they are but tweak their musical 
accompaniment so that each one is introduced in a framework unmistakably native to Bb 
ionian. Either way, something has to give, for the actual introductions of “So[l]” and “La” do 
not make for the best exemplars of how ionian-mode sol and la characteristically feel. 
 The case regarding “Ti” is nominally similar, but a closer look at my annotations in mm.
5–6 reveals some notable limitations of ordered-triple notation that warrant candid discussion. I 
have proffered two possible interpretations for these bars; each interpretation has its own 
benefits but also some nontrivial drawbacks. Above the staff, I propose a scale-degree hearing 
that has the advantage of y-component parallelism with the previous pair of two-bar units; 
under this interpretation, Maria’s “Ti” is reckoned as yet another re-flavored cog in the 
sequential machine. But the principal drawback of this hearing is that its scale-degree labels 
presuppose a tonicization of G ionian (rather than the expected G aeolian)—which leads to the 
melodic Bb on the downbeat of m.6 being labeled with an altered solfège syllable of me 
(rather than the expected mi).  Why should one hear this Bb as auxiliary, given that the 90
 Readers will notice that the ordered triples in m.5 of this hearing are nominally native to B 90
phrygian—a scale that is y-identical to G ionian, the putative goal of the tonicization. My main 
issue with this interpretation, to be clear, is not that B phrygian should not be considered a 
“parallel” mode to the other Bb-centric modes in the passage; this is an inevitable 
consequence of my more expansive conception of “parallel,” and in any case, there is 
precedent in Russian music theory for granting parallel status to two modes whose centers are 
a minor second apart. [See Dolzhansky, “O ladovoi osnove sochinenii Shostakovicha” (1962), 
which has been cited more recently in Carpenter, “Russian Theorists on Modality in 
Shostakovich’s Music” (1995) and Bazayev, “The Expansion of the Concept of Mode in 
Twentieth-Century Russian Music Theory” (2014).] Rather, I primarily take issue with the 
assumption that Bb ever lies outside of a referential orienting collection in this passage and 
that, as a corollary, it should ever warrant an altered solfège syllable when it occurs melodically.
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diatonic triad being tonicized at this point (G minor, or vi of Bb ionian) contains Bb as its third? 
The hearing I propose below the staff, on the other hand, treats mm.5–6 as a tonicization of G 
aeolian. But while this hearing is ostensibly more faithful to the modal quality of the sequence’s 
triadic landing points, it also creates the (dubious, in my opinion) impression that the melodic 
Bbs on the downbeats of measures 6 and 8 are experientially identical (since both receive a y-
component of do—at least initially in the case of m.6). Ordered-triple notation therefore posits 
a qualitative equivalence on paper where one may not actually exist. The reason for this 
apparent equivalence is that the bottom-staff hearing of mm.5–6 marks the one exceptional 
case in which a local tonicization does not disturb the customary x/y pairing of an overarching 
mode: when the local area being tonicized exists in a “relative” relationship to the global 
referential diatonic collection.  If ordered-triple notation can be likened to a drug, then the 91
way it deals with tonicizations of relative tonal areas is certainly one of its most pronounced and 
notable side effects. Or, to use a metaphor instead of a simile, it is a notable “bug” in my 
system—and a pointed reminder that no analytical tool can work perfectly all the time.  92
 Because G aeolian (local goal) and Bb ionian (global anchor) share the same naturally 91
occurring minor seconds, they are y-identical. And because this is a tonicization, x is preserved 
as well. At first, admittedly, it is difficult to tell from my scale-degree labels that a local 
harmonic shift is even taking place in the fifth measure of Ex. 2.8—but the raised solfège 
syllables fi and si provide the telltale traces of that form of aeolian typically called “melodic 
minor.”
 Ordered-triple notation might also be accused of “diatonic bias” in that it does not treat 92
heptatonic (but non-diatonic) scales like harmonic minor or lydian dominant as genuine 
referential structures in their own right. Instead, the notation would regard the former as an 
altered form of aeolian and the latter as an altered form of either lydian or mixolydian. (And this 
is to say nothing of the system’s limited applicability to various non-Western scales and modes.)
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 Now, to return to my hypothetical question from earlier: regardless of how one hears 
Ex. 2.8, none of the three new syllables Maria introduces in this excerpt actually corresponds 
with their typical ionian character. Yes, under the bottom-staff interpretation of mm.5–6, her 
introduction of “Ti” can actually be heard as occurring on a ti. But this is not the ti that is native 
to the Bb ionian scale she is teaching. The point of this closing gambit, to be abundantly clear, 
is not to argue that Maria Von Trapp was a poor pedagogue, or to chide her and her family for 
not knowing ordered-triple scale-degree notation. Over half a century later, “Do-Re-Mi” 
remains an indispensable classic—and an invaluable resource for teaching diatonic scalar 
structure. All I ask is that we consider the subtle ways in which its didactic purview actually 
extends far beyond a single major scale. The drawbacks of my system notwithstanding, let my 
counterfactual rethinking of this cultural relic serve as a final case in point that, when armed 
with a labeling system that reflects a genus/species conception of scale-degree qualia, one will 
find themselves better equipped to capture not only the “sound” of Western tonal music, but 
also its “feels.”
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Chapter 3   |   Is Exposure So Mere? 
By this point, I have played Blackwood’s microtonal music for almost two hundred people, 
spanning all sorts of musical backgrounds. I can confidently say that I have never before seen a 
recording arouse such consistently strong and pronounced reactions in listeners, regardless of 
their respective levels of musical expertise, experience, and training. Sometimes, I would single 
out specific people—like my parents (who have no musical training whatsoever) or my students 
(many of whom are trained, practicing musicians)—to solicit their gut reactions and opinions on 
the music. But perhaps even more revealing have been those instances where I played 
Blackwood’s microtonality for people who had no idea it was coming. 
 One perk of my having chosen to study music for a living is that people sometimes 
entrust me with the auxiliary cable at social gatherings. Most of the time, when I play music that 
I like (whether it be Steely Dan, Mark Turner, or Joni Mitchell), most others do not bat an eye; 
the music simply recedes to the background, serving as sonic accompaniment for our 
conversations. Rarely does anyone actually stop and ask me what I am playing. But whenever I 
play Blackwood’s microtonal music for an unsuspecting audience, it does not take long for the 
entire room to fall silent. Indeed, it is difficult to multitask when so many implicit 
preconceptions about how music sounds are being blown to bits right before one’s ears. 
Innocuous social experiments such as these communicate to me more pointedly than any direct 
conversation that, simply put, something bizarre is up with this music. As Theodor Adorno 
writes, “Involuntariness is the best proof that a tendency is socially authentic.”  1
 Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music (1976), p.175.1
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 Blackwood’s music provokes intensely visceral reactions across the board—whether of 
fascination, dumbfoundedness, or frustration—and there does not seem to be any middle 
ground. When I press listeners to describe it, the most common descriptors I receive are 
“weird” or “out of tune.” A few actually cannot stand to hear it and plead with me to turn the 
music off immediately. But many more are instantly hooked and request to hear more, listening 
with mouths agape and brows furrowed, trying to figure out what is happening. For these sorts 
of listeners, Blackwood’s microtonality represents the ultimate contradiction: music that sounds 
out of tune, yet music that cannot be simply tuned out. 
 A healthy plurality of people I have surveyed describe the experience of hearing 
Blackwood’s music in contradictory terms. Many have communicated to me the paradoxical 
sense that it sounds unlike anything they have ever encountered in their lives, yet at the same 
time, oddly similar to music they have heard before. Descriptions like these remind me of 
Jonathan Kramer’s characterization of Blackwood’s microtonality as “music simultaneously of 
strange novelty and of almost comfortable familiarity.”  One recurring descriptive motif in this 2
vein, most common among trained musicians and fellow music theorists, is that Blackwood’s 
music is “highly dissonant,” yet also somehow “more consonant” than they initially thought it 
would be. Comments such as these especially intrigued me at first. For how could music that 
contains basically no purely tuned intervals besides octaves—and extremely few other intervals 
that match the size of ones in 12-TET—be heard as “consonant”? This contradiction eventually 
became the impetus for the present chapter. 
 Kramer, “Can Modernism Survive George Rochberg?” (1984), p.347.2
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 In the following pages, I examine the familiar categories of consonance and dissonance 
through a primarily microtonal lens. This continues the dissertation’s overarching theme of 
exploring what can be revealed about the most conventional musical concepts by considering 
them from an unconventional perspective. I begin by briefly surveying some of the ways that 
scholars have previously talked about consonance and dissonance. I then advance an 
expectational account of these terms, in which musical events are considered consonant to the 
extent that they are expected (and vice versa for dissonance). Throughout, I frame consonance/
dissonance qualia as cognitive misattributions wherein listeners pin broader sensations of 
expectational fit/non-fit onto what David Huron calls the “convenient bystanders” of intervals, 
chords, and progressions.  Advancing this account will occasion an unpacking of the kinds of 3
expectation that impinge upon such interpretive judgments as well as the panoply of musical 
parameters that can inform and influence them. My analytical vignettes focus on the roles that 
enculturation, meter, and notation play in mediating this complex process. With these last two 
mediators in particular, I explore some of the oft-overlooked ways in which non-pitched 
elements can act as “consonating” and/or “dissonating” forces. 
Let’s Start with a Quick Salad 
Historically, the terms “consonance” and “dissonance” have referred to quite a number of 
different things. James Tenney’s book-length survey of these terms posits at least five distinct 
“consonance/dissonance concepts” (or “CDCs”) in Western musical culture.  According to his 4
 Huron, Sweet Anticipation: Music and the Psychology of Expectation (2006b), p.138.3
 Tenney, A History of ‘Consonance’ and ‘Dissonance’ (1988), p.3.4
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account, “consonance” has been used to refer to [1] a “relatedness between pitches sounding 
successively,” [2] the “sonorous character of simultaneous dyads,” [3] the “perceptual clarity 
[of] a polyphonic texture,” [4] “individual tones in a chord,” and [5] an acoustico-perceptual 
smoothness (whose flip side equates “dissonance” with “roughness”).  This last concept, 5
catalyzed by the work of Hermann von Helmholtz,  is the most recent to take hold in musical 6
discourse. It aligns with what Tenney calls the “colloquial” notion of dissonance as beats (and 
consonance as their relative absence).  William Sethares, for instance, adopts something like 7
CDC-5 in his book Tuning, Timbre, Spectrum, Scale—except he calls it “sensory” consonance 
and dissonance.  8
 Of course, there are several other conceptions of consonance and dissonance that fall 
outside of Tenney’s historical typology. Aline Honingh, for example, relies on geometric and 
group-theoretic criteria in her account, arguing that “consonance is optimized in a convex 
 Ibid., p.4. Crucially, Tenney argues that these various CDCs are chronologically accumulative; 5
they do not simply replace one another over time.
 See especially Helmholtz, Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen als psychologische 6
Grundlage für die Theorie der Musik (1863).
 Tenney, A History of ‘Consonance’ and ‘Dissonance’ (1988), p.94. Tenney goes on, in the 7
book’s conclusion, to suggest calling this subtype “timbral consonance and dissonance” (100, 
emphasis mine).
 Sethares, Tuning, Timbre, Spectrum, Scale (2005), p.3. Sethares claims rather boldly that “[i]t 8
is possible to make almost any interval reasonably consonant, or to make it wildly dissonant, by 
properly sculpting the spectrum of the sound” (3). For him, no parameter has a greater 
influence on judgments of consonance, dissonance, and intonation than timbre. In fact, their 
relationship is so closely intertwined that it can often be difficult to distinguish between 
something that is strictly “out of tune” and something that is in tune but “out of 
spectrum” (250), as Sethares puts it.
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musical pitch structure.”  Jan Wild asserts that “the phenomenon [of consonance/dissonance] 9
is of a genuinely interdisciplinary nature,” citing works of neurophysiology, psychology, 
musicology, and psychoacoustics alike.  And Norman Cazden claims that consonance and 10
dissonance are culturally contingent concepts, arising from the regularities “peculiar to specific 
system[s] of music-making.”  Cazden triangulates the historical binary between Pythagorean 11
and Aristoxenian notions of musical consonance, proffering a middleground view of 
consonance as more than a simple mathematical ratio or an isolated judgment of the ear. His 
nuance on this matter is particularly welcome—for as is becoming clear, comparing these 
differing perspectives on consonance/dissonance is more than the proverbial “apples-to-
oranges” affair. A veritable fruit salad has accumulated. Consonance and dissonance have been 
applied to single tones, horizontal successions, and vertical combinations; they have been 
 Honingh, “The Origin and Well-Formedness of Tonal Pitch Structures” (2006), p.23. 9
“Convexity” is a term borrowed from mathematical topology, where it describes a set in 
Euclidean space that “contains all the line segments connecting any pair of its points” (80).  
Honingh goes on to conjecture that “[c]onvexity may be a consequence of striving for 
maximizing connectivity; i.e. to get as many consonant intervals as possible within the notes 
defining the scale or chord” (86).
 Wild, “The Computation Behind Consonance and Dissonance” (2002), p.301.10
 Cazden, “The Definition of Consonance and Dissonance,” (1980), p.159. As Cazden pithily 11
concludes, “Musical consonance and dissonance therefore arise, not from Nature, but from 
‘second nature’” (159).
125
located in notation, in sound, and in the mind; they have been associated with both specific 
cent sizes and generic interval classes.  Does there exist a common ingredient? 12
 I propose that expectation is this ingredient, akin to the collected juice in which the fruit 
salad macerates. My account treats consonance and dissonance as flexible qualia that describe 
the interaction between sounding music and culturally conditioned expectation. As I argue in 
Chapter 1, musical expectation is largely subconscious and difficult to verbalize with precision, 
and so listeners sometimes compensate by offloading their sensations of expectational fit/non-
fit onto musical proxies of various sizes and dispositions—e.g., “this note is a dissonance,” 
“this chord is a consonance,” “this interval is consonant,” “this progression (or section [or even 
piece]) is dissonant.” This is in part why there have been so many “consonance-dissonance 
concepts” over the course of Western music history. But what binds them all together, I 
maintain, is an implicit conception of dissonance as unexpectedness relative to statistically 
learned cultural/stylistic norms—and it is this sense that I wish to pursue further. 
Setting Up Shop 
Blackwood’s microtonal music demonstrates that the same structural processes and rhetorical 
moves that orient listeners in familiar (twelve-note) tunings can be recognized as such in more 
finely grained tunings—but only if enough other musical parameters (such as rhythm/meter, 
 Two examples of this latter perspective—that is, of consonance as a function of generic 12
interval class rather than specific cent size—are Balzano, “The Group-Theoretic Description of 
12-fold and Microtonal Pitch Systems” (1980) and Yasser, A Theory of Evolving Tonality (1932). 
Both of these authors argue (in their own ways) that each tuning houses its own unique set of 
consonances that are derived from mathematical criteria independent of the approximation of 
familiar just or equal-tempered intervals.
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style/topoi, timbre, dynamics, etc.) join forces in predictable ways. “Predictability,” here, is a 
cognitive alloy: a function of several distinct forms of expectation and types of memory working 
in tandem. Huron notes three of these in particular: veridical expectation (“episodic” memories 
of specific events), schematic expectation (“semantic” memories of auditory abstractions), and 
dynamic expectation (“short-term” memories arising from real-time exposures).  I have already 13
discussed the distinction between “veridical” and “schematic” in Chapter 1, noting how these 
types of expectation engage auditory sensory memory and long-term memory, respectively. 
The new term here is “dynamic” expectation, which describes piece-specific predictions that 
are set up, confirmed, or denied processually, in the act of real-time listening; this type of 
expectation engages one’s short-term and working memory capacities.  
 My guiding assumption is that listeners enculturated to 12-note tunings (what I have 
been calling “12-enculturated listeners”) rely primarily on schematic and dynamic expectations 
to contextualize the unusual features of Blackwood’s microtonality and render them more 
intelligible. This reliance, furthermore, is overcompensatory: faced with the near absence of 
specific intervals, chords, and progressions familiar from 12-TET or just tuning (which would 
trigger episodic / auditory sensory memories), listeners react by relying all the more strongly on 
semantic/long-term and short-term/working memories to make sense of the music. Rather than 
trying to process each unfamiliar interval/chord/progression on its own, which would be 
cognitively taxing, listeners instead “relinquish the particularities and idiosyncrasies of the 
sensory experience in favor of forms of conceptualization by which [they] can process the 
 Huron, Sweet Anticipation (2006b), pp.221–31.13
127
incoming information in a more economical way.”  As I discuss in previous chapters, this is the 14
principle of cognitive economy: the notion that we are disposed to seek out a “maximum of 
information with the least cognitive effort.”  15
 Human brains have evolved to compress information efficiently, latching onto certain 
features of the environment at the expense of others. But to what end? Huron notes that our 
brains typically condition us to behave in ways that pursue pleasure and avoid punishment or 
pain. When it comes to listening to music, for example, the brain rewards a “successful (i.e. 
coherent) parsing of the auditory scene.”  One key to this process is the identification of a 16
tonal center, or tonic: a referential pitch class z that has an anchoring/hierarchizing effect on 
melodic and harmonic perception across a certain span of musical time. As I have already 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the stakes are only raised when the music is in an unfamiliar tuning: 
for one must either attend to the music in a framework that maximizes predictive accuracy 
whilst minimizing cognitive load, or else risk the negative feelings of confusion, annoyance, and 
frustration—nature’s “punishment.” 
 It appears that the human capacity for tonic-finding has a long evolutionary history. Piotr 
Podlipniak addresses this history, synthesizing previous research by Huron and Reybrouck, 
among others, to argue that “the ability of pitch centre recognition (PCR) became an adaptive 
 Mark Reybrouck, “A Biosemiotic and Ecological Approach to Music Cognition: Event 14
Perception Between Auditory Listening and Cognitive Economy” (2005), p.248.
 Ibid., p.256.15
 Huron, “The Plural Pleasures of Music” (2005), p.7. For more on auditory scene analysis, see 16
Bregman, Auditory Scene Analysis: The Perceptual Organization of Sound (1990). Of course, it 
goes without saying that there are certain situations, for humans and animals alike, where 
successfully/coherently parsing an auditory scene can be a literal manner of life or death.
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innovation in the course of hominine evolution which enabled a more effective social 
consolidation.”  In other words, the capacity to hear tonal centers is rooted in human ritual 17
culture and sociality.  As Podlipniak claims, “[A] musical performance that is organized around 18
pitch centricity can serve as a tool for reducing tension between group members and 
enhanc[ing] mutual trust,” in addition to promoting feelings of community, group identity, and 
social cohesion.  Tonic-finding is thus part nurture and part human nature: though its 19
evolutionary specifics are strongly conditioned by culture, it also serves a fundamentally 
biological purpose—as a means to enhance adaptive fitness—that cannot be discounted or 
forgotten. Indeed, Huron takes great pains to emphasize that all evolved behaviors (along with 
the emotions that attend/accompany them) have arisen via natural selection “as adaptations 
that enhance survival.”  The act of hearing tonality in microtonality, therefore, is more than just 20
a vestigial product of a bygone era, or an optional choice only available to a small group of 
musicians trained in Western Euroclassical idioms. Rather, it is also a manifestation of a more 
general biological phenomenon: the instinctual response to make sense of unfamiliar 
surroundings by leveraging mental heuristics to impose a sense of order and control on a 
highly variable environment. 
 Such are the stakes of (micro)tonal attention—like the aural equivalent of being 
dropped in the middle of the woods (or a maze) and needing to follow environmental cues in 
 Podlipniak, “The Evolutionary Origin of Pitch Centre Recognition” (2016), p.527.17
 Ibid., p.537. 18
 Ibid.19
 Huron, “The Plural Pleasures of Music” (2005), p.2.20
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order to find one’s way out. Tonal hearing (whether in microtonality or not) thus has a lot to do 
with the interconnected processes of expectation and prediction, which work in tandem to help 
listeners stake out their musical bearings in the face of equivocality. I have already spoken at 
great length about the role that implicit learning plays in influencing this process and fleshing 
out its specifics. As Carol Krumhansl writes, “Listeners appear to be sensitive to the frequency 
with which various elements and their combinations are employed in music. It seems probable 
that abstract tonal and harmonic relations are learned through internalizing distributional 
properties characteristic of [a particular] style.”  This process is largely unconscious, as several 21
authors have noted, and begins mere months after birth. Annabel Cohen calls it “tonality 
induction”: the “natural outcome of acoustic redundancies in music, and the predisposition of 
the brain to represent these redundancies.”  22
 To put things bluntly, the baggage of enculturation is heavy and cannot be pushed 
aside. I have been arguing that 12-enculturated listeners, faced with a tuning/soundworld that 
is culturally unfamiliar, compensate by seeking out familiar shapes, processes, and behaviors as 
referential guideposts, pinning these labels (however subconsciously) on the best available 
candidates that present themselves. This in itself is a rather uncontroversial assertion. Meagan 
Curtis and Jamshed Bharucha, for instance, have tested this hypothesis empirically, finding that 
“one’s internalized cultural knowledge may drive musical expectancies when listening to music 
 Krumhansl, Cognitive Foundations of Musical Pitch (2001), p.286.21
 Cohen, “Development of Tonality Induction: Plasticity, Exposure, and Training” (2000), p.437.22
130
of an unfamiliar modal system.”  Daniel Cox has even given this sensation of unfamiliarity a 23
name: “intercultural structural discordance.”  What is more controversial, however, is the 24
notion that the labels listeners pin on musical proxies are not always accurate (or at least, not 
always what they think they are). The mutable history of “consonance” and “dissonance” 
provides a fertile case study in cognitive misattribution, and this circles back to the major goal 
of the chapter. My choice to look more closely at the role expectation plays in judgments of 
consonance and dissonance is not to be understood as an indictment of listeners, a way of 
chiding them for thinking they have been talking about one thing, when in reality they have 
actually been talking about another all along. Rather, it is an attempt to think more critically 
about how minds have evolved to work, and how this in turn conditions the ways that musical 
expectation and prediction operate. 
 To be clear, my intention is not to replace or supersede all existing definitions of 
consonance and dissonance with a catch-all expectational account. I understand the danger of 
claiming that consonance and dissonance are solely about expectation. Over half a century 
ago, John van de Geer, Willem Levelt, and Reinier Plomp demonstrated that judgments of 
“consonance” are actually judgments about many different phenomena at the same time, 
conflated under a convenient blanket descriptor.  And in a more recent book, Huron suggests 25
that “at least ten factors influence the perceived pleasantness of a sonority,” ranging from 
 Curtis and Bharucha, “Memory and Musical Expectation for Tones in Cultural 23
Context” (2009), p.365.
 Cox, “The Emancipation of Discordance,” (2014), p.18.24
 Van de Geer, Levelt, and Plomp, “The Connotation of Musical Consonance” (1962).25
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enculturation to the mechanics of the basilar membrane.  Yet I still believe it can be useful to 26
tell the story of consonance and dissonance primarily through the lens of expectation—
especially in the case of Blackwood’s microtonal music, which engages (even demands) the 
workings of musical expectation in unique and memorable ways. As will hopefully become 
clear in what follows, consonance/dissonance judgments mainly derive from subconscious, 
lower-level musical exposures and expectancies, but they can trickle up to infuse more complex 
assessments of centricity, stability, and even value. 
Some Terminological Distinctions 
My account does not disavow the existence of sensory consonance and dissonance. Simply 
put, certain combinations of sounds come across as rougher than others, and this is an 
established psychoacoustic fact that I do not intend to downplay or discount. But alongside 
this sensory conception of consonance and dissonance, there also exists a robust cognitive 
component to consonance/dissonance judgments wherein expectation and prediction play 
central roles—and this latter component is the main focus of the present chapter. Like Chapter 
2, which argues that much can be revealed about scale-degree qualia by separating out two 
oft-conflated subcomponents of scale-degree experience, this chapter performs a similar type 
of disentangling work. But again, as is the case with the x- and y-components of my scale-
degree ordered triples, the sensory and cognitive components of consonance/dissonance 
judgments are richly interactive in practice—a fact that cannot be denied even as I argue for 
their terminological disentanglement. In 12-TET, for example, the intervals that are most 
 Huron, Voice Leading: The Science Behind a Musical Art (2016), pp.55–56.26
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dissonant in the sensory sense of the term (i.e., the ones that produce the most “beats” and 
whose ratios involve the largest numbers) are also the ones that are rarest in tonal music and 
thus the least expected. This is not to say that tritones or minor seconds are dissonant 
primarily/precisely because they are unexpected, but rather, that sensory dissonance often 
begets cognitive dissonance, and these two subcomponents exist in complicated historical and 
cultural feedback loops where one is not so easily separated from the other. 
 And yet, microtonal music such as Blackwood’s, where so many passages come across 
as oddly coherent and familiar despite the near-complete lack of intervals that are “consonant” 
in the sensory/psychoacoustic sense of the term, demonstrates the utility of isolating the 
cognitive/expectational side of consonance/dissonance judgments. Until this point, very few 
music scholars have framed the phenomena of consonance and dissonance in expectational 
terms, demonstrating the persistence of the historical trend to talk about these properties as if 
they were inherent in musical sounds themselves (rather than being the result of interpretive 
judgments of these sounds). Ian Quinn is one of the exceptions; in a 2013 talk, he makes a 
distinction between “acoustic” consonance/dissonance and “schematic” consonance/
dissonance, the former corresponding with the sensory/psychoacoustic sense of the term and 
the latter with the expectational/predictive sense that is contingent upon a listener’s 
enculturation.  Another exception is Jamshed Bharucha; in his 1994 article discussing the 27
difference between schematic and veridical expectation, he argues that “[e]xpectation, 
 Quinn, “In Time and Out of Tune: Some Perspectives on Consonance and 27
Dissonance” (2013), invited lecture given at St. Jerome’s University, Waterloo, Ontario. A 
recording of the talk is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A5XodbqeZK0; in it, 
Quinn also proposes a third type of consonance/dissonance that relates to the properties of 
critical bands (he calls this “cochlear” consonance and dissonance).
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consonance, and stability [….] refer to slightly different experiential aspects of the same 
underlying process.”  But statements such as these that explicitly link sensations of 28
consonance/dissonance to expectation are few and far between, and they largely have yet to 
take hold in music-theoretic discourse. 
 There is, however, precedent for such a framing in the social-psychological literature of 
the 1950s onwards. I am thinking in particular of Leon Festinger’s influential notion of 
“cognitive dissonance.”  In his words, “The simplest definition of dissonance can be given in 29
terms of a person’s expectations. In the course of our lives we have all accumulated a large 
number of expectations about what things go together and what things do not. When such an 
expectation is not fulfilled, dissonance occurs.”  Festinger argues that when facing such 30
dissonance, it becomes imperative to reduce it by all means necessary. This restoration of 
mental consistency can be accomplished by a variety of means, from changing one’s behavior 
 Bharucha, “Tonality and Expectation” (1994), p.217.28
 See in particular Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957). This original work has 29
spawned a burgeoning subfield of social psychology in the decades since. For more on how 
this theory has developed over time, see Chapanis and Chapanis, “Cognitive Dissonance: Five 
Years Later” (1964); Aronson, “Dissonance Theory: Progress and Problems” (1968); Fazio, 
Zanna, and Cooper, “Dissonance and Self-Perception: An Integrative View of Each Theory’s 
Proper Domain of Application” (1977); Cooper and Fazio, “A New Look at Dissonance Theory” 
(1984); Shultz and Lepper, “Cognitive Dissonance Reduction as Constraint Satisfaction” (1996); 
Hoshino-Browne et al., “On the Cultural Guises of Cognitive Dissonance: The Case of 
Easterners and Westerners” (2005); and Harmon-Jones, “Clarifying Concepts in Cognitive 
Dissonance Theory” (2017).
 Festinger, “Cognitive Dissonance” (1962), p.94. This quote is from a public-facing distillation 30
of his 1957 book that appears in a 1962 issue of Scientific American. The article, it is worth 
noting, makes for a rather uncomfortable read, as some of its examples and illustrations are 
blatantly sexist, reducing women to the value they can provide for men, and painting them as 
objects of “temptation” (see in particular p.98). It also consistently uses male pronouns to refer 
to hypothetical persons when explaining the theory.
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to altering one’s belief system to even “distorting [one’s] perception and information about the 
world around [them].”  I argue that this last technique of “dissonance reduction,” so to speak, 31
is particularly important in parsing Blackwood’s microtonality. More specifically, listening to this 
music produces a profound sort of cognitive dissonance in 12-enculturated listeners—since so 
much of it flouts 12-conditioned expectations about how music typically sounds—and reducing 
this dissonance often amounts to “consonating” deviant musical events by fitting (sometimes 
even forcing) them into familiar categorical frameworks of best fit, thereby making them easier 
to process and understand. Festinger’s conception transfers particularly well to the case of 
processing unfamiliar music (and music in unfamiliar tunings) not only because it centers the 
role of expectation, but also because it is equipped to deal with the fundamental relationality 
of tonal cognition. As he writes, “The word ‘cognitive’ simply emphasizes that the theory deals 
with relations among items of information.”  32
 As far as I am aware, no music scholar has applied the notion of cognitive dissonance to 
discussions of musical consonance/dissonance or to scenarios involving the processing of 
music in unfamiliar tunings. Leonid Perlovsky has written about music’s capacity to help 
students “tolerate cognitive dissonances” and “overcome CD-related stress” while taking tests 
and exams—situations that usually involve making difficult decisions among competing 
choices.  But rarely, if ever, is music framed as the source of cognitive dissonance. Blackwood’s 33
 Ibid., p.93.31
 Ibid., emphasis mine.32
 Perlovsky et al., “Mozart Effect, Cognitive Dissonance, and the Pleasure of Music” (2013), pp.33
9 and 13.
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microtonality demonstrates rather cleverly that music is not always the calming, soothing 
influence it is often taken to be. Sometimes, music can be a thorn in our side, a threat to our 
established worldview of how things ought to go—and when its conflicts strike us at an 
existential level, we are often forced into making snap decisions to resolve them and re-
establish some semblance of order and control. 
 Pointing up the expectational, cognitive component of musical consonance/dissonance 
judgments has some provocative implications for the way that consonance and dissonance are 
typically discussed and understood. This leads to the second terminological distinction I wish 
to make in this section: one among the terms “consonance,” “dissonance,” and 
“discordance.” This third term is particular to Blackwood, who distinguishes between 
discordances and dissonances on the following grounds: the former are characterized by 
“rough sound[s],” whereas the latter “contain combination[s] of tendency notes” that are 
“unstable regardless of the level of discordance.”  For Blackwood, therefore, “discordance” 34
aligns with the sensory/psychoacoustic conception of dissonance discussed earlier, whereas 
“dissonance” is more of a contextual/behavioral phenomenon that need not be directly 
proportional to discordance (though it sometimes can be). “Consonance,” on the other hand, 
features both the absence of discordance and the absence of dissonance; it is marked by 
smooth sounds and stable notes. 
 Blackwood, “Modes and Chord Progressions in Equal Tunings” (1991), p.177. For more on 34
Blackwood’s distinction between “dissonance” and “discordance,” see Keislar, “Six American 
Composers on Nonstandard Tunings” (1991), Skinner, “Toward a Quarter-Tone Syntax: Analysis 
of Selected Works by Blackwood, Haba, Ives, and Wyschnegradsky” (2007), and Cox, “The 
Emancipation of Discordance” (2014).
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 Under an expectational lens, however, the meanings of these terms shift in ways that 
might strike a reader as controversial. To start, because discordance is fundamentally sensory, 
there is no such thing as “cognitive discordance”—though psychoacoustic discords can be said 
to evoke varying degrees of cognitive dissonance. This, admittedly, is not likely to cause a 
reader much alarm. More likely to ruffle some feathers, however, is the notion that there exists 
a valid expectational sense in which traditional musical “dissonances” are actually more 
cognitively consonant than traditional musical “consonances,” since the former tend to 
behave/resolve in a predictable manner, whereas the latter are behaviorally unconstrained. This 
last bit has become such a pedagogical commonplace—that dissonances must resolve 
downwards by step, whereas consonances are free to move/leap/proceed as they please—that 
it obscures an important truth of musical processing: that when a (chordal or functional) 
dissonance occurs, we tend to know what it will do next. Of course, traditional “consonances” 
are more statistically probable than traditional “dissonances” in the zeroth-order sense of 
frequency of occurrence, and I do not intend to deny or supplant this truism here. But in the 
first-order sense of continuational probability in a given musical context, traditional 
“dissonances” tend to behave and progress in ways that engender a greater degree of 
expectational certainty than do traditional “consonances”—and it is precisely this that 
motivates my suggestive inversion of these categories when regarding them as expectational 
phenomena. Again, this is not to argue that what we usually think of as “dissonances” are 
actually “consonances” wholesale (and vice versa), but rather, to point up the fact that 
adopting a cognitive/expectational framework can reveal surprising contradictions in how these 
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terms are typically framed and discussed. These contradictions, I believe, are worth unraveling, 
taking seriously, and pursuing further. 
 Before proceeding to some musical specifics, some preparatory words of summary and 
synthesis are in order. I have been arguing that we should take a closer look at the 
expectational underpinnings of consonance/dissonance judgments, and that microtonal music 
that purports to be tonal is fertile terrain to see these misattributions in action. The ecological 
stakes of attention are only raised when processing unfamiliar tunings; this demands the union 
of schematic and dynamic expectation, working together in the name of cognitive economy, to 
make sense of the unfamiliar. If listening to microtonal music can be likened to standing on 
razor’s edge, then the process of parsing it treats this razor as Occam’s. In other words, a 
listener’s mental toolbox of referential orienting collections, auditory categories, and strategies 
for coping with musical novelty is only as robust as their enculturation allows it to be. There will 
always be intervals, chords, and progressions in microtonal music that fall “between the 
cracks,”  so to speak, and hearing them encourages (over)compensatory responses in 35
listeners, who must do something to mitigate their unfamiliarity and reduce the attendant 
cognitive dissonance. Most of the time, schematic expectation picks up the burden, 
 As I mention in Chapter 1, Charles Ives was the first person to use this phrase to describe 35
microtonal music. When I use it in this dissertation, I employ it not only in Ives’s original/
colloquial sense of “between the literal ‘cracks’ that separate notes on the piano,” but also 
(more pertinently) in the sense of “between the figurative ‘cracks’ of culturally conditioned 
expectation.” It is worth noting that the phrase “between the cracks” has been applied to 
other musical contexts outside of microtonality. Benjamin Doleac, for instance, uses it to 
describe the not-quite-straight, not-quite-swung feel of sixteenth notes in funk. [Doleac, 
“Strictly Second Line: Funk, Jazz, and the New Orleans Beat” (2013), passim.] It is interesting 
that this same phrase can be applicable both in contexts of unequal subdivision (funk 
sixteenths) and in contexts of perfectly equal subdivision (Blackwood’s microtonal equal 
temperaments)—the former rhythmic, the latter pitch-based.
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encouraging the stretching of existing auditory categories so that a novel occurrence can be 
contextualized in a more economical manner. One way to conceive of Blackwood’s 
microtonality, then, is as a demonstration of the elasticity of auditory categories.  These 36
stretchy categories are made to bend—and some more than others.  But do they ever break? 37
Dwelling in the Cracks (I): 19-TET 
I begin with a cross-section of moments from Blackwood’s music that problematizes the 
traditional distinction between step and skip, a distinction that Peter Westergaard argues is 
central to tonal cognition, particularly given its close relation with consonance and 
dissonance.  The following claim motivates the ensuing discussion: of all the hundred-cent 38
gaps between the intervals of 12-TET, the one between 200c and 300c presents enculturated 
listeners with the most unique cognitive demands, because it spans a sort of transition zone in 
diatonic space between what is typically parsed as conjunct versus disjunct melodic motion. 
One of the more intriguing aspects of Blackwood’s microtonal compositions is their usage of 
 This notion of graded category membership originates with the pioneering work of Eleanor 36
Rosch in the 1970s. [See especially Rosch and Mervis, “Family Resemblances: Studies in the 
Internal Structure of Categories” (1975).] For three good musical extensions of Rosch’s work, 
see Haluska, “On Fuzzy Coding of Information in Music” (1997), Zbikowski, Conceptualizing 
Music (2002), and Hanninen, “Associative Sets, Categories, and Music Analysis” (2004).
 For instance, as I discuss in Chapter 2, major/minor intervals (such as major thirds or minor 37
sevenths) are often regarded as having a wider bandwidth of acceptability than do perfect 
intervals (such as unisons or fifths) for most Western listeners. At certain points in this 
dissertation, however, I question this claim, highlighting moments in Blackwood’s microtonality 
that demonstrate the striking (and heretofore largely unheralded) contextual flexibility of 
perfect intervals themselves. I will consider one such moment from “13 Notes” later in this 
chapter.
 See in particular the Appendix to Westergaard, An Introduction to Tonal Theory (1975).38
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intervals lying in the middle of this transition zone, which can function both as scale steps 
(arrayed horizontally) and as harmonic building blocks (stacked vertically)—oftentimes within 
the same span of music. My hypothesis is that judgments of these intervals as “dissonant” refer 
not just to their specific cent size but also, crucially, to the comparative lack of expectational 
schemata that situate them within some familiar framework. Even further, this sensation of 
“dissonance” is a misattribution that originates in the experience of being in between qualia 
and/or in between auditory categories (here due to the problems such intervals present to 
auditory streaming). In Blackwood’s microtonal music, intervals of this sort occur most often in 
those tunings where the perfect fourth is divisible in half—something, of course, that is not 
possible in twelve-note tunings.  Simply put, parsing/contextualizing half a perfect fourth takes 39
more “work” for a 12-enculturated listener, and it is precisely this increased cognitive load that 
is reinterpreted (indeed, misattributed) as a property of the interval itself—its apparent 
“dissonance.” 
 All this is not to imply that listeners rigidly and exclusively cognize all intervals that are 
200 cents or smaller as “steps” (i.e., relations between numerically adjacent x-components), or 
all intervals that are 300 cents or larger as “skips” (i.e., relations between numerically non-
adjacent x-components)—even in diatonic contexts in 12-TET. Several counterexamples 
abound. Consider, for instance, the augmented second between x=6̂ and x=7 ̂in the harmonic 
 Of the dozen tunings in which Blackwood composes, the spelled perfect fourth is exactly 39
divisible in half in 14-TET (6 unit intervals), 15-TET (6), 18-TET (8), 19-TET (8), 20-TET (8), 23-
TET (10), and 24-TET (10). I will explore some examples from 19- and 15-TET in this chapter. 
Julian Hook has previously mentioned the split-fourth property of Blackwood’s 19-TET in Hook, 
“Enharmonic Systems: A Theory of Key Signatures, Enharmonic Equivalence, and 
Diatonicism” (2007), p.108.
140
minor scale, which is understood as a step despite its three-semitone size. The reverse case, a 
200-cent interval cognized as a skip, is also possible; a characteristic example is the N6–V(7) 
progression, in which the melodic diminished third between flat supertonic (x=2̂) and leading 
tone (x=7)̂ is understood as a skip despite its two-semitone size. Yet these counterexamples, 
while notable, are merely isolated exceptions. In other words, 300-cent steps may exist in 
certain 12-TET contexts (especially anhemitonic pentatonic ones), but they are never the most 
frequently occurring adjacency in any well-formed scale of cardinality 5 or greater.  Likewise, 40
200-cent skips may also exist in certain 12-TET contexts, but they manifest themselves 
melodically; in other words, diminished thirds never stack to form chordal objects. Here one 
does well to disentangle the ability to be heard (in a particular context) as a step/skip from the 
potential to self-iterate (in general) as a scalar/chordal unit. This is to say, not all 12-TET 
intervals heard as steps have the right “stuff” to form the basis of scales; similarly, not all heard 
skips have the “stuff” to form the basis of chords.  41
 The counterexamples in the previous paragraph are no doubt interesting. But they are 
also limited in that they only probe the boundaries of what I call the “conjunct/disjunct 
transition zone”—the gap (roughly) between 200 and 300 cents. What is to be made of the 
vast uncharted territory in between these endpoints? How big, in a microtonal context, can an 
 For more on the concept of scalar well-formedness, see Carey and Clampitt, “Aspects of 40
Well-Formed Scales” (1989).
 In the present case, a four-note scale with 300-cent steps would probably strike most 12-41
enculturated listeners as more of an arpeggiated (diminished-seventh) “chord,” whereas a six-
note close-position chord that stacks 200-cent thirds would likely strike those same listeners as 
more of a verticalized (whole-tone) “scale.” I will discuss the liminal case of the fivefold division 
of the octave in the next section on 15-TET.
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interval heard as a “major second” be—and how small a “minor third”? Is there a critical 
bandwidth wherein these auditory categories seem to fuse into an uncanny singularity? 
Blackwood’s book provides a telling clue. In a table where he lists the possible cent sizes of 
diatonic intervals in different tuning systems, there is a notable gap between 231.174 cents (the 
largest type of major second he lists, corresponding to an 8:7 frequency ratio) and 266.871 
cents (the smallest type of minor third he lists, corresponding to a 7:6 frequency ratio).  One 42
might therefore hypothesize that the window from about 231 to 267 cents affords the optimal 
potential, in contexts that are otherwise diatonic or quasi-diatonic, for the qualitative blurring 
of the categories “major second” and “minor third.” This 36-cent span might be conceived as 
a “gray area” of sorts. But does such a designation correspond to the realities of perception 
and cognition? After all, brains, operating in context, do not care for gray; they seek to resolve 
its partials into more determinate strands of black and white. 
 Onwards, at last, to some musical specifics. In Blackwood’s “Fanfare in 19-note Equal 
Tuning,” the 8–unit-interval perfect fourth is frequently decomposed into two 4–unit-interval, 
253-cent halves that straddle the line between major second and minor third—and with it, the 
cognitive categories of conjunct (x-adjacent) versus disjunct (x–non-adjacent) melodic motion, 
respectively. 
 Blackwood, The Structure of Recognizable Diatonic Tunings (1985), p.117.42
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Fig. 3.1: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 19-TET
The unusual aural effect of this interval is set into even greater relief by the recognizable 
diatonicity otherwise afforded by 19-TET, on which Blackwood capitalizes in this topically 
normative fanfare whose tonal trajectory recalls late 19th-century practice.  In other words, 43
Blackwood deploys this interval in contexts that make it particularly “stick out” to listeners 
enculturated to Western Euroclassical functional tonality, since the rest of the “Fanfare” is 
actually quite expectationally tractable (and thus cognitively “consonant”) by comparison. 
 Consider the excerpt below, for instance, in which the split fourth occurs in a 
melodically “passing” formation: 
For a succinct overview of the tonal trajectory of the “Fanfare,” see Cox, “The Emancipation 43
of Discordance” (2014), pp.40–41.
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Ex. 3.1: A voice exchange involving split fourths; excerpt begins  
at 1:18 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GO516WYU-Zw
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The governing harmony in mm.58–59 is a V6/4 in a mode centered on G#, but the exact 
identity of this mode is complicated by the passing F major triad on the pickup to m.59, which 
is rooted exactly halfway between the D# still sounding in the bass and the G# centricity of the 
passage. The melodic fragment boxed in the top part of Ex. 3.1, which directly splits this D#–
G# fourth in half, warrants particular focus. These 253-cent intervals, I argue, produce a 
sensation of cognitive dissonance in 12-enculturated listeners, who are not accustomed to 
hearing perfect fourths split exactly in half. This dissonance is manifested in the dual scale-
degree potentiality of the melodic F natural, which can be reckoned either as a (6̂, la, 8) in G# 
ionian or as a (7,̂ fa, 8) in G# mixolydian—but not as both at the same time.  Indeed, the F 44
appears to lie on the borderland of these two familiar qualia, seemingly too high to be firmly 
the former and too low to be firmly the latter. Faced with an interval lying directly in between 
two familiar qualia—and one that suddenly calls into question the governing modal identity of 
the passage—12-enculturated listeners are pressed to account for this F either as more like an 
ionian 6̂ or as more like a mixolydian 7,̂ should they wish to momentarily reduce their cognitive 
dissonance. Both interpretations are in principle possible, and different listeners will 
undoubtedly interpret the moment in different ways, according to their own listening habits, 
priorities, and predispositions. I will note that I personally exhibit a slight preference for the 
ionian interpretation, which strikes me as the more cognitively economical option. Such a 
 The scenario is therefore another example of the “intervallic duck-rabbit” phenomenon I 44
theorize in the previous chapter.
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hearing consistently maintains the local G#-ionian identity of mm.58–61,  whereas the 45
mixolydian hearing, on the other hand, introduces a quale that is rarely ever heard during a 
cadential 6/4.   46
 It is worth pointing out that under the ionian hearing, one would interpret the melodic 
D#–F as qualitatively smaller than the ensuing F–G#—an interpretation that contradicts the 
spelling of these intervals as skip and step, respectively, and thereby introduces another (visual) 
element of cognitive dissonance. Later in this chapter, I will take up the topic of the visual 
consonance/dissonance of notation in more detail. For now, however, the larger point of this 
example is that, because the split fourth sounds contextually anomalous and dissonant, 
listeners compensate for its disorienting effect by seeking out the framework of best 
(expectational) fit through which to filter it. Whether this means reckoning the F natural as an 
ionian 6̂ or as a mixolydian 7,̂ the end result is the same: treating an equally spaced acoustic 
object as if it had an uneven constitution. As we will see, this kind of mental “distortion” is a 
recurring theme when one tries to hear the tonality in microtonality. 
 Ultimately, because the split fourth in Ex. 3.1 occurs in such a fleeting “non-harmonic” 
context, its effect is not as bewildering as it could be, were it to occur in a way that affects the 
underlying identity of an ongoing progression more directly. Earlier on in the “Fanfare,” in 
perhaps the piece’s first moment of profound cognitive dissonance, the halved fourth appears 
 The V6/4—>5/3 that is operative in mm.58–60 promptly leads to a G# major triad on the 45
downbeat of m.61 (immediately after Ex. 3.1 cuts off), thereby effecting a perfect authentic 
cadence (PAC) in G# ionian.
 Hearing a mixolydian seventh during a cadential 6/4 would attenuate this chord’s charge as a 46
cadential dominant, pointing instead towards the key of the subdominant (as a potential V4/3 
of IV).
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in a context that is decidedly more “harmonic” in nature. Ex. 3.2 below shows the relevant 
excerpt, in which a root progression from IV (m.30) to I (m.32) in D# ionian is bisected by this
unusual interval in the bass:
Ex. 3.2: Bass motion by four–unit-interval split fourth, connecting IV and I;  
excerpt begins at 0:41 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GO516WYU-Zw
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Measure 31 is my focus here; it consists of a minor seventh sonority rooted on a pitch (once 
again, F natural) that lies exactly halfway between G# (global IV) and D# (global I). But unlike 
the previous “Fanfare” example, in which the split-fourth dissonance is carefully introduced 
within the positional “security blanket” of a cadential 6/4, the F-rooted harmony in Ex. 3.2 
carries more colloquial “weight.” Indeed, its metrical, dynamical, and rhetorical emphasis 
conspire to make its dissonance come across as rather palpably disorienting, even despite the 
subdued timbral/registral environment of its occurrence (as compared with Ex. 3.1). Once 
again, the moment is dissonant for reasons that are primarily cognitive/expectational, not 
sensory/psychoacoustic. Minor sevenths in 19-TET—much like major triads in the same tuning
—are not especially discordant; in fact, this particular tuning produces some of the smoothest 
versions of these sonorities that exist in any of the tunings in which Blackwood composes. But 
the unusual way that these sonorities are approached and left, plus the fact that they are not 
easily assimilated into any one unambiguous governing modal context, comprise the main 
drivers of the cognitive dissonance they produce. Ex. 3.2 furnishes the first moment in the 
“Fanfare” that falls so viscerally between the cracks of 12-conditioned expectation, and it 
forces a choice between hearing the F natural in the bass as more “2̂-like” or more “3̂-like” (in 
some modal context where this 3̂ is a minor third above tonic), if one wishes to contextualize 
this anomalous occurrence within a more familiar (i.e., heptatonic diatonic) framework and 
thereby reduce its dissonance. Of course, the fact that this intervallic anomaly occurs in the 
bass part has nontrivial implications for the functional identity of m.31, a point to which I return 
in the next chapter on harmonic function. 
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 Despite the different contexts of occurrence of the split fourths in Ex. 3.1 and Ex. 3.2, 
the upshot of both examples is the same: that situating this transition-zone interval into a more 
familiar framework entails mentally “bending” it such that one of the two halves of the fourth 
comes across as qualitatively larger than the other (despite their literal acoustic equality). It is as 
if the ear seeks to domesticate this unfamiliar equally divided fourth by imposing upon it what 
Norman Carey calls the “characteristic asymmetry of tonality.”  The effect is analogous to the 47
well-known optical illusion displayed below, in which both horizontal lines are exactly the same 
size but come across as unequal due to the contextual “lengthening” of the top line and the 
contextual “shortening” of the bottom one:
Image 3.1: The Müller-Lyer illusion as a visual analog to parsing split fourths 
I have been framing such impositions and distortions in overcompensatory terms: these are 
things that enculturated listeners do in the face of musical unfamiliarity in an attempt to better 
understand it or more efficiently contextualize it. Such actions essentially function as a form of 
“dissonance treatment” that the brain employs as it works in tandem with the auditory system 
and the pathways of expectation, prediction, and response. Yet so often, our heuristics are 
 Carey, “Review Article: Tonality and Transformation by Steven Rings” (2012), p.223.47
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imperfect, and they can cause us to mentally bend and warp the things we hear in accordance 
with our preconceptions. Several authors, among them Daniel Jordan, Roger Shepard, and W. 
Jay Dowling, have discussed the mental equalization of diatonic steps that takes place despite 
their literally unequal sizes.  The above examples from the “Fanfare” show that the opposite 48
sort of process is also possible—the mental “un-equalization” of a musical object whose 
acoustic reality is one of completely equal spacing. This might seem counterintuitive at first, 
but as Dowling astutely notes, these impulses represent opposite sides of the coin of 
enculturation. As he writes, “The feeling that the notes of the diatonic scale are equally spaced 
is so strong that our perception of a scale that is actually equally spaced is distorted in the 
opposite direction.”  Whether from literally unequal to notionally equal, or literally equal to 49
notionally unequal, acoustic reality so often bends in the direction of auditory desire. 
Dwelling in the Cracks (II): 15-TET 
Among the other tunings used by Blackwood whose fourths are divisible in half, two in 
particular (15- and 20-TET) contain the fivefold equal division of the octave into 240-cent 
intervals, making them especially fertile sites for the bending of familiar auditory categories 
 See in particular Jordan, “Influence of the Diatonic Tonal Hierarchy at Microtonal 48
Intervals” (1987), Shepard, “One Cognitive Psychologist’s Quest for the Structural Grounds of 
Music Cognition” (2009), and Dowling, “Qualia as Intervening Variables in the Understanding 
of Music Cognition” (2010).
 Dowling, “Qualia as Intervening Variables in the Understanding of Music Cognition” (2010), 49
p.9. When it comes to hearing unfamiliar scales, Dowling writes, “[L]isteners, even 
nonmusicians, judge them with respect to the scale[s] with which they are familiar from the 
music they hear every day” (9–10).
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and the blurring of familiar scale-degree qualia. Taken as a whole, the fivefold equal division 
occupies a unique perceptual borderland that engages the conjunct/disjunct transition zone. 
Music theorists and pedagogues generally refer to the fourfold division of the octave as a 
(diminished-seventh) “chord” and the sixfold division as a (whole-tone) “scale.” The fivefold 
division therefore constitutes another liminal sort of “duck-rabbit”—a distinctive collection that 
can sound more like a scale with 240-cent “large seconds” in some contexts, or a chord with 
240-cent “narrow thirds” in others. Blackwood’s 15- and 20-TET compositions often probe this 
collection’s contextual multiplicity. As he writes in the liner notes to the Suite for Guitar in 15-
note Equal Tuning, “This novel arrangement is useful both melodically, and as a harmony when 
placed in a variety of distributions.”50
 I will discuss the harmonic-functional affordances of this 5-TET division at greater length 
in Chapter 4. For now, I focus more on the melodic affordances of its constituent 240-cent 
intervals. Fig. 3.2 below lists the pitches of 15-TET; Fig. 3.3 (reprinted from Chapter 1) then 
diagrams the unusual layout of fifth space in this tuning:
Fig. 3.2: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 15-TET 
 Blackwood, Microtonal Compositions (1994), Cedille CDR 90000 018, n.p. As I write in 50
Chapter 1, Blackwood sometimes refers to this collection as the “pi chord” (though this term 
never makes it into any of his published works).
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Fig. 3.3: Fifth space in 15-TET as three distinct fivefold equal divisions of the octave
Consider the note D (z=3), for instance, located in plain-space. Three unit intervals and 240 
cents above it lies a note that can be named either E (M2) or F (m3); three unit intervals and 
240 cents below lies either C (M2) or B (m3). Blackwood’s notational scheme thus embeds at its 
very core this potential ambiguity between the auditory categories of step and skip, conjunct 
and disjunct motion. 
 The presence of this fivefold division in both 15- and 20-TET makes it possible for 
Blackwood to write analogous passages across these tunings that showcase the same 
transition-zone intervals in similar contexts, achieving tonal effects that lack equivalents in 12-
TET. Consider the opening of the fourth and final movement of the Suite for Guitar,  for 51
instance, which features a moment of “notal” ambiguity that is very similar to the one just 
discussed from “20 Notes” at the end of Chapter 2: 
The idiosyncrasies of 15-TET actually mold quite well to the shape of the modified acoustic 51
guitar. Each string is tuned a six–unit-interval perfect fourth (480 cents) apart, with the outer 
ones forming a double octave in the conventional manner. This layout, which rids the guitar of 
its “wolf major third,” is said to simplify the task of fingering for the player. It also perceptually 
accentuates the fivefold division through the resonance of open strings.
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Ex. 3.3: A “stretched” upper neighbor? Excerpt begins at 0:00 of https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=pZT02bDMAfY&list=OLAK5uy_mUM6_6q6J4VL8gSrPIesFNU9FCGfmRL9g&index=17
Both moments feature a 240-cent interval in the melody-bearing voice that extends upwards 
from 5̂  (here, E-down) to a pitch that seems to lie right in between a major sixth and minor 
seventh above tonic (here, F#-down), before descending back to 5̂  again. The operative 
question in both cases is whether this melodic peak note—which is located exactly halfway 
between the perfect fourth from 5̂ and 1—̂sounds more like a stretched upper neighbor (i.e., 
more “6̂-like”) or a strained upwards skip (more “7-̂like”).  I like to consider these moments as 52
the microtonal analogs of “blue notes”: between-the-cracks pitches that originated in jazz/
blues vocal practice but that continue to resurface in the popular consciousness in sources as 
diverse as the Law & Order theme song  and the Pointer Sisters’ “Pinball Number 53
Count” (best known for its inclusion on Sesame Street).54
 What makes the present case distinct, however, is that the operative mode of the piece is not 52
yet clear; therefore, the ambiguity of this top note is not just a matter of x=6̂ versus x=7,̂ but 
also a matter of dorian versus aeolian interpretation of the passage as a whole.
 Listen in particular to the electric guitar part from 0:43–0:55 of https://www.youtube.com/53
watch?v=xz4-aEGvqQM.
 Listen in particular to the intonation of the word “four” at 0:19, 1:08, and 1:56 of https://54
www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUL4T8WcFdA.
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 By now, the story should be familiar: there are multiple plausible hearings of the F#-
down “blue note” in Ex. 3.3, and one can theoretically flip back and forth between them at will 
across multiple hearings of the passage. Indeed, it is this very fact that one can possess several 
conflicting interpretations of this F#-down in their mind at once that is primarily responsible for 
its striking cognitive dissonance. But again, interestingly, I must note that the interpretation I 
prefer is one that contradicts Blackwood’s supplied spelling. That is to say, I am more inclined 
to hear the F#-down as a strained upwards skip from E-down (i.e., more like a 7)̂, rather than as 
its stretched upper neighbor (i.e., less like a 6̂). My rationale hinges on an appeal to cognitive 
economy. Given the salient leaping motion from tonic to dominant in the bass that undergirds 
this melodic move, and considering the overwhelmingly triadic soundworld of the Suite for 
Guitar thus far, hearing this circled F#-down as a minor third (or tenth) above the bass would 
allow for a more straightforward interpretation of the red-boxed arpeggiated harmony as some 
sort of dominant triad. Hearing the F#-down as a major second (or ninth) above the bass, on 
the other hand, would needlessly posit an element that cannot be reckoned as easily within the 
prevailing chordal structure. And yet, it is worth pointing out that while this latter interpretation 
would seem to create more dissonance (in the form of a “non-harmonic” tone) than already 
exists, it must be remembered that the former interpretation also creates its own “extra” kind 
of dissonance: a visual mismatch between a spelled/notated step and a heard skip. The 
scenario, on the whole, serves as a pointed reminder that cognitive dissonance never truly 
dissipates in full, since the process of reducing it necessarily entails a selective ignorance 
towards (and rationalization of) those things that can remind one of the nature/stakes of the 
conflict in the first place. 
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 While the 240-cent interval in 15-TET sounds conspicuously dissonant in Ex. 3.3, there 
are other musical contexts in which this same interval—in this same tuning—loses its uncanny 
luster and strikes the 12-enculturated ear as less unusual, less marked (that is, as more 
consonant with expectation). Consider, for instance, the opening of “15 Notes”:
Ex. 3.4: The context dependency of transition-zone intervals;  
excerpt begins at 0:00 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIYXm-CJqUo
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Each of the three boxes in Ex. 3.4 encloses a stepwise traversing of a different interval: from left 
to right, a minor third, a major third, and a perfect “fourth.”  And each stepwise snippet 55
involves at least one instance of the 240-cent interval: from left to right again, D-down —> E-
down, G-down —> A-down, and both in the last case. My overarching claim is that this interval 
sounds less dissonant in the blue-boxed contexts than it does in the red-boxed context, where 
it sticks out because it splits an interval that is typically not traversable by two (quasi-“diatonic”) 
steps. 12-enculturated listeners have heard countless instances of minor and major thirds being 
split into two steps in diatonic contexts, but rarely (if ever) a perfect fourth.  And so, as long as 56
the bounding thirds are relatively in tune (which, in 15-TET, they are—320 [m3] and 400 [M3] 
cents), listeners are likely to forgive some centwise discrepancy in the component steps. Here, 
once again, schematic expectation domesticates the acoustic anomaly; the gray area 
momentarily emulsifies into black and white. 
 So with all this taken into consideration, what key/mode is the passage in? This is a 
vexing question, for even though mm.1–3 of “15 Notes” partake in the flavor of heptatonic 
diatonicism, there are only six notes in the excerpt: D-down, E-down, F, G-down, A-down, and 
C-down. There are two ways to understand this six-note scale: either as D-centric “down-
space” (cf. Fig. 3.3) plus a minor third, or as D-down “hexadorian.” The former emphasizes the 
presence of the (fifth-generated) fivefold equal division of the octave, whereas the latter 
emphasizes the prevailing heptatonic-diatonic modal quality that obtains even despite the 
 I will unpack the scare quotes in the next paragraph. 55
 As I am referring principally to diatonic musical contexts, this remark excludes the case of 56
pentatonicism, where fourths are quite often split into two “steps” (though these are always of 
unequal size).
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reduced cardinality. One might say that the hexadorian mode consists of a lower, minor 
tetrachord and an upper, “perfect” (or “neutral”) trichord.  Both components involve the 240-57
cent step, but only in the latter is this interval marked as expectationally anomalous (that is, as 
cognitively dissonant). 
 A brief coda is in order. Inductive reasoning is central to tonal cognition and musical 
expectation in general—even more so when a musical environment is unfamiliar. But the “leaky 
dike of inductive learning,” to quote Huron, is not without its “patches,” and cognitive 
misattribution is one of them.  Humans are creatures that instinctively categorize, 58
compartmentalize, and label as a means of maintaining order and control over their 
environments. Moreover, these instincts are often overcompensatory in nature: we frequently 
resort to (and fall back on) behaviors of labeling, classifying, and contextualizing when we are 
least certain about the facts of the matter. So it should come as no surprise that the labels we 
supply are as imperfect as the heuristics we apply to generate them. Yet this should not be 
taken to mean that listeners are naïve, or that music cognition is a lost cause. In fact, it bears 
repeating how impressive it is that the auditory system is able to resolve so many of 
microtonality’s contradictions so quickly. But the larger point here is that expectation and 
prediction drive this process, and therefore, any judgments generated from it are necessarily 
judgments about expectation and prediction, in the most fundamental sense. 
 Calling the ascending interval from A-down to D-down a “perfect fourth” would therefore be 57
a misnomer; perhaps a more appropriate name would be a “perfect third.” This is precisely the 
logic behind my referring to each of the melodic motions within the three boxes of Ex. 3.4 as 
“stepwise” in the previous paragraph.
 Huron, Sweet Anticipation (2006b), p.233.58
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Meter as a “Consonating” Force 
Western Euroclassical tonality involves a distinctive symbiosis between harmony and meter. 
Blackwood frequently capitalizes on this culturally specific codependency to produce (or 
manufacture, or engineer) brief wisps of relative tonal/metric clarity onto which in-group 
listeners can latch, much like North Stars in an unpredictable sky of sound. These moments can 
carry strong orienting capabilities, especially in tunings that are otherwise quite discrepant from 
12-conditioned expectations. They sound particularly striking because they engage “both the 
pleasure arising from accurate prediction and the contrastive valence arising from innocuous 
surprise.”   59
 The following excerpt from “14 Notes” is a case in point—another instance of how 
schematic and dynamic expectations can join forces to clarify the acoustic anomalies of 
Blackwood’s microtonality. My claim is that Blackwood engineers a hypermetric downbeat to 
occur at m.47 whose predictability intensifies the local tonic accent on F-up, to the point of 
overshadowing the ways that this tonic triad is still traditionally/conventionally “dissonant.”  60
Once again, the mechanism of overcompensation is key to understanding the dynamics of this 
moment. More specifically, when listeners are deprived of any large-scale orienting periodicity, 
 Ibid., p.141.59
 Engineered hypermetric downbeats are particularly common as large-scale orienting devices 60
in the symphonic literature. See, for instance, m.343 of Brahms’s First Symphony, 1st 
movement, in which the onset of sonata recapitulation is “prepared” as a hypermetric 
downbeat. (A similar thing happens at the juncture of recapitulation in Franck’s D minor 
Symphony, 1st movement.) Brahms was particularly fond of this device, also employing it in the 
4th movement of his First Symphony (m.220, a moment previously discussed in Cohn’s 
Audacious Euphony [2012], pp.191–94), the 1st movement of his Second Symphony (m.44, 
enabled by the periodic timpani rolls), and the 4th movement of his Second Symphony (m.78, 
preparing the entrance of the sonata’s secondary theme).
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they are prone to compensate by latching all the more tightly onto any brief wisps of metrical 
clarity that may emerge. As will be seen, these moments are especially ripe sites for the 
attendant misattributive back-projection of other labels, such as “tonally stable” and 
“consonant.”
Fig. 3.4: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 14-TET 
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Ex. 3.5: An engineered hypermetric downbeat at m.47 that “consonates” its governing harmony;
bracketed part of excerpt begins at 0:37 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rW_X0bgHlrQ




 The wisp in question is the bracketed portion of Ex. 3.5—more precisely, the four bars 
of 2/4 (mm.43–46) that prepare the aforementioned hypermetric downbeat. This sort of local 
metric regularity is hard to come by in the capricious “14 Notes”; only two passages in the 
whole etude contain more consecutive measures in the same time signature, and both have yet 
to occur. So m.47 accrues a (hyper)metric accent because of the preparatory bars of pure duple 
meter that frame its arrival as expected (and hence, rhetorically “strong”).  But this is only part 61
of the story. [The pickup to] m.47 also delineates a phrasal boundary, the end of a tonic-
prolonging sequence that begins with the bracketed pickup to m.39.  This former pickup also 62
carries the accent of motivic parallelism, since it references a common descending gesture of 
the etude (and in the proper anacrustic context). In short, the arrival of m.47 is accented for a 
confluence of reasons, most so because it is a rare island of schematic and dynamic 
predictability in the sea of surprises that is “14 Notes.” 
 It may seem surprising that so many kinds of accent should accrue to this particular 
moment, especially given that no harmonic progression takes place across the barline of m.47. 
 This sensation of (hyper)metric accent is the product of dynamic and schematic expectation61
—the former because of the “engineered” (or “manufactured”) nature of the downbeat arrival, 
and the latter because of the human preference for duple groupings. For more on this latter 
preference, see Fraisse, “Rhythm and Tempo” (1982); Lerdahl and Jackendoff, A Generative 
Theory of Tonal Music (1983); Essens and Povel, “Metrical and Nonmetrical Representations of 
Temporal Patterns” (1985); Smith and Cuddy, “Effects of Metric and Harmonic Rhythm on the 
Detection of Pitch Alterations in Melodic Sequences” (1989); and Dawe, Platt, and Racine, 
“Inference of Metrical Structure from Perception of Iterative Pulses within Time Spans Defined 
by Chord Changes” (1994).
 Also worth mentioning are the diacritic accents given to the top two parts on the downbeat 62
of m.47, in tandem with the local dynamic swell from p to mp. When all is taken into account, 
m.47 simultaneously sports all three categories of accent that Lerdahl and Jackendoff describe 
on p.17 of A Generative Theory of Tonal Music (1983): the “metrical” and “structural” accents 
just described in the main text, and the “phenomenal” accents described in this footnote.
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The F-up tonic arrives two measures prior, and when it is reiterated in m.47, it is clouded with 
upper neighbors. Five distinct pitch classes sound on the downbeat of m.47; why should this 
particular configuration sound like a “consonance” at all, much less a convincing assertion of 
tonic harmony? Even when the upper neighbors resolve to triadic tones by the downbeat of m.
48, the presence of a rogue D-up (circled in Ex. 3.5) ensures that the local tonic of F-up major 
never sounds as a conventional three-note triad. Further, the fifth of this triad measures only 
686 cents (8 unit intervals in 14-TET), which is the lower boundary of Blackwood’s “range of 
recognizability” —and on top of that, its thirds are the same size (4 unit intervals, 343 cents). 63
The triad’s quality is thus equivocal, and the way it is notated presents an even further layer of 
visual interference: the third is Ab-up, which looks like a minor third in relation to the F-up root 
on the page. But does it sound like a minor third? This is a more complicated matter, and it 
brings the heretofore ignored D-up into the discussion. This note occupies generic scalar 
position x=6̂ and approximates a major sixth above the F-up tonic—and I argue that its 
inclusion can help to clarify the quality of the triad. More specifically, on my hearing, this added 
sixth prompts me to retrospectively reinterpret the neutral third as a “major” third, since the 
tonic accent of m.47 is especially strong, and it is rare for tonic-functioning chords in Western 
Euroclassical musics to contain tritones (which would be the case if this third were cognized as 
 As I mention in Chapter 1, Blackwood delineates the “range of recognizability” for the 63
perfect fifth as lying between 4/7 (686 cents) and 3/5 (720 cents) of the 1200-cent octave. 
[Blackwood, The Structure of Recognizable Diatonic Tunings (1985), p.199.] Note that 4/7 is 
equal to 8/14, which describes the present case of the 8–unit-interval fifth in 14-TET.
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“minor”).  This interpretation is contradictory to the supplied spelling (not to mention that 343 64
cents is closer to the minor third—both pure and 12–equal-tempered—than it is to the major 
third). But the power of schematic expectation is strong enough to “bend” this interval, as it 
were, in the upwards direction. That is to say, stylistically enculturated listeners can apply an 
expectational schema here that can reasonably contextualize the neutral third as “major” (or at 
least “major enough”): the knowledge, however implicit and subconscious, that tonic-
functioning chords in Western Euroclassical tonal musics tend to lack tritones. 
 The larger point of the previous paragraph is not to be missed: that the tonic arrival in 
mm.47–48 still “dissonates” in many traditional senses of the term—its fifth is flat, its thirds are 
the same size, it contains an added sixth degree, it is initially clouded with upper neighbors 
(which are contrapuntal “dissonances” above the bass), etc. And yet, despite all this, I hold that 
many 12-enculturated listeners would likely be eager to accept what Daniel Harrison would call 
this “clouded and malformed” tonic anyway,  hearing past its unusual surface features 65
because the accent of its arrival is so strong. One might even say that the predictable 
preparatory measures (which are certainly a rarity in “14 Notes”) work to “consonate” the tonic 
harmony in mm.47–48 by smoothing over its aberrant features, contextually overpowering 
them and pushing them towards the back burner of musical consciousness. It would be 
interesting to test this hypothesis in a laboratory setting. Participants might hear the above 
 Of course, dominant sevenths often function as tonics in other styles, such as blues and jazz. 64
But the large majority of chords with tritones—what Paul Hindemith calls “Group B” chords in 
his Craft of Musical Composition (1937)—function as dominants in Western Euroclassical 
musics, not as tonics. For more on “Group B” chords, see Harrison, Pieces of Tradition (2016), 
pp.54–57.
 Harrison, “Nonconformist Notions of Nineteenth-Century Enharmonicism” (2002), p.144.65
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excerpt both as is and with an added metrical complication introduced somewhere between 
mm.43–46, and be asked to rate the degree of consonance (or perhaps the perceived stability) 
of the tonic assertion beginning at m.47.  If they rate the manipulated trials as significantly less 66
consonant, it would constitute compelling evidence that judgments of consonance and 
dissonance are largely judgments about expectation that are redirected onto musical proxies. It 
would also affirm the crucial role that meter plays in influencing judgments about consonance, 
dissonance, and tonal stability. 
 This role is sometimes given short shrift. Commentators ranging from Joseph Yasser to 
Dmitri Tymoczko make virtually no mention of meter in their otherwise wide-ranging accounts 
of tonality.  But as Sarah Fuller reminds us of the history of Western music theory, “[A] 67
categorical and systematic distinction between consonance and dissonance lay dormant until 
the emergence of meter as a dominant trait of polyphonic music.”  Brian Hyer writes in a 68
similar vein: “Meter is crucial to the subordination of dissonant harmonies to consonant ones 
[….] While most theorists concentrate on harmonic considerations, tonality is perhaps best 
conceptualized as a tertium quid in which melody, harmony, and meter all combine into a 
single musical nexus.”  Despite perceptive statements such as these, however, scholars have 69
generally been slow to take meter more seriously in their accounts of consonance/dissonance, 
tonality, and tonal cognition. Recent efforts by David Temperley, Jon Prince, William 
 The order of these trials would have to be randomized. Participants would ideally be 12-66
enculturated listeners—half musicians and half nonmusicians.
 See Yasser, A Theory of Evolving Tonality (1932) and Tymoczko, A Geometry of Music (2011).67
 Fuller, “Theoretical Foundations of Early Organum Theory” (1981), p.84.68
 Hyer, “Tonality” (2002), p.735.69
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Thompson, Mark Schmuckler, Matthew Rosenthal, Erin Hannon, Christopher White, and Megan 
Long,  however, have stemmed this tide, invigorating a discourse that just fifteen years ago 70
was gauntly populated by the likes of Peter Westergaard, Marilyn Boltz, and Joseph Swain 
(among few others).  Long even goes so far, in a recent book, as to propose a “model of 71
tonality—and of tonality’s history—that centers not pitch, but rhythm and meter” instead.  It is 72
encouraging to see the field turning towards the realization that, to a great extent, tonal 
stability is metrical stability (and vice versa). The next step is for music theory pedagogy to 
disentangle the terms and conditions of this symbiosis with greater precision: that much of 
what makes downbeats sound “strong” is actually our expectation that certain types of things 
tend to occur on them within the norms of particular styles, and that much of what makes tonic 
chords sound “stable” is precisely their tendency to occur in predictable temporal/metrical 
contexts. 
 Temperley, Music and Probability (2007a); Prince, Thompson, and Schmuckler, “Pitch and 70
Time, Tonality and Meter: How Do Musical Dimensions Combine?” (2009); Prince and 
Schmuckler, “The Tonal-Metric Hierarchy: A Corpus Analysis” (2014); Rosenthal and Hannon, 
“Cues to Perceiving Tonal Stability in Music: The Role of Temporal Structure” (2016); White, 
“Meter’s Influence on Theoretical and Corpus-Derived Harmonic Grammars” (2018b); and 
Long, “Cadential Syntax and Tonal Expectation in Late Sixteenth-Century Homophony” (2018).
 See Westergaard, An Introduction to Tonal Theory (1975), Boltz, “Rhythm and ‘Good 71
Endings’: Effects of Temporal Structure on Tonality Judgments” (1989), and Swain, Harmonic 
Rhythm: Analysis and Interpretation (2002). Among these few others are Zuckerkandl, Sound 
and Symbol: Music and the External World (1956); Caplin, “Tonal Function and Metrical 
Accent: A Historical Perspective” (1983); Hershman, “Rhythmic Factors in Tonality” (1995); and 
Stevens, “Cross-Cultural Studies of Musical Pitch and Time” (2004).
 Long, Hearing Homophony: Tonal Expectation at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century 72
(2020), p.3.
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The Visual Consonance/Dissonance of Notation 
Notation does things. It is not merely a passive bystander, or a neutral “copy” of sounding 
music. Notating music, much like analyzing it, is a pragmatic and contingent act that points up 
certain features of the music, regarded as essential, at the expense of others. In Chapter 1, I 
explore the implications of using five-line staff notation to represent microtonal music, arguing 
that it encourages what I call a “12-analogous Euroclassical interpretive epistemology”—
essentially specifying/suggesting a sort of “listening grammar” through which one can 
understand Blackwood’s “compositional grammar.”  Indeed, for 12-enculturated listeners who 73
are also trained readers of the five-line staff, Blackwood’s notational system itself acts as 
another “consonating” force that cannot be ignored, since it enables his music to look a lot 
neater on the printed page than it sounds. By notating each microtonal interval through a 
governing scheme of representational close-quantization,  Blackwood visually erases many of 74
the auditory-expectational discrepancies/dissonances that such intervals generate. Central to 
this process is the way Blackwood strategically chooses enharmonic equivalences: to facilitate 
the spelling of each tuning’s best triads, sevenths, and scales as familiar-looking triads, 
 Lerdahl, “Cognitive Constraints on Compositional Systems” (1992), p.99.73
 This scheme mirrors how nonmusicians, according to Freya Bailes, Roger Dean, and Mary 74
Broughton, tend to perceive microtonal intervals: “as instances of neighbouring 12-TET 
intervals.” [Bailes, Dean, and Broughton, “How Different Are Our Perceptions of Equal-
Tempered and Microtonal Intervals? A Behavioral and EEG Survey” (2015), p.1.] I have been 
arguing that musicians accustomed to playing/listening in 12-TET are also inclined to perceive 
microtonal intervals by analogy to their nearest 12-TET counterparts.
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sevenths, and scales on the staff.  If microtonal intervals exist between the cracks of 75
expectation, then enharmonic equivalence is the notational caulk that binds these cracks into 
privileged visual shapes, allowing them to appear with optimal transpositional frequency. 
 Blackwood’s notational choices might thus be considered a gerrymandering of the pitch 
electorate to favor the customary visual appearance of familiar chords and scales. I use such 
terminology because Blackwood’s decisions are political in that they impose a visual, historical, 
and cultural value system on the act of sonic interpretation. He could have devised his own 
novel notational system, but he chose not to do so, and this is consequential. By drawing the 
lines of each “pitch district” in a way that encourages interpretation by analogy to the familiar 
shapes of 12-note tuning, Blackwood leverages what Kofi Agawu calls the “institutional 
power”  of five-line staff notation in order to render his music more visually intelligible. Does 76
this make Blackwood a colonizer of unfamiliar tunings with the language and customs of 
Western 12-TET tonality? Do his conservative compositional style and traditional notational 
choices imply that unfamiliar tunings can only speak out for themselves within a particular 
aesthetic infrastructure of parametric normativity? Or is he simply an intrepid explorer of 
uncharted musical territory trying to communicate his findings to as broad an audience as 
possible? It seems as if Blackwood’s microtonal music can be heard in two ideological 
frameworks that are diametrically opposed: as a perpetuation of 12-TET hegemony and 
 One occasionally disorienting byproduct of this is that enharmonic relationships fluctuate 75
across Blackwood’s dozen tunings, and they do not always match the familiar/customary ones 
from 12-TET. For example, the note B# is sometimes equivalent to C (21- and 22-TET), but it 
can also be equivalent to Cbb (13-TET), Cb (19-TET), and even Db (17-TET).
 Agawu, Representing African Music: Postcolonial Notes, Queries, Positions (2003), p.143.76
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ideologies of Western Euroclassical supremacy, or as a radical deconstruction of the same. (And 
this is to say nothing of the vast and thorny middleground between these two extremes.) 
 This circles back to the complicated issue of Blackwood’s target audience for these 
microtonal pieces—an issue I first take up in Chapter 1. My position is essentially that, while 
Blackwood’s principal audience seems to be a small, notationally literate in-group of classically 
trained musicians, his microtonality also constitutes an unusually rare case of a “highbrow” art 
music that can tap into and reveal the breadth of implicit musical knowledge held by the 
musically untrained. I have been arguing that 12-enculturated listeners, regardless of their level 
of musical training or expertise, run Blackwood’s music through the interpretive filter of the 12-
tone octave in order to make sense of it. But the nature of this interpretive filter, crucially, 
differs based on whether one is a trained musician or not. For nonmusicians, the filter is 
primarily aural, based on a comparison of heard sounds to a mental archive of auditory 
categories built through exposure to the statistical regularities of a culture’s music. For 
musicians, however, this aural dimension exists in a close feedback loop with an additional 
visual dimension that is based in one’s experience with Western staff notation. And so it is 
worth clarifying that the visual consonance/dissonance discussed in this section (and briefly 
alluded to in previous ones) is a kind of consonance/dissonance that is only experientially 
accessible to readers of notation. In other words, one need not be notationally literate in order 
to feel the cognitive dissonance wrought by a split fourth, or to mentally “bend” an equally 
spaced acoustic object into a more familiar asymmetric form, or to experience the ways that 
meter can act as a “consonating” force. But one does need to be notationally literate in order 
to register those moments when a plausible, economical interpretation of an interval 
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contradicts Blackwood’s spelling of it—moments when the sound of the music is inconsistent 
with, or outright different from, its look in notation. 
 Norman Cazden writes that listeners “cannot divest [themselves] of the entire set of 
assumptions which underlie [their] by now automatic responses” to music.  I have been 77
demonstrating, over the course of this chapter, that these assumptions and heuristics—usually 
trusty and reliable in 12-TET contexts—reveal themselves to be partial, imperfect, and 
contingent in the face of microtonality, whose novelty is such that auditory paradoxes, 
categorical contradictions, and expectational disjunctures are unavoidable. The previous 
sections have considered notable moments in Blackwood’s microtonality when established 
auditory categories bend to their breaking point. The present section, on the other hand, 
zeroes in on a sort of “breaking point” that is more cross-sensory in nature: a perceived 
mismatch between auditory and visual domains that engenders another distinctive sense of 
expectational dissonance for those listening with score. The conditions that allow such 
moments to arise lie in the codependent, mutually reinforcing relationship between 12-TET 
music and five-line staff notation that has solidified over the past century. More specifically, due 
to the modern ubiquity of 12-TET, notationally literate Western musicians/listeners have grown 
accustomed to connecting certain notated shapes on the staff (“looks”) with certain 
prototypical auditory realizations (“sounds”). With regards to such visual/sonic convergences, 
Huron cogently writes that “[i]n parsing auditory scenes, our brains prefer that our ears agree 
with our eyes.”  But despite Blackwood’s best efforts to optimize consistency between 78
 Cazden, “Staff Notation as a Non-Musical Communications Code” (1961), p.122.77
 Huron, Voice Leading: The Science Behind a Musical Art (2016), p.130.78
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“sound” and “look,” there are still scenarios in which score-following listeners are wise to take 
his supplied spellings with a grain of salt. Notation, after all, can be cunning, deceptive, and 
misleading; it is not always deserving of one’s blind trust. 
 Consider the excerpt below from “13 Notes,” which corresponds loosely to the 
opening bars of the etude (a passage I discuss later on in Chapter 5):
Fig. 3.5: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 13-TET 
Ex. 3.6: Spelled tritone, heard perfect fifth; excerpt begins at 1:25 of https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=gA6m6DW83SM&t=0s&list=PL0Mptms4dkf7w1VFmYaZRScQ-o9qoAoFJ&index=7
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The circled F# in m.45 is something I like to call a “tonic by [gentle] imposition,”  and it 79
behaves much like the Ab in the bass of m.5:  as a subtle “nudge” that motivates the upper 80
parts to resolve normatively to a minor triad (boxed in blue). Or, more accurately, the “nudge” 
can be said to act on listeners—who are motivated to (re)interpret the sounding pitches in 
terms of the newly imposed tonic. When this F# enters, the highest sounding voice is the 
circled C natural, which lies seven unit intervals and 646 cents away in pitch-class space. Yet 
even though this interval is spelled as a tritone (not to mention that it lies closer in cents to the 
12-TET tritone than to the 12-TET perfect fifth), I argue that many 12-enculturated listeners 
would be likely to override this apparent evidence and cognize it as a perfect fifth instead. The 
situation, once again, comes down to dynamic and schematic expectations working in tandem 
to outweigh the duo of spelling and acoustic reality. Dynamic expectation primes the “perfect 
fifth” interpretation because of the analogy to the etude’s opening bars; this activates the 
cognitive disposition to hear “parallel passages in parallel ways.”  On top of this dynamic cue 81
to hear an imposed tonic in mm.45–46, schematic-expectational cues also bolster the “perfect 
fifth” interpretation, since in most Western Euroclassical music (as I mention earlier), tonic-
 I will develop the idea of a “tonic by [gentle] imposition” further in Chapter 5 when I discuss 79
the opening bars of the etude. This concept extends Daniel Harrison’s notion of “asserted 
keys” to contexts of greater rhetorical subtlety and understatedness. [See Harrison, 
“Nonconformist Notions of Nineteenth-Century Enharmonicism” (2002), p.144.]
 Again, m.5 of “13 Notes” is not pictured above (or anywhere else in this chapter). It will be 80
treated in Chapter 5. For now, it suffices to think of m.5 and m.45 as what James Hepokoski 
and Warren Darcy would call “referential measures”: structurally analogous moments that differ 
in their surface details (here, their respective centricities). [Hepokoski and Darcy, Elements of 
Sonata Theory: Norms, Types, and Deformations in the Late–Eighteenth-Century Sonata (2006), 
pp.241–42.]
 Lerdahl and Jackendoff, A Generative Theory of Tonal Music (1983), p.75.81
172
functioning root-position triads contain perfect fifths and not tritones. This line of reasoning 
represents one possible way that an enculturated listener might efficiently (and subconsciously) 
wield tools of expectation, prediction, and categorization to resolve the cognitive dissonance 
resulting from the cross-modal mismatch between the “look” of the spelled tritone and the 
“sound” of the heard perfect fifth; in this particular case, sound outweighs look. The moment 
demonstrates just how stretchy the auditory category of “perfect fifth” can be across 
Blackwood’s dozen tunings: as small as 646 cents (in this particular etude) and as large as 720 
(in “15 Notes,” “20 Notes,” and the Suite for Guitar)—a bandwidth of nearly 75 cents!82
 Other notable instances of look/sound disjuncture occur across modulatory boundaries 
that involve some of the more visually perplexing enharmonic relationships featured in 
Blackwood’s tunings. Take the case of 17-TET, for instance:
Fig. 3.6: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 17-TET 
It is worth investigating why the 8–unit-interval, 738-cent span of 13-TET is never deployed 82
as a perfect fifth in “13 Notes,” considering that this interval lies closer to both the pure (~702-
cent) fifth and the 12-TET (700-cent) fifth than does its 7–unit-interval counterpart.
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As I discuss in Chapter 2, 17-TET is one out of just four of Blackwood’s dozen tunings that 
contains what he calls “recognizable diatonic scales,”  and his notational scheme is designed 83
with this fact in mind. As a result, “look” and “sound” line up particularly well in this tuning—
but only within keys, not between them. This is to say, modulation in 17-TET can sometimes 
look peculiar on the page because of the unusual skipwise spelling of its enharmonic 
equivalences,  and this can serve to visually “dissonate” tonal transformations that otherwise 84
sound relatively normative, tractable (in the cognitive sense), and commonplace. 
 Consider the following excerpt from “17 Notes,” which transitions from D# phrygian to 
either Gb ionian or Ab dorian across the double bar, with A# reinterpreted as Cb:
Ex. 3.7: Confusing spelling obfuscates an otherwise conventional scale-degree  
transformation; excerpt begins at 0:34 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_I-
YkCkMUNY&t=0s&list=OLAK5uy_mUM6_6q6J4VL8gS4PIesFNU9FCGfmRL9g&index=9
 Blackwood, The Structure of Recognizable Diatonic Tunings (1985), p.254.83
 Indeed, this is the only one of Blackwood’s dozen tunings in which enharmonic equivalences 84
are not spelled as some form of second.
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My claim, crudely put, is that this modulatory move sounds more “normal” than it looks. In 
other words, a 12-enculturated listener with a score would likely regard this move as more 
dissonant than would one listening without a score, because in the former case, visual 
information conflicts with sonic impression. As Ex. 3.7 demonstrates, the enharmonic common 
tone over the boundary transforms from a phrygian 5̂  to either an ionian 4̂  or a dorian 3̂, 
depending on one’s preferred interpretation. Either way, this move is not especially unusual; 
both are relatively common scale-degree transformations that 12-enculturated listeners are 
likely accustomed to hearing (at least in the x sense). The excerpt below, for instance, displays 
a famous x=5̂ —> x=3̂ transformation from the film music literature.
Ex. 3.8: A “fifth becomes (minor) third” transformation from John Williams’ “Imperial 
March” (1980);  excerpt begins at 0:11 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hNv5sPu0C1E85
 The difference lies in how the bounding key areas are notated. In 12-TET, x=5̂ —> x=4̂
transformations usually connect tonal/modal areas that are separated by a spelled major (or 
sometimes minor) second; likewise, x=5̂ —> x=3̂ transformations typically accompany tertian 
 To be clear, this is not a large-scale modulation from Eb aeolian to G aeolian, and no 85
enharmonic transformation or reinterpretation takes place here. Yet the similarities with Ex. 3.7 
are clear enough—particularly in that the x=5̂ —> x=3̂ transformation connects two modes 
that feature minor thirds above tonic. Erik Heine discusses this and other chromatic mediant 
progressions in a recent article that explores their usage in film music; he connects the above 
“‘Vader’ motion” with Wagner’s “Tarnhelm” progression. [Heine, “Chromatic Mediants and 
Narrative Context in Film” (2018), p.121.] See also Donald Fagen, “Mary Shut The Garden 
Door” (2006), in which a similar x=5̂ —> x=3̂ transformation repeatedly operates on the note 
D, the common tone between the shuttling G minor and B minor harmonies.
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modulations whose centricities are separated by a spelled major or minor third. But in 17-TET, 
the bounding centricities in Ex. 3.7 are separated not by a spelled M/m second or third, but 
rather by a spelled doubly diminished fourth (top hearing) or doubly diminished fifth (bottom 
hearing). These intervals are extremely rare in most musical contexts, and their cameos here are 
striking enough to give most score-following listeners pause. As the sudden sea-change in 
accidentals shows, this moment traverses a wide swath of tonal space in one fell swoop—either 
thirteen (bottom) or fifteen (top) notches down the line of fifths, in comparison to just four 
notches up in the case of Ex. 3.8. The notation in mm.35–36 of “17 Notes” is therefore a form 
of visual interference that clouds and defamiliarizes an otherwise unremarkable/normative aural 
event, making it come across as more dissonant than it actually sounds. 
 Skipwise enharmonic equivalences, in short, are the visual price one has to pay in 17-
TET for the transpositional optimization of major/minor triads and diatonic scales in notation. 
Whether this price is regarded as large or small varies among individual listeners, in accordance 
with how much trust they are accustomed to putting in notation. For those who typically take 
notation at its word (or rather, its “letter”), the moment in Ex. 3.7 might be regarded as more of 
nuisance than anything, since its representation sands against the grain of cognitive economy, 
creating more “work” for listeners to do (and more contradictions for them to reconcile). Here 
one does well to recall Harrison’s warning that notation does not always “reliably indicate real 
differences in tonal meaning.”  86
* * * 
 Harrison, “Nonconformist Notions of Nineteenth-Century Enharmonicism” (2002), p.117.86
176
 Let me be explicit: I am not arguing that 12-enculturated listeners should interpret the 
passages in this chapter in only the ways I propose. But I am arguing that they can, that there is 
enough evidence to do so reasonably, and that in many cases, these interpretations contradict 
some fundamental aspect of notation/spelling. This last bit is the upshot: Blackwood’s 
notational regime relies on varying familiar enharmonic relationships in order to produce 
familiar visual shapes, and while this might provide for global interpretive coherence, it also 
creates space for local anomalies that seem to expose the holes in the system. Perhaps my 
choice to dwell in the aperture between “look” and “sound” is itself overcompensatory, a way 
of correcting my own former blind trust in notation with a hearty dose of skepticism. But it is 
also an act of resistance—an affirmation that we as listeners are free to conceive of the “lines of 
the district,” so to speak, in ways that diverge from how they have been drawn for us. 
Tying It Together 
So where does this leave us with consonance and dissonance? In short, with a lot more left to 
say. This section will tie together some loose ends before addressing some provocative open-
ended questions about musical preference and value. Paul Zweifel writes that “[m]ost early 
attempts at micro-tuning, in particular Blackwood’s, were [a] means of optimizing chordal 
consonance.”  Yet as we have seen throughout this chapter, such an optimization does not 87
preclude the simultaneous existence of a profound, multilayered sense of dissonance that 
accompanies the act of listening to this music and reading its notation. Crucially, this 
dissonance is not just a matter of sensory/psychoacoustic “roughness” produced by beating 
 Zweifel, “The Mathematical Physics of Music” (2005), p.1102.87
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intervals and intervallic combinations. It also contains a multifaceted cognitive component that 
is psychological and expectational at its core. Blackwood’s microtonality arouses such cognitive 
dissonance in 12-enculturated listeners, musicians, and readers of notation alike because it is a 
paradoxical blend of expectational conformance and expectational noncompliance—seemingly 
both at the same time.   88
 There are several dimensions to this cognitive dissonance, ranging from the sense of 
being in between familiar qualia and/or auditory categories, to scenarios where multiple 
plausible interpretations of an ambiguous or expectationally anomalous event exist (but none 
seems to be an obvious choice), to apparent cross-modal mismatches between “look” and 
“sound.” There are even other dimensions that, despite being unexplored in this chapter, 
deserve mention anyway—like the “mimetic” dissonance that results from one’s (assumed) 
unfamiliarity with the Motorola Scalatron and Polyfusion synthesizer (the microtonal instruments 
that Blackwood uses). Arnie Cox writes that “musical imagery is partly motor imagery[, and] 
part of how we comprehend music is by way of a kind of physical empathy that involves 
imagining making the sounds we are listening to.”  Blackwood’s microtonality, which features 89
a combination of unfamiliar tunings/sounds and unfamiliar instruments/technologies used to 
render them audible, makes such “physical empathy” difficult for most listeners. Indeed, many 
of those who hear this music may well wonder how it was even possible to play to begin with—
 This calls to mind Ezra Sims’s memorable characterization of microtonal consonance/88
dissonance as a sort of “chiaroscuro.” [Sims, “Reflections on This and That (Perhaps A 
Polemic)” (1991), p.255.]
 Cox, “Embodying Music: Principles of the Mimetic Hypothesis” (2011), [2–3] [emphasis in 89
original].
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and this leads to another sense of expectational remove, bewilderment, and dissonance that is 
not to be overlooked. 
 In the face of all this dissonance, listeners can throw a variety of cognitive tools at 
unfamiliar music in an attempt to make sense of it. And when they do so, they do so efficiently: 
in a manner contingent on the time-worn grooves of enculturation. Yet, as I have argued, this 
process involves a good deal of jumping to false conclusions, throwing around inaccurate 
labels, and bending reality to fit preconceived desires. Misattribution, as Huron claims, “is the 
price we pay for trying to draw conclusions from small amounts of information.”  So why do 90
we do it anyway? What is the payoff? 
 Huron has written extensively about the interconnections among misattribution, 
emotion, and the prediction response, explaining that “[i]n trying to ensure that we learn a 
useful lesson, our minds tolerate learning all sorts of wrong lessons as well.”  In the case of 91
listening to microtonal music, the long-term “useful lesson” is the ability to develop a 
sensitivity to its idiosyncrasies and regularities, and thus to be able to better predict it (and 
music like it) in the future. We are inclined to do this because accurate prediction arouses 
pleasure and attendant positive emotions.  Yet this is a premise that can be harnessed towards 92
some controversial conclusions. Can we only enjoy music to the extent that we can predict it 
 Huron, Sweet Anticipation (2006b), p.137.90
 Ibid. See also Huron, “The Plural Pleasures of Music” (2005).91
 As Huron writes in Sweet Anticipation (2006b), “When a listener accurately predicts some 92
stimulus, misattribution is ready to pin the positive emotion onto any convenient bystander. 
Similarly, when a listener fails to predict some stimulus, misattribution is ready to spread the 
blame [….] The innocent bystander [is] the stimulus itself” (138).
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accurately? And when we evaluate music as “good,” are we not fundamentally rewarding 
ourselves, in some circuitous way? 
 To the first of those two questions, I would answer in the resounding negative—this is 
too much of an oversimplification.  The sounds of ticking metronomes and analog clocks are 93
easy to predict, but I doubt that many would regard them as enjoyable music. Similarly, a 
hypothetical piece that consists of just a single note (or interval, or chord) recurring at a regular 
periodicity would probably fail to strike many as interesting, even though it is technically 
extremely predictable. Of course, it goes without saying that variety, surprise, and suspense are 
fundamental to musical experience (and enjoyment), precisely for the cathartic trajectories of 
tension and release they engender.  Leonard Meyer has famously theorized that musical 94
meaning resides in the emotions that are generated when expectations are violated.  And 95
Bharucha has argued that “expected events aren’t necessarily preferred over unexpected 
events [….] If there is any relationship between expectation and preference, it takes the form of 
an inverted-U function: a moderate amount of violation of expectations is generally preferred 
 And this is the case even despite established empirical evidence that “[h]uman listeners 93
strongly prefer chord progressions that fulfill their expectations, and this preference is 
unaffected by musical training.” [Loui and Wessel, “Harmonic Expectation and Affect in 
Western Music: Effects of Attention and Training” (2007), p.1091.]
 In the words of Fred Lerdahl, “The best music utilizes the full potential of our cognitive 94
resources.” [Lerdahl, “Cognitive Constraints on Compositional Systems” (1992), p.118.]
 See especially Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music (1956).95
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over always fulfilling expectations or always violating them.”  In short, expectation and 96
prediction may be necessary conditions for musical enjoyment, but they alone are not sufficient 
to explain the sensation in all its manifold complexity (nor is this the dissertation to do so). 
 The second question above, though, is not so easily dismissed. This chapter began by 
framing consonance and dissonance in expectational terms, noting that these lower-level 
misattributions have the potential to trickle up to inform judgments of centricity, stability, and 
value. I have dealt with centricity and stability in the foregoing analytical vignettes; now is the 
time to reflect upon the question of value. I think that we should take seriously the possibility 
that our value judgments about music tell us more about ourselves than about the music—
specifically, about our capacity to understand it, process it[s surprises] efficiently, and 
contextualize it in terms of what we know. The polarizing case of twelve-tone serialism is 
representative: many listeners accustomed to the syntactic regularities of tonal music find it 
frustrating and opaque, and therefore dislike it.  Others are able to develop an appreciation 97
for it, but only over time, once they have listened to enough of it that they can better 
 Bharucha, “Tonality and Expectation” (1994), p.221. This “inverted-U function” is sometimes 96
called the “Wundt curve”; it was first described by Daniel Berlyne in his book Conflict, Arousal, 
and Curiosity (1960) and later refined in his Aesthetics and Psychobiology (1971). Since then, it 
has been invoked frequently in discussions of musical preference. See for example Smith and 
Cuddy, “The Pleasingness of Melodic Sequences: Contrasting Effects of Repetition and Rule-
Familiarity” (1986); Gebauer, Kringelbach, and Vuust, “Ever-Changing Cycles of Musical 
Pleasure: The Role of Dopamine and Anticipation” (2012); Margulis, “Aesthetic Responses to 
Repetition in Unfamiliar Music” (2013); and Chmiel and Schubert, “Back to the Inverted-U for 
Music Preference: A Review of the Literature” (2017), among several others.
 There is a good discussion of this in Chapter 16 of Huron’s Sweet Anticipation (2006b), pp.97
331–53. See also Hicks, “Serialism and Comprehensibility: A Guide for the Teacher” (1991) and 
Lerdahl, “Cognitive Constraints on Compositional Systems” (1992). Of course, one could make 
the same point about other styles of music that are commonly labeled as “dissonant,” such as 
free jazz.
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internalize its nuances and idiosyncrasies. Simply put, serialism is an acquired taste, and this is 
why tone rows do not make for Billboard hits, now or then. But for those avowed aficionados of 
twelve-tone technique (or, say, of Blackwood’s microtonal music), I do wonder the extent to 
which their enthusiasm for the music originates in a self-congratulatory impulse. 
 Of course, there are lots of other valid reasons to like or dislike music, and I am not 
denying their existence.  But I ask: are we willing to take this one more seriously, or at least to 98
acknowledge that it can play a greater role in our judgments than we might be aware? It may 
seem a stretch—or perhaps overly reductive—to connect consonance/dissonance to value. But 
I believe it to be a line of implication worth tracing here (and a relationship worth pursuing 
further). Whether or not we like a piece of music is undoubtedly complicated, subjective 
territory. But it is more than conceivable that these higher-order judgments say something, 
however indirectly, about our expectational and predictive capacities, which themselves are 
 For some other perspectives on musical preference and value, see Bowman, “Why Do 98
Humans Value Music?” (2002); Tekman and Hortaçsu, “Aspects of Stylistic Knowledge: What 
Are Different Styles Like and Why Do We Listen to Them?” (2002); Chapter 8 of Levitin, This Is 
Your Brain on Music: The Science of a Human Obsession (2006); Schäfer and Sedlmeier, “What 
Makes Us Like Music? Determinants of Music Preference” (2010); and Schubert, “Enjoying Sad 
Music: Paradox or Parallel Processes?” (2016).
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contingent upon the music we are accustomed to hearing. If it all circles back to mere 
exposure,  can exposure be so mere?99
 For more on the mere exposure effect, see Fechner, Vorschule der aesthetik (1876); Zajonc, 99
“Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure” (1968) and “Mere Exposure: A Gateway to the 
Subliminal” (2001); Lee, “The Mere Exposure Effect: Is It a Mere Case of 
Misattribution?” (1994); and Fang, Singh, and Ahluwalia, “An Examination of Different 
Explanations for the Mere Exposure Effect” (2007). Music-specific discussions of this effect are 
found in Oram and Cuddy, “Responsiveness of Western Adults to Pitch-Distributional 
Information in Melodic Sequences” (1995); Tillmann, Bigand, and Bharucha, “Implicit Learning 
of Tonality: A Self-Organizing Approach” (2000); Chapter 8 of Huron, Sweet Anticipation 
(2006b); Loui and Wessel, “Acquiring New Musical Grammars: A Statistical Learning Approach” 
(2006); Hannon and Trainor, “Music Acquisition: Effects of Enculturation and Formal Training on 
Development” (2007); Pearce and Wiggins, “Auditory Expectation: The Information Dynamics 
of Music Perception and Cognition” (2012); and Leung, “From Novel to Familiar: The Learning 
of Pitch Intervals and Event Frequencies in Microtonal Music Systems” (2017).
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 Chapter 4   |   Laughing at the Static 
  
In Curb Your Enthusiasm’s Season 9 finale, Marty Funkhouser (played by the late Bob Einstein) 
arrives a few minutes late to a dinner table already populated by Larry David (himself), Susie 
Greene (Susie Essman), and Jeff Greene (Jeff Garlin). After a brief argument regarding the 
quality of Funkhouser’s apology for being late, Susie proposes that they order a bottle of wine, 
and Funkhouser enthusiastically agrees. Larry then asks Funkhouser, “So, what’s happening?” 
and he responds with “I had a colonoscopy; clean as a whistle.” Immediately thereafter, some 
cheery transition music begins to play, and the scene cuts abruptly to the following day.  None 1
of the ensuing dinner is shown on screen. 
 What makes this brief scene funny? Certainly, reproducing it on this page comes 
nowhere close to capturing its humor on screen. To be sure, Funkhouser’s response is not 
exactly the most conventional answer to the question “So, what’s happening?” (nor is it the 
most appropriate for dinner-table conversation), and his nonchalant, matter-of-fact delivery of 
the line certainly adds to the bizarre, incongruous nature of the scene. But while this is part of 
the equation, it does not tell the whole story. Funkhouser’s line may be mildly comical on its 
own, but its full comedic effect, I argue, does not kick in until the scene abruptly cuts and the 
transition music starts to play. In other words, his line is not so much a punchline in itself as it is 
a setup for the ensuing music and scene cut, which act like a “punchline” in their own right—or 
 See in particular 11:47 to 12:00 of the episode, which can be viewed on HBO Max at https://1
www.hbo.com/curb-your-enthusiasm/season-9/10-fatwa. The transition music is Franco 
Micalizzi’s “Morning Promenade” (1991).
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at the very least, a form of comedic punctuation that ices the cake of the scene, so to speak, 
and consolidates its humorous effect. 
 Of course, most of us are more accustomed to laughing at words and actions than at 
music and camera work. Indeed, when I have shown this scene to others and prompted them 
to describe what they find funny about it, nearly all have pinned this sensation on the scene’s 
last spoken line. And yet, not a single person who laughed or smiled in response did so until 
after the camera cut away from the restaurant and the transition music started to play. The 
actual trigger of the humor, it seemed, was getting lost in translation. 
 Perhaps this is what the laugh track has morphed into in a century when it finds itself 
increasingly absent from its former comedic home. No longer is piped-in laughter prompting 
audiences to laugh; instead, this function is often performed by rapid cuts of scene that are 
accompanied by music, or—in the case of Adult Swim’s Robot Chicken—literal static. 
Oftentimes, when these sorts of punctuating devices are used, we think we are laughing at the 
preceding punchline. But is it possible that we are actually laughing more so in response to, or 
“at,” the static? 
 In this chapter, I propose that hearing harmonic function in tonal music works in much 
the same way. Harmonic function is often colloquially invoked as something that inheres in 
individual chords, or point-like musical entities. This has become somewhat of a pedagogical 
convention: students are asked to perform Roman numeral analyses of (usually homophonic) 
music, and every chord is neatly outfitted with its own numeral and associated function. I want 
to push back against this widely ingrained notion of harmonic function and consider it instead 
as something that pertains to spans of music and relations among intervallic collections (the 
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latter being my alternate term for “chord”). This means considering harmonic function as more 
of a retrofitting than an instantaneous outfitting: much like the transition music or the static that 
prompts us to laugh in post of the punchline proper, the way that an intervallic collection 
(henceforth “IC”) is followed is what retroactively gives it much of its perceived sense of 
function. 
 Of course, this is not to discount the fact that the way an IC is preceded—much like the 
setup of a joke or punchline—also contributes to that IC’s perceived sense of function. Indeed, 
harmonic function is something I like to call “two-tailed,” in that an IC’s functional identity can 
be regarded as the sum total of how it is approached and how it is left.  Much of the time, 2
these two tails align. Cadential dominants preceded by ii6 (or ii6/5, or IV, etc.), for instance, are 
approached like dominants and left like dominants (provided they resolve to some tonic-
functioning harmony). Dominants preceded by their own (secondary) dominant, however, are 
approached like tonics and left like dominants, which can lead to some confusion as to how 
secondary dominants function in general, not to mention some initial confusion about the 
functional identity of the dominant itself. However—and this is the larger point—such initial 
confusion is immediately cleared up upon the resolution of that dominant to tonic. This 
demonstrates that while the context in which an IC initially appears can trigger very specific 
predictions about how it might function, this functional identity is not fully determined, 
 This is closer to the way harmonic function is framed in the corpus-based approach of White 2
and Quinn, “Chord Context and Harmonic Function in Tonal Music” (2018).
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confirmed, or revised until that IC is followed by another.  Therefore, function is something that 3
is at least partially back-projected onto harmonies, and for this reason, it represents another 
form of cognitive misattribution that is widespread in musical thinking: treating something that 
pertains to a relation as if it pertained to an entity (and further yet, treating that thing as if it 
inhered in the entity the second it sounds). 
 Harmonic functions, just like scale degrees and consonance/dissonance, are examples 
of musical qualia, which I have been framing as “misattributions that originate in limbic 
responses to expectation.”  This means that harmonic-functional apperceptions derive from 4
implicit statistical learning processes and reflect expectational/predictive judgments about how 
ICs tend to behave in particular cultural and stylistic contexts. My account of harmonic function 
in this chapter follows logically from my account of scale degrees in Chapter 2. If scale-degree 
qualia describe what “happens” when one groups a series of sounding pitches based on what 
it is like to hear these pitches in context (i.e., as intervals relative to an organizing focal point), 
then harmonic function qualia describe the related, higher-level process of grouping a series of 
sounding intervals based on what it is like to hear these intervallic collections in context (i.e., as 
intervallic successions relative to that same focal point). 
 This is especially the case when one is still in the midst of the tonic-finding process, whether 3
at the very beginning of a piece or during its moments of tonal flux within. Without an 
anchoring tonal frame within which to place and contextualize sounding musical events, 
listeners must work to create one themselves, and this engages the back-projective logics of 
inductive reasoning more heavily than do those moments in which a frame is already 
established. I will return to this distinction between “finding” and “monitoring” tonality (which 
extends Danuta Mirka’s notions of “finding” and “monitoring” meter) in the next chapter. [See 
Mirka, Metric Manipulations in Haydn and Mozart: Chamber Music for Strings, 1787–1791 
(2009), p.22.]
 Huron, Sweet Anticipation (2006b), p.167.4
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 But what may seem less logical, at least on the surface, is my account of the “stuff” of 
harmonic function. I want to take seriously in this chapter the controversial possibility that 
harmonic function may not actually be about “harmony” at all—insofar as this refers to the 
conventional/colloquial sense of the term as a vertical abstraction tied to a static concept of 
“chord.” Rather, I want to argue that harmonic function emerges from the interaction of generic 
scalar position (x) and metrical position, and thus, that it is more about (colloquial) “melody” 
and meter than it is about harmony or chords. In other words, harmonic function is a product of 
both scale-degree content and temporal context, and as we will see, this view triangulates the 
recent scholarly tendency to conceive of function (and classify functional theories) in terms of 
one or the other pole.  5
Annals of a Floating Signifier (I) 
“Harmonic function” is one of those unfortunately versatile terms that has been used so often, 
and in so many different contexts, that it is exceedingly difficult to pin down a precise 
definition. As David Kopp laments, “In our time, any search for a commonly accepted 
definition of function will be frustrated, for the meaning of the word has proved adaptable to 
support a wide variety of statements concerning harmon[ic] meaning and action [….] Yet we 
use it as if its meaning were fixed and intuitively evident.”  Kopp then goes on to list at least 6
 Of course, this tendency is not exclusive; see http://openmusictheory.com/5
harmonicFunctions.html for an account of function that centers the interplay of content (i.e., a 
chord’s “internal characteristics,” or “the notes that belong to it”) and context (“the chords that 
tend to precede and follow it, and where it tends to be employed in the course of a musical 
phrase”).
 Kopp, “On the Function of Function” (1995), [1].6
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seven competing definitions of harmonic function, linking the concept at once to individual 
scale degrees,  to representative Roman numerals,  to phrase-structural syntax,  and to the 7 8 9
“intrinsic potentiality” of certain chords to progress in certain ways (among other accepted 
meanings).  What makes things even more complicated, according to Kopp, is that “we 10
commonly associate an idea of function with the thought of many theorists of common-practice 
tonality, and regularly identify the presence of ‘function’ in theory which significantly predates 
the introduction of the formal concept” by Hugo Riemann in his Vereinfachte Harmonielehre of 
1893.  In other words, the concept of harmonic function is frequently subject to the biases of 11
“presentism,”  to borrow a term from Thomas Christensen, in that it is often projected 12
backwards onto pre-Riemannian thought and read into earlier theories of harmony where it did 
not yet exist as such. 
 As is the case in Piston and DeVoto, Harmony (1976), p.49 and Harrison, Harmonic Function 7
in Chromatic Music (1994), Chapter 2.
 See for instance Kostka, Payne, and Schindler, Tonal Harmony, with an Introduction to 8
Twentieth-Century Music (1989), p.103.
 As in Aldwell and Schachter, Harmony and Voice Leading (1989), p.84.9
 Kopp, “On the Function of Function” (1995), [1]. A succinct summary of these competing 10
definitions listed by Kopp is given in Nobile, “Harmonic Function in Rock Music: A Syntactical 
Approach” (2016), pp.151–52.
 Kopp, “On the Function of Function” (1995), [2].11
 Christensen, “Music Theory and Its Histories” (1993), passim.12
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 The root-motion theories of Jean-Philippe Rameau, for example, are commonly cited as 
an origin point for harmonic-functional thought.  Because Rameau was the first to use the 13
terms tonic (tonique), dominant (dominante), and subdominant (sous-dominante), he is often 
credited with anticipating many of the ideas about harmonic function that would crystallize 
over a century and half later in the writings of Riemann. But while these terms, on the surface, 
may seem to align with Riemann’s three principal functions (drei Hauptfunktionen), they 
connote very different things for each theorist. For Riemann, these labels describe immanent 
properties of chords themselves; for Rameau, on the other hand, they describe connections/
progressions among chords.  As Kopp writes to this point, “Riemann’s functions inhere as 14
tonal meanings in individual chords; they do not determine action from one to the next.”  15
 In the middle of the temporal chasm separating Rameau and Riemann lies another 
strain of music-theoretic thought typically regarded as “proto-functional”: the Stufentheorie 
([scale-]degree theory) tradition whose representatives include Johann Philip Kirnberger,  16
 Rameau’s early treatises tend to be marshaled as evidence for this claim, particularly Traité 13
de l’harmonie (1722), Nouveau système de musique théorique (1726), and Génération 
harmonique (1737). For a succinct chapter-length discussion of these treatises and their place 
in Rameau’s oeuvre, Joel Lester’s “Rameau and Eighteenth-Century Harmonic Theory” (2002) is 
a good resource.
 More specifically, tonique names a freedom to progress by any acceptable interval of the 14
fundamental bass, whereas dominante is associated with progression by descending fifth, and 
sous-dominante with progression by ascending fifth.
 Kopp, “On the Function of Function” (1995), [11].15
 See in particular Volume 1 of Kirnberger’s Die Kunst des reinen Satzes (1774), pp.15–19, 16
which may contain the earliest documented usage of Roman numerals put in the service of 
musical analysis.
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Georg Joseph Vogler,  Gottfried Weber,  and Simon Sechter.  Weber is often taken to be the 17 18 19
paradigmatic figure in this lineage,  even though he was not the first to use Roman numerals. 20
Though Stufentheorie is heavily indebted to Rameauvian ideas, it parts company with Rameau’s 
root-motion theories (and differs from Riemann’s mature Funktionstheorie) in that it considers 
individual scale degrees, not extrinsic relations/progressions among chords (or chords 
themselves), to constitute the brass tacks of harmony. For these theorists, chords are identified 
by the scale degrees on which they are rooted, and Roman numerals accomplish this task.  21
Therefore, what is most important about chords, to Stufentheorists, is “their participation and 
position in a key, not their relation to each other or their tendency to progress.”  Put another 22
 Representative works include Vogler’s Tonwissenschaft und Tonsezkunst (1776), his Grunde 17
der Kuhrpfälzischen Tonschule (1778), and his Handbuch zur Harmonielehre (1802). For more 
on Vogler’s life and teachings, see Grave and Grave, In Praise of Harmony: The Teachings of 
Abbé Georg Joseph Vogler (1987).
 The classic work is Weber’s Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst (1817–21), 18
which popularized the method today known as “Roman numeral analysis” (and is sometimes 
erroneously cited as inventing this method outright).
 See especially Sechter, Die Grundsätze der musikalischen Komposition (1853–54) and Die 19
Richtige Folge der Grundharmonien (1854). William Caplin’s Classical Form (1998) regards 
Sechter’s former treatise to be “the first comprehensive formulation of [Viennese] 
Stufentheorie” (261); a similar pronouncement is made in Wason, Viennese Harmonic Theory 
from Albrechtsberger to Schenker and Schoenberg (1985), p.33.
 See Kopp, “On the Function of Function” (1995), Tymoczko, “Root Motion, Function, Scale-20
Degree: A Grammar for Elementary Tonal Harmony” (2003), and Holtmeier, “The Reception of 
Hugo Riemann’s Music Theory” (2011) for three sources that cite Weber as the preeminent 
representative of scale-degree theories of harmonic function. 
 While Vogler (and sparingly, Kirnberger before him) used Roman numerals to label tonally 21
situated chord roots, it was Weber who first introduced the convention of using uppercase and 
lowercase Roman numerals to indicate a chord’s quality.
 Kopp, “On the Function of Function” (1995), [6].22
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way, while I, V, and IV nominally map onto tonique, dominante, and sous-dominante, 
respectively, Rameau’s labels connote action, whereas the former numerals used by Weber et 
al. connote identity and membership. Scale-degree theories also differ from Riemann’s theories 
of chord progression (Harmonieschritte) in that the latter are formulated as key-agnostic. 
According to Kopp, Riemann “makes this clear in an impassioned refutation of Weber’s Roman 
numeral notation, arguing for an essential identity of individual chord progression types 
existing independently of the character which they take on in the context of a key.”  This 23
makes Riemann’s Harmonieschritte less of a “harmonic” theory and more of a “contrapuntal” 
one, according to a recent distinction proposed by Ian Quinn  (though Quinn would probably 24
classify Riemann’s separate Funktionstheorie differently).  25
 To summarize the preceding, no music theorist explicitly mentions harmonic function by 
name until Riemann in 1893, but this has not stopped later theorists and historians of theory 
from imputing proto-functional intentions to figures as diverse as Sechter, Weber, and Rameau. 
While none of these earlier figures actually sets out to propose a theory of harmonic function, 
traces of their insights are nevertheless palpable in many of the competing definitions of 
 Ibid., [9]. For the original “impassioned refutation,” see Riemann, Katechismus der Musik-23
Ästhetik (1890), p.65.
 See Quinn, “Tonal Harmony” (2019), passim. According to Quinn, “Contrapuntal laws are 24
those that operate independently of a controlling tonic and can be expressed without recourse 
to a scale-degree concept,” whereas “[h]armonic laws are those that describe the ways in 
which a tonic exerts its control and must be expressed in terms of scale degrees” (469, 
emphasis in original).
 As Quinn writes, “Function theories and scale-degree theories have in common the principle 25
that a chord’s tendencies depend on the scale-degree identity of its members, or at least of its 
root”; both are thus dependent on “harmonic,” rather than “contrapuntal,” laws. [Quinn, 
“Tonal Harmony” (2019), p.468.]
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harmonic function in use today. The recent history of the term “harmonic function” is therefore 
one rife with presentism and confirmation bias. As we are beginning to see, it is fundamentally 
a story about misattribution—in many senses of the word. 
  
Annals of a Floating Signifier (II) 
So how do the music theorists of more recent generations sort through this multiplicity of 
definitions? Many attempt to impose a sense of order on this growing chaos through acts of 
classification—by drawing typological distinctions that separate different strands of thought 
about harmonic function and their roles in broader theories of tonal harmony. Different scholars 
have slightly different ways of doing this, but in general, there exists a broad degree of 
categorical overlap among their schemes. For Kopp, there are three major strands of thought, 
represented by the paradigmatic case studies of Rameau, Weber, and Riemann.  This tripartite 26
scheme is mirrored exactly in a later article by Dmitri Tymoczko, which “considers three 
theories that have been used to explain tonal harmony: root-motion theories, scale-degree 
theories, and function theories.”  While Tymoczko cites the same representative trio of figures 27
as Kopp,  he also problematizes the rigidity of such a scheme, assuring the reader that he is 28
aware of its limitations: “Historians may well feel that I am drawing overly sharp distinctions 
between root-motion, scale-degree, and functional theories. Certainly, many theorists have 
 Kopp, “On the Function of Function” (1995), passim.26
 Tymoczko, “Root Motion, Function, Scale-Degree: A Grammar for Elementary Tonal 27
Harmony” (2003), p.35.
 He does not, however, cite Kopp himself.28
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drawn freely on all three traditions. (Rameau in particular is an important progenitor of all the 
theories considered in this paper.)”  The upshot is a familiar one: neat typologies can make a 29
messy smattering of data points easier to understand, but at the cost of creating apparently 
siloed narratives that downplay the roles of intellectual influence, lineage, and exchange—all of 
which cut across typological borders. 
 Eytan Agmon proposes a tripartite model that is slightly different, laying out an 
opposition among Stufentheorie, Funktionstheorie, and a third approach that “emphasi[zes] 
hierarchical structure and voice leading.”  Root-motion theories are absent from this model, 30
instead replaced by a Schenkerian strand that centers voice-leading activity and prolongational 
scale-step motion. Brian Hyer, writing a few years later, posits a binary distinction between “the 
function theories of Rameau and Riemann on the one hand and the scale-degree theories of 
Gottfried Weber and Schenker on the other,”  effectively turning the three-pronged 31
classification systems of Kopp, Tymoczko, and Agmon into a two-pronged one that makes 
room for all of their paradigmatic category representatives. But Hyer, like Tymoczko, is careful 
to invoke his heuristic scheme historiographically, not historically: as a means to characterize 
the state of the discourse surrounding theories of functional tonality, not as a way to make 
 Tymoczko, “Root Motion, Function, Scale-Degree: A Grammar for Elementary Tonal 29
Harmony” (2003), pp.36–37. By “treating these three theories in isolation,” Tymoczko further 
clarifies, his goal is not “a historical one,” but rather “to see how well we can explain the most 
elementary features of tonal harmony on the basis of a few simple principles” (36–37). 
Additionally, his discussion of root-motion theories is less centered on Rameau and more on a 
then-recent article by Nicolas Meeus, “Toward a Post-Schoenbergian Grammar of Tonal and 
Pre-Tonal Harmonic Progressions” (2000).
 Agmon, “Functional Harmony Revisited: A Prototype-Theoretic Approach” (1995), p.202.30
 Hyer, “Tonality” (2002), p.733.31
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claims about individual historical actors and their intentions. Hyer also does not treat his 
categories as mutually exclusive, acknowledging that many tonal theories can be understood 
as “a hybrid of both.”  32
 This seems to be the case: that theorists’ conceptions of harmonic function often merge 
aspects of multiple categories mentioned in the previous two paragraphs—even the ones they 
themselves typologize as separate. Agmon’s own theory of harmonic function, for instance, is a 
self-described hybrid, maintaining some key continuities with Riemannian Funktionstheorie 
while also remaining “compatible with a hierarchical [i.e., Schenkerian] approach.”  Willi Apel’s 33
article on function in the second edition of the Harvard Dictionary of Music, similarly, links the 
concept with notions of scale-step prolongation,  thereby combining aspects of Stufentheorie 34
with Schenkerian voice-leading theory. And Kevin Swinden’s claim that “[c]haracterizing bass-
line patterns are the primary determinants of harmonic function”  integrates considerations of 35
bass motion (not necessarily root motion), characteristic scale steps, and the properties of the 
Tonnetz into a single Gestalt. Definitions such as these demonstrate just how porous the 
aforementioned categorical boundaries can be in practice. And this is precisely the larger 
 Ibid. 32
 Agmon, “Functional Harmony Revisited: A Prototype-Theoretic Approach” (1995), p.203. 33
Agmon’s theory draws on work by Steven Harnad and Eleanor Rosch on prototypes and 
prototypicality. See in particular Harnad’s introduction to Categorial Perception: The 
Groundwork of Cognition (1987), a collection of essays that is greatly influenced by the prior 
work of Rosch, including “Universals in Color Naming and Memory” (1972) and “Classification 
of Real-World Objects: Origins and Representations in Cognition” (1977). I will return to 
Agmon’s prototype theory of harmonic function later in the chapter.
 Apel, “Function” (1969), p.337. See also Kopp, “On the Function of Function” (1995), [1].34
 Swinden, “When Functions Collide: Aspects of Plural Function in Chromatic Music” (2005), p.35
260.
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point: that basically all theories of harmonic function are hybrids of some sort, not just because 
of the fundamental intellectual interconnectedness of music-theoretic thought over time, but 
also because of the fundamental experiential interconnectedness of musical domains—such as 
melody (qua scale degrees), counterpoint, harmony (qua chords), and meter—that are often 
strategically posited as separate. 
Content and Context 
Despite this interconnectedness, however, much of the scholarship on function over the last 
decade has been structured by another binary that is often framed as oppositional: either 
harmonic function is a matter of chord content (i.e., its scale-degree makeup), or it is a matter 
of chord context (i.e., its conventions of usage). After surveying some of this relevant literature 
(and speculating on the origins of this binary framing), I then ask a simple question: why can’t it 
be both? 
 In Chapter 4 of his 2013 Ph.D. dissertation, Christopher White claims that “[h]armonic 
function depends upon a chord’s content and/or context, and functional categorizations can 
either emphasize the former or the latter.”  White eventually proposes that harmonic function 36
can be understood entirely under the aegis of the latter. Using a Hidden Markov Model (HMM), 
an algorithm “that identifies contextual categories of objects within streams of observations,” 
White argues that “a purely contextual model—i.e., one that does not take a chord’s pitch or 
scale-degree content into consideration—is sufficient to create functional chord classes within 
 White, “Some Statistical Properties of Tonality, 1650–1900” (2013), p.183.36
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[the] corpus [of Bach chorales].”  This chapter was later turned into an article, co-authored by 37
Ian Quinn, that doubles down on the content/context binary and makes an “aggressively data-
driven” case for the latter by applying the HMM to two more corpora in addition to the Bach 
chorales: the Kostka-Payne corpus and the McGill Billboard corpus.  This article is even more 38
explicitly structured around the opposition between content and context. In its literature 
review, White and Quinn make the distinction up front between “two ways of defining 
harmonic functions: context-driven approaches are concerned with chords’ usage, and content-
driven approaches are concerned with chords’ scale-degree constituents.”  They cite Daniel 39
Harrison  and Fred Lerdahl  as two theorists whose conceptions of harmonic function are 40 41
aligned with the “content” pole, and Drew Nobile  as one aligned with the “context” pole.  42 43
 Ibid. 37
 White and Quinn, “Chord Context and Harmonic Function in Tonal Music” (2018), p.314. The 38
Kostka-Payne corpus is comprised of all the musical examples included in the instructors’ 
edition of Kostka, Payne, and Almén’s Tonal Harmony, with an Introduction to Twentieth-
Century Music (2012). The McGill Billboard corpus, on the other hand, is comprised of 649 
randomly chosen songs that appear on the Billboard “Hot 100” list sometime between 1958 
and 1991.
 Ibid., p.315 [emphasis in original].39
 Harrison, Harmonic Function in Chromatic Music (1994), particularly Chapter 2, which links 40
harmonic function with the notion of “scale-degree assemblies.”
 Lerdahl, Tonal Pitch Space (2001), particularly pp.214–31. According to White and Quinn 41
(2018), Lerdahl “derives function from the placement of pitches and chords within a tonal 
hierarchy” (315)—what Lerdahl calls the “basic space.”
 See especially Nobile, “A Structural Approach to the Analysis of Rock Music” (2014), p.22.42
 White and Quinn, “Chord Context and Harmonic Function in Tonal Music” (2018), pp.315–43
16.
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 The work of Nobile—which is not corpus-based, and which deals primarily with pop/
rock music—deserves further mention. His is another recent voice that leverages the content/
context binary to make the claim that harmonic function is purely about syntax. As he argues, 
“A theory of harmonic function rooted in chord category—e.g., ascribing dominant function to 
any chord related to V—inadequately accounts for rock’s harmonic organization”; instead, he 
advocates for a “syntactical definition of harmonic function such that function is acquired not 
by a chord’s scale-degree content but by its role in the context of a song’s form.”  For Nobile, 44
then, form does not merely follow function (as the cliché goes); oftentimes, in rock music, form 
is function.  45
 Alongside the guiding content/context binary, Nobile also employs a tripartite 
classification scheme to organize the kinds of definitions of harmonic function typically used in 
music theory. These are “function-as-category” (i.e., “what kind of chord is this?”), “function-as-
progression” (i.e., “what other chord[s] does this chord want to proceed to?”), and “function-
as-syntax” (i.e., “what role does this chord play in its musical context?”).  We might imagine 46
these three conceptions of harmonic function as existing on a continuum from the most 
content-based (function-as-category) to the most context-based (function-as-syntax), with 
function-as-progression lying somewhere in between. Importantly, Nobile notes that these 
conceptions often tacitly cross-pollinate in common-practice definitions of harmonic function. 
 Nobile, “Harmonic Function in Rock Music: A Syntactical Approach” (2016), p.149.44
 This is a foundational assumption in Nobile’s recently published book, Form as Harmony in 45
Rock Music (2020).
 Nobile, “Harmonic Function in Rock Music: A Syntactical Approach” (2016), pp.151–52.46
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As he writes to this point, “[C]ommon-practice theorists rarely if ever use function-as-syntax 
without also employing function-as-category” ; similarly, “Function-as-progression often [also] 47
presupposes function-as-category, as when tonic, subdominant, and dominant categories are 
said to arrange themselves in the paradigmatic progression T–S–D–T.”  Nobile brings up 48
these implicit entanglements to argue that a purely contextual/syntactical conception of 
harmonic function, particularly in the common-practice literature, is hard to come by.  But 49
while his goal in writing—to advance such a conception—is nominally similar to White’s,  these 50
two authors sometimes differ widely on how to classify certain theories of their predecessors. 
 Ibid., p.151. This implicit linkage, Nobile argues, is not transferrable to pop/rock contexts, 47
where it is rather common for chords unrelated to V (such as ii, IV, or bVII) to take on dominant 
function.
 Ibid., p.153. This pattern is often regarded as the quintessential marker of functional tonality. 48
Riemann offers an early argument for the primacy of this pattern in his Grosse 
Kompositionslehre, Volume 1 (1902), p.33. Later theorists have taken up this T–S–D–T 
succession and called it different things, from a basic “four-place pattern” (Guck, “The 
Functional Relations of Chords: A Theory of Musical Intuitions” [1978], p.34) to a standard 
“phrase model” (Laitz, The Complete Musician [2016], pp.273–76) to an “expanded cadential 
progression” (Caplin, Analyzing Classical Form [2013], pp.374–75).
 He cites Kopp’s “phrase-based syntactical meaning” formulation (which itself cites an 49
illustrative passage from Aldwell/Schachter’s Harmony and Voice Leading [1989]) as perhaps 
the only qualifying definition in the literature. [See Kopp, “On the Function of Function” (1995), 
[1].] It is to be noted, however, that what Kopp finds to be “phrase-based” about Aldwell and 
Schachter’s (1989) conception of function—namely, their distinction between “opening” and 
“closing tonic[s]” (84)—is also present in Marion Guck’s earlier article “The Functional Relations 
of Chords: A Theory of Musical Intuitions” (1978), which reformulates Riemann’s T–S–D–T as 
“T1–P–D–T2” (34).
 I say “nominally” because White’s more zoomed-in, local-succession–based conception of 50
“syntax” may strike some readers as partaking nontrivially in Nobile’s “function-as-progression” 
category. Nobile’s own conception of “syntax,” on the other hand, is more macroscopic in 
orientation.
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Take Lerdahl’s theory of harmonic function, for instance.  Nobile regards it as “the most 51
explicitly syntactical [function theory] in the common-practice theoretical literature,” claiming 
that Lerdahl “eschews function-as-category definitions and constructs a functional model that 
identifies chords’ roles in their musical context.”  But White, on the other hand, classifies it as 52
a “content-driven approach” (despite its surface appearance as syntactical), because of 
Lerdahl’s reliance on tonal hierarchies as measures of pitch/chord stability.  As White and 53
Quinn argue to this point, “What seems like a context-oriented function is, in fact, tethered to 
an elaborate and precisely determined notion of a hierarchical pitch space.”   54
 But why must an ideal theory of harmonic function be purely about context, as opposed 
to content, when so many preexisting conceptions of harmonic function—as Nobile and White 
each point out in their own way—implicitly bake in elements of both? Could it be that this 
recent turn to context-exclusive definitions is symptomatic of a broader overcompensatory 
trend in music-theoretic thought: to be more attentive to matters of context (whether musical, 
historical, cultural, or otherwise) in the wake of musicology’s contextual turn of the 1980s and 
1990s? Some may find this hypothesis of a delayed/indirect ripple effect across subdisciplines 
to be intriguing and suggestive; others, however, will probably find it somewhat of a stretch. I 
 See Lerdahl, Tonal Pitch Space (2001), pp.214–31.51
 Nobile, “Harmonic Function in Rock Music: A Syntactical Approach” (2016), p.155. He goes 52
on to note one exception: “The only function that contains explicit function-as-category 
elements is T, which is defined based on Lerdahl’s ‘tonic-finding rule’ (essentially a measure of 
pitch stability)” (155).
 White and Quinn, “Chord Context and Harmonic Function in Tonal Music” (2018), p.315.53
 Ibid., p.316.54
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want to propose an alternative explanation: that some music theorists were already framing 
tonal context and tonal content in “either/or” terms as early as the 1980s. 
 This strain of scholarship arose as a response to the work of Carol Krumhansl, who 
observed empirically that different tones in a key afford different hierarchical levels of perceived 
tonal stability.  More specifically, the tonic pitch is typically judged as the most stable, 55
followed by the remaining members of the tonic triad, then the remaining members of the 
diatonic (major) scale, and finally the remaining members of the chromatic octave (in that order 
and according to those clusters).  Krumhansl’s work was widely influential, but as I will discuss 56
at greater length in the next chapter, it was also sometimes misunderstood. Indeed, her 
pioneering experiments precipitated some heated debates regarding which aspects of tonality 
are the most perceptually salient, and David Butler would emerge as her most vocal 
challenger.  Butler frames his theory of “intervallic rivalry” as a foil to Krumhansl’s work in 57
nearly every way: it is dynamic, relational, and sensitive to temporal and musical contexts 
 See in particular Krumhansl and Shepard, “Quantification of the Hierarchy of Tonal Functions 55
Within a Diatonic Context” (1979), which introduced the now-famous probe-tone method.
 See Krumhansl and Keil, “Acquisition of the Hierarchy of Tonal Functions in Music” (1982), p.56
244, for a graphical representation of this tonal hierarchy for major keys.
 See the following trio of articles for their brief but contentious back-and-forth: Butler, 57
“Describing the Perception of Tonality in Music: A Critique of the Tonal Hierarchy Theory and a 
Proposal for a Theory of Intervallic Rivalry” (1989), Krumhansl, “Tonal Hierarchies and Rare 
Intervals in Music Cognition” (1990), and Butler, “Response to Carol Krumhansl” (1990). Butler’s 
(1989) position is that “listeners recognize the tonal center in tonal music on a best-evidence 
basis, and the clearest evidence is carried in the rarest-occurring intervals in the diatonic 
set” (219). This aligns his theory with Richmond Browne’s earlier notion of “position finding,” 
according to which comparatively rarer intervals (like tritones and minor seconds) reveal more 
information about tonal positioning than do more common intervals (like fifths and thirds), 
“which could hold any number of places in a diatonic field.” [Browne, “Tonal Implications of 
the Diatonic Set” (1981), p.7.]
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whereas Krumhansl’s tonal hierarchies are (allegedly) static, fixed, and not sensitive enough to 
contextual factors.  While Krumhansl does eventually defend herself and clarify her position, 58
attempting to bring her and Butler’s theories into more of a “both/and” relationship,  the 59
Butler-inspired “either/or” rhetoric still persists in subsequent theories of tonal perception 
(though with considerably less hostility). 
 Perhaps the first scholar to explicitly frame this debate in terms of an opposition 
between “content” and “context” is Helen Brown in her 1988 article “The Interplay of Set 
Content and Temporal Context in a Functional Theory of Tonal Perception.”  Her empirical 60
findings indicate that “perception of tonality is too complex a phenomenon to be explained in 
the time-independent terms of psychoacoustics or pitch-class collections, [and] perceived tonal 
relationships are too flexible to be forced into static structural representations.”  Brown thus 61
argues for the primacy of temporal context over pitch-class–set content—and though she is 
 See especially Butler, “Describing the Perception of Tonality in Music: A Critique of the Tonal 58
Hierarchy Theory and a Proposal for a Theory of Intervallic Rivalry” (1989) and Butler and 
Brown, “Describing the Mental Representation of Tonality in Music” (1994). An important 
precursor to Butler’s 1989 article is Butler and Brown, “Tonal Structure versus Function: Studies 
of the Recognition of Harmonic Motion” (1984), which posits the same basic binary distinction 
but does not yet use the term “intervallic rivalry.”
 See in particular Krumhansl, “Tonal Hierarchies and Rare Intervals in Music Cognition” (1990); 59
the most explicit attempts at rapprochement are on pp.309 and 317. The vitriol seems to have 
cooled by the publication of Brown, Butler, and Jones, “Musical and Temporal Influences on 
Key Discovery” (1994), which frames tonal hierarchy and intervallic rivalry not as oppositional 
models, but as compatible ones.
 This article is based on her earlier Ph.D. dissertation, “The Effects of Set Content and 60
Temporal Context in Musicians’ Aural Perception of Tonality” (1985), written at Ohio State 
University.
 Brown, “The Interplay of Set Content and Temporal Context in a Functional Theory of Tonal 61
Perception” (1988), p.219.
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discussing the broader phenomenon of tonal hearing, she frames her claim in a manner that is 
closely mirrored by the later argumentative formulations of Nobile and White/Quinn discussed 
above. While these latter authors do not actually cite Brown’s study in their respective articles,  62
traces of her influence can nevertheless be felt throughout their work. 
Moving Away from “Chord” 
As I have hinted previously, my conception of harmonic function will consider how aspects of 
scale-degree content (particularly x) and aspects of musico-temporal context (particularly 
[hyper]meter) can interact to produce sensations of tonal vectoredness in enculturated 
listeners. But before rolling out this conception in full, it is first necessary to situate my main 
terminological intervention—the substitution of “intervallic collection” (or “IC”) for “chord”—
alongside those other theorists whose ideas of function are unsutured from conventional 
notions of “chord.”  
 I begin with Daniel Harrison’s aforementioned book, which from the outset declares a 
vested “interest in having function and chord regarded as separate things.”  His overarching 63
contention that harmonic function inheres in scale degrees seems to paint his theory as a 
successor to the Stufentheorie tradition. There is, however, a crucial difference. Stufentheories 
link harmonic-functional behavior with scale degrees—but only insofar as these scale degrees 
are understood as roots of chords. Harrison’s theory, on the other hand, pushes back against 
 White does, however, cite Brown’s article in his dissertation—and multiple times. But none of 62
these occurs in his chapter on harmonic function, where he first introduces the content/context 
distinction.
 Harrison, Harmonic Function in Chromatic Music (1994), p.xiii [emphasis in original].63
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this notion that a chord is a singularity (and that its scale-degree root is its synecdochic 
essence), instead assigning different functional roles to different triadic members. And so, on 
top of triadic roots (which he terms functional “bases”), triadic thirds (functional “agents”) and 
fifths (functional “associates”) also take on unique and distinct functional responsibilities.64
What gives agents their “agency,” for example, is the fact that they are prime movers in the 
voice-leading dimension of harmonic function—a dimension that Harrison refers to in terms of 
“functional discharge.”  As he argues to this point, “All agent discharges are to one of the two 65
other functional elements—base or associate.”  Fig. 4.1 below provides a simple illustration of 66
this principle.
Fig. 4.1: The patterned, systematic voice-leading behavior of functional agents (i.e., triadic thirds) 
 Harrison’s theory of scale-degree assemblies inverts the old Aristotelian adage that the 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Rather, under this conception of harmonic function, 
the sum of a chord’s scale-degree “parts” is at the very least equal to, if not (in a sense) greater 
than, the “whole” of the chord—insofar as such a chord is understood as a unified 
Ibid., pp.46ff. These roles hold regardless of chordal inversion.64
Ibid., pp.90ff. This topic is central to Chapter 3 of the book, “Establishment, Discharge, and 65
Chromatic Behavior of Functions.”
Ibid., p.96.66
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“synergism”  represented by its root. Such a conception represents a new take on 67
Stufentheorie that frees it from its prior dependency on harmonic verticality and its privileging 
of chordal roots. But Harrison’s theory still does privilege one particular type of chord—the 
triad—in the rollout of his functional apparatus, and this leads to the assumption that only 
certain specific configurations of scale degrees can participate in properly “functional” 
behavior. It also perpetuates a distinction between triadic members (as colloquially “harmonic” 
tones) and triadic nonmembers (as “nonharmonic” tones) that indirectly reinforces and upholds 
a form of the very same chord-concept that Harrison seeks to eschew. 
 One particular strain of subsequent scholarship, spearheaded by Quinn and White 
(writing both separately and together), actively seeks to challenge this assumption and 
problematize this distinction. Its inception comes in a 2010 article on key-finding by Quinn that 
begins with a radical redefinition of what constitutes a “chord.” As he writes, “Our sense of the 
word ‘chord’ will differ substantially from its ordinary pedagogical usage, referring [instead] to a 
snapshot of all pitch-classes sounding at any given moment”; the result is a “radically localized 
conception” of chord such that “every time a new note sounds, a new chord is identified.”  A 68
few consequential things result from this. First, there are no “restriction[s] on what can 
constitute a chord; the model knows no distinction between consonance and dissonance, 
diatonic and chromatic, tertian and quartal,” and so on.  Second, as a result of this, Quinn’s 69
 Ibid., p.43.67
 Quinn, “Are Pitch-Class Profiles Really ‘Key for Key’?” (2010), p.152.68
 Ibid.69
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model dissolves the “distinction between chord tones and non-chord tones,”  effectively 70
arguing that no tone can be called “nonharmonic” if there exists no a priori notion of what a 
“harmony” is (or should be) in the first place. And third, because chords are no longer 
regarded as abstractions that have an idealized form, there need not exist the concept of 
“root.” Instead, chords are “characterized with reference to the bass [i.e., lowest sounding] 
voice,” with any upper parts “identified in terms of their intervallic relationship to the bass.”  71
 Quinn leverages this new concept of “chord” to claim that mere transitions/
progressions from one to the next are “sufficient as windows for key-finding,”  in effect 72
arguing against the reductionism of pitch-class profiles as key-finding aids.  He demonstrates 73
the empirical utility of this claim through a model that “is able to reach an almost stunning 
degree of subtlety in its harmonic analysis of chorales it’s never heard before,” despite its not 
being programmed to know any explicit information about chord progressions other than their 
“transpositional distribution[s] in the training corpus” (to say nothing of the model’s ignorance 
of conventional concepts such as triad, key, tonic/dominant/subdominant, and the like).  While 74
the main objective of Quinn’s model is to determine the key of a passage, one of its most 




 Here Quinn is specifically referring to the key-finding procedure developed by Carol 73
Krumhansl and Mark Schmuckler that is laid out in Krumhansl’s Cognitive Foundations of 
Musical Pitch (2001).
 Quinn, “Are Pitch-Class Profiles Really ‘Key for Key’?” (2010), p.151.74
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interaction/relation between successive “time-slice[s]”  (Quinn’s original term for his new 75
chord-concept). 
 This would be the rationale behind a conference paper by Quinn and Panayotis 
Mavromatis from the following year. Their corpus study retains the “time-slice” notion of 
“chord” (though it never actually uses the former term) and investigates whether harmonic-
functional information can be read out of the voice leading between adjacent such chords.  By 76
performing a cluster analysis on the wide variety of voice-leading types (or “VLTs”) that connect 
adjacent chordal “slices,” they are able to empirically confirm their hypothesis that such VLT 
clusters “are bound together by principles related to harmonic function,” despite not “building 
into the[ir] model any assumptions about harmonic function.”  They also find that syntactic 77
differences exist between their two chorale corpora, which demonstrates that harmonic 
function is a stylistically contingent phenomenon that manifests itself differently in different 
musical idioms. 
 These particular insights—that harmonic function is corpus-dependent, that it can exist 
even in the absence of traditional notions of “chord,” “triad,” or “root,” and that it can be 
modeled in terms of the relationship between successive musical “slices”—become major 
 Ibid., p.152.75
 Quinn and Mavromatis, “Voice-Leading Prototypes and Harmonic Function in Two Chorale 76
Corpora” (2011). The two chorale corpora are [1] a set of 404 four-voice homophonic Lutheran 
chorales published between 1586 and 1627, called the “Modal corpus,” and [2] a set of 353 
Bach chorales compiled by Riemenschneider, called the “Bach corpus” (232). Each chorale is 
treated “as a series of four-note chords,” with a new chord identified “each time a note-on 
message occur[s] in the MIDI file” (232).
 Ibid., p.239.77
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themes in the work of White, who began developing his dissertation topic under Quinn at the 
same time as Quinn’s aforementioned work in this area. Indeed, as White argues in the opening 
chapter of his dissertation, any model that “depends on [a] corpus for its own identity” must 
necessarily be “fettered to that corpus’ culture, style, time, and place.”  (Subsequent works by 78
White reiterate this theme; many of them touch at least tangentially on the demographic 
relativity of harmonic-functional behavior. ) In addition, as I have already mentioned earlier, 79
White’s dissertation advances a context-based conception of harmonic function that is neither 
beholden to the scale-degree makeup of sonorities nor sutured to a triadic chordal ideal. 
“Since a chord’s content does not influence its participation in the model,” White writes in 
reference to his Bach-chorale corpus, “non-tertian harmonies that consistently act in 
predictable ways can participate in functions. Since [027] often intercedes between tonic 
chords and dominant chords, the model judges it to be a predominant chord.”  Fig. 4.2 below 80
illustrates: 
 
 White, “Some Statistical Properties of Tonality, 1650–1900” (2013), p.85.78
 See in particular White, “Changing Styles, Changing Corpora, Changing Tonal 79
Models” (2013), which contends that “chord-progression norms are connected to specific 
historical situations” (244); White, “A Corpus-Sensitive Algorithm for Automated Tonal 
Analysis” (2015), which prioritizes a methodological “sensitiv[ity] to the characteristics of 
individual repertories” (115); and White and Quinn, “Chord Context and Harmonic Function in 
Tonal Music” (2018), which argues explicitly against “assuming the universality of one 
functional system” (314).
 White, “Some Statistical Properties of Tonality, 1650–1900” (2013), p.199.80
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Fig. 4.2: Under White’s (2013) model, non-tertian sonorities can be “functional”  
as long as they behave with contextual/statistical regularity within a particular corpus 
White adopts Quinn’s “time-slice”  method throughout but refers to its products as “salami 81
slices” instead.  This culinary neologism would soon replace its less tasty predecessor in 82
subsequent scholarly works that leverage this looser conception of chord to make claims not 
just about harmonic function, but also about related concepts like key finding, voice leading, 
meter, part writing, and the statistical regularities of tonal praxes.83
Quinn, “Are Pitch-Class Profiles Really ‘Key for Key’?” (2010), p.152.81
 White, “Some Statistical Properties of Tonality, 1650–1900” (2013), pp.141ff. White links this 82
latter term with Quinn’s 2010 article, even though it never actually appears within. The authors 
later clarify that the term “is a homage to György Ligeti, who described first conceiving his 
1968 harpsichord piece Continuum as ‘a paradoxically continuous sound […] that would have 
to consist of innumerable thin slices of salami’ due to the characteristic envelope of a note 
played on the harpsichord.” [White and Quinn, “The Yale-Classical Archives Corpus” (2016), p.
57; for the original Ligeti quote, see Várnai et al., György Ligeti in Conversation (1983), p.22.]
See, in addition to the post-2013 sources cited in footnotes on this and the previous page, 83
White, “Feedback and Feedforward Models of Musical Key” (2018a) and “Autocorrelation of 
Pitch-Event Vectors in Meter Finding” (2019); Quinn, “Tonal Harmony” (2019); de Clercq, “Big 
Data, Big Questions: A Closer Look at the Yale-Classical Archives Corpus” (2016); Ju et al., 
“Non-Chord Tone Identification Using Deep Neural Networks” (2017); de Heer, “Harmonic 
Syntax and High-Level Statistics of the Songs of Three Early Classical Composers” (2017); and 
Jones, “Bach’s ‘Gapped’ Voices, Expressive Meaning, and Part-Writing Pedagogy” (2015) and 
“Harmony and Statistical Temporality: Toward Jazz Syntax from Corpus Analytics” (2017).
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 I treat harmonic function in this chapter in a way that is sensitive to many of these more 
recent strands of discourse, but not reducible to any one of them. While function does depend 
on a sonority’s scale-degree makeup, particularly in Western tonal musics, this dependence is 
not evenly distributed between x and y. I have already begun to unravel this relationship in my 
Chapter 2 discussion of “Body and Soul,” where I isolate a moment of ambiguity in which x 
and functional category change together while y and z remain fixed across interpretations. 
Later in this chapter, I probe the reverse side of the coin, isolating a situation in which x and 
functional category remain constant while y and z differ across modal variants of the same basic 
progression. In other words, I make the case that changes in x alone (all else being equal) are 
sufficient to precipitate functional differences in kind, whereas changes in y alone can only 
produce functional differences in degree. For example, {1,̂3̂,5̂} —> {7,̂2̂,5̂} is fundamentally a T 
—> D progression in (say) ionian, aeolian, and mixolydian alike, but each T —> D succession 
has a slightly different contextual flavor due to changes in specific modal character (y). 
 But function is far more than something that “resides” in point-like harmonic 
abstractions, in frozen collectional “snapshots,” or in the individual scale degrees that comprise 
either of these. Rather, it is an interpretive judgment that pertains to a network of relations: 
between adjacent sonorities, between those sonorities and a governing tonic, between 
sonority placement and metrical position, and (more generally) between sounding music and 
the expectational/predictive capacities of enculturated listeners. Zeroing on the multiply 
relational nature of “chords,” then, entails more than just reframing a chord as “any 
simultaneously sounding collection of scale degrees,”  as the salami-slicing method dictates. 84
 Quinn, “Tonal Harmony” (2019), p.473.84
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Instead, it requires the acknowledgement that scale degrees themselves are relational entities, 
because they are understood as intervals relative to a governing tonic. On top of this, the 
constituents of a sonority also participate in intervallic relations [1] with respect to a sounding 
bass note, [2] with respect to analogous voice parts in the preceding and following sonorities, 
and [3] with respect to the other constituents in that same sonority. Quinn has recently 
formulated an explanatory framework for harmonic succession in tonal music that takes 
particular stock of this last class of relations: “Rather than treating a chord as a confederation of 
individual scale degrees, we will consider a chord’s tendencies to be the sum of the tendencies 
of its constituent dyads, since those dyads seem to have very clear tendencies.”  But this 85
“dyadic interaction framework,”  as he calls it, prioritizes some of the above intervallic-86
relational categories over others—caring more about bass notes and following sonorities than 
it does about governing tonics and preceding sonorities. 
 As I state earlier in this chapter, I prefer to use the term “intervallic collection” (or 
“IC”)  rather than “chord,” because this former label evokes more desirable associations with 87
relationality and contextual embeddedness. The “I” in “IC” casts an intentionally broad net, 
being attentive/sensitive to all the various kinds of intervallic relations that are broached in the 
previous paragraph. Each of these, I argue, can be a potentially potent subcomponent in 
harmonic-functional judgments, which are always synthetic and holistic, drawing on multiple 
 Ibid., p.476.85
 Ibid., p.480.86
 “IC” is always capitalized to avoid confusion with lowercase “ic,” which is already an 87
established music-theoretic term standing for “interval class.”
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sources of musical input, kinds of musical knowledge (mostly implicit, but sometimes also 
explicit), pathways of expectation, and forms of memory, all at once. Therefore, my principal 
terminological intervention in this chapter is one of reconciliation, not one of disentanglement 
(as was the case in Chapters 2 and 3). One could say—and the pun is certainly intended—that 
my account of function aims to bring several historical and contemporaneous strands of 
reasoning concerning this topic into closer harmony. 
 And yet, the irony of this pun is that the essence of harmonic function extends far 
beyond conventional/colloquial notions of “harmony” and “chord.” Indeed, as I have been 
arguing—and as I will soon illustrate with some musical examples—harmonic function arises 
when certain generic scalar positions are temporally/metrically configured in ways that reflect 
their typical conventions of usage within a historically situated corpus. I am certainly not the 
first scholar to link harmonic function with rhythm and meter,  or to frame functional sensations 88
as qualia that are contingent on one’s exposure to particular repertoires. But what makes my 
account unique is my view that functional qualia can be understood as subjective 
misattributions to ICs. Each of these misattributions integrates several moving parts that by 
now should sound familiar to attentive readers: [1] a judgment about expectation/prediction is 
framed as a judgment about music, [2] a judgment about musical relations (i.e., successions/
progressions among ICs) is framed as a judgment about musical entities (i.e., individual chords 
in isolation), and [3] a retrofitting (i.e., a back-projection of functional identity onto an IC once 
 Joseph Swain, for instance, writes that “[h]armonic rhythm, harmonic function, and meter are 88
all intimately related in rather complex feedback relationships.” [Swain, Harmonic Rhythm: 
Analysis and Interpretation (2002), p.120.] See also White, “What if Harmonic Function is All 
About Meter?” (2020) for a more recent take on this topic.
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that IC is succeeded by another) is framed as an outfitting (i.e., an instantaneous revelation of 
functional identity that is clear from the moment an IC initially sounds). 
The Numbers Game 
Because harmonic function is something whose nature and specifics vary among individual 
repertoires, styles, and corpora, there is not a hard-and-fast answer to how many harmonic 
functions exist in general. But even within individual repertoires, styles, and corpora, as White 
argues, “There is not as much one ‘correct’ number of functional categories as there are 
different lenses providing different levels of functional focus.”  White demonstrates this insight 89
through a cluster analysis showing that the Bach chorale corpus is comprehensible not only 
through the lens of the traditional three-function model, but also through the more fine-
grained lens of a thirteen-function model.  These models, according to White, serve different 90
purposes and are not to be regarded as mutually exclusive. The simpler three-function model, 
he claims, “might represent a listener’s experience that favors three functions and focuses on 
tertian sonorities,” whereas the more complex thirteen-function model “might represent expert 
compositional knowledge.”  While White does not rigorously pursue the question of whether 91
 White, “Some Statistical Properties of Tonality, 1650–1900” (2013), p.211.89
 These thirteen functions are named early tonic, medial tonic, late tonic, early dominant, weak 90
dominant, late dominant, weak predominant, medial predominant, strong predominant, vi, 
applied to vi, applied to ii, and applied to V. Their independent existence confirms White’s 
initial hypothesis that “the traditional three functions might have disciplined and predictable 
chord functions embedded inside them.” [White, “Some Statistical Properties of Tonality, 
1650–1900” (2013), p.190.]
 White, “Some Statistical Properties of Tonality, 1650–1900” (2013), p.185.91
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a listener and/or expert composer actually experiences or thinks about harmonic function along 
these lines, his study makes a convincing case for “a definition of harmonic function that is not 
fixed to a particular number of categories, but allows for shifts in quantity depending on the 
corpus involved and the purpose of the analysis.”  He extends this insight further in an 92
aforementioned article with Quinn  that considers the applicability of a four-function model  93 94
to the Kostka-Payne corpus and an eight-function model  to the McGill Billboard corpus, 95
despite the fact that these corpora, too, are typically discussed with reference to the traditional 
three-function model. 
 A look inside most present-day music theory classrooms will probably give off the 
impression that the traditional three-function model is alive and well, despite our being more 
than a century removed from Riemann’s initial promulgation of these functions (and yet another 
century removed from much of the music that this model seems best to fit/describe). Students 
continue to learn about tonics, dominants, and pre/subdominants, and to affix sonorities with 
these labels in one-to-one fashion, as if they were coextensive with that sonority in isolation. 
 Ibid., p.184.92
 See White and Quinn, “Chord Context and Harmonic Function in Tonal Music” (2018).93
 These four functions are named tonic (T), pre-predominant (P-), predominant (P), and 94
dominant/pretonic (D/T-). “Pre-predominant” might be thought of as the “extra” fourth 
function here; slightly more than half of this category is comprised of vi triads. The term “pre-
predominant” is adopted from Christopher Doll’s 2007 Ph.D. dissertation “Listening to Rock 
Harmony.”
 These eight functions split into a central circuit of four functions—named tonic (T), antitonic 95
(S), pre-antitonic/post-tonic (T+), and post-antitonic/pretonic (S+)—and a peripheral circuit of 
four functions, which itself is split into two pairs labeled Q/P and X/W. Q and P include more 
extended sonorities (featuring sevenths and ninths) that are influenced by jazz-based harmonic 
languages and that tend to progress to one another in shuttle-like fashion, whereas X and W 
mainly include minor-mode sonorities that also tend to shuttle back and forth.
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The centrality of homophonic chorale-style music in this curriculum  continues to perpetuate 96
the idea that harmonic functions inhere in point-like musical entities, with little attention paid to 
how harmonic transitions are what actually create emergent sensations of functional behavior. 
Riemannian ideas are routinely presented to students in ideologically sanitized form, stripped 
of their metaphysical baggage and their attachment to dualism.  This leads to a few notable 97
on-the-ground consequences, such as the usage of “subdominant” as a blanket term that 
applies to harmonies other than the IV of Riemann’s original formulation (or the ii6/5 of 
Rameau’s sous-dominante). In addition, it is not uncommon for pedagogues to treat the terms 
“subdominant” and “predominant” as synonymous (while simply choosing the one they prefer, 
or even allowing students to use them interchangeably). 
 These terms are also rather slippery in the scholarly literature, as White and Quinn have 
noted.  Deborah Stein, for example, uses the term “subdominant” to refer to both [1] a 98
 This centrality is currently being questioned, however, as evidenced by conversations across 96
the larger music theory community concerning whether chorales are still relevant teaching tools 
in the twenty-first–century classroom. See, for instance, the Friday evening session from the 
2019 Annual Meeting of the Society for Music Theory entitled “Corralling the Chorale: Moving 
Away from SATB Writing in the Undergraduate Music Theory Curriculum.”
 While there does exist a nontrivial body of music-theoretic scholarship from the late 97
twentieth century that aims to rehabilitate aspects of Riemannian dualism, from Lewin’s “A 
Formal Theory of Generalized Tonal Functions” (1982) and “Klumpenhouwer Networks and 
Some Isographies that Involve Them” (1990) to Harrison’s Harmonic Function in Chromatic 
Music (1994) and Mathieu’s Harmonic Experience (1997), there are also several vocal detractors 
to this philosophy. One of the most outspoken voices in this regard is Finn Egeland Hansen, 
who argues in his 2006 book Layers of Musical Meaning that while “dualistic theories are 
beautiful and simple, they reflect musical practice so badly that they all must be rejected as 
useless” (198).
 See in particular the literature review section of White and Quinn, “Chord Context and 98
Harmonic Function in Tonal Music” (2018), pp.314–16.
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“preparation for the dominant” and [2] a “neighboring harmony that prolong[s] the tonic 
chord.”  Kevin Swinden, on the other hand, advocates for the functional separation of these 99
two meanings, reserving “subdominant” for the latter tonic-prolongational context while 
referring to the former as “dominant preparation.”  Stein’s (left) and Swinden’s (right) 100
respective conceptions of harmonic function are schematized in the diagrams below.101
Fig. 4.3: Conflation of multiple meanings of “subdominant” (left) versus  
distinction between “subdominant” and “predominant” (right);  
I adopt the latter scheme throughout this dissertation 
 Other theorists have sought to further supplement the traditional triptych of Riemannian 
functions by distinguishing among certain patterned behaviors that typically fall under the 
Stein, “The Expansion of the Subdominant in the Late Nineteenth Century” (1983), p.156.99
Swinden, “When Functions Collide: Aspects of Plural Function in Chromatic Music” (2005), 100
p.253. 
These diagrams are taken from White and Quinn, “Chord Context and Harmonic Function in 101
Tonal Music” (2018), p.316. It is interesting to note that while Swinden’s perspective 
distinguishes among four base functions, these do not exactly match the four functions 
eventually identified by White and Quinn as best fitting the Kostka-Payne corpus. More 
specifically, there is no equivalent for “pre-predominant” in Swinden’s half of Fig. 4.3 above 
(this would amount to an arrow pointing from “S” to “P”); instead, S exists solely in a 
bidirectional (i.e., prolongational) relationship with T, whereas P is vectored unidirectionally 
towards D (and cannot, by definition, progress back to T).
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banner of “prolongation.” Lerdahl, for example, postulates four subordinate functions that 
prolong the canonical T/S/D identities: departure (Dep), return (Ret), neighboring (N), and 
passing (P).  Given Lerdahl’s particular interest in prolongational structure, it is not surprising 102
that his theory of functions would seek to supply names for more fine-grained nuances in this 
area. What is more surprising, however, is that there are other theories of harmonic function 
based in linguistic theories of syntax that actually postulate fewer than the three traditional 
Riemannian functions. Allan Keiler’s harmonic theory,  for instance, also leverages tree 103
diagrams to make claims about the structure of harmonic prolongation. But unlike Lerdahl’s 
seven-fold functional model, Keiler’s model only has room for two functional categories: tonic 
and dominant.  This has led certain scholars writing in Keiler’s wake to claim that his model 104
oversimplifies the nature of tonal harmony and is insufficiently attentive to its nuance. Marion 
Guck, for one, writes that “[o]ne cannot apply what is in many essential ways a theory of 
language to music without misrepresenting—warping—the musical relations.”  105
 A two-function model may indeed seem overly reductive to most present-day readers. 
But to Keiler’s credit, his harmonic theory captures something fundamental about most all tonal 
music conceived in the Western tradition: that it is chiefly animated by a predictable 
relationship between a stable, “home” sonority and another sort of sonority that typically 
 Lerdahl, Tonal Pitch Space (2001), Chapter 5.102
 See in particular Keiler, “The Syntax of Prolongation I” (1977) and “Bernstein’s The 103
Unanswered Question and the Problem of Musical Competence” (1978).
 Any sonorities that may function in a manner similar to a pre/subdominant, for Keiler, are 104
subsumed into the larger catch-all categories “Tonic Prolongation” and “Dominant 
Prolongation.”
 Guck, “The Functional Relations of Chords: A Theory of Musical Intuitions” (1978), p.33.105
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leads/proceeds to the former. Still, however, there exist a great deal more sonorities that 
typically occur in such music but that fall outside of the above binary scheme—and this is 
probably why the “pre/subdominant” category has always been the murkiest and thorniest for 
theorists and pedagogues alike to pin down. The approaches of White and Keiler might thus 
be considered opposite poles on a continuum of potential theoretical treatments for this 
category: the latter erases its presence altogether, whereas the former breaks it up into more 
subcategories than are accorded to tonic and dominant combined!  106
 Quinn’s recent model of tonal harmony in the thoroughbass era embraces this 
contradiction in a distinctive way, essentially de-centering and centering the subdominant at 
the same time. He begins by “assert[ing] two special collections of scale degrees[:] the two 
primary triads,” tonic {1,̂3̂,5̂} and dominant {5̂,7,̂2̂}, and “their complements,” the 
“antitonic” {7,̂2̂,4̂,6̂} and “antidominant” {4̂,6̂,1,̂3̂} collections.  He then argues that “[t]he 107
‘missing’ subdominant is a feature, not a bug: my claim is that what we think of as subdominant 
function, at least at this early stage of tonality’s consolidation, is an emergent property of the 
 More specifically, the thirteen functions that White posits as applicable to the Bach chorale 106
corpus can be broken up into three T-related functions (early tonic, medial tonic, and late 
tonic), three D-related functions (early dominant, weak dominant, and late dominant), and 
seven functions that could potentially fall under the aegis of P/S (weak predominant, medial 
predominant, strong predominant, vi, applied to vi, applied to ii, and applied to V). [White, 
“Some Statistical Properties of Tonality, 1650–1900” (2013), particularly pp.201–05.]
 Quinn, “Tonal Harmony” (2019), p.479.107
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complex interaction between tonic/antitonic and dominant/antidominant.”  But the 108
subdominant is far from “missing” in Quinn’s eventual schematic model of functional 
progression; rather, it is placed at the center of an axis of symmetry that frames the tonic/
dominant opposition. As he claims, “This is a fundamentally different symmetry than the one 
promulgated by Riemann and the dualists, which places tonic function, and a dominant/
subdominant opposition, at the center.”  109
 However they are schematically arranged, the three traditional functions do not always 
furnish neat categorical boundaries that separate one from the others. Agmon’s graded-
category approach to harmonic function, for example, holds that while I, IV, and V are the most 
prototypical exemplars of T, S, and D functions, respectively, vi and iii can also function as 
tonics, viio, ii, and vi can also function as subdominants, and iii, viio, and ii can also function as 
dominants, depending on the musical context.  According to this system, then, each diatonic 110
triad except for I, IV, and V possesses dual functional allegiances. But as we have seen, there 
are certain repertoires whose syntactic regularities call into question even the fuzzy divisions 
postulated by Agmon’s prototype theory. Nobile, for one, argues rather forcefully that IV can 
 Ibid. This resonates with a remark White makes at the end of Chapter 5 of his dissertation: 108
“Tonic and dominant chords garner their functions because of the frequency of particular chord 
classes, while predominant and plagal chords are defined by how they act in relationship to the 
former two functions.” [White, “Some Statistical Properties of Tonality, 1650–1900” (2013), p.
262.]
 Quinn, “Tonal Harmony” (2019), p.491.109
 Agmon, “Functional Harmony Revisited: A Prototype-Theoretic Approach” (1995), p.201. 110
While the Roman numeral labels I supply here pertain specifically to the ionian mode, Agmon 
also intends for his triadic classification scheme to generalize to aeolian-mode contexts as well. 
He does not, however, consider any of the other diatonic modes in his article.
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function both as a predominant and as a dominant in rock music—sometimes taking on both 
roles within the same verse of a song.  And even within the Western Euroclassical tradition, as 111
Swinden explores, there are moments “when functions collide”: when sonorities seem to 
merge properties of both subdominant and dominant functional elements in the same instance 
of occurrence.  112
 I raise these points to reinforce my position that, when it comes to harmonic function, 
playing the numbers game is somewhat of a trap. There is not one correct answer to the 
question of how many harmonic functions exist—and this is the case not just across styles and 
corpora, but also within styles and corpora. All theories of harmonic function must necessarily 
strike that precarious balance between the descriptive accuracy of many fine-grained 
categories and the explanatory power of just a few. For many years, the traditional three-
function model has stuck around simply because it is good enough at cataloguing the recurring 
idiosyncrasies of harmonic progression in Western Euroclassical tonal music. And while I 
acknowledge that these functions can sometimes break down into more nuanced 
subcategories based on one’s desired lens of focus, or in other moments, blur together in 
practice, I do not aim to supplant the traditional model with a radically new set of labels in 
 Nobile, “Harmonic Function in Rock Music: A Syntactical Approach” (2016). See in particular 111
his analysis of the first verse of the Eagles’ “Lyin’ Eyes” (1975), which bookends the article.
 Swinden, “When Functions Collide: Aspects of Plural Function in Chromatic Music” (2005). 112
Swinden proposes two labels, SD and DS, to capture the functional multiplicity of such 
moments. In the former case, a bass scale step characterizes S function, but a sonority’s upper 
structure contains dominant-functioning elements; in the latter, on the other hand, a bass scale 
step characterizes D function, but a sonority’s upper structure is “imbued” with the “essential 
harmonic character” of subdominant function (261). It is surprising that, during this discussion, 
Swinden does not give much attention to secondary dominants or other applied harmonies 
(whose functional identities are also a unique kind of hybrid).
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what follows. Rather, I want to probe the limits of these labels, meditate on which musical 
parameters (other than “harmony”) enable them to be heard as such, and investigate what 
sorts of taken-for-granted premises can be revealed about harmonic function when one tries to 
hear the tonality in microtonality. 
But First, 12-TET Music 
In Chapter 2, after laying out my genus/species conception of scale-degree qualia, I tease the 
possibility that harmonic function may be more closely correlated with the “genus” part (x) than 
it is with the “species” part (y). I illustrate this by examining the opening harmonic shuttle of 
Anita Baker’s “Body and Soul,” whose representative string of z’s admits of multiple plausible 
hearings. All of these hearings, crucially, are linked together by the same string of y’s, differing 
only in [1] their associated string of x’s and [2] their harmonic-functional profiles. I now return to 
Baker’s recording in more detail. This time around, I pay closer attention to the role that 
hypermeter plays in mediating tonal/functional judgments. The top system of Ex. 4.1 below is 
an identical reproduction of Ex. 2.4 from Chapter 2. The bottom system, however, is new here; 
it contains the first few bars directly following the song’s instrumental intro. 
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 Readers will notice that by the time Baker’s vocals enter in m.9, only the F# mixolydian 
interpretation remains, suggesting that the shuttle’s tonal orientation becomes clarified at this 
point. The way that this happens is quite clever. Typically, harmonic shuttles with an initially 
ambiguous centricity require the intervening/mediating presence of a third element (usually 
another IC) to clarify the governing centricity. But here, no new ICs join the mix; in fact, the only 
change occurring in m.9 is that the shuttle is simply reversed, with the F#-rooted IC now falling 
on the odd-numbered measures and the C#-rooted IC on the even-numbered ones. Reversing 
the order of a shuttle that is already ambiguous to begin with may seem, on the surface, like a 
way to engender even more confusion. Yet the aural effect is just the opposite: it is here that 
there finally emerges a relative sense of certainty about where the song might be centered. 
This emergent sense of F# mixolydian “victory” arises for reasons that are primarily 
hypermetrical. Since the introductory vamp establishes the presence of two- and four-bar 
groupings, m.9 marks the expectationally “strongest” hyper-downbeat in the recording thus 
far. Locations that are hypermetrically strong tend to support harmonies that are structurally 
stable; David Temperley formulates this as a preference rule: “Prefer a tonal interpretation in 
which the tonic harmony is hypermetrically strong.”  And so, because m.9 is the moment of 113
greatest hypermetrical strength since the beginning of “Body and Soul,” its associated IC 
provides the strongest evidence as to the song’s centricity going forward. By the end of my 
transcription in Ex. 4.1, it is still the case that only two types of IC—one with C# in the bass, 
and another with F# in the bass—have occurred in the entire recording. And yet, through an 
understated sleight of hand that separates the introductory vamp from the first verse, the 
 Temperley, The Musical Language of Rock (2018), p.37.113
223
song’s tonal orientation is provisionally clarified. There is no need for a third IC to come in and 
elucidate the relationship between the first two; hypermeter itself is that clarifying element. 
 Now, to be clear, I am not arguing that the shuttle’s directional reversal in m.9 
retrospectively clarifies the tonal orientation of the previous eight-bar intro—only that it clarifies 
the tonal orientation of “Body and Soul” for the moment, from m.9 onwards. Indeed, this 
momentary clarity does not wholly excise, or render moot, the fundamentally ambiguous 
nature of mm.1–8. All three hearings of this intro that I propose in Ex. 4.1 still have their own 
merits, even if a listener familiar with the song knows exactly what is coming in m.9. The C# 
dorian hearing of mm.1–8, for example, is highly plausible in that it also respects Temperley’s 
aforementioned preference rule about the alignment of hypermetric downbeats with 
articulations of tonic harmony. Someone listening in this framework might then pivot to an F# 
mixolydian hearing over the double bar separating mm.8–9 without much trouble, since tonics 
would still be occurring in every odd-numbered bar. Likewise, another hypothetical listener 
could choose to hear the opening 8-bar vamp in F# mixolydian; not only would this 
interpretation have the advantage of tonal continuity, by not requiring a change in centricity 
over the double bar, but it would also allow each two-bar unit of the introductory shuttle to be 
heard as a harmonic procession from tension (D) to release (T). And finally, even the B ionian 
hearing of the opening shuttle has its merits—particularly for those listeners who are able to 
delay their gratification. This last hearing is probably the least initially plausible of the three, 
since it features no instances of a literal tonic between mm.1–8, only a continual P <—> D 
shuttle that calls attention to that tonic’s absence. But even this interpretation is dignified later 
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on in the song’s form when, exactly eight bars prior to the first chorus,  the shuttle that begins 114
in m.9 is transposed up a perfect fourth to sound in B mixolydian, with this section also 
beginning on a strong hyper-downbeat. As a result, the B-centric tonic triad that is withheld in 
the intro does eventually occur after a long wait. But its surrounding modal climate has shifted 
(from expected ionian to actual mixolydian) in the meantime, capitulating to the modal inertia 
wrought by the move to (F#) mixolydian in m.9. 
 The broader takeaway here is that hypermeter exerts a major influence on the way that 
harmonic function qualia are felt and experienced. In “Body and Soul,” the initial functional 
ambiguity of the harmonic shuttle is only clarified once metrical factors step in, effecting a 
transition from an introduction that can be heard in three plausible frameworks to a first verse 
in which one of these three becomes more plausible than the others. On the face of it, this 
takeaway is not necessarily a new or groundbreaking insight. There exist countless instances in 
popular and other musics alike when hypermetric downbeats encourage the hearing of their 
associated harmonies as new/emergent tonics, even when these harmonies effect modulations 
into tonal areas that are generically non-normative  or seemingly totally unrelated to the 115
 Beginning at 0:40 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5duKqPSNt64, on the lyrics “Now 114
once I could turn away.”
 For example, “Breathless” (2000) by the Corrs, which contains an unusual instance of a 115
chorus occurring in the global subdominant. This begins at 0:57 of https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=vzerbXFwGCE; the sudden transition into this unexpected tonal area is smoothed 
over by the fact that it occurs on a hyper-downbeat.
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affective world set up previously.  But what is especially distinctive about “Body and Soul” is 116
that this metrical clarification of tonal position takes place without the accompanying 
introduction of any “new” tonal areas (or even any new ICs)—instead being accomplished by 
merely reversing the order of an ongoing shuttle that was previously multiply ambiguous! 
 Turning back to function’s apparent covariance with x, Fig. 4.4 on the following page 
illustrates the reverse side of the coin. Every cell of this diagram contains the same fundamental 
T–P–D–T progression, with the intervallic specifics of each tweaked slightly to include only the 
naturally occurring tones of a given diatonic mode. The primary upshot of this diagram is that, 
from cell to cell, only two things remain the same: the x-components of each scale degree and 
the basic functional trajectory of the progression as a whole. Meanwhile, no two cells contain 
the same configuration of y-components, and even the z-components of each cell differ 
slightly, in accordance with characteristic differences in modal shape. This situation, while 
artificially constructed, constitutes the exact notational inverse of the ambiguous opening of 
“Body and Soul.”  In the latter, y and z stay the same across potential hearings while x and 117
function differ, whereas in the former, x and function stay the same across cells while y and z 
 For example, “We Roll Deep” (1993) by the Conscious Daughters, whose chorus begins in a 116
key about a minor second lower than that of its verse. This moment sounds like a sudden 
transition between back-to-back tonics due to the hypermetric emphasis accorded to the 
chorus’s structural downbeat. [The first such transition in the song occurs at 0:58 of https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=jKkMAGSIRmM.] Notice that I say “about” a minor second lower, 
because this tonal transition may actually be one by a microtonal (!) interval measuring slightly 
less than the hundred-cent minor second of 12-TET (despite the fact that all of the musical 
material within each section of the song lies squarely in 12-TET). A fascinatingly disorienting—
and yet also strongly orienting—moment indeed.
 Readers may recall that I also frame tonicization as the notational inverse of tonal ambiguity 117
in Chapter 2. While no tonicizations take place in Fig. 4.4, the basic principle resulting from my 
conception of the term—a shift between “parallel” modes—is exactly what separates each cell.
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differ. Both scenarios illustrate the same basic principle in complementary ways: that harmonic 
function is primarily a property of generic scalar position over and above the other 
subcomponents of scale-degree experience.
Fig. 4.4: The notational foil to the “Body and Soul” intro: only x and functional category remain 
constant across modally analogous progressions, whereas y- and z-strings vary from mode to mode 
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 And yet, despite the basic essential similarity of the functional trajectories in each cell of 
Fig. 4.4, there are still some subtle affective differences between these successions in different 
modes that I want to highlight. An ionian dominant leading to an ionian tonic, simply put, does 
not arouse exactly the same sensations as a dorian dominant leading to a dorian tonic—even 
though both successions can be understood under the aegis of the same broader category 
(namely, that of D–T progression in the abstract). To capture these slight differences in modal 
affect while retaining the sense that the basic functional categories do not evaporate between 
modes, I have color-coded each harmonic-functional label in accordance with the surrounding 
modal context, with color wavelength directly proportional to modal “brightness” (as defined 
in Chapter 2).  Therefore, a tonic occurring in a lydian context is written as “T,” a 118
predominant in an ionian context is written as “P,” a dominant in a mixolydian context appears 
as “D,” and so on.  I continue to adopt these color-coded labels in the analytical vignettes 119
that follow, reserving black-texted capital letters only for those moments when I am referring to 
harmonic-functional behavior in the abstract. 
Blackwood’s Microtonality (I): Starting Out Simple 
So how well does all this translate to microtonal terrain? It depends, of course, on the kind of 
microtonality under consideration. There are countless theoretical approaches to microtonal 
 This color-coding system is meant to address the fact that traditional harmonic-functional 118
labels do not reflect distinctions among modes. One could also conceivably use this system to 
label Roman numerals, which would go a long way towards addressing the ways that major/
minor bias seeps into this kind of notation as well.
 The missing mode in Fig. 4.4, locrian (least bright of all), would thus receive the remaining 119
color of the rainbow: violet (smallest wavelength of all).
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composition, and a great many of them simply do not lead to musical results that are 
recognizably “tonal,” “modal,” “diatonic,” “functional,” or even “centered” at all. But there 
are others that, rather than brazenly eschewing all things familiar, concern themselves with 
manipulating the familiar and stretching its limits. Blackwood’s microtonality is therefore a 
fruitful test site for exploring the scope of functional tonality and the margins of harmonic-
functional behavior. Because all of his microtonal pieces are linked by the same compositional 
aim—to simulate the style, demeanor, and soundscape of Western Euroclassical tonal music—I 
maintain that the canonical harmonic-functional labels previously discussed are applicable 
enough to this music that they need not be discarded or replaced. But, as we will see in the 
remainder of this chapter, they occasionally require neological supplementation, since there are 
certain novel moments in Blackwood’s music that slip between the cracks of 12-conditioned 
expectation and necessitate individual treatment of their functional idiosyncrasies. 
 I begin with a relatively straightforward example of a T–P–D–T succession that closes 
the first movement of “21 Notes,” to illustrate how traditional functional labels can sometimes 
transfer quite smoothly to microtonal contexts:
Fig. 4.5: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 21-TET 
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LOCAL:  D             DH [ T    DH     T         DH      T    P        D —— (H)          T ]
GLOBAL: D———— (H)                [ T  —————————— P       D —— (H)                T ]
Ex. 4.2: A concluding cadential progression that uses both “natural” and “harmonic” forms of 
the aeolian mode; excerpt begins at 1:04 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vn_JH4TBku8
This passage approximates familiar diatonic behavior rather closely, being in F aeolian but 
making liberal use of a leading tone (Eb-up, mm.45–48) that is chromatically raised from its 
natural aeolian location (Eb-down, m.45). I have labeled the ICs containing this Eb-up as “DH,” 
to indicate that they are aeolian dominants inflected with the characteristic leading tone of 
harmonic minor (thus the subscript “H”). Compare these to the natural aeolian dominant on 
the downbeat of m.45, which is labeled with a plain old “D.” This is one way to capture the 
qualitative subtleties differentiating aeolian-derived dominants that are more (subscript) or less 
strongly (no subscript) vectored towards tonics. 
 Upon first listen/glance, this passage may seem to bear out Blackwood’s conviction 
that, when it comes to the tonal affordances of microtonal tunings, “[O]nly the familiar seven-
note [i.e., heptatonic diatonic] system contains anything like those functions commonly called 
(4̂,re,18)        (4̂,re,17)     
(2̂,ti,13)     
 (7,̂sol,5)        (7,̂ si, 7)
} [F aeolian]
 (2̂, ti, 12) 
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tonic, dominant, and sub-dominant.”  But a closer look at Ex. 4.2 reveals that more than 120
seven notes (ten, in fact) are involved in the articulation of F aeolian—and none of these 
necessarily comes across as “extra,” falling “between the cracks,” or sounding “out of place.” 
How is this possible? Ordered-triple notation can help to clarify that when Blackwood uses the 
word “note” above, he is tacitly referring to generic scalar position (x). In 12-TET, a mode is 
typically associated with seven generic scalar positions, seven specific modal characters, and 
seven pitch classes; that is, it is associated with the same number of x’s, y’s, and z’s. Microtonal 
music, however, complicates this relationship of equality. In the above excerpt from “21 
Notes,” there are seven generic scalar positions (1 ̂through 7)̂, eight specific modal characters 
(x=7 ̂can be either y=sol or y=si), and ten pitch classes (x=7 ̂can be either z=5 [sol] or z=7 [si], 
x=4̂ can be either z=17 [re] or z=18 [re], and x=2̂ can be either z=12 [ti] or z=13 [ti]). The 
situation with x=7 ̂(see the circled pitches in m.45), to be clear, is not unique to microtonality; it 
represents the familiar phenomenon of intra-aeolian borrowing from harmonic minor. In this 
case, a difference in z (5 vs. 7) registers auditorily as a difference in y (sol vs. si) that 
nevertheless falls under the banner of the same overarching x (7)̂. But the situation with x=4̂ 
and x=2̂ (cf. the circled pairs of pitches in mm.47–48) is unique to microtonality. In these latter 
two cases, a difference in z (18 vs. 17 and 13 vs. 12, respectively) does not register auditorily as 
a difference in y (both re and both ti, respectively). This is to say, the same modally situated x/y 
pair can be represented by different values of z—even within the same brief span of non-
modulating music. I will return to this phenomenon in the next chapter, when I discuss the 
 The Easley Blackwood Papers, Box 44, letter to Webster College President Leigh Gerdine 120
(in “Correspondence, 1977–1984”), p.1. Blackwood prefers “subdominant” to “predominant.”
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applicability of Dmitri Tymoczko’s “five components of tonality”  to Blackwood’s microtonality. 121
But for now, the main takeaway is that these additional pitch classes and solfége syllables do 
not perturb the overarching sense of F aeolian in Ex. 4.2, nor do they muddle the undergirding 
functional succession that consolidates this tonal area. If the recognizability of traditional 
harmonic-functional behavior is associated with seven of anything—coming back now to 
Blackwood’s above-mentioned quote—then it is seven generic scalar positions, not seven 
solfège syllables or seven pitch classes. This only further strengthens the link between x and 
function for which I have been arguing in this chapter. 
Blackwood’s Microtonality (II): Split Fourths, Again 
It can be oddly satisfying to experience those moments in Blackwood’s microtonal music that 
imitate, trope, or analogize the sorts of functional behavior to which we have become 
accustomed in 12-TET. But for each moment like this, there exists another that showcases the 
sorts of things that are not possible in 12-TET. Particularly when these disorienting moments 
are embedded within larger musical contexts that are relatively normative, questions arise as to 
their functional allegiances, tonal ramifications, and potential cognitive consequences. I now 
turn back to one such moment previously discussed in Chapter 3 from the “Fanfare in 19-note 
Equal Tuning,” in which a perfect fourth in the bass voice is divided into two equal parts.  122
 See Tymoczko, A Geometry of Music: Harmony and Counterpoint in the Extended Common 121
Practice (2011), particularly Chapter 1.
 In his “Research Notes: NEH Grant R0-29376-78-0642” (1979–81), Folder 1, Blackwood 122
discusses how the bisectable 19-TET fourth is capable of producing the “most strikingly 
individual chromatic progressions” (51).
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Fig. 4.6: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 19-TET
Ex. 4.3: When scale-degree content is equivocal, rely all the more on temporal/phrasal context 
for functional cues; excerpt begins at 0:42 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GO516WYU-Zw
(OPTION 1)        P D T
(OPTION 2)    S S+/T-                           T
[D# ionian]:   (4̂,fa,12)       (?,?,8) (1,̂do,4)
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 How does the IC in m.31—a minor seventh rooted on F natural—function? As I mention 
in the previous chapter, this harmony breaks up a local IV–I progression in D# ionian, and its 
root is exactly equidistant from those of the surrounding measures (four unit intervals away 
from each), producing a sonic effect unlike anything possible in 12-TET. None of the pitches in 
m.31 is easily assimilable within the governing D# ionian collection; as a result, scale-degree 
content is no longer the reliable indicator of harmonic function that it usually is. In the absence 
of such scalar anchoring, the functional identity of m.31 is best inferable from the surrounding 
phrasal and temporal context. I have proposed two plausible options in Ex. 4.3 above. In the 
first, the IC in m.31 is regarded as a dominant simply by virtue of its interceding between 
predominant (IV) and tonic (I) harmonies. This interpretation has the advantage of adhering to 
Occam’s razor, abstracting away from the unusual scale-degree particularities of the IC and 
focusing instead on its functional role in the grander scheme: as directly preceding the final 
tonic of an otherwise normative 8-bar phrase. But admittedly, this interpretation relies on a 
loose abstraction of dominant function that seems to ignore both scalar/modal situatedness as 
well as quality; after all, the IC in m.31 is a minor seventh, which tends to function as a pre/
subdominant in most ionian contexts. For this reason, I propose a second interpretation that 
stops short of calling the IC in m.31 a “dominant,” instead reckoning it as a “post-
subdominant/pre-tonic” (S+/T-). Under this interpretation, the IC in m.30 can no longer be 
regarded as a predominant, because it does not proceed to a dominant. Instead, I label it as a 
subdominant, and I consider the subsequent IC in m.31 to function as the sum total of how it is 
approached (S+) and how is left (T-). This supports my earlier contention that harmonic function 
is fundamentally a “two-tailed” phenomenon. Notice, however, that in both interpretations, the 
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functional label for m.31 is written in black text, rather than in the surrounding orange of ionian. 
This reflects the impression that such functions are phrase-based behavioral abstractions that 
are not associated with any one particular mode, instead relying on contextual cues outside of 
scale-degree situatedness for their identity. 
 The functional situation gets a bit more complicated when a split perfect fourth in the 
bass unfolds itself across a longer musical timespan, as this excerpt from “19 Notes” illustrates:
Ex. 4.4: An IC’s function largely depends on the structural level at which one is attending to it; 
excerpt begins at 0:59 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8lK38I1Anc
LOCAL: [E] T P [Db] DH
GLOBAL: [E] T
LOCAL: T         S       T S     T             P [B] DH           T        S      T [E]  D     T              D
GLOBAL:  T+/D- (or P)                    D T
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The black-circled Db is the exact midpoint between E (the passage’s global tonic) and B (its 
global dominant), and yet the harmonic arrival on Db in m.36 lacks much of the visceral punch 
that accompanies the analogous arrival on F natural in m.31 of the “Fanfare.” For one thing, 
the transition into and out of this midpoint is smoother in “19 Notes”; it is lubricated by the 
enharmonic equivalences in mm.35 and 37, bounded by the only T–P–D–T successions that 
occur on the local level of my analysis, and given hypermetric support in the larger scheme of 
the phrase.  These contextual factors, coupled with the parallelism of mm.35–36 and mm.37–123
38, effectively mask the fact that the arrival on Db ushers in an affective world at great remove 
from the E-centric phrase that surrounds it. For this reason, I proffer a plausible “zoomed-in” 
hearing of the passage in Ex. 4.4 that regards each waystation of the divided perfect fourth (E, 
then Db, then B) as a metrically buttressed local tonic arrival; each functional label in this 
hearing is modally situated in either aeolian or ionian. Compare this to the “zoomed-out” 
hearing listed right below that, in which the whole passage is reckoned under the aegis of an E 
centricity (and the “local tonic arrivals” in m.36 and m.38 are no longer reckoned as tonics). 
Under this latter interpretation, the Db-rooted IC in m.36 is labeled as a black-texted, modally 
agnostic “post-tonic/pre-dominant” (T+/D-, or just P), following the rationale established in the 
previous “Fanfare” example. This functional identity, once again, is a behavioral abstraction 
that derives purely from an IC’s contextual temporal placement within a phrase, having nothing 
 In addition to all this, the downbeats of m.36 and m.38 are approached by contrary minor-123
second motion in the outer voices, intensifying the sense of local tonic arrival in both cases.
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to do with its scale-degree allegiance to a particular governing collection.  Overall, this 124
passage demonstrates several aspects of my conception of harmonic function rather well: that 
function is two-tailed, that an IC’s function can change depending on one’s structural lens of 
focus,  and that function and (hyper)meter are largely codependent phenomena. 125
Blackwood’s Microtonality (III): Functional Collision 
This section examines the harmonic-functional affordances of another equally spaced acoustic 
object—the fivefold equal division of the octave—in terms of Swinden’s notion of functional 
“collision” between pre/subdominant and dominant elements.  I have already discussed the 126
melodic properties of this IC’s 240-cent component intervals in Chapter 3; now, I turn to its 
potential to be heard as a harmonic totality. The excerpt in question is from the opening 
movement of the Suite for Guitar in 15-note Equal Tuning. 
 From this and the previous split-fourth example, then, one might cautiously cull the 124
following general insight: that while function is typically a byproduct of generic scalar position 
(content) interacting with temporal conventions of usage (context), whenever one of these 
types of cues is absent, the onus falls even more squarely on the other to provide functional 
information.
 This is one way to solve a recurring problem in the theoretical/pedagogical literature as to 125
how to classify the function of a secondary dominant. Take V/V, for instance: on the most 
zoomed-in, local level, it functions more as a dominant because of the way it resolves. But on a 
more zoomed-out, global level, it functions more as a predominant because it precedes 
dominant harmony within a larger phrase. Thus, the short answer to the question of how a 
secondary dominant functions is that “it depends on how you look at it.”
 Swinden, “When Functions Collide: Aspects of Plural Function in Chromatic Music” (2005).126
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Fig. 4.7: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 15-TET
Ex. 4.5: A potential functional collision in m.2 and m.6 as a result of the fivefold equal division 
of the octave; excerpt begins at 0:00 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YJQsR-Z5aDc
 Measures 2 and 6 are the interesting ones; both arpeggiate the components of the 
same 5-TET IC,  the former in “open” position (and involving solely open strings on the 127
modified acoustic guitar) and the latter in “close” position. But how does this IC function in 
 This IC consists of all the pitches in 15-TET that are notated with a “down” circle-arrow: E-127
down (z=5), F#-down[=G-down] (8), A-down (11), B-down[=C-down] (14), and D-down[=C#-
down] (2). There are two other 5-TET ICs in 15-TET; these are comprised of the pitches that 






DS              T   
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each case? Measure 2 clearly separates two statements of tonic in m.1 and m.3, but its scale-
degree components send mixed functional signals. The bounding pitches of E-down act like 
two sturdy pieces of dominant bread, but the sandwich they enclose contains lukewarm, 
modally equivocal lunchmeat. The resulting taste is one of curious functional hybridity, and I 
have split my interpretation of this IC into two potential “tracks” based on whether one hears 
the F#-down in m.2 as a mixolydian 7̂ (top) or an ionian 6̂ (bottom). In the top hearing, there is 
no cross-pollination between dominant and subdominant, but there is a modal switch: the 
mixolydian D in m.2 encourages the hearing of the ensuing tonic in m.3 in this same modal 
framework. In the bottom hearing, on the other hand, there is no modal switch—the 
interpretation remains in ionian throughout—but the IC in m.2 is reckoned as a merging of 
dominant and subdominant function. Following Swinden, I label this IC as a “DS” because the 
bass motion in mm.1–3 (1–̂5̂–1)̂ is a quintessential “characterizing pattern” that encloses 
dominant function,  making this IC lean closer to dominant identity despite the fact that its 128
upper voices are also “imbued” with the “essential harmonic character” of subdominant 
function.  In other words (to return to the sandwich metaphor from above), the taste of the 129
bread overpowers that of the lunchmeat in this particular case. 
 The story is similar for the second system of Ex. 4.5, since the parallelism between mm.
1–3 and mm.5–7 encourages an analogous treatment of the IC in m.6. The difference, however, 
 Swinden, “When Functions Collide: Aspects of Plural Function in Chromatic Music” (2005), 128
p.260.
 Ibid., p.261. Blackwood himself has referred to the 5-TET IC as a “piquantly discordant, but 129
weakly dissonant subdominant.” [Blackwood, “Modes and Chord Progressions in Equal 
Tunings” (1991), p.192.]
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is that m.5 and m.7 project global dominant function, and so m.6 has more of an applied feel. 
Once again, my interpretation splits into two potential tracks. As before, the top hearing 
involves a brief modal pivot to mixolydian but no Swindenian functional hybridity, whereas the 
bottom hearing remains in ionian throughout but posits a functional collision in m.6. Notice 
that the superscript in this hybrid is now “P” instead of “S,” owing to the fact that this IC now 
precedes a dominant instead of prolonging a tonic. In addition, the bottom system also differs 
in that its two tracks merge back together by m.7, since the dominant IC in this measure 
contains the global ionian leading tone (G-up),  which negates/erases the previous traces of 130
mixolydian potentiality. 
 The larger point of all this is that, regardless of the interpretive track one chooses, both 
hearings involve milking contextual asymmetries (and attendant functional qualia) out of a 
completely symmetrical acoustic object, contradicting the prevailing wisdom that equal 
divisions of the octave are usually either functionally inert (augmented triads, whole-tone 
scales) or functionally ambiguous (diminished sevenths). The functional apperceptions in Ex. 4.5 
therefore represent yet another imposition of tonality’s “characteristic asymmetry” onto an IC 
that is actually equally spaced.  In other words (to return to a comparison that I first make in 131
Chapter 3), the Müller-Lyer illusion’s auditory cousin has struck again. 
 This pitch is mistakenly notated as G-down in m.7, despite its unmistakably sounding as G-130
up in the recording (cf. the identical harmony in m.5, where this pitch is notated correctly).
 Carey, “Review Article: Tonality and Transformation by Steven Rings” (2012), p.223.131
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Blackwood’s Microtonality (IV): Two Senses of “Antitonic” 
One consequential fallout of my characterizing tonal cognition as relational and misattributive 
is the contention that there is no such thing as a harmonic function that exists in isolation. 
Certainly, this seems intuitive in the case of dominants, which garner their functional identity by 
virtue of their relationship with tonics, and pre/subdominants, which are conventionally 
understood in terms of their relationships with both dominants and tonics. But the case of 
tonics, at least on the surface, seems more complicated. One could conceivably mount the 
argument that tonic function is uniquely able to exist in isolation, citing a hypothetical example 
of a piece that drones on a single IC for its entire duration—or even more reductively, one that 
repeats a single pitch over and over, never including any others. While such repetitive musical 
behavior creates a seemingly incontrovertible sense of centeredness, this sense is not 
tantamount to an expression or assertion of “tonic function,” as I understand it. For function is 
fundamentally (re)action, not inertness; in the words of Brandon Derfler, it is an “operation 
[that] transform[s] one Klang into another harmonic object.”  And so, if there is just a single 132
Klang, and not another harmonic object, function cannot exist. This isolated Klang may sound 
or seem like a tonic—and one would probably be correct in asserting it as a notional “center” 
of sorts. But, crucially, it does not behave like a tonic, and therefore, it does not function like 
one. In fact, it does not function like anything. It simply exists, and it arouses its own attendant 
set of predictions and expectations about how it might continue to exist. But even as these 
predictions and expectations are confirmed, and even as their confirmation over time creates a 
 Derfler, Single-Voice Transformations: A Model for Parsimonious Voice Leading (2010), p.132
106. See also Lewin, “A Formal Theory of Generalized Tonal Functions” (1982), p.51, for an 
earlier conception of functions as “operations” that harmonies perform on one another.
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very real sense of certainty, this sense cannot rightfully be called “tonic” (or “tonic function”) in 
the absence of one or more “foils” for the isolated Klang.133
Each of Blackwood’s microtonal compositions articulates tonic function at some point, 
and in its own idiosyncratic way. But not all of the tunings in which he composes are capable of 
producing analogs to traditional “dominants” and “pre/subdominants,” raising the legitimate 
question of how to regard those ICs that act as the “foils” against which tonic function can be 
heard as such. Consider, for instance, the case of “23 Notes,” which Blackwood regards as “[a] 
particular challenge, [since] 23-note tuning contains no diatonic configurations and no
chromatic structures in common with any of the other tunings explored in this study.”134
Fig. 4.8: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 23-TET, with Eb-centric 
approximations to the pelog (black) and slendro (brown) collections circled 
 As Norman Cazden writes to this point, there exists a “strange logic by which a composition 133
cannot begin on its tonic harmony. The work may be, let us say, in the key of C major, and it 
may begin with a simple C major chord, but there is no functional relationship as yet that 
makes us accept that chord as having a tonic role, and the further progress of the composition 
may easily demonstrate that it is really in another key.” [Cazden, “Tonal Function and Sonority 
in the Study of Harmony” (1954), p.25.] One piece that fleshes out Cazden’s remark rather well 
is Debussy’s “Général Lavine” (1913), whose intro insistently asserts an apparent sense of C-
centricness, but whose ensuing bars reveal the prelude’s global center to be F instead—
retrospectively painting this introductory material as dominant-functioning rather than tonic-
functioning. A recording is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v6Kv3B5fDho.
 Blackwood, Microtonal Compositions (1994), Cedille CDR 90000 018, n.p. Julian Hook, 134
similarly, regards “23 Notes” as “[t]he one truly exceptional Etude,” since “[its] notation is not 
consistent with any enharmonic system.” [Hook, “Enharmonic Systems” (2007), p.118.]
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What 23-TET does contain, however, is a reasonable approximation of the two principal scales 
of Indonesian gamelan music—the slendro and the pelog. “23 Notes” is therefore unique 135
among Blackwood’s microtonal compositions in that it evokes a non-Western style: it 
approximates non-Western scales, simulates non-Western timbres, and mimics the
heterophonic texture characteristic of gamelan.136
Ex. 4.6: Metrically regular toggling between Eb-centric pelog (odd-numbered bars) and slendro 
(even-numbered bars) ICs creates the emergent impression of tonic/antitonic alternation over a 
tonic pedal; excerpt begins at 0:34 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qXy7HPeJPQM
Blackwood explains this in Keislar, “Six American Composers on Nonstandard Tunings”  135
(1991), p.199. Ethnomusicologist Jaap Kunst was the first to notice this property of 23-TET.
For more on American microtonal composers’ longstanding fascination with Indonesian 136
gamelan music, see Perlman, “American Gamelan in the Garden of Eden: Intonation in a Cross-
Cultural Encounter” (1994).
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 And yet, there are still certain aspects of this etude that are peculiarly Western, above 
and beyond its usage of five-line staff notation and its insistence on octave equivalence. I want 
to focus on the brief stretch of Eb-centric music, reproduced in Ex. 4.6 above, that emerges in 
m.23 and constitutes the first expression in the etude—indeed, one of the only—of what a 
Western-enculturated listener might cognize as “tonic function.” This emergent sense of tonic, 
however, is not established by means of triadic progression or directional inertia on the line of 
fifths—nor is it linked to any one specific heptatonic diatonic collection. Instead, it is 
established by a regular back-and-forth toggling between pelog  (in the odd-numbered 137
measures) and slendro  (even-numbered measures) collections. This periodic scalar oscillation 138
creates a fleeting impression of harmonic/functional oscillation, with the hypermetrically 
emphasized pelog IC momentarily playing the role of “tonic” and the hypermetrically 
subordinate slendro IC momentarily playing the role of that tonic’s “foil.” Moreover, these ICs 
share two pitches, Eb and Bb, that might be heard as a shared “overtonal”  frame that 139
anchors the oscillation by providing it with the stasis of a harmonic pedal. 
 But the question of how to modally situate these ICs is a challenging one—as is the 
question of what to call this “tonic foil.” Option 1 in Ex. 4.6 illustrates this difficulty. The pelog 
 The Eb-centric pelog in “23 Notes” consists of five pitches: Eb (z=6), G-down (13), A-down 137
(16), Bb (19), and D-down (3), producing an intervallic pattern of <73373>23. All of these except 
A-down are used in the above excerpt.
 The Eb-centric slendro in “23 Notes” also consists of five pitches: Eb (z=6), F (10), Ab[=G#] 138
(15), Bb (19), and C-up (1), producing an intervallic pattern of <45455>23. All five of these are 
used in the above excerpt.
 For more on “overtonality,” see Harrison, Pieces of Tradition: An Analysis of Contemporary 139
Tonal Music (2016), Chapter 2.
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collection in the odd-numbered measures sounds reasonably like an arpeggiated major 
seventh, an IC that is native to two modes: ionian and lydian. While a statistical learning 
argument may favor the ionian-tonic interpretation, it must not be forgotten that the Eb-centric 
pelog scale also contains an A-down (absent from these measures but present in other 
moments of the etude) that seems to fall directly in between an ionian 4̂ and a lydian 4̂. Thus, it 
is irresponsible to assert the pelog collection as a definitive subset of any one heptatonic 
diatonic mode. The same goes for the slendro IC in the even-numbered measures, which 
seems to straddle the line between an ionian subdominant and a mixolydian dominant (over a 
tonic pedal). This difference hinges on the modal ambiguity of C-up (the exact midpoint 
between Bb and Eb), which can be regarded either as (6̂, la, 1) (entailing S) or as (7,̂ fa, 1) 
(entailing D) relative to the Eb bass. But again, there is no interpretive advantage to quantizing 
this ambiguous interval into one neat scale-degree box at the expense of the other. This 
excerpt from “23 Notes,” while it does create a palpable impression of tonic function aided by 
metrical means, ultimately demonstrates the futility of trying to pigeonhole non-Western scales 
into Western modal clothes—even when it seems like a relatively close fit. 
 Option 2 therefore presents another hearing of the passage that acknowledges its 
gestural troping of functional oscillation but does not situate these functions within 
Euroclassical scalar confines. This hearing regards the odd-numbered measures as 
communicating a behavioral abstraction of tonic function, but it intentionally avoids labeling 
the “foil” IC as a “dominant” or “pre/subdominant,” since 23-TET is not capable of producing 
unambiguous, distinctive analogs to these conventional relationships with tonic. Instead, I label 
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m.24 and m.26 as modally agnostic “antitonics” (A) that occur over a tonic pedal.  Under this 140
interpretation, the functional oscillation in the passage takes place more so on Eb than it does 
in Eb—insofar as this latter implies a situatedness within any particular diatonic or pentatonic 
collection(s). 
 The label “antitonic” is more of a contextual designation in this case than it is one 
based on mutual exclusivity of pitch-class membership. My usage here thus aligns more closely 
with White and Quinn’s conception of the term in their discussion of the McGill Billboard 
corpus  than it does with Quinn’s slightly later employment of it in his model of thoroughbass 141
harmony.  In short, I call the ICs in Ex. 4.6 “tonic” and “antitonic” simply because [1] there are 142
no other ICs in the passage besides these two, [2] both progress back and forth to one another 
in shuttle-like format, and [3] one is more (metrically) stable than the other. I can imagine, 
however, that some readers might bristle at my usage of “antitonic” in this context, especially 
considering that two pitches—including the notional tonic itself—are shared between the 
 Some readers may take umbrage at my eschewal of the terms “dominant” and “pre/140
subdominant” but not “tonic,” preferring that I throw out all three of these Western labels 
when discussing nominally non-Western music. (Indeed, one could substitute any number of 
other binary pairs for the labels “tonic” and “antitonic,” such as “home” and “away.”) But I 
choose to retain the label of “tonic,” here, because I believe it captures the passage’s rather 
Western modus operandi: creating tonal accent via metrical means.
 See White and Quinn, “Chord Context and Harmonic Function in Tonal Music” (2018), p.141
323. For these authors, an antitonic simply “provides transition into and out of tonic” (323), 
without any additional requirement that it have no pitch classes in common with that tonic.
 See Quinn, “Tonal Harmony” (2019), p.479. For Quinn, an antitonic consists of the scale-142
degree complement to the tonic triad—the {7,̂2̂,4̂,6̂} to its {1,̂3̂,5̂}. This conception of tonic and 
antitonic is akin to the mutual exclusivity between the notes produced when inhaling versus 
exhaling into a harmonica. For more on “harmonica space,” see De Souza, Music At Hand: 
Instruments, Bodies, and Cognition (2017), Chapter 3.
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pelog and slendro collections used in “23 Notes.” For these readers, a quintessential antitonic 
might sound more like the following IC from m.110 of “14 Notes,” which shares the three 
contextual criteria listed earlier in the paragraph but also contains no z-overlap with the tonics 
that surround it:
Fig. 4.9: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 14-TET
Ex. 4.7: Tonic/antitonic alternation between two ICs with no pitch-class overlap;  
excerpt begins at 1:48 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rW_X0bgHlrQ
      [Ab-up]: T A           T
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 Every note in mm.109 and 111 (and 108, for that matter) has an odd-numbered z-
component and is spelled with a circle-arrow, whereas those in m.110 have even-numbered z-
components and no circle-arrows. This modally agnostic antitonic differs from the ones 
previously discussed in Ex. 4.6 in that the present case involves a change of bass and no pitch-
class overlap between the two ICs, which sets m.110 into even starker relief against the 
surrounding tonics. The aural effect of this progression is not unlike that of the following 
progression from the Fortnite Battle Royale menu theme:
Ex. 4.8: An analogous instance of tonic/antitonic alternation with no pitch-class overlap; excerpt 
begins at 0:18 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lzJ3eUGVRHA (music by Rom Di Prisco) 
Both of these progressions occur in tunings where expressions of dominant and pre/
subdominant function are also possible, which further sets them apart from the oscillatory “23 
Notes” progression previously discussed. But what is unique about “14 Notes,” as I will 
explore further in the next chapter, is that these traditional functions can be perceived as such 
even when the music is fully equiheptatonic, or in 7-TET. This is to say, harmonic function and 
tonal centeredness can be perceived even in the absence of literal heptatonic diatonicism, 
because 12-enculturated listeners are so accustomed to a distinction between major and minor 
seconds that they will mentally “bend” a 7-TET scale to create these desired asymmetries—
which are so fundamental to enabling a “centered” hearing—even when they do not exist. In 
[Bb]: T A   T (or T)
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theory, a 7-TET scale can be marshaled in composition (and subsequently “warped” in 
listening) to evoke associations with any of the diatonic modes. But in “14 Notes,” as we will 
see, it usually comes across as a mix between ionian and mixolydian. This will make for a fitting 
culmination to my recurring exploration, in this dissertation’s interior chapters, of the various 
kinds of equally spaced acoustic objects native to non–12-TET tunings that can be 
subconsciously distorted into their nearest (asymmetrical) 12-TET counterparts as a means of 
hearing the tonality in microtonality. Not only does this phenomenon occur with split fourths, 
triads whose thirds are identical, or fivefold equal divisions of the octave; it can also occur with 
entire heptatonic scales. 
* * * 
 If harmonic process can be likened to humor—and certain well-placed ICs to 
“punchlines”—then harmonic function represents an interpretive judgment not about these 
punchlines themselves, but about the particular ways that these punchlines are set up and 
moved past, relative to the enculturative particularities of one’s expectational and predictive 
apparatuses. This chapter has been pushing back against the tacit yet widespread pedagogical 
tendency to frame harmonic function as something that inheres in chords the second they 
sound, with little attention paid to their broader contexts of occurrence, the conditioning 
influence of (hyper)meter, and the like. In the process, I have been arguing for an 
understanding of function in which content and context both play indispensable roles, and I 
have been doing so while paying particularly close attention to the ways that so-called “scene 
cuts” and “transition music” consolidate an IC’s functional qualia. It is my hope that future 
generations of musical discourse are more explicitly cognizant of the realization that, when it 
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comes to sensations of harmonic function, the setup and punchline are simply not complete 
without the ensuing static. And this constitutes the ultimate irony of all: that only when we 
attend more closely to the “static” (as a noun) can we then truly claim to have moved past a 
“static” (as an adjective) conception of harmonic function.
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Chapter 5   |   The “Stuff” of Tonality 
Imagine that you are teaching a rather straightforward tonal piece in an undergraduate theory 
classroom. Ask the class “what key are we in?,” and you are likely to receive some quick 
responses. Follow up by asking them “how do we know?,” however, and you are likely to be 
met with a healthy dose of silence (at least at first). Certain students may find the query facile: 
of course it’s in C major—it says so right there in the piece’s title! Or they may find it mildly 
frustrating, even pointless: it just is! What else could it be in? Other students, though, may 
simply be at a loss for words, unexpectedly struck by the gravity of a question that is far less 
simple than it seems at face value. For how exactly do we know that a key is a key, and a tonic 
a tonic, without resorting to circular or tautological reasoning? 
 This one-two punch of questions has become a go-to gambit of mine in the classroom 
over the past few years. In asking the second question of the pair, I am prompting my students 
to reflect on what I call the “stuff” of tonality: the slew of factors that led them to answer the 
first question of the pair as they did. Of course, many of these factors are subconscious—the 
result of a lifetime of exposure to tonal musics and the implicit knowledge that comes with it. 
Others are explicit topics covered in the course itself, such as the tendency for “stronger” 
metrical positions to house more structurally stable tonal events. When a student eventually 
mentions an explicit factor such as this and points to certain locations in a score to illustrate 
their point, I immediately ask: “So where is tonality located, then? In the notes on the page?” 
Most catch on right away that this question is a leading one and that notation alone does not 
tell the full story. At this point, the expressions on many of their faces indicate that they need 
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some time to process their thoughts. And so I ask them to reflect on these matters in writing for 
our next class—specifically, to address the ways that musical/theoretical factors, historical/
cultural factors, and psychological/cognitive factors interact to influence their judgments of key. 
One student remarked to me upon entering the room for our next meeting that they felt they 
somehow knew “far more about tonality, and yet also far less about tonality,” than they ever 
did before. This sort of productive confusion was exactly what I was after. 
 It is what I have been after, too, in this dissertation. The regime of Euroclassical-derived 
tonality as configured in 12-TET has become so ubiquitous, given, and seemingly obvious in 
Western musical culture over the past century that we often do not stop to question why and 
how it is the way it is. We tend not to hear its peculiarities, its idiosyncrasies, and its puzzling 
contradictions as such, because things are rarely ever otherwise. The liminality of Blackwood’s 
microtonal music—as both a part of this regime and yet seemingly apart from it as well—
therefore makes it a productive tool to shine a light on some of tonality’s oft-overlooked 
mechanisms of operation. It has been my contention all along that attending closely to this 
music can lead to some refreshing clarity about the nature of tonality—perhaps that most 
prominent floating signifier in the sea of music-theoretic terms and concepts. But this eventual 
clarity can only come at the cost of initial confusion: that sense that one’s most deeply 
ingrained predispositions about tonality may not actually be as self-evident as they seem. I 
have been begging the reader’s patience through these moments of disorientation and 
cognitive dissonance, promising that productive confusion can only be productive in the end if 
one first embraces the generative power of confusion. I want to reiterate here that, when it 
comes to unlocking the “true nature” of tonality (or harmonic function, or consonance and 
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dissonance, or scale-degree qualia), I do not have all the answers. Nor does anyone else, for 
that matter. What I do have, however, is a useful prism in Blackwood’s microtonality that, when 
held up to our “everyday” experiences of tonal music, can refract some previously invisible 
facets and reveal some fresh and novel insight—so long as we are willing to savor the 
attendant fuzziness and paradox. 
Fruit Salad, Again 
Donald Tovey has written that “[t]onality is a thing which you can no more describe except by 
metaphors and comparisons than you can describe the taste of a peach.”  But a cursory survey 1
of what Brian Hyer has called the “veritable profusion of definitions” accorded to tonality 
makes one wonder whether scholars have actually been eating different fruits all along.  Gerald 2
Balzano, for instance, formulates an account of tonality that is heavily indebted to group-
theoretic criteria but that also attempts to bridge the mathematical and the perceptual. He 
frames the concept in terms of an interaction between three isomorphic groups that form three 
differently generated spaces—semitone, fifth, and triad—encouraging readers to think of 
tonality as “corresponding to a perceptible region in the[se] spaces.”  Norman Carey and 3
David Clampitt posit a mathematical explanation of a different sort, zeroing in on a single 
 Tovey, A Musician Talks, Volume 1: The Integrity of Music (1941), p.47. This quote also opens 1
Chapter 2 of Harrison, Pieces of Tradition: An Analysis of Contemporary Tonal Music (2016), p.
12.
 Hyer, “Tonality” (2002), p.726.2
 Balzano, “The Group-Theoretic Description of 12-Fold and Microtonal Pitch Systems” (1980), 3
p.83.
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active ingredient rather than a triptych of interacting spaces. As they write, “[A] single structural 
principle [….] the well-formed scale [….] can serve as a principled basis for tonal music,” since 
it accounts not only for pentatonic, diatonic, and chromatic scales but also for the tonic/
subdominant/dominant relationship (not to mention other non-Western and microtonal pitch 
collections).  4
 In a later article, Carey approaches the question from an information-theoretic 
perspective, arguing that “the information content of scales is related to their capacity to 
promote a tonic.”  More specifically, the best scale candidates, for Carey, are those that “carry 5
relatively little information and are fairly rich in redundancies.”  On the surface, this seems to 6
resonate with Paul Erlich’s notion of “harmonic entropy,”  which measures “uncertainty in pitch 7
perception” and “provides a physical correlate of tonalness” such that “high tonalness 
corresponds to low entropy” (and vice versa).  But Erlich’s “tonalness” describes the “closeness 8
 Carey and Clampitt, “Aspects of Well-Formed Scales” (1989), p.177 [emphasis in original]. 4
Well-formed (WF) scales are defined as “scales generated by consecutive fifths in which 
symmetry is preserved by scale ordering” (189).
 Carey, “On Coherence and Sameness, and the Evaluation of Scale Candidacy Claims” (2002), 5
p.45.
 Ibid., p.41.6
 Erlich developed this term in a series of online posts to the Mills College Tuning Digest 7
beginning in September 1997. Some of this material is archived at http://www.tonalsoft.com/
enc/e/erlich/harmonic-entropy_original.aspx.
 Sethares, Tuning, Timbre, Spectrum, Scale (2005), p.371. See especially Appendix J, pp.371–8
73, for a method of calculating harmonic entropy that involves the Farey series.
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of the partials of a complex sound to a harmonic series,”  whereas Carey’s conception of 9
tonality does not rely on the harmonic series—or on any sort of acoustical criteria, for that 
matter. For Erlich, just intonation is the standard, the referential yardstick, when extending 
notions of consonance and tonality to microtonal terrain; for Carey (as well as Balzano before 
him), tonality is more about replicating generalized intervallic behaviors than it is about 
approximating specific frequency ratios or cent sizes. 
 Of course, the whole of tonality is greater than the sum of its intervallic parts, and 
several commentators have formulated definitions of tonality that center the tendency for these 
intervals and intervallic collections to be (heard as) vectored towards a single privileged z. Aline 
Honingh, for instance, describes tonality as “the orientation of melodies and harmonies 
towards a referential (or tonic) pitch class.”  But she also notes that there is often 10
disagreement as to whether such orientation is “natural or inherent in [the] music” or whether it 
is “constructed by the composer, performer, and listener.”  What is left unaddressed, though, 11
is the possibility that ostensibly naturalistic accounts of tonality may actually be products of 
cognitive misattribution. 
 Obviously, I cannot make any further claims about specific theories or theorists in this 
regard. But I can safely say that naturalistic definitions of tonality have largely been in decline 
 Ibid., p.371. This differs from David Temperley’s probabilistic definition of “tonalness” as “the 9
degree to which a [pitch-class] set is characteristic of the language of common-practice tonal 
music.” [Temperley, “The Tonal Properties of Pitch-Class Sets: Tonal Implication, Tonal 
Ambiguity, and Tonalness” (2007b), p.24.]
 Honingh, “The Origin and Well-Formedness of Tonal Pitch Structures” (2006), p.20. This 10
definition is basically identical to the one proffered in Hyer, “Tonality” (2002), p.726.
 Honingh, “The Origin and Well-Formedness of Tonal Pitch Structures” (2006), p.20.11
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over the past few decades, in favor of accounts that stress the subjectively constructed nature 
of tonal sensations. These latter accounts have largely been bolstered by recent research in 
music perception and cognition (much of which I discuss in Chapter 1) that unpacks the roles of 
expectation, prediction, and enculturation in structuring one’s experience of tonality. David 
Temperley’s Music and Probability, for instance, discusses tonality in terms of the real-time 
mental processes involved in perceiving keys and metrical structures.  Steven Rings’s Tonality 12
and Transformation, moreover, pursues tonality’s “esthesics”  in a phenomenological account 13
that frames tonality as “something experienced,” rather than something “immanent [in] musical 
works.”  And even Dmitri Tymoczko’s A Geometry of Music, which has a very different set of 14
goals and commitments than the previous two books,  proposes five components of tonality 15
(conjunct melodic motion, acoustic consonance, harmonic consistency, limited macroharmony, 
and centricity) that are all framed and/or discussed at some point in terms of their capacity to 
be heard as such.  16
 Temperley, Music and Probability (2007a), passim. Temperley models musical perception and 12
cognition using the tools of Bayesian conditional probability, information theory, and Markov 
chains.
 Rings borrows this term from Nattiez, Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music 13
(1990), pp.12ff. Nattiez notes that the word “esthesic” was coined by Paul Valéry in his 1945 
inaugural lecture at the Collège de France.
 Rings, Tonality and Transformation (2011), p.3.14
 Robert Hasegawa’s review-article “New Approaches to Tonal Theory” (2012) provides a good 15
discussion of the differences in method and ideology between Rings’s and Tymoczko’s 
contemporaneous accounts of tonality.
 Tymoczko, A Geometry of Music: Harmony and Counterpoint in the Extended Common 16
Practice (2011), pp.4ff.
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 Tymoczko’s principal goal in formulating these five features is to isolate certain 
properties that link together a wide swath of tonal musics—both “Western and non-Western, 
past and present.”  Other accounts are more general yet, sharing Tymoczko’s focus on stylistic 17
plurality and temporal flexibility but stopping short of positing an overarching list of common 
features that make all tonal musics tonal. The purpose of such definitions, which typically 
engage what Hyer calls the “broadest possible sense” of tonality as a “systematic arrangement 
of pitch phenomena and relations between them,”  is to optimize the term’s cultural coverage 18
and thus its explanatory power. Philip Tagg’s conception of tonality as “the system or set of 
norms according to which tones are configured in any musical culture” is a perfect example of 
this.  Tagg’s account is remarkable for its decolonial approach, its meticulous terminological 19
clarity,  and its colloquial focus on the intuitive aspects of “what most people hear.”  But his 20 21
framing also raises some questions: who, for instance, is excluded from the banner of “most 
people”? And is there really only one dominant “system or set of norms” in each musical 
culture? Christopher White’s insistence that “within Western music history, there has not only 
 Ibid., p.4.17
 Hyer, “Tonality” (2002), p.726.18
 Tagg, Everyday Tonality II: Towards a Tonal Theory of What Most People Hear (2014), p.60.19
 See in particular Chapter 1 (pp.45–64), which carefully and concisely disentangles the terms 20
“note,” “pitch,” “tone,” “tonal,” “modal,” “tonical,” and “tonality” (among a few others).
 This latter phrase, of course, is explicitly foregrounded in the book’s bold subtitle: “Towards 21
a Tonal Theory of What Most People Hear.”
257
been one tonality, but multiple tonalities”  comes to mind as a notable objection to this latter 22
claim. Both White and Tagg emphatically push back against the idea that Western Euroclassical 
tonality is a unitary and hegemonic phenomenon that serves as the benchmark for the rest of 
the world’s tonal musics. But they go about their respective projects of provincialization in 
vastly different ways. 
 A zooming-out is warranted here, before the plethora of fruits starts to overwhelm and 
the metaphorical bowl starts to overflow. While there are some discernible trends in recent 
scholarship about tonality—foremost among them a greater emphasis on cognition and a de-
centering of Euroclassical functional varietals—broad disagreements still exist regarding the 
term’s historical scope, its cultural domain of application, whether it can be distilled into a list of 
basic ingredients, and if so, what those ingredients might be. There is also ongoing debate as 
to tonality’s proper “location” (i.e., in notation, in sound, in the mind, in the body, in multiple of 
these, or in none of these), the relationship between musical properties and perceptual ones in 
this nexus, and the relative importance of concepts and percepts in processes of tonal hearing. 
And finally, there has been a longstanding ambiguity arising from what Lloyd Hibberd calls “the 
application of ‘tonality’ to a theoretico-historical concept on the one hand, and to a 
psychological sensation on the other.”  In the face of all this, it is important to reiterate that 23
my intent in this dissertation has not been to fix a definition of this slippery term; that would be 
 White, “Some Statistical Properties of Tonality, 1650–1900” (2013), p.98 [emphasis in 22
original]. Of course, this idea originates with François-Joseph Fétis in the mid-nineteenth 
century; see in particular Fétis, Traité complet de la théorie et de la pratique de l’harmonie 
(1844), Book 3.
 Hibberd, “‘Tonality’ and Related Problems in Terminology” (1961), p.15.23
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a counterproductive exercise. Instead, my aim all along has been to wield Blackwood’s 
microtonal compositions as a strategic lens through which one can gain a fresh look at diatonic 
tonality from a uniquely liminal perspective that is at once outsider (eschewing the familiar 12-
tone octave) and insider (evoking its phantom presence anyway). Perhaps this is exactly what 
the well-worn concept of tonality needs: a jolt from some music whose paradoxical nature can 
compel one to stop and think about those elements of tonality (and tonal hearing) that tend to 
be downplayed, passed over as unremarkable, or taken for granted in conventional accounts 
and everyday experience. 
 The remainder of this chapter contains two major sections that delve into the “stuff” of 
tonality. The first meditates on the nature of tonal salience, investigating the respective roles 
that musical “entities” (like individual tonal pitches) and musical relations (like the intervals 
among those pitches) play in broader sensations of tonality, and asking whether such entities/
relations might stand out to listeners because of their relative frequency, their relative rarity, or 
some combination of the two. The second section, then, lays out some fundamental 
propositions about tonality that Blackwood’s microtonal compositions reveal rather well, 
ultimately leading into a discussion of tonality’s physiognomy, its enabling conditions, and its 
practical limits. In this latter section, I propose the term fuzzy heptatonic diatonic tonality as a 
way to synthesize the various inflections of tonality discussed throughout this dissertation—
both within Blackwood’s microtonal music and beyond—into a conceptual gestalt. 
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On Salience (I): The “Rivalry” of Tonal Hierarchy and Intervallic Rivalry 
What makes something tonally salient? Does the relative frequency of a musical occurrence 
make it stand out more, or is the opposite the case: that the less frequent it is, the more it 
strikes the ear as carrying noteworthy information? This section argues that both can be the 
case simultaneously, since there are multiple kinds of tonal salience that operate 
independently, in conjunction with pathways of expectation, memory, and prediction that are 
themselves independent. The ensuing discussion picks back up on two interrelated threads 
from previous chapters: the distinction between processing music-syntactic (ir)regularities and 
acoustic (ir)regularities (as outlined in Chapter 1), and the reconciliatory framing of tonal 
context and tonal content that is enabled by such a distinction (as outlined in Chapter 4). I 
begin by returning to a moment of scholarly contention mentioned in the previous chapter—a 
brief debate in the late 1980s and early 1990s between David Butler and Carol Krumhansl 
concerning the brass tacks of tonal hearing—and unpacking it in more detail. After 
recapitulating and mediating this debate, I illustrate some different kinds of tonal salience 
through two contrasting analytical vignettes from Blackwood’s microtonality, and then I 
consider more broadly the misattribution of qualia that are relational to entities that are static. 
 Certain scholars have attempted to model tonal hearing by specifying tonal hierarchies, 
according to which different layers of the hierarchy afford different levels of tonal stability. Fred 
Lerdahl, for instance, proposes the following “basic space,”  in which higher rows are more 24
structurally stable than lower ones, with the result that pitch classes (i.e., columns) with more x’s 
are of comparatively greater tonal importance in C major: 
 Lerdahl, Tonal Pitch Space (2001), p.48.24
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Fig. 5.1: Lerdahl’s basic diatonic space, normalized to C major25
Lerdahl’s theory is indebted in large part to Carol Krumhansl, whose prior work established the 
empirical observability of tonal hierarchies through the pioneering probe-tone method, which 
she developed in conjunction with Roger Shepard.  Under this paradigm, listeners hear a short 26
snippet that establishes a tonal context followed by an isolated single tone, which they are 
then asked to rate according to its perceived goodness of fit with the preceding context. These 
ratings can be schematized as below:
Fig. 5.2: Krumhansl’s tonal hierarchy for major keys, normalized to C major27
Notice the similarities with Lerdahl’s basic space in Fig. 5.1 above—except here, the more 
stable layers of the hierarchy are the lower rows (and there is no separate fifths level). Once 
 Image is from Krumhansl and Cuddy, “A Theory of Tonal Hierarchies in Music” (2010), p.77.25
See especially Krumhansl and Shepard, “Quantification of the Hierarchy of Tonal Functions 26
Within a Diatonic Context” (1979).
Image is from Krumhansl and Keil, “Acquisition of the Hierarchy of Tonal Functions in 27
Music” (1982), p.244.
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again, the more populated columns indicate the notes that are of greater comparative tonal 
importance in a C-major context, but in Krumhansl’s case, these ratings reflect actual 
judgments of fit by participants rather than theoretical postulates unconnected from empirical 
observation. 
  One advantage of tonal hierarchies is that they have been found to correlate rather well 
with each note’s relative frequency of occurrence in a (major-key) tonal context. Matt Hughes’s 
study of Schubert’s Op. 94, No. 1,  for instance, records the sum-total durations for each of 28
the twelve chromatic scale tones in the piece; as it turns out, these share a correlation of r=0.97 
with Krumhansl’s tonal hierarchy for G major. This close relationship is summarized below:
Fig. 5.3: A strong correlation between tone durations and probe-tone ratings29
Hughes, “A Quantitative Analysis” (1977).28
 Image is from Krumhansl, Cognitive Foundations of Musical Pitch (2001), p.72.29
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But while this is an impressive correlation, it must be clarified that Schubert’s Op. 94, No. 1 is 
actually in C major, and so the best fitting tonal hierarchy in this case is that of the dominant 
key, not the tonic. This illustrates rather well the complications involved in treating statistical 
frequency as a direct measure of tonal stability. As David Huron points out in this regard, “[T]he 
dominant pitch is the most frequently occurring scale degree [in Western tonality]; however, the 
tonic pitch is judged by listeners as evoking the greater pleasure.”  Ian Quinn, similarly, 30
cautions against placing too much trust in the static reductionism of pitch-class profiles, 
arguing against the assumption that tonal hierarchies are transpositionally invariant.   31
 Krumhansl has taken great pains to clarify that her tonal hierarchy is “not a theoretical 
model, but instead a summary of psychological data” —a disclaimer that is carefully repeated 32
in more recent books by Eytan Agmon  and Daniel Harrison.  But much of the confusion that 33 34
led to this remark in the first place, I contend, is not actually of Krumhansl’s own doing. The 
catalyst is a 1989 article by David Butler that launches a critique of what he calls the “tonal 
hierarchy theory” and its associated probe-tone technique, proposing in its place a theory of 
“intervallic rivalry.”  Butler frames his theory in opposition to Krumhansl’s work, charging that 35
 Huron, Sweet Anticipation (2006b), p.139. The reason that 5̂ occurs more frequently than 1 ̂30
in Western tonal music is that 5̂ is a member of both the dominant and tonic triads.
 See in particular Quinn, “Are Pitch-Class Profiles Really ‘Key for Key’?” (2010) and Quinn and 31
White, “Corpus-Derived Key Profiles Are Not Transpositionally Equivalent” (2017).
 Krumhansl, “Tonal Hierarchies and Rare Intervals in Music Cognition” (1990), p.310.32
 Agmon, The Languages of Western Tonality (2013), p.230.33
 Harrison, Pieces of Tradition (2016), p.27.34
 Butler, “Describing the Perception of Tonality in Music: A Critique of the Tonal Hierarchy 35
Theory and a Proposal for a Theory of Intervallic Rivalry” (1989).
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her tonal hierarchies “do not describe the mental processes by which the tonal center of a 
piece of tonal music is recognized, nor [do they] account for the dynamic perception of tonality 
as it unfolds during actual music listening.”  Butler’s alternative theory claims to be more 36
attentive to these real-time dynamics. As he argues, “[L]isteners recognize the tonal center in 
tonal music on a best-evidence basis, and the clearest evidence is carried in the rarest-
occurring intervals in the diatonic set.”  In other words, rare intervals such as tritones provide 37
the more perceptually salient cues in what Richmond Browne calls the process of tonal 
“position finding”  than do more common intervals such as thirds and fifths, since these latter 38
occur naturally in multiple places within diatonic scales, whereas tritones only occur naturally in 
a single position.  39
 A series of neat oppositions thus emerges: tonal hierarchies are static, whereas 
intervallic rivalries are dynamic. The former locate the most valuable tonal information in 
zeroth-order statistical frequencies, whereas the latter locate it in first-order statistical rarities. 
With tonal hierarchies, the carriers of such information are individual pitch classes. But under 
the intervallic rivalry theory, as the name indicates, these carriers are intervals. Butler’s 
polemical style reduces the complexities and nuances of tonal hearing to a simple binary. But 
at the same time that it reduces, it also raises the stakes of debates surrounding the elusive 
 Ibid., p.219.36
 Ibid.37
 Browne, “Tonal Implications of the Diatonic Set” (1981), pp.7ff.38
 The logic of position finding and intervallic rivalry calls to mind Huron’s remark that “[w]hen 39
something is novel, it makes sense that an organism should direct its attention towards 
it.” [Huron, “A Psychological Approach to Musical Form: The Habituation-Fluency Theory of 
Repetition” (2013), p.9.]
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nature of tonality and tonal hearing, creating a discursive environment in which interlocutors 
can often feel pressured to choose sides. Robert Gjerdingen’s review of Krumhansl’s Cognitive 
Foundations of Musical Pitch, for instance, is indicative of the “either/or” nature of the 
discourse at the time: “I share Krumhansl’s belief that people initially learn to understand music 
through sensitivity to statistical regularities in the music they hear. But I suspect that the entities 
making up those regularities are relational in nature—intervals, rhythms, and contours rather 
than individual pitches.”  Traces of this oppositional strain even persist into the next century, 40
as the following quote from Dora Hanninen attests: “[M]usic emerges not within the notes one 
can point to on the page, but between notes, among sounds, within contexts, over time.”  41
 Butler’s 1989 article prompted a brief but intense back-and-forth between he and 
Krumhansl the following year. In it, Krumhansl pushes back against Butler’s charge that tonal 
hierarchies are static, arguing that “the cognitive representations revealed by the [probe-tone] 
experiments carry important time-variant information,”  and citing her own prior work  on 42 43
“contextual asymmetry”  to bolster her point. She also stresses the distinction between data 44
 Gjerdingen, “Review of Cognitive Foundations of Musical Pitch by Carol L. 40
Krumhansl” (1992), p.487.
 Hanninen, “Associative Sets, Categories, and Music Analysis” (2004), p.201 [emphasis in 41
original].
 Krumhansl, “Tonal Hierarchies and Rare Intervals in Music Cognition” (1990), p.322.42
 Krumhansl, “The Psychological Representation of Musical Pitch in a Tonal Context” (1979), 43
pp.358 and 363.
 According to this Gestalt principle, “When a [probe] tone lower in the hierarchy is followed 44
by one higher in the hierarchy, they are perceived as psychologically less distant than when the 
two tones are played in the opposite order.” [Krumhansl and Cuddy, “A Theory of Tonal 
Hierarchies in Music” (2010), p.59.] 
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and theory, claiming that Butler (mis)takes her notion of tonal hierarchy for the latter when it 
actually encapsulates the former. But the main thrust of her response is one of rapprochement: 
“It is important to emphasize from the outset that the tonal hierarchy is just one component of 
experienced listeners’ abstract knowledge of relations among tones, chords, and keys.”  45
According to Krumhansl, several kinds of tonal cues exist, from the statistical regularities of the 
diatonic set to the rare intervals of tritones and minor seconds, and “they are not mutually 
exclusive. Listeners may use a number of cues in combination, with the weighting possibly 
dependent on the musical passage in question.”  With this response to Butler, Krumhansl tries 46
to change the register of the debate from the polarizing exclusivity of “either/or” to the 
pluralistic nuance of “both/and.” 
 It would take a few years for Butler to cede any ground on the matter. His immediate 
response to Krumhansl only doubles down on his position, arguing that the probe-tone 
method lacks ecological validity, that Krumhansl portrays his intervallic rivalry theory as 
“severely limited,” and that her own understanding of chromaticism and tonicization is too 
“simplistic,” which leads her to confound “tonality” and “diatonicism.”  It is here that the 47
debate reaches its peak intensity—but from this point forward, the temperature would cool. 
Krumhansl never directly responds to Butler again, and by 1994, he adopts a more conciliatory 
tone. In an article from that year by Helen Brown, Butler, and Mari Riess Jones, tonal hierarchies 
and intervallic rivalry—once framed as warring factions—are now regarded as compatible 
 Krumhansl, “Tonal Hierarchies and Rare Intervals in Music Cognition” (1990), p.309.45
 Ibid., p.317.46
 Butler, “Response to Carol Krumhansl” (1990), p.335.47
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models. As they claim, “[T]he intervallic rivalry model and the tonal hierarchy model 
complement one another insofar as the former may function with rare intervals to guide and 
confirm key discovery, while the latter may come into play with common intervals to express 
tonal implications between the established key and related ones.”  This suggests a tonality-48
focused analog to Danuta Mirka’s distinction between “finding” and “monitoring” meter  that 49
is best illustrated with two contrasting moments from Blackwood’s microtonal music. 
On Salience (II): Illustrative Vignettes 
In both of the following moments, tonal groundedness is either suspended, ambiguous, or in 
flux; my focus is on how one might go about (re)gaining their bearings in the face of 
(micro)tonal equivocality. A crucial premise here is that “being in a key” is not one single 
sensation, since there exists a robust continuum of tonal articulation. Keys can be established, 
denied, foisted, dangled, or clouded by various syntactical and rhetorical means—and doing 
so enlists the help of myriad configurations of musical parameters and materials. Tonal 
interpretation, in short, is never an all-or-nothing affair. Rather, it is a nuanced process that is 
always-already in flux. The following analytical vignettes therefore treat key areas not as “static 
entities,” to quote Harrison, but as “part of the apparatus of becoming.”  50
 Brown, Butler, and Jones, “Musical and Temporal Influences on Key Discovery” (1994), p.48
404.
 Mirka, Metric Manipulations in Haydn and Mozart: Chamber Music for Strings, 1787–1791 49
(2009), p.22.
 Harrison, “Nonconformist Notions of Nineteenth-Century Enharmonicism” (2002), p.131.50
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 Harrison’s study of late–nineteenth-century enharmonicism proposes a sixfold typology 
of “graduated key articulations”  that comprises an appropriate starting point for inquiry into 51
Blackwood’s treatment of keys, not least because several of his microtonal compositions evoke 
this same late–nineteenth-century soundworld. Harrison’s six categories are formal keys 
(established by “large-scale cadential articulations”), asserted keys (“created by rhetorical 
means” and “established by force”), surface keys (“lightly articulated” with “weak establishing 
rhetoric”), passing keys (“largely analytical artefacts” that arise from “pointing to a key but 
withholding its tonic”), chord keys (“temporary special effect[s] created by a rhetorical accent” 
on a triad lying outside of a local key), and feigning keys (surface keys with a “dissonant tonic 
chord at the cadence”).  I contend that all of these above types occur unambiguously at some 52
point in Blackwood’s microtonal music. But more interesting are those moments that do not fit 
so neatly within Harrison’s typology—moments that reveal rather pointedly, in their rhetorical 
and contextual novelties, that key articulation and tonal hearing are things that exist on a rich 
continuum of qualitative possibilities. In what follows, I discuss two such moments, paying 
particular attention to the roles that rare intervals and tonal hierarchies can play in shaping the 
processes of “finding” and “monitoring” tonality. 
 I begin with the opening bars of “13 Notes,” which provide an interesting case study in 
the matter of “finding tonality.” My overarching contention is that the listener does not find the 
tonic here; rather, to quote Harrison, “[the t]onic finds the listener.”  More specifically, the 53
 Ibid., p.143.51
 Ibid., p.144.52
 Harrison, Harmonic Function in Chromatic Music (1994), p.75.53
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boxed Ab in the bass of m.5 behaves like what I will call a “tonic by imposition”—though its 
rhetoric of assertion is gentle, understated, and (as Blackwood’s timbral marking reads)
“veiled.” 
Fig. 5.4: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 13-TET 





           (7,̂sol,6) 
(4̂,re,1)            (5̂,mi,3) 
   (1,̂la,9)(2̂,ti,11)(3̂,do,12)        (6̂,fa,4) 
[Ab aeolian]:   T(i6——4——
(3̂,do,12)(1,̂la,9)               (1,̂la,9)       (5̂,mi,3)  (1,̂la,9)
(3̂,do,12) 
(1,̂la,9) 





 This is far from a brash Harrisonian “asserted key,” nor is it quite a full-fledged instance 
of what Charles Smith calls “presentational tonality.”  For one thing, the moment is extremely 54
subdued—certainly not the “brute-force reiteration” of tonic that Smith describes as 
prototypical.  The moment does, however, dovetail with Smith’s condition of “registral 55
prominence” : the boxed Ab in Ex. 5.1 enters once the parallel thirds in the upper two voices 56
have reached their melodic peak, and this effects their directional reversal. The bass-voice Ab, 
then, might be imaginatively conceived as imposing a force field on the notes already 
sounding above (hence the term “tonic by imposition”)—a gentle “nudge” that motivates 
them to resolve normatively to a minor triad above the sounding root.  The Ab therefore acts 57
as an agent of retroactive tonal clarification; its presence allows perceptible scale-degree 
identities to accrue to the upper voices, which then bend to its unwavering will. This tonic may 
not sound like the conventional tonal tyrant—the durchbruch D major of Mahler’s Titan, or the 
assault-like orchestral apotheoses of Liszt, for instance. But though it speaks softly, it carries 
with it a highly charged regime of expectation: the “big stick” of tonality. 
 So a moment of relative tonal clarity results from this Ab in the bass, even as the full-
fledged arrival of the tonic triad itself is delayed by a double suspension. The Ab contains 
sufficient magnetism to impose momentary order on the equivocal scalar wandering of the first 
 Smith, “The Functional Extravagance of Chromatic Chords” (1986), p.129. Smith’s 54
“presentational tonality" and Harrison’s “asserted keys” are described in similar ways (both 
authors, for example, use the word “force”).
 Ibid.55
 Ibid.56
 By the closing bracket midway through m.6, every voice is sounding a degree of this Ab 57
minor triad.
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four bars—which is no small feat, considering the unusual nature of this 13-TET scale. Sporting 
eight notes and an intervallic pattern of <21221221>13,  this collection’s closest 12-TET analog 58
is an aeolian scale with both a minor seventh (y=sol) and a major seventh (y=si) above tonic. 
But as the parallel ascending thirds in mm.1–4 demonstrate so viscerally, this scale can also 
exist at great affective remove from the “home world” of 12-TET. I like to conceive of mm.1–4 
as presenting the tonal equivalent of the linguistic “garden path” phenomenon.  The effect is 59
subtle: the 277- and 369-cent thirds in this passage (measuring three and four unit intervals, 
respectively) are rather narrow, but as individual dyadic verticalities, they can be cognized as 
thirds without much issue. Yet when these intervals are iterated several times upward over an 
eight-note scale, centwise discrepancies accumulate to the point where it sounds like an extra 
scale step is needed to traverse the octave. This throws one’s sense of scale-degree bearings 
into disarray by m.3: what starts out so innocently as a passage of parallel rising thirds now 
seems like an uncanny portal through a tonal wormhole. Metrical interpretation, too, is thrown 
off by the sudden reconsideration of alleged scalar bearings.  All in all, the “extra” minor 60
second in this eight-note scale greatly complicates the process of position finding for those 
listeners who are accustomed to this interval’s relative rarity in typical diatonic contexts. Indeed 
 Blackwood calls this collection the “sub-minor” scale in several of his published and 58
unpublished writings.
 For more on this phenomenon as it applies to music and expectation, see Huron, Sweet 59
Anticipation (2006b), pp.279–81, and Temperley, The Cognition of Basic Musical Structures 
(2001), pp.210–11.
 Blackwood’s curiously idiosyncratic phrasing (and at times rhythmically shaky rendering) of 60
these first few bars—particularly after the slightly awkward voice crossing in m.2—certainly 
does not do a listener any favors, either.
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(and perhaps unsurprisingly given the main argument of Chapter 3), much of this passage’s 
dissonance is expectational in nature, originating in the cardinality mismatch between the 8-
note scale of the etude and the 7-note aeolian scale that acts as a referential orienting 
collection for many 12-enculturated listeners. 
 Huron refers to the moments of confusion that attend garden-path experiences as 
“glitches,” noting that they “def[y] straightforward classification as either schematic or dynamic 
surprise.”  When the boxed Ab enters in m.5, then, the glitch begins to resolve. Listeners are 61
“nudged” to reinterpret the scale degrees just heard in terms of this newly imposed tonic (Ex. 
5.1 illustrates this for the pitches of m.4), and the system—at least momentarily—is debugged. 
The emergent sense of Ab aeolian extends beyond the bracketed point in Ex. 5.1; members of 
its tonic triad also appear on the downbeats of m.7 and m.8 in the highest voice part (labeled 
above), providing periodically regular points of reference that tonally anchor the novel, snaking 
melodic line. Of course, the Ab pedal also remains in the bass until measure 12.  
 Now compare this with the following moment of relative tonal clarity that emerges 
amidst the quarter-tone contrapuntal bustle of “24 Notes”:
Fig. 5.5: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 24-TET 
 Huron, Sweet Anticipation (2006b), p.281. He goes on to say that “[t]he surprise itself is 61
schematic, but the setup is clearly passage-specific” (281).
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T?
Ex. 5.2: A potential “chord key” in m.42? Excerpt begins at  
1:18 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5bcFsHeFuB4
Whereas the previous example from “13 Notes” deals with finding tonality, this one engages 
processes of monitoring tonality. Measure 42 features the longest cessation of contrapuntal 
motion—at half a measure without any voices moving—since m.28, and this will not happen 
again until m.71. The moment, quite uniquely, is marked for its lack of activity, which helps to 
create a rhetorical accent (both agogic and metrical) on the boxed Gb major triad. One could 
argue that this triad acts rather like a Harrisonian “chord key,” particularly given that we 
“remain on the chord long enough for it to be proposed as an asserted key.”  But certain of 62
his other requirements, such as the tendency for chord keys to “move towards a cadential 
progression in a new (generally surface) key,”  are not fulfilled. In addition, it is difficult to 63
make the claim that this triad is “not diatonic to the local key,”  since the frequent switching 64




back and forth between quarter-tone collections muddles any sense of a clear local tonic or an 
unambiguous referential scalar collection. 
 More interesting, though—and more determinate—is the triad’s diatonic relationship to 
the etude’s global key of Bb aeolian. Indeed, it shares two pitch classes, Bb and Db, with this 
key’s tonic triad.  It is thus parseable as a first-inversion VI: a tonic proxy whose outer voices 65
provide an associational link with the nominal tonic of the etude. I say “associational,” rather 
than “hierarchical” or “prolongational,”  because this Bb aeolian tonality is not embedded in 66
the etude’s “deep structure,” so to speak. It is never confirmed with syntactic progressions or 
familiar cadences. Rather, it is just sort of there when it needs to be: the etude, formally a 
passacaglia, opens with the anacrustic Bb–Db of its main subject (each subject also ends on a 
Bb), and it closes with a nineteen-measure pedal point on Bb.  Between these endpoints, 67
there are few signs of Bb acting as a conventional tonal center. Instead, it acts rather like a 
placeholder: the etude is more nominally “on” (or “enclosed by”) Bb than it is “in” Bb.  68
Because most of the etude presents a clouded tonality brought on by continuous toggling 
 Not to mention that Bb and Db are also the first two notes of the etude’s passacaglia subject, 65
which begins another entry just prior to the occurrence of the IC under discussion (pickup to m.
41, bracketed in Ex. 5.2).
 For more on “associational” versus “prolongational” relationships among musical events, 66
see Straus, “The Problem of Prolongation in Post-Tonal Music” (1987).
 This latter Bb certainly does not sound like a tonic pedal when it enters in m.69; it ushers in 67
some of the most dense chromaticism of the etude, featuring its only instances of quarter-tone 
“mixture” within individual ICs. By the time the pieces of Bb aeolian fall into place (mm.81–83), 
the ensuing close seems perfunctory—even anticlimactic, resigned. Blackwood invokes a 
strong norm of fugal writing, the pedal point, in name only; its usual functional charge is 
drained.
 This is precisely why I use the term “nominal tonic” earlier in the paragraph.68
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between quarter-tone collections, listeners are likely to compensate for this disorientation by 
latching all the more tightly onto any brief wisps of tonal clarity that may happen to emerge. As 
far as “24 Notes” is concerned, the downbeat of m.42 presents as clear a tonic function as 
there will be, relatively speaking, between the aforementioned endpoints of the etude. That 
the IC in question is only a proxy, a triadic substitute for the nominal tonic, does not matter; we 
will take what we can get. 
 Rhetorical accent created by the absence of musical motion: this is exactly what agogic 
accent is, and yet in a sense, it also seems strangely counterintuitive. After all, is it not usually 
the case that something—or some series of things, like a cadential progression—has to happen 
in order for an IC to be confirmed as a tonic? The situation is counterintuitive, too, from an 
expectational standpoint. One of my guiding claims in this dissertation is that 12-enculturated 
listeners compensate for the lack of specific intervals, ICs, and progressions familiar from 12-
TET by relying all the more strongly on schematic and dynamic expectations to make sense of 
Blackwood’s microtonality. As it turns out, 24-TET is the only one of Blackwood’s dozen tunings 
that contains the exact pitches of 12-TET (boosting the likelihood of veridical resonances), but 
he marshals 24-TET in composition so as to defamiliarize the pitches of 12-TET, largely by 
flouting schematic expectations about how keys are confirmed. What is more, m.42 of “24 
Notes” even flouts dynamic expectations in that the predictable 8th-note stream of 
contrapuntal patter suddenly stops. Sure, it is on a downbeat, but this is the second downbeat 
since the passacaglia subject’s most recent entry—typically a “weak” measure in hypermetric 
terms. In short, this is an odd spot for a tonic to emerge. Yet it does, and this emergence is 
powerful enough to outweigh the fact that the tonic is not even in root position! 
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 I have chosen the two illustrative vignettes in this section with a single rationale in mind: 
to problematize Brown, Butler, and Jones’s claim that intervallic rivalry primarily aids listeners in 
finding tonics, whereas tonal hierarchies primarily aid listeners in monitoring tonics. The 
situation, as these examples demonstrate, is not so neatly complementary. It might be more 
accurate to characterize intervallic rivalry and tonal hierarchy as equally important players in 
both processes, finding and monitoring tonics, with this added caveat: when rare-intervallic 
expectations are manipulated (or if such intervals are absent altogether), listeners compensate 
by relying more heavily on statistical regularities of tonal hierarchies to orient themselves. This 
is to say, common intervals can aid one in position finding just as much as rare intervals can—if 
not more in some cases. 
 In “13 Notes,” for example, the first three dyads of the etude point towards Ab aeolian 
as the most probable tonic, in large part because of the tell-tale minor second between Bb and 
Cbb (not to mention the initial metrical support given to the triadic tones of Ab, Cbb, and Eb). 
But by the downbeat of m.4, which houses an octave transposition of the etude’s first dyad, 
one will likely come to realize that minor seconds are no longer the reliable indicators of tonal 
positioning that one might have initially thought. It is not just that the scale in question 
contains an “extra” eighth tone; it also contains an “extra” third minor second, meaning that 
this interval is comparatively less rare than it usually is in more familiar diatonic contexts. This 
makes the minor second lose much of its power as a positional indicator; in fact, it becomes a 
primary agent of tonal disorientation in this scenario. What eventually saves the day is the 
unveiling of a familiar tonic-functioning IC—a complete triad—in mm.5–6, without any of the 
attendant confusion previously caused by the extra minor second. In the midst of subtle chaos, 
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the common intervals of fifth and (minor) third above root provide a much-needed positional 
anchor. In other words, when intervallic rivalry fails, tonal hierarchy steps in to pick up the 
burden. 
 The situation is superficially similar in “24 Notes,” even despite the finding/monitoring 
distinction that separates these two examples. Listeners latch onto the comforting familiarity of 
a triad—that prototypical bearer of tonic function in Western tonal music—to compensate for 
the alien effect of toggling between quarter-tone collections that pervades the etude up until 
that point. Of course, quarter-tone intervals are expectationally “rare” for 12-enculturated 
listeners (and their proliferation in this etude certainly does not do any favors, as regards 
position finding). But this is a different category of intervallic rarity than the one represented by 
minor seconds and tritones in diatonic contexts, and this leads to an important distinction: rare 
intervals can only aid in position finding if they are part of a listener’s referential orienting 
collection. If they are not (as is likely the case with quarter-tone intervals), they only complicate 
the process of tonal orientation. Therefore, it is not simply the preponderance of quarter-tone 
intervals in “24 Notes,” but rather their occurrence at the expense of normatively functioning/
resolving diatonic minor seconds and tritones, that clouds the tonality of the etude and shifts 
the onus of position finding onto the more common (that is, culturally familiar) intervallic 
combinations, which stand out even more when they occur. 
 Notice that I am being careful with my language here, referring to intervals and 
intervallic combinations rather than notes or chords. This reflects a basic premise of the 
dissertation: that music cognition is fundamentally relational, and that point-like constructions 
such as “scale degrees” and “chords” are cognitive misattributions that treat relations as if they 
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were entities. This position has some important implications. First, it pushes back against 
Butler’s idea that intervallic rivalry lies in direct opposition to tonal hierarchy, the former being 
dynamic and the latter static. Indeed, as is clear from the preceding examples (and even from 
Krumhansl’s initial response to Butler), tonal hierarchies are always-already relational in that [1] 
they “carry important time-variant information,”  and [2] their stability/goodness-of-fit ratings 69
refer not to individual pitches in isolation, but to intervals above a perceived tonic. And 
second, this position problematizes the distinction traditionally made in psychology between 
relational categories, “whose members share common relational patterns,” and entity 
categories, “whose members share common intrinsic properties.”  Is there even such thing as 70
a genuine entity category in tonal cognition? As preceding chapters have shown, 
categorization depends fundamentally on contextual relationships; the same “transition-zone” 
interval, for instance, may be heard as conjunct in one context of occurrence but disjunct in 
another. Indeed, I contend that all categories in tonal cognition that are notionally regarded as 
entities can be framed as relational in some way.  Consonance and dissonance, for example, 71
are not merely intrinsic properties of isolated acoustic signals; rather, they are also cognitive 
 Krumhansl, “Tonal Hierarchies and Rare Intervals in Music Cognition” (1990), p.322.69
 Asmuth and Gentner, “Relational Categories Are More Mutable Than Entity 70
Categories” (2016), p.2007. Two important predecessors to this work are Gentner and Kurtz, 
“Relational Categories” (2005) and Markman and Stilwell, “Role-Governed Categories” (2001).
 A version of this debate is still playing out in the metrical literature, with authors divided over 71
whether musical meter is comprised of a series of extensionless points or of the time-spans that 
connect those points (or both). Important contributions to this debate include Zuckerkandl, 
Sound and Symbol: Music and the External World (1956); Lerdahl and Jackendoff, A 
Generative Theory of Tonal Music (1983); Boone, “Marking Mensural Time” (2000); Mirka, 
Metric Manipulations in Haydn and Mozart (2009); and London, Hearing in Time: Psychological 
Aspects of Musical Meter (2012).
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categories that relate the experience of sounding music to culturally conditioned expectations. 
Furthermore, unless one has perfect pitch, “notes” are colloquial redescriptions of intervals, 
“chords” are colloquial redescriptions of progressions, and “keys” are colloquial redescriptions 
of large-scale tonal relationships. All of these labels, too, are generated by relating experience 
to expectation. 
 This is not to deny that pitches (or chords, or beats, etc.) have intrinsic properties, but 
rather to emphasize that tonal cognition necessarily involves transducing these intrinsic 
properties into extrinsic/relational ones, which are more useful for making sense of music over 
time. Therefore, musical entities do technically exist—the frequency of a sound is one—but this 
information is often converted into something more useful for time-dependent processing of 
sound combinations, like intervallic cent size.  In such a manner, the intrinsic transforms into 72
the relational. To conclude, then, tonal hearing requires apprehending musical relations, and 
this process involves taking stock of both regularities and rarities, each of which contributes in 
its own way to sensations of tonal salience, and neither of which is more important than or 
logically prior to the other (though their proportional weighting, or relative cueing potential, 
varies according to the musical context). 
 Let us not forget that this very process of conversion is literally embedded in the equal-72
tempered piano keyboard itself, whose physical/visual layout results from a logarithmic 
transformation that converts pitch frequencies into interval cents. This effectively linearizes 




It is now time to step back and pivot to a more summative register. The principal task of the 
preceding chapters has been to rethink tonality by disrupting its longstanding discursive 
linkage with the 12-tone octave (and 12-TET more specifically). Through the defamiliarizing lens 
of Blackwood’s microtonal music, I have put traditional theories and conventional accounts of 
tonality under the microscope, investigating how Blackwood’s distinctive compositional and 
notational approach can reveal certain things about tonality that would not be quite as 
apparent when listening from within the confines of the Western 12-TET “comfort zone.” By 
rupturing these culturally ingrained feedback loops, I have promised to shine a light not only 
on some of the possibilities for composing and attending to tonal music in unfamiliar tunings, 
but also on certain aspects of tonality and tonal hearing that are often taken for granted in 
more familiar 12-TET contexts. Doing so has involved a large-scale process of disassembly and 
reassembly that cuts across the four interior chapters. I have taken certain things apart 
(disentangling x from y in Chapter 2; separating sensory from cognitive conceptions of 
consonance/dissonance in Chapter 3) so that I can put other things back together again 
(reconciling content- and context-based accounts of harmonic function in Chapter 4; 
demonstrating the complementarity of tonal hierarchies and intervallic rivalry in Chapter 5). 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I continue in the spirit of reassembly by synthesizing my 
main conclusions and findings into a list of ten basic lessons that Blackwood’s approach to 
microtonality can teach us about tonality more broadly. And so, in lieu of a culminating, monist 
theory of (micro)tonality, I instead offer the following series of clarifying propositions: 
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1) Tonality is not reducible to a list of features, a set of properties, or a single “magical 
ingredient.” 
Let us return to Tymoczko’s claim that there are five fundamental components of tonality: 
conjunct melodic motion, acoustic consonance, harmonic consistency, limited macroharmony, 
and centricity.  As discussed previously, he argues that these five features “are present in a 73
wide range of genres, Western and non-Western, past and present.”  But the degree to which 74
they transfer to microtonal terrain, I submit, is debatable.  Consider the opening of “21 75
Notes,” for instance:
Fig. 5.6: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 21-TET
 Tymoczko, A Geometry of Music (2011), p.4.73
Ibid.74
 Of course, I have already explored at length in Chapter 3 how tonality can exist without the 75
traditional sense of (psycho)acoustic consonance. In Chapter 6, moreover, I will examine a free 
jazz recording by Ornette Coleman to argue that it is possible for music to still sound tonal 
even when it does not subscribe to the traditional understanding of centricity—thereby 
challenging William Thomson’s assertion that this property constitutes “the sine qua non of 
tonality.” [Thomson, Tonality in Music: A General Theory (1999), p.242.]
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Ex. 5.3: Emulating “comma drift” in an equal-tempered environment;  
excerpt begins at 0:00 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vn_JH4TBku8
z=17    z=18 
z=2       z=3 z=1     z=0 
z=14         z=15 
z=2         z=3      z=20     z=0                z=17 z=18
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 This excerpt demonstrates conjunct melodic motion, harmonic consistency, and an F 
aeolian centricity. But it notably lacks a limited macroharmony—in large part because of its 
adherence to harmonic consistency. More specifically, every local harmonic root exhibits 
diacritic consistency with the perfect fifth, perfect fourth, and major second above, but also 
diacritic inconsistency with the third above (whether this third is major or minor). This is to say, if 
the root of a major or minor triad is spelled without a circle-arrow, then the same will be true of 
its fifth (but not of its third). Conversely, if the root of a major/minor triad is spelled with a circle-
arrow, then its fifth will also have a circle-arrow pointing in the same direction (but its third will 
not). Blackwood’s consistent adherence to this principle leads to the sacrificing of limited 
macroharmony; I have marked several places in Ex. 5.3 above where what sounds like the same 
z in close quarters is actually two different pitch classes separated by a unit interval.   76
 These subtle shifts operate in the service of harmonic consistency, but do they also 
bring about a greater degree of acoustic consonance? This is debatable. On the one hand, 
every minor third in “21 Notes” measures five unit intervals (286 cents), and every major third 
measures seven unit intervals (400 cents); the six–unit-interval “neutral third” (343 cents) is 
never used. In addition to the strategic absence of this “gray-area” interval, which straddles the 
line between major and minor quality, the 400-cent major third in 21-TET is exactly the same 
size as it is in 12-TET. But this is not exactly an acoustic consonance in the small-number–ratio 
sense of the term, since this major third is still a bit distant from its acoustically pure varietal 
(and even more so for the 21-TET minor third). 
 In fact, twenty of the twenty-one pitch classes in this tuning appear at some point in Ex. 5.3. 76
The only one absent is Bb-up (z=19), which just so happens to “complete the aggregate” in 
the very next measure after the excerpt cuts off.
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 Despite the dubious existence of limited macroharmony and acoustic consonance, this 
passage still comes across as clearly tonal—though its kaleidoscopic and shifting nature makes 
it sound more like an emulation of “adaptive just intonation” than anything equal tempered.  77
This may seem somewhat paradoxical: that an equal temperament is capable of emulating the 
behavior of an unequal tuning (especially considering that the thirds used in “21 Notes” lie 
closer to their 12-TET sizes than to their just-intonational versions). But this leads seamlessly 
into my next proposition: 
2) Tonality is not coextensive with any one tuning or temperament (though enculturation 
exerts a strong conditioning influence on one’s tonal judgments and apperceptions).  78
This is something that Blackwood’s music demonstrates especially well. Each of his microtonal 
compositions is capable of its own idiosyncratic articulation of tonal behavior, showing that 
tonality is something that transcends tuning. However, as I have also been arguing since the 
opening chapter, this music also relies on a very specific and historically situated set of 
accompanying conditions for its tonal intelligibility. 
 When discussing the idea of intelligibility, White writes that composers often 
“‘compensate’ for novelty within some musical domain by being particularly conservative in 
 A good introduction to adaptive just intonation is Sethares, “Adaptive Tunings for Musical 77
Scales” (1994). For a more recent computational application of this concept, see Anders and 
Miranda, “A Computational Model for Rule-Based Microtonal Music Theories and 
Composition” (2010).
 The term “tonal apperceptions” is used by Rings in Tonality and Transformation (2011), pp.78
88 and 221. See Chapter 1 of the present dissertation for a more detailed discussion of tonal 
enculturation processes. It is worth noting that some scholars use the term “acculturation” 
instead of “enculturation”; see for instance Tillmann, Bigand, and Bharucha, “Implicit Learning 
of Tonality: A Self-Organizing Approach” (2000) and Tillmann, “Implicit Investigations of Tonal 
Knowledge in Non-Musician Listeners” (2005). The former of these two articles discusses how 
such implicit learning processes might be modeled using neural nets.
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another.”  In a similar vein, William Sethares remarks that “[m]usical tastes change slowly, and 79
it can be difficult for audiences to appreciate music in which everything is new.”  Blackwood, 80
then, in an attempt to balance “old” and “new,” leverages the inertial and institutional force of 
Euroclassical functional tonality in order to make his microtonal tunings more intelligible to 12-
enculturated listeners. As I argue in Chapter 1, Blackwood configures the pitches of these 
tunings (and sets up their notation) in ways that conform to certain schematic expectations 
about how Western tonal music “works,” and what its enabling conditions are. In such a way, 
both his music and its method of notation invoke what might be called the hegemonic 
“discourse network” of Western Euroclassical tonal practice: an assemblage of media that 
includes a prototypical repertoire, its familiar instruments, and its customary mode of visual 
representation.  This is Blackwood’s response to what Temperley calls “communicative 81
pressure”—the social injunction that composers ought to make their music structurally 
intelligible to (certain desired in-groups of) listeners.  Blackwood does this by aligning his 82
“compositional grammar” with his own hypothetical conception of Western tonal “listening 
 White, “Some Statistical Properties of Tonality, 1650–1900” (2013), p.89. White is 79
paraphrasing Temperley, Music and Probability (2007a), p.197.
 Sethares, Tuning, Timbre, Spectrum, Scale (2005), p.289.80
 Rehding, “Three Music-Theory Lessons” (2016), p.252. “Discourse network” is a loose 81
translation of Friedrich Kittler’s earlier term Aufschreibesystem (more literally, “writing-down 
system”). [See Kittler, Aufschreibesystem 1800/1900 (1985), passim.]
 Temperley, “Communicative Pressure and the Evolution of Musical Styles” (2004), passim. 82
See also Chapter 10 of his later book, Music and Probability (2007a).
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grammar” —one that is strongly conditioned by the cultural ubiquity of 12-TET.  For this 83 84
reason, even though none of Blackwood’s microtonal compositions is in 12-TET, listeners 
culturally accustomed to this tuning cannot help but pass his music through this referential 
orienting filter in an attempt to understand it. 
 However—and this is crucial—there is not one standard or culturally sanctioned way to 
do so. People, simply, differ: in their musical upbringings, in the sedimented contents of their 
mental and cultural archives,  in their conceptual metaphors of choice, in their levels of 85
musical training and literacy, and so on. This occasions the next interrelated pair of 
propositions: 
3) Tonality is an experienced sensation (of groundedness/stability/attraction/magnetism/
etc.) that resides in the minds and bodies of listeners; it is not an inherent property of the 
music or its notation. 
4) Tonality is not one single sensation; it exists on a robust continuum and admits of all 
degrees, modalities, kinds, and intensities. 
While tonality does not reside within musical notation, this is not to say that the visual 
mediation of notation plays no role whatsoever in tonal comprehension. As I discuss in 
Chapters 1 and 3, the way Blackwood chooses to notate his music grafts on a consequential 
visual dimension to the music’s aural ethos of 12-analogy, effectively priming/specifying a 
particular “audile technique” through which notationally literate listeners are encouraged to 
 Lerdahl, “Cognitive Constraints on Compositional Systems” (1992), p.99.83
 Of course, both grammars are also strongly conditioned by Blackwood’s pianistic 84
background.
 For a recent account of tonality as a kind of “cultural archive,” see Rodgers, “Renaissance 85
Formalisms in the Cultural Archive of Tonality” (2019).
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parse his music.  And so, for those with this specific kind of musical training, the experience of 86
tonality exists in a complicated cross-sensory feedback loop wherein aural and visual factors 
intermingle—often reinforcing each other because of the modern cultural symbiosis between 
12-TET and five-line staff notation. But the larger point here is that this intermedial cross-
pollination is the exception rather than the rule when it comes to tonality, because for the vast 
majority of listeners (and here I am referring primarily to the so-called musically “untrained,” or 
“casual/everyday” listeners), tonality is exclusively an aural phenomenon. 
 And it is a phenomenon that can take many forms. One could conceivably argue that 
there are even more tonalities than there are cultures, and that for each hypothetical form of 
tonality, there exist countless more ways of experiencing it. Put simply, there are too many 
dialects, flavors, and modalities of tonality to count—and this plurality is a feature, not a bug 
that renders the term meaningless. But tonality’s many guises cannot be exhaustively 
enumerated in a single dissertation, nor can all its mysteries be solved, its paradoxes 
unraveled, its secrets unlocked, and its nuances captured in a single catch-all definition. My aim 
throughout has been rather modest, but focused and targeted: to zero in on one particular 
type of tonality, Western heptatonic diatonic tonality, and to probe its limits while laying bare 
some of its oft-overlooked enabling mechanisms. Blackwood’s microtonal music has been 
especially useful in this regard, since it demonstrates so pointedly the fundamental fuzziness of 
Western heptatonic diatonic tonality and the fundamental stretchiness of the auditory 
categories involved in its cognition. As I have illustrated in the preceding chapters, this type of 
 For more on audile technique, see Sterne, The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound 86
Reproduction (2003), pp.23ff.
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tonality—even in its most syntactically restricted Euroclassical functional varieties—is 
surprisingly adaptable to non–12-tone tunings, where it can take on a remarkable array of local 
colors, flavors, and “feels.” And this adaptability occasions a rethinking of the domain and 
scope of heptatonic diatonic tonality to better reflect its fuzziness and elasticity. 
 Thus warrants my fifth proposition, which introduces the main terminological 
intervention of the chapter: 
5) Under my conception of fuzzy heptatonic diatonic tonality, a piece of music can still be 
considered “tonal” even if [i] it is not written in a twelve-note tuning (i.e., what would 
normally be called “microtonal”); [ii] it uses heptatonic diatonic scales outside of the 
traditional major/minor binary (i.e., what would normally be called “modal”); and/or [iii] it 
uses scales that are not actually heptatonic and/or diatonic at all (for instance, those that 
have more or fewer than seven generic scalar positions)—provided that such collections 
can still be cognized with reference to a heptatonic diatonic model. 
The tripartite Ex. 5.4 below illustrates the expressive range of fuzzy heptatonic diatonic tonality 
across Blackwood’s microtonal compositions. Each of these excerpts challenges traditional 
definitions of tonality in their own idiosyncratic ways, but all of them nevertheless fall under the 
banner of my more expanded conception outlined above. 
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Ex. 5.4a: Etude exhibits condition [i] of proposition #5 above;
excerpt begins at 0:00 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8lK38I1Anc
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Ex. 5.4b: Etude exhibits condition [i] and passage exhibits condition [ii] of proposition #5; 
excerpt begins at 0:00 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_I-YkCkMUNY
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Ex. 5.4c: Etude exhibits condition [i], passage exhibits condition [iii], and postulated referential 
scalar collection (D-down dorian) exhibits condition [ii] of proposition #5; excerpt 
begins at 0:00 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIYXm-CJqUo
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 The only requirement of fuzzy heptatonic diatonic tonality, then, is a cognitive one: that 
a piece of music can be heard with reference to an orienting scalar collection that is notionally 
heptatonic and diatonic. This is the case regardless of the piece’s tuning—12-TET or otherwise
—and furthermore, it does not require that the actual scale used in the piece be literally 
diatonic or even heptatonic. For instance, a seven-note scale may contain five major seconds 
and two minor seconds, but these minor seconds may not be spread out as much as possible, 
thereby failing to meet the necessary condition of “maximal evenness”  that is required for 87
diatonicism (e.g., the A acoustic scale featured in Debussy’s L’isle joyeuse).  Similarly, a scale 88
may contain seven generic steps, but these may come in more than two specific sizes, thereby 
failing to meet the necessary condition of “Myhill’s property”  that is required for diatonicism 89
(e.g., the heptatonic scales used in “21 Notes,” whose minor seconds always measure two unit 
intervals but whose major seconds can measure either three or four, depending on the 
context). And moreover, a piece may even feature a scale that is not heptatonic at all—such as 
 This condition was first defined in Clough and Douthett, “Maximally Even Sets” (1991). As 87
they write, a maximally even set is one “whose elements are distributed as evenly as possible 
around the chromatic circle” (96). Any set that is diatonic is also necessarily maximally even, as 
laid out in Clough, Engebretsen, and Kochavi, “Scales, Sets, and Interval Cycles: A 
Taxonomy” (1999), p.78.
 Listen in particular to the theme beginning at 0:27 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?88
v=XeBZT5_iEeA.
 This condition, named after the mathematician John Myhill, was first defined in Clough and 89
Myerson, “Variety and Multiplicity in Diatonic Systems” (1985). According to them, “A scale in 
which every generic interval appears in exactly two specific sizes is said to have Myhill’s 
property” (250). Any set that is diatonic also necessarily exhibits Myhill’s property, as laid out in 
Clough, Engebretsen, and Kochavi, “Scales, Sets, and Interval Cycles: A Taxonomy” (1999), p.
78.
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the ascending octatonic motif recurring throughout Radiohead’s “Just” (1995),  the eight-note 90
scale from “13 Notes” discussed earlier in this chapter, or the six-note scale from “15 Notes” 
just seen in Ex. 5.4c. But as long as these above scales can be heard with respect to a 
heptatonic diatonic orienting model (e.g., the postulated Ab aeolian in “13 Notes,” or the 
postulated D-down dorian in “15 Notes”), then all of these pieces can be considered members 
of the same broad tonal family, according to the sense of “tonality” put forth in proposition #5. 
 In arguing that some 12-enculturated listeners might cognize the six-note collection in 
Ex. 5.4c with reference to a seven-note (dorian) model,  I seem to be contradicting the upshot 91
of Ex. 5.3 above, in which several more than twelve pitch classes are also allegedly mapped 
onto a seven-note (aeolian) model. That the latter might be the case should come as no 
surprise; this is cognitive economy hard at work. But why should the former be the case as well
—that a listener parse a scale as if it had more notes than it actually does? This may seem like 
extra work on the surface, but I would argue that is just the other side of cognitive economy’s 
coin. For heptatonic diatonic scales are so ubiquitous in Western tonal music that enculturated 
listeners are prone to use them as referential orienting collections regardless of whether the 
musical surface actually contains more or fewer than seven pitch classes. Such a situation is 
analogous to the one previously discussed in Chapter 3: how 12-enculturated listeners can 
both mentally equalize acoustic objects that are unequally spaced (like the diatonic scale), and 
 The first such instance occurs from 0:18 to 0:29 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?90
v=oIFLtNYI3Ls in the electric guitar part.
 The qualitatively multivalent note in Ex. 5.4c is C-down, which has the capacity to be heard 91
either as a dorian 6̂ or a dorian 7—̂that is, as (6̂, ti, 14) or (7,̂ do, 14)—depending on the 
context.
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mentally un-equalize acoustic objects that are equally spaced (like split fourths or the fivefold 
equal division of the octave). In both situations, seemingly opposite scenarios can be reframed 
as complementary responses to the conditioning pull of enculturation and the cognitive 
mandate of economical processing. 
 Now that the matter of equal versus unequal spacing is back on the table, it is worth 
returning once more to the idea of tonality’s “characteristic asymmetry,”  which has become 92
somewhat of a recurring theme throughout this dissertation. I have discussed in previous 
chapters how tonality is often associated with pitch collections that divide the octave nearly, 
but not exactly, evenly:  major/minor triads, dominant sevenths, diatonic/pentatonic scales, 93
and so on. It is commonly argued that the essence of tonality results from these slight 
asymmetries, and that equally spaced pitch collections (such as augmented triads, diminished 
sevenths, and whole-tone scales), while useful as voice-leading conveniences, play ancillary 
roles in establishing tonal centeredness. Whole-tone scales, for example, are typically regarded 
as tonally clouded and indeterminate, because they lack the asymmetric spacing of diatonic 
scales, whose telltale minor seconds guide position finding. To be tonal, then, according to 
prevailing scholarly wisdom, is to be slightly uneven in constitution—a physiognomy that both 
enables the vectorial nature of goal-directed musical motion and facilitates its perception as 
such. 
 I have been gradually pushing back against one critical assumption underlying these 
traditional accounts: that tonality’s characteristic unevenness is necessarily linked to literal 
 Carey, “Review Article: Tonality and Transformation by Steven Rings” (2012), p.223.92
 On this point, see Tymoczko, A Geometry of Music (2011), pp.63–64.93
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intervallic asymmetries in constituent pitch collections themselves. Let the following passage 
from the end of “14 Notes” serve as my final piece of evidence in this regard. This 
equiheptatonic excerpt illustrates rather strikingly that tonality can be perceived even in an 
environment of complete scalar symmetry—because when it comes to hearing tonality in a 
fuzzy heptatonic diatonic framework, the intervallic asymmetries that matter the most are the 
ones located within a listener’s own referential orienting collection.
Fig. 5.7: Blackwood’s note names and enharmonic equivalences for 14-TET
[Ab-up mixolydian]:  (1,̂sol,11)            (7,̂fa,9)                     (6̂,mi,7)         (5̂,re,5) 
[Ab-up ionian]:          (1,̂do,11)                           (7,̂ti,9)      (6̂,la,7)   (5̂,sol,5)
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Ex. 5.5: Two ways of bending 7-TET to fit a diatonic model; excerpt begins  
at 2:25 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rW_X0bgHlrQ)
(1,̂sol,11)
(1,̂do,11) 
(4̂,do,3)  (3̂,ti,1)            (2̂,la,13)    (5̂,re,5) 
(4̂,fa,3)                (3̂,mi,1)            (2̂,re,13)                    (5̂,sol,5) 
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 Measures 143 to 150 contain only the seven pitch classes in 14-TET that have odd-
numbered z-components: Ab-up, Bb-up, C-up, D-up, Eb-up, F-up, and G-up.  These seven 94
pitch classes form a 7-TET scale in which each step measures two 14-TET unit intervals, or 
about 171 cents. Yet despite the completely equal spacing of this scale, I argue that 12-
enculturated listeners have become so accustomed to heptatonic scales with multiple step 
sizes that they are likely to subconsciously “bend” this one to fit a diatonic model. As for this 
model’s specific modal quality, I hear mixolydian and ionian as the two top candidates, and I 
have labeled Ex. 5.5 accordingly. Neither is a perfect fit, of course. There are times when G-up 
strikes me as more of a mixolydian 7̂ (e.g., the bass of m.144) and others when it sounds more 
like a weak ionian leading tone (cf. the melody of m.149). But the larger point here is that an 
unequally spaced referential scalar collection is what facilitates the hearing of this passage as 
tonal and centered on Ab-up, despite its consistent adherence to literal equiheptatonicism. 
 Of course, this impression of centeredness does not emerge in a vacuum; Blackwood’s 
organization of pitch materials primes and encourages it. The passage tropes the familiar 
contour of a descending scalar bassline, with each scale degree in the descent (circled in Ex. 
5.5) neatly occupying one notated measure. This metric predictability, coupled with the 
passage’s palpable rhetoric of closure, intensifies the sense that tonal resolution is on the 
horizon. In other words, there is a strong sense that the descending bassline will eventually end 
on the same note with which it started: Ab-up. When this ultimately occurs in m.150, the 
preceding bar of 3/4 creates the impression that this predictable landing point has arrived 
 This closing section of “14 Notes” marks the only instance in any of Blackwood’s microtonal 94
compositions in which circle-arrows appear in the key signature, likely as a means to reduce 
visual clutter on the page.
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slightly earlier than expected, since the intervening dominant on the last quarter of m.149 is 
only given one beat of emphasis instead of two (like the rest of the degrees in the descending 
gesture).  The resulting impression is pleasantly cathartic—exhilarating, even—because it 95
combines what Huron calls “the pleasure arising from accurate prediction” with “the 
contrastive valence arising from innocuous surprise.”  96
 In an unpublished manuscript, Blackwood outlines what he considers “[t]he three basic 
elements of what is perceived as tonality[:] the parts go by seconds, the fundamental melodic 
units; the individual chords are composed of piled up thirds, the most euphonious harmonic 
combinations; while the roots constantly descend by fifths.”  At first glance, the above excerpt 97
from “14 Notes” appears to conform to this (Western Euroclassical) conception of tonality, 
even if the conformance sounds somewhat loose. Much of its melodic motion is stepwise, 
involving adjacencies between the pitches of 7-TET. Likewise, most of its harmonies involve at 
least one third (each measuring four unit intervals, or about 343 cents) superimposed over the 
harmonic root. And the end of the excerpt (mm.149–50) features root motion by descending 
fifth, which solidifies the overall impression of tonal centeredness. But what Blackwood leaves 
 Notice that this progression over the barline in mm.149–50 still comes across as a  95
rhetorically convincing dominant-tonic succession, even though the former harmony lacks a G-
up (i.e., an x=7)̂ altogether. In fact, the upper voices in this IC contain scale degrees that are 
more prototypical of pre/subdominant than dominant function, and so one could posit that this 
IC necessitates a Swindenian superscript in its functional label (a situation I previously explore 
in Chapter 4 with respect to the functionally hybrid 5-TET IC in the Suite for Guitar in 15-note 
Equal Tuning).
 Huron, Sweet Anticipation (2006b), p.141.96
 Blackwood, A Practical Musician’s Guide to Tonal Harmony (1992), p.251.97
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out of his definition is the ingrained tendency for 12-enculturated listeners to cognize these 
seconds—and by extension, these thirds—as unequally spaced even when they are not.  98
 Thus arises the following proposition: 
6) Tonal cognition involves latching onto intervallic asymmetries, and this tendency is so 
strong that it can lead to the projection of intervallic asymmetries onto music where none 
actually exist.  
The preceding example acts as a culminating illustration of my contention that pitch collections 
that divide the octave evenly are just as capable of being heard in a tonal framework as those 
that do not—provided that enough other musical parameters (meter, notation, etc.) conform to 
culture-specific schematic expectations about how tonality tends to sound, look, and feel. Even 
in the literal absence of rare intervals such as tritones or minor seconds, enculturated listeners 
may well seek out their phantom presence anyway in an overcompensatory effort to find their 
position. This demonstrates just how pervasive a role cognitive bias can play when one tries to 
hear tonality in microtonality. 
 This cognitive bias manifests itself in a number of ways. The well-known image on the 
following page catalogues many of these biases and groups them into a single circle diagram; I 
have marked some that are particularly relevant to the processes involved in making sense of 
Blackwood’s microtonality (and hearing music in a tonal framework more broadly): 
 He does, however, write the following about “14 Notes” in his unpublished “Research Notes: 98
NEH Grant R0-29376-78-0642” (1979–81): “I did not anticipate how the modality of ambiguous 
thirds could be clarified by incorporating them into pentatonic scales” (479).
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Image 5.1: The Cognitive Bias Codex, designed in 2016 by John Manoogian III (zoom in to view)
One of this dissertation’s central through-lines is that a foundational substratum of mechanisms 
attends music listening regardless of one’s conscious awareness, and this shapes one’s 
instinctive responses when listening to new or unfamiliar music. To restate in greater detail: 
7) Music processing in general (and tonal cognition more specifically) rests on a 
fundamental bedrock of statistical learning, expectation formation, and probabilistic 
prediction—all of which operate in the service of cognitive economy. 
This proposition addresses a rather substantial question: when attending to music in a tonal 
framework, what exactly are we listening for (and why)? The bullet points boxed in red above 
offer some general principles that gesture at these bedrock mechanisms at work: (reading 
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clockwise from top) “We notice things already primed in memory or repeated often,” “[w]e are 
drawn to details that confirm our existing beliefs,” and “[w]e project our current mindset and 
assumptions onto the past and future.” All of this begins with mere exposure to the statistical 
regularities of the music(s) of one’s own culture(s); such regularities are subsequently registered 
implicitly (and sometimes even explicitly) in memory, serving as the basis for one’s expectations 
about how future music will go. Expectation and prediction then work hand in hand—usually 
subconsciously, but sometimes partially consciously in the case of certain trained musicians—to 
help listeners make sense of such music, in accordance with the particularities of their 
respective enculturations. 
 Importantly, these mechanisms and processes are subject to the constraints of cognitive 
economy, a guiding principle of mental activity based on the idea that “[d]ividing the world 
around us into categories of items that we can treat in similar ways facilitates our lives and 
direct[s] future learning.”  The bullet points boxed in magenta above illustrate how cognitive 99
economy is a common theme that cuts across the color-coded “quadrants” of Image 5.1: 
(reading clockwise from bottom right) “We simplify probabilities and numbers to make them 
easier to think about,” “[w]e favor simple-looking options and complete information over 
complex, ambiguous options,” and “[w]e discard specifics to form generalities.” These 
postulates are especially apparent in the case of Blackwood’s microtonal music, which is chock 
full of ambiguities, categorical fuzziness, and cognitive gray areas. If one is to make sense of 
this music, one must not dwell on minutiae or revel in equivocality. Instead, one must simplify, 
 Tekman and Hortaçsu, “Aspects of Stylistic Knowledge: What Are Different Styles Like and 99
Why Do We Listen To Them?” (2002), p.28.
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assimilate, make snap decisions based on contextual clues, and focus on the bigger picture at 
the expense of smaller details. As the yellow box in the lower left corner of Image 5.1 
succinctly states, we “need to act fact.” If we do, we will be rewarded with the pleasure 
associated with fluent and efficient processing;  if we do not, however, we are likely to 100
experience negative feelings of bewilderment, frustration, and perhaps even downright anger. 
 But is it the music that bewilders, frustrates, and angers us, or is it our perceived 
inability to attend to it in a framework that optimizes accurate prediction whilst streamlining 
cognitive load? We may be inclined to think (and say) that it is the former—perhaps due to our 
ingrained bias (black-boxed in Image 5.1 above) to “notice flaws in others more easily than we 
[do] in ourselves”—but I contend that it is more so the latter: a projection of our negative 
feelings onto the music itself. This is one of two major types of cognitive misattribution 
involved in music processing, as I outline in the proposition below: 
8) Musical processing (and by extension, tonal cognition) engages two main kinds of 
cognitive misattribution: [i] the offloading of expectational sensations of fit/non-fit onto 
musical proxies of various sizes, and [ii] the pinning of qualia that originate in musical 
relations onto proxies that are notionally regarded as singular musical entities. 
I have discussed these two interrelated varieties of misattribution both separately and together 
in previous chapters. I focus most explicitly on the first in Chapter 3, where I examine the 
expectational underpinnings of consonance/dissonance judgments. The second, meanwhile, 
comes to the fore in Chapters 2 and 4, where I push back against the widespread discursive 
 See in particular Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman, “Processing Fluency and Aesthetic 100
Pleasure: Is Beauty in the Perceiver’s Processing Experience?” (2004); Huron, “The Plural 
Pleasures of Music” (2005); Gebauer, Kringelbach, and Vuust, “Ever-Changing Cycles of 
Musical Pleasure: The Role of Dopamine and Anticipation” (2012); Huron, “A Psychological 
Approach to Musical Form: The Habituation-Fluency Theory of Repetition” (2013); and 
Salimpoor et al., “Predictions and the Brain: How Musical Sounds Become Rewarding” (2015).
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tendency to refer to scale-degree qualia as properties of pitches or single notes (rather than 
intervals) and harmonic functions as properties of single chords (rather than progressions/
successions among intervallic collections). As I discuss in Chapters 1 and 2, one potential 
reason why such language may remain so colloquially widespread is that it reflects a broader 
human tendency to (want to) pin down sources/causes that are concrete in order to explain 
outcomes/effects that are abstract (like the emotions generated by music’s manipulation of our 
expectations). 
 It may also be the case that this second kind of misattribution occurs as a result of 
another overcompensatory human impulse: to pigeonhole something that is dynamic and 
ineffable (like music) into a box that is static and fixed, as a way to make said thing easier to 
control and understand. Thus, my penultimate proposition: 
9) While tonal hearing is strongly conditioned by enculturation, it can also be understood 
as a manifestation of a fundamental biological impulse: to impose a sense of order and 
control on a highly variable environment (in this case, a sonic one), thereby “taming” it 
and establishing/exercising one’s mastery over it. 
This may seem somewhat farfetched—to frame music listening as something akin to 
domesticating a wild animal—but the comparison is suggestive, particularly in the case of 
music in unfamiliar tunings. For we cannot lose sight of the fact that music has a unique 
capacity not just to soothe us and calm us, but also to haunt, frighten, intimidate, frustrate, and 
threaten us.  If we seek to mitigate these latter feelings, then we must do something to 101
counter the power that music wields over us, whether this be turning it off and walking away, 
 Pearce and Wiggins’ “Auditory Expectation: The Information Dynamics of Music Perception 101
and Cognition” (2012) and Huron’s Sweet Anticipation (2006b) are two sources that discuss 
how listening to unfamiliar music can evoke instinctive physiological fight/flee/freeze responses 
in listeners.
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listening addictively to it until we become desensitized to its potency, or even writing a 
dissertation about it as a way to mentally “outmuscle” its sheer sonic force.  102
 Mark Reybrouck seems keyed into this way of thinking when he frames music cognition 
in terms of “coping behavior.”  He conceives of music “as part of the sonic environment and 103
of listening as a way of coping with this environment. Listening, on this view, relies on music 
knowledge that must be generated as a tool for adaptation to the sonic world.”  Other 104
authors share Reybrouck’s opinion that music listening (and tonal hearing more specifically) 
serves an adaptive function. Marcus Pearce and Geraint Wiggins, building off prior work by 
Huron and Leonard Meyer, discuss the importance of auditory expectation in music listening, 
noting that “[t]he ability to anticipate the future is a fundamental property of the human brain,” 
and that “[f]ailures of expectation can be fatal, so organisms should be motivated to expect as 
accurately as possible.”  And Piotr Podlipniak describes the uniquely human capacity for 105
tonal hearing as “an adaptive innovation”  that has its roots in the Baldwin effect: “an 106
 Indeed, one could rightfully charge that the detached and clinical analytical style long 102
favored by many music theorists—myself included, admittedly, at certain points in this 
dissertation—effectively serves to flatten much of music’s power and charm, thereby enabling 
analysts to perform acts of ownership, dominance, and control over the musical “object.” For 
three perspectives on this issue, see Abbate, “Music––Drastic or Gnostic?” (2004), McCreless, 
“Ownership, In Music and Music Theory” (2011), and Ewell, “Music Theory and the White 
Racial Frame” (2020a).
 Reybrouck, “A Biosemiotic and Ecological Approach to Music Cognition: Event Perception 103
Between Auditory Listening and Cognitive Economy” (2005), p.231.
 Ibid., p.230 [emphasis in original].104
 Pearce and Wiggins, “Auditory Expectation: The Information Dynamics of Music Perception 105
and Cognition” (2012), pp.625 and 627.
 Podlipniak, “The Evolutionary Origin of Pitch Centre Recognition” (2016), p.527.106
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evolutionary mechanism which transforms a culturally invented and acquired trait into an 
instinctive trait by means of natural selection.”  (Micro)tonal hearing, therefore, is a site where 107
nature and nurture merge under the rubric of imposing order on chaos. 
 It is imperative to tame such sonic chaos by all means necessary; at stake is nothing less 
than one’s well-being, and even, one’s self-image. Alfred Adler believes that “to be human is to 
feel inferior,” and so “[h]umans strive towards superiority to overcome this feeling.”  I have 108
been arguing that hearing the tonality in Blackwood’s microtonality fundamentally engages this 
base overcompensatory impulse, which can manifest itself in a number of specific ways. With 
that, I introduce my final proposition: 
10) When it comes to tonal hearing, no one musical parameter, type of expectation, kind 
of salience, or mode of attending dominates a priori over any others—though when 
certain of these are lacking in reliability, listeners compensate by latching all the more 
strongly onto others in an effort to (re)gain their bearings. 
I have already discussed several such situations. Earlier in this chapter, for example, I illustrate 
how internalized knowledge about tonal hierarchies can pick up the slack when the position-
finding affordances of rare intervals are either attenuated or compositionally manipulated—and 
further, how 12-enculturated listeners can mentally manufacture scalar asymmetries and rare 
intervals even when they do not exist. In this and previous chapters, moreover, I explore how 
 Podlipniak, “The Role of the Baldwin Effect in the Evolution of Human Musicality” (2017), p.107
5. In a review of Huron’s Sweet Anticipation (2006b), Marcus Pearce and Daniel Müllensiefen 
characterize the Baldwin effect slightly differently, putting forth a definition that centers the 
roles of learning and expectation: “The evolved capacity to learn is a biological solution to the 
problem of anticipation in highly variable environments (known as the Baldwin effect).” [Pearce 
and Müllensiefen, “Review of Sweet Anticipation: Music and the Psychology of Expectation by 
David Huron” (2008), p.159 (emphasis in original).]
 Qtd. in Coleman and Croake, “Organ Inferiority and Measured Overcompensation” (2005), 108
p.399.
305
listeners might seek out islands of predictability (or brief wisps of tonal/metrical clarity) as 
cognitive guideposts that help them wade through an otherwise unpredictable sea of sound. In 
Chapter 4, I examine multiple scenarios in which contextual cues are likely to be the principal 
drivers of harmonic-functional judgments, because the cues provided by scale-degree content 
—normally reliable—are momentarily equivocal. And a major theme running throughout all 
chapters is that schematic and dynamic expectations step in to pick up the burden when 
veridical expectations prove unhelpful for making sense of unfamiliar music. All this is to say 
that enculturated listeners possess a variety of tools that can help them impose a sense of 
order on sounding music, and when certain of these do not seem to do the trick, they will 
instinctively reach for others that can best get the job done. 
 A corollary of this tenth and final proposition warrants explicit mention: that tonality is 
not all about pitch (or harmony). Rather, it is more so about expectation and prediction than it 
is about any one musical parameter.  But, as I have been claiming from the outset, if there is 109
any one parameter that deserves more attention for its role in regulating the flow of tonality, it 
would undoubtedly be meter. In Chapter 3, I mention a series of scholars who have worked in 
recent years to combat the long-held belief that “[the l]iterature on how tonality and meter 
work together [is] surprisingly small.”  I envision this dissertation as another contributor to the 110
ongoing dialogue in this area. Since the opening chapter, I have been unpacking not just how 
 This is precisely the position of Megan Long, who argues in a recent article that “[h]armony, 109
syntax, and centricity are actually not the most crucial elements of a tonal language [….] A 
tonal language is defined by the trajectories of expectation that it establishes.” [Long, 
“Cadential Syntax and Tonal Expectation in Late Sixteenth-Century Homophony” (2018), p.79 
(emphasis in original).]
 Prince and Schmuckler, “The Tonal-Metric Hierarchy: A Corpus Analysis” (2014), p.254.110
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(hyper)metrical factors can influence judgments of tonality, but also how such factors can play 
even bigger roles in these judgments than usual whenever a musical environment contains 
pitch information that is either ambiguous or culturally unfamiliar. 
 Of course, Blackwood’s microtonal music illustrates this last point rather well. But the 
same is true, let us not forget, in more familiar 12-TET contexts as well. Palpable sensations of 
tonal centeredness can exist even in the absence of reliable, consistent, and expectationally 
conformant pitch information—so long as these pitches are temporally configured in a manner 
that is metrically predictable to Western-enculturated ears. Peter Erskine’s “Boogie Shuttle
Stop” (2002), whose A section is transcribed below, is an instructive example in this regard:
Ex. 5.6: (Hyper)meter, not pitch, as the primary parametric determinant of tonality;  












In this excerpt, a new tonal area is introduced every two measures by means of semitonal 
(leading-tone) motion in the bass part. I have labeled these tonal areas in the characteristic 
orange of ionian to match the specific modal character of their approach and initial 
presentation. The font size of each label, moreover, is directly proportional to the degree of 
(hyper)metric accent associated with each local tonal arrival. This string of local arrivals does 
not paint a very clear picture as regards large-scale tonality; the eight key areas in total trace 
out a descending octatonic scale—a collection that is evenly spaced throughout the octave. In 
the face of such large-scale positional ambiguity, I argue, the burden of tonal clarification shifts 
from pitch/harmonic information onto (hyper)metrical information. Under this hypothesis, if 
“Boogie Shuttle Stop” can be reduced to any one governing tonality, it would be the one that 
receives the greatest hypermetric accent: C ionian. In other words, several key areas are 
approached like tonics in this A section, but the forest of C ionian perceptually outweighs the 
other octatonically spaced trees on the grounds of its relative metrical predictability (which 
colloquially registers as “strength,” and is consequently misattributed as “stability”).  This 111
makes for a fascinating scenario: C ionian comes across as the global tonality of the tune, 
despite the fact that its melody uses every pitch class in the octave except for E natural—
arguably the most telltale bearer of that key’s ionian quality. 
* * * 
 Similar reasoning can be applied to judgments of overall key in other jazz tunes that are 111
built around a system of evenly spaced major or minor thirds, such as John Coltrane’s 
“26-2” (1970), whose global tonality is F ionian according to analogous hypermetric criteria. 
Such examples illustrate Daniel Harrison’s insight that “tonic accent” in popular music is 
“create[d] largely from metric hierarchies.” [Harrison, Pieces of Tradition (2016), p.73.]
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 To reiterate, pitch isn’t everything when it comes to tonality, and this may be one of the 
most important take-home lessons from Blackwood’s microtonality. For tonality is, above all, a 
regime of expectation—one that regulates mental operations over time, and one whose many 
component parts array themselves over time. Losing sight of this temporal dimension is 
tantamount to flattening the diverse range of experiences that constitute tonal hearing into an 
inapt box of reductionism. Any account of tonality that aspires to experiential validity, 
therefore, must come to terms with what may be the most deeply ingrained misattribution of 
all: that tonal stability, fundamentally, is expectational stability—and that expectational stability, 
in turn, cannot exist without a sense of temporal/metrical predictability. In time, and in the 
mind: here is where the “stuff” of tonality truly lies.
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 Chapter 6   |   Zooming In, Zooming Out 
  
When I first encountered Blackwood’s microtonal music, as a junior in college, I was instantly 
hooked. Its fascinating contradictions were endlessly alluring, and for a while, I could not stop 
listening. At that time, I was a lifelong concert pianist of Western Euroclassical tonal music with 
a rather provincial view of what music was (and what it could be). I thought through the 
interface of the keyboard; most all of my conceptual knowledge about music was routed 
through its referential orienting shape. I also had absolute pitch—but as I would be quick to 
point out, not the kind that made me regard slight deviations in pitch as a needling, intolerable 
bother. “Out-of-tuneness” always fascinated me, piqued my interest. 
 In short, I was initially attracted to Blackwood’s microtonal music because it validated 
many of the specifics of my own musical upbringing and training. The music was also clever, 
attention-grabbing, and ostensibly iconoclastic—closely mirroring the kind of persona I sought 
to cultivate at that time in my life.  And because it was not music that I could easily play back 1
on my own piano, it presented a persistent itch that I could not scratch via the conventional 
means of aural transcription. All this led to what Steven Rings might call a “stubborn 
enchantment”  with Blackwood’s microtonality that lasted for years. His music struck me as a 2
compelling mystery—and I was hell-bent on solving it. I spent years in the analytical weeds, so 
to speak: counting unit intervals, calculating cent sizes, and reducing the music to a series of 
 On the role of music in the fashioning/constructing of one’s self-identity, see DeNora, Music in 1
Everyday Life (2000), Chapter 3.
 See especially Rings, “Music’s Stubborn Enchantments (and Music Theory’s)” (2018).2
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numbers in an attempt to figure out how it all worked. I thought that dissecting the music as if 
it were a fruit fly would be the key to unlocking it. 
 Of course, I was wrong. Eventually, I would come to learn that there is no such thing as 
a truly “objective” claim about music,  that the dispassionate and clinical tone prototypical of 3
much music analysis does not preclude the spectral presences of preference and value in its 
avowedly “neutral” prose, and that such specters are inextricably intertwined with issues of 
race, gender, class, (dis)ability, and the like.  I would come to realize that to hide behind a 4
veneer of objectivity is to take refuge in a “folk-psychological”  house of cards that only makes 5
one’s subjectivity—and with it, one’s tacit prejudices—more loudly apparent. And I would learn, 
finally, that to “focus on the music itself,” as it were, is not an necessarily act of elucidation. It 
can also be a willful act of ignorance. 
 For many years, I was as ignorant as they came. One could say that my own “stubborn 
enchantment” with Blackwood’s music rendered me unable—unwilling, even—to take a more 
 See in particular Guck, “Analytical Fictions” (1994) and Monahan, “Action and Agency 3
Revisited” (2013) for two accounts that work to unmask the inherently subjective nature of such 
allegedly “objective” claims.
 These latter issues are front and center at the groundbreaking plenary session of the 2019 4
Annual Meeting of the Society for Music Theory in Columbus, OH (entitled “Reframing Music 
Theory”). A recording of this session is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=ZSOFpwDIZCA (from 2:07:15 onwards).
 The term “folk psychology” is taken from Jerome Bruner’s Acts of Meaning (1990), p.35, and 5
it has been subsequently applied to music theory and analysis by a few notable commentators. 
See for example Cross, “Music Analysis and Music Perception” (1998), p.5, and Pearce and 
Wiggins, “Auditory Expectation: The Information Dynamics of Perception and 
Cognition” (2012), who argue that music theory is “arguably the most formally developed 
example of a folk psychology currently extant, being based on extensive and careful study of 
the aural constructs used in a particular musical culture (Western art music), and their 
associated semiotic connotations, in terms of their usage in that culture” (645). 
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critical look at the historical, political, and ideological factors that formed the conditions of 
possibility for its creation (and that still constellate to influence its reception). In particular, I 
spent many years disinterested in the kind of person that Blackwood was. After all, I had grown 
up believing that even while music can tell us a great deal about the philosophies, 
psychologies, and ideological commitments of its creators, to focus one’s inquiry on these 
areas is to adopt a limiting approach that can only go so far and accomplish so much. Keen to 
set my sights on something “bigger” than Blackwood the person, I never really thought twice 
about digging deep into the recesses of his mind. 
 That is, until the whispers started coming. A couple years ago, someone who knew 
Blackwood personally approached me with some words of warning: that Blackwood harbored 
some controversial views that made him somewhat of an outsider in the University of Chicago 
Department of Music (with which he has been associated since his initial appointment in 
1958).  This sent me down a multi-year detective trail to try and piece together more 6
information about who Blackwood was as a person. What I found would ultimately alter the 
trajectory of this project—and this chapter is the story of how it all happened. 
 What follows can be considered a simultaneous zooming-in and zooming-out. On the 
one hand, it is a close look at Blackwood himself: his personal archive, his unusual personality, 
and the ways that his distinctive worldview colors his scholarly activity, compositional 
 Blackwood transferred to Emeritus status in 1997 and continued to teach courses at the 6
University until the mid-2010s, when his health began to precipitously decline. He is still listed 
as Professor Emeritus on the University of Chicago Department of Music website (https://
music.uchicago.edu/people/faculty-lecturers), though he is the only person listed without an 
email address (likely due to his very limited computer literacy; he refused to learn computer 
basics until the early 2000s, and even then he regularly employed other people to act as his 
“tech crutch”), and his associated phone number is that of the music-departmental main office. 
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philosophy, and interpersonal interactions. On the other hand, it is a turn away from the 
musical specifics of his microtonal compositions and towards a consideration of their broader 
political and ideological contexts—both in terms of Blackwood’s own life and in terms of music 
theory’s longstanding hegemonic whiteness and maleness. Viewed through one lens, it is an 
account of how I responded when I realized I had chosen to study the music of a “monstrous 
man.”  Viewed through another, however, it is an allegory for music theory’s history of 7
exclusionary practices, a cautionary tale about its valorization of reclusive white-male 
“geniuses,” and a critical reflection on how the discipline can only move forward in the future if 
it first reckons head-on with its problematic past and present.  8
Blackwood the Person 
Finding out more information about Blackwood was not an easy task. For as I quickly came to 
learn, he has always been an extremely private person with few (if any) people in his inner circle
—friends, family, or otherwise. I started my investigation by trying to directly contact 
Blackwood himself, but upon calling the number listed on his departmental website, I got a 
member of the office staff who told me that Blackwood was recently put in a nursing home. No 
 On the topic of “monstrous men,” see Dederer, “What Do We Do with the Art of Monstrous 7
Men?” (2017). Two recent works by music scholars that pick up on Dederer’s ideas are Cheng, 
“Gaslight of the Gods: Why I Still Play Michael Jackson and R. Kelly for My Students” (2019) 
and Beaudoin, “After Ewell: Music Theory and ‘Monstrous Men’” (2019).
 This calls to mind the following quote from James Baldwin that Philip Ewell has recently used 8
as an epigraph in his critical-race scholarship on music theory: “Not everything that is faced can 
be changed; but nothing can be changed until it is faced.” [Baldwin, “As Much Truth as One 
Can Bear” (1962), qtd. in Ewell, “Music Theory’s White Racial Frame” (2019) and “Music Theory 
and the White Racial Frame” (2020a).]
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one seemed to know the name of this home. Instead, I was given the name of a recent 
caretaker who was supposed to have a better idea about his current condition and 
whereabouts. I tried getting in touch with this person, but I never ended up receiving a 
response. I started to believe that speaking directly with Blackwood might turn out to be a lost 
cause. 
 My plan was to make the best of this apparent dead end by visiting the Hanna Holborn 
Gray Special Collections Research Center at the University of Chicago Library to consult 
Blackwood’s recently inventoried archive of personal papers.  All the while, I would continue to 9
speak with those people—at Yale, at the University of Chicago, and beyond—who overlapped 
with Blackwood in some way and could give me some more insight into his enigmatic persona. 
Those at Yale and beyond adopted more of a cautionary tone, telling me that Blackwood had 
become the subject of an underground whisper network alleging his racism, sexism, 
homophobia, and even sexual harassment towards some of his students and advisees.  Those 10
at the University of Chicago, on the other hand, were more measured and careful in their 
appraisals, noting that Blackwood always had a small and dedicated circle of student acolytes 
at the University, but that he had basically no personal friends on the faculty who could speak 
to his behavior in more informal, private settings. He could not be faulted for being a poor 
 This timing was fortuitous; a large stockpile of his materials had just arrived at the facility a 9
few months prior to my visit. As it turned out, many of the documents contained within were 
extremely important to my research—and according to library staff, I was the first visiting 
scholar to see them in this form.
 I prefer to protect the identities of those who passed along this information to me; therefore, 10
I will only cite personal correspondence with others in those cases that I have expressly 
obtained permission to do so.
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colleague on paper, always showing up on time to faculty meetings, participating on those 
committees to which he had been elected, and fulfilling all of his in-writing duties as a tenured 
professor. But he frequently held views that conflicted with those of the rest of the department, 
and he was not shy about making them known—often doing so in a way that was couched in 
overly formal bureaucratic language. No one I met at the University of Chicago said anything 
about the more unsavory aspects of Blackwood’s personality about which I had been warned; 
perhaps there exists some sort of tacit agreement on campus to remain silent on such matters 
while Blackwood is still living (and particularly while he is in his current state of rapid physical/
mental decline).  But everyone who overlapped with him, in Chicago or elsewhere, essentially 11
told me a version of the same basic story: that the reclusive Blackwood always seemed to exist 
in his own mental world, and that no one—not even his longest-tenured departmental 
colleagues—ever truly got to know what this world was like. 
 For a week in the summer of 2019, I entered this world. Sitting in a small, overly air-
conditioned room in the University of Chicago’s Joseph Regenstein Library, I spent multiple 
consecutive nine-to-fives poring through the only publicly accessible trove of Blackwood’s 
personal papers. As I discuss in Chapter 1, I was able to read through his two most substantial 
unpublished works, a 1992 manuscript entitled A Practical Musician’s Guide to Tonal Harmony 
and three folders of research notes (spanning 1979–81 and totaling over six hundred pages) 
that catalogue the major findings and takeaways of his NEH-funded foray into microtonal 
 Blackwood has been suffering from Parkinson’s disease and Guillain-Barré Syndrome 11
throughout the last decade or so, according to his personal diaries. [The Easley Blackwood 
Papers, Box 20 (in “Spiral Notepad, 2008–2014”).] This has gotten especially acute since his 
relocation to the nursing home a few years ago.
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composition. But the most revealing documents, as regards Blackwood the person, were the 
ones that had nothing to do with microtonality, tonal harmony, or music theory. Particularly 
after he transferred to Emeritus status in 1997, Blackwood got into the habit of meticulously 
documenting every single aspect of his travels in spiral notebook diaries.  He would spare no 12
detail: recording exact departure and arrival times to the minute, listing precise dollar-and-cent 
totals of every meal and drink he purchased, noting any conversations he had with people he 
met along the way (in addition to other conversations on which he eavesdropped), spelling 
words wrong intentionally to mimic regional dialects he encountered (e.g., “ice” as “aahss,” 
“wine” as “waan,” and “eggs” as “aigs”), and even using his perfect pitch to transcribe those 
sounds that impeded his restful sleep or otherwise annoyed him (from incessantly barking dogs 
to crying infants on airplanes).  These diaries portray Blackwood as quite the eccentric—as 13
someone so sufficiently entertained by his own interior monologue that he never felt much of a 
need to leave his self-constructed bubble of comfort (even, ironically, when he was traveling). 
 He always documented his travels in some form, but around the 1990s and after, his 12
preferred method for doing so transformed from sparse bulletpoints into extremely detailed 
prose. My hypothesis is that Blackwood, who still felt he had the energy to remain Full 
Professor for many years after 1997, displaced much of this energy into documenting the 
mundanities of his personal life at a level of detail he had never before achieved on paper. 
According to Anne Walters Robertson, who helped to negotiate Blackwood’s retirement 
package/trajectory around that time, Blackwood took quite a good deal of convincing to start 
phasing out his teaching load and departmental presence, believing that he could basically 
continue as a full-time employee until the day he died. [Robertson, personal communication, 
6/24/2019. For more on the specifics of this retirement negotiation, see The Easley Blackwood 
Papers, Box 42 (in “Correspondence and Agreements, 1958–2005”).] Having lost an 
indispensable and previously unchanging part of his world, I contend, Blackwood took special 
pains to reconstitute his world through his personal diaries, which existed in a private and 
written form that no one could take from him.
 See in particular the many spiral notebooks and the single spiral notepad contained within 13
The Easley Blackwood Papers, Box 20.
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But while such writings are certainly amusing, and at times even humorous, they ultimately 
form the tip of a more deeply rooted ideological iceberg that, when considered as a whole, 
begins not to look so innocuous. 
 John Donne has famously written that “[n]o man is an island.”  Blackwood may be the 14
closest thing there is to an exception to this rule. He never married, had no kids, and does not 
mention any romantic relationships, even in his most detailed personal diaries. He is an only 
child, appears not to have been particularly close with his parents, and after their deaths in 
1982 (mother) and 1992 (father), had extremely few living family members. The living family 
member with whom he is nominally closest seems to be his cousin, Walter Russell Trapp, whom 
Blackwood recently designated as his health care agent and primary beneficiary.  Blackwood 15
also had few, if any, personal friends that did not also double as professional contacts; as far as 
I can tell, the only name of a non–family member and non–music associate that appears in his 
archive and correspondence with any sort of regularity is a Mike Ervin, who is half Blackwood’s 
 Donne, “Meditation XVII” from Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions (1624).14
 The Easley Blackwood Papers, Box 28 (in “Notes, n.d.”). Walter’s son (and Blackwood’s 15
nephew), William Andrew Trapp, is also designated as Blackwood’s successor agent. Both 
Walter and William are based in Florence, Alabama, where they work together as financial 
advisors at Morgan Stanley (https://advisor.morganstanley.com/the-trapp-group).
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age and whose exact relationship to Blackwood is puzzling and unclear.  Blackwood also did 16
not have a habit of befriending his colleagues in the University of Chicago Department of 
Music, sometimes even drawing their ire with his incessant practicing of atonal modernist music 
on his office piano.  Simply put, Blackwood was not the sort of person who would ever ask 17
anyone about themselves (or how they were doing), instead preferring to initiate conversation 
by sharing puzzling observations or making inscrutable remarks, often seemingly out of left 
field, that reflected the inner workings of his solitary mind.  18
 Indeed, there is a good deal of correspondence between the two, and Blackwood writes to/16
about Ervin with an uncharacteristic warmth that he seems to reserve for very few. Ervin does 
not appear to have been a former student of Blackwood’s at the University of Chicago, 
however, and it is never actually specified how they met or why they remained close. He 
resurfaces as a close confidant of Blackwood’s throughout the latter’s spiral notebooks (see in 
particular those in The Easley Blackwood Papers, Box 20), and he also seems to have acted as 
a sometime page-turner (see “Correspondence and Agreements, 1958–2005” in Box 42) and 
tech crutch (scattered correspondence in Boxes 43 and 44) for Blackwood. Once, Ervin even 
consulted Blackwood for informal legal advice about an ugly court case in which he had been 
embroiled during the early and mid-2000s (see “Correspondence, 1979–2002” in Box 43). For 
more on this case, see https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th-circuit/1448937.html.
 There is a memorable exchange now archived in Box 12 of The Easley Blackwood Papers (in 17
“Correspondence, 1968–1976”) between Blackwood and then-chair of the University of 
Chicago Department of Music Leonard Meyer regarding Blackwood’s practice habits. Meyer 
essentially tells Blackwood that his constant and loud practicing (particularly of 20th-century 
atonal music) is an annoyance and distraction to the other members of the department, 
hindering their ability to concentrate and get work done in their offices. He directs Blackwood 
to use the practice rooms designated for students instead, to which Blackwood takes 
considerable offense, refusing to be subjected to rules meant for students, and vowing 
retaliation against Meyer’s allegedly condescending order, which he suggests is some form of 
departmental conspiracy against him. Apparently, Blackwood had already received similar 
complaints from his neighbors in his nearby Chicago apartment, and he felt that his music-
departmental office was a perfectly acceptable space—perhaps the only “safe space” he had—
to play his piano.
 Lawrence Zbikowski, personal communication, 7/1/2019.18
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 He brought this approach rather unapologetically to his scholarship. In his only 
published book, The Structure of Recognizable Diatonic Tunings, Blackwood makes no attempt 
to connect his work to that of any previous music theorists or music historians, and the result is 
an insular treatise that reads as if it were conceived in an intellectual vacuum. There is no 
bibliography or reference section (only a self-referential index), and if Blackwood cites any 
previous work at all, it is almost exclusively mathematical textbooks from the 1920s through 
1950s (and these only in footnotes). To do music theory à la Blackwood was not to participate 
in an ongoing historical dialogue of ideas. Rather, it was to put forth a monologue of one’s own 
thoughts, and to judge the future work of others based on how well they subscribed to the 
tenets of that monologue. The only ideas worth considering, for Blackwood, were (the ones 
that built on) his own. The following brief quote about Ralph Lorenz, who was pursuing his 
Ph.D. in Music Theory at Indiana University at the time of Blackwood’s writing in 1992, is 
representative: “He quotes me extensively. He is generally on the right track.”  19
 Blackwood was also a political and ideological outlier in his field, to say the least. He 
was a staunch lifelong conservative who went to high school with former Senator Richard Lugar 
(R-IN, served 1977–2013)  and later stumped for Ronald Reagan in 1980.  In public, he liked 20 21
 The Easley Blackwood Papers, Box 38 (in “Notes, n.d.”), n.p. Lorenz is currently Senior 19
Associate Dean of the College of Visual and Performing Arts at Syracuse University. 
 Some of their correspondence is archived in The Easley Blackwood Papers, Box 91 (in 20
“Tuning Stuff: Correspondence and Publications, 1982–2011”). Both men were members of the 
1950 graduating class of Shortridge High School in Indianapolis, Indiana, and they shared a 
mutual respect for one another throughout their lives that comes through in their 
correspondence.
 More details on this arrangement are available in The Easley Blackwood Papers, Box 37 (in 21
“Memorabilia, 1980–1985”).
319
to present himself as logical and principled, but in private, he showed shades of ideological 
extremism. Some of his personal writing argues for an “America-first” isolationist nationalism 
that would be more at home in today’s alt-right than in the early days of the Cato Institute.  22
Viewing his microtonal output through the ideological prism of these political writings is 
especially instructive, as it lends further credence to my claim in Chapter 1 that one cannot 
consider Blackwood’s microtonality without taking stock of exactly what it is, in these 
compositions, that he is ostensibly taking pains to “preserve.” 
 Whether one regards Blackwood as a principled conservative or an alt-right extremist, 
the larger point is that Blackwood had few ideological peers in the music-academic community
—and he knew it. He would often speak of Democrats with great contempt, painting them with 
a broad and monolithic brush and characterizing them as too dependent on emotion (in 
contrast to the apparent logic and rationality possessed by Republicans). The following quote, 
from a late-1980s letter to Matthew Kiell (formerly of the Chicago Tribune) in France, is typical 
in this regard: “Since the vast majority of music theorists and scholars are Democrats, their 
resistance to my theory can confidently be expected to be both intense and angry.”  23
Blackwood wrote this letter at a time not only of broad demographic shifts and increasing 
ideological polarization in America at large, but also of vast disciplinary change within the 
music-academic community—the time of the budding New Musicology and its increased focus 
 See in particular Blackwood’s “Essay on Democracy” (n.d.) in The Easley Blackwood Papers, 22
Box 31. 
 The Easley Blackwood Papers, Box 43 (in “Typed Paper Documents—Blackwood, 1985–23
1991”), n.p. Blackwood is referring to the theory laid out in his then-recent book, The Structure 
of Recognizable Diatonic Tunings (1985).
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on interdisciplinarity and sociocultural criticism. One must therefore consider Blackwood’s 
methodologically steadfast approach to doing music theory in this broader context. This entails 
regarding his scholarly contributions not simply as isolated actions (as they may seem on the 
surface) but also, more fundamentally, as politically charged reactions to changing times and 
shifting disciplinary priorities. Viewed in this framework, Blackwood’s consistent reliance on 
mathematics (and only mathematics, as far as other disciplines are concerned) begins to look 
more like a defense mechanism—a way to “fix” music theory into place by imbuing it with the 
permanence and certainty of the equals sign (not to mention a way to perform the control of 
unknown variables by subsuming them under the ironclad logic of a proof-based approach).  24
 In short, Blackwood’s approach to scholarship was under siege starting in the 1980s, 
and while he never phrased the matter explicitly in these terms, his tacit awareness of this fact 
can be gleaned from his manner of speaking about other scholars—especially those who had 
the possibility of becoming long-term departmental colleagues. One case in point is his 
dissenting opinion regarding Rose Subotnik’s tenure case in 1980. By that time, Subotnik had 
been at the University of Chicago for seven years, where she quickly garnered wide respect 
(both in the department and beyond) for her pioneering work on Adorno and her firm 
conviction that music cannot be understood apart from the social, cultural, and political 
contexts that give rise to it. Of course, much of the musicological community would come to 
embrace this same conviction over the course of the ensuing decade; Subotnik was thus a 
 This calls to mind a memorable passage from Khaled Hosseini’s And The Mountains Echoed 24
(2013): “There was comfort to be found in the permanence of mathematical truths, in the lack 
of arbitrariness and the absence of ambiguity. In knowing that the answers may be elusive, but 
they could be found. They were there, waiting, chalk scribbles away. ’Nothing like life, in other 
words,’ he said. ‘There, it’s questions with either no answers or messy ones’” (204).
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trailblazing representative of the music-academic “new guard” to come. Something about what 
she stood for must have threatened Blackwood, whose letter of dissent to her case is not only 
territorial, but also riddled with sexist overtones. In it, he tries to label Subotnik’s brand of 
scholarship as a fringe case that will never catch on, and on top of this, he argues in rather 
condescending fashion that she does not know how to analyze music, nor does she understand 
Kant.   25
 In the end, Subotnik did not receive tenure at the University of Chicago, thanks in part 
to Blackwood’s downvote.  Nevertheless, she persisted, eventually receiving tenure at Brown 26
University in 1993. Still, she spent most of the 1980s publishing without an institutional 
affiliation, and it cannot be overstated how her Chicago tenure vote ended up momentarily 
stalling the trajectory of her otherwise illustrious career. Ultimately, it is not surprising that 
Blackwood would dissent to her case. What is more surprising, however, is that Blackwood 
would save the receipt. Indeed, as far as I am aware, his letter opposing Subotnik’s tenure is 
the only document in the entirety of his archive that has anything to do with a tenure case other 
 The Easley Blackwood Papers, Box 37 (in “Memorabilia, 1980–1985”). Though Blackwood 25
does not cite any specific publications by Subotnik, it is likely that he is referring to her article 
“Kant, Adorno, and the Self-Critique of Reason: Towards a Model for Music Criticism” (1979). 
Joseph Kerman, another major figure in the oncoming New Musicology, would later call 
Subotnik’s work on Kant “a contribution to the history of ideas,” praising the way that it centers 
“music’s relation to the socio-cultural matrix.” [Kerman, Contemplating Music: Challenges to 
Musicology (1985), p.171. See also Subotnik, “The Sound of Musicology” (1986), pp.45–46.]
 Subotnik has previously touched on the politics of her tenure battle in “The Role of Ideology 26
in the Study of Western Music” (1983) and in her 1980 Society for Ethnomusicology paper 
presentation of the same title—though she does not mention any of her former University of 
Chicago colleagues by name in them. A brief discussion of Subotnik’s tenure case also appears 
in Taruskin, Cursed Questions: On Music and Its Social Practices (2020), pp.21–23 and 151–53.
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than his own.  Why would he keep a copy of this particular document, but not any from the 27
numerous other tenure cases he must have adjudicated throughout his years in the 
department? Was he proud of the fact that he had a hand in keeping Subotnik out? Regardless 
of his motive, the document still exists, and it serves as a harrowing reminder that the 
exclusionary, gatekeeping, and preservationist ideologies that mark Blackwood’s theoretical 
writings and color his compositional approach are not just things that exist in some sort of 
detached musical stratosphere—they also trickle down into concrete actions on the ground 
that can hurt other human beings. There is something more than irony in the fact that 
Blackwood, as a privileged white male, could claim that his scholarly persona was detached 
from all things political, while at the same time treating the personal and the political as if they 
were inseparable in Subotnik’s case (when it was suddenly convenient for him to do so). 
 Blackwood wrote other music besides his microtonal compositions, of course, and each 
of these works reveals something, however indirectly, about the fundamental interconnection of 
his personhood and his politics. But perhaps none does so as explicitly and brazenly as the 
music he never intended for the general public to see. Consider the following song, for 
example: 
 For more on the specifics of Blackwood’s own tenure, see The Easley Blackwood Papers, Box 27
12 (in “Correspondence, 1969–1979”).
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Ex. 6.1: Some of Blackwood’s “music for the drawer” (in The Easley Blackwood Papers, Boxes 84 
and 91, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library) 
While Blackwood’s antipathy towards Democrats likely comes as no surprise by now, this is still 
a shocking find—particularly given Blackwood’s penchant for decrying entire genres of music as 
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too loud and sex-obsessed.  Yet here, in this brief ditty penned when he was already well into 28
his fifties, Blackwood appears to be the one who is rather sex-obsessed. Indeed, one of his 
private hobbies seems to have been writing bawdy limericks,  and this represents the only 29
instance I could find in his archive of one of these actually being set to music. On top of the 
immature, vulgar lyrics and the cloyingly sexist subtitle—which themselves are patently obvious 
and need no further mention—even the song’s tempo marking is imbued with a sexual subtext 
(its lower bound, I would bet, is no accident). But perhaps most revealing of all are Blackwood’s 
performance directions for the song, located in the lower right corner of Ex. 6.1. Two things 
stand out in particular: [1] Blackwood’s recommendation that the song simply be “played over 
and over,” and [2] his endorsement of its transposition “into any lower key.” The former 
advocacy of repetition ad infinitum only doubles down on the song’s blatantly sex-obsessive 
character; the latter clarification about its acceptable tessitura, meanwhile, confirms something 
about the song’s intended audience: that this is music by men, for men. I can imagine the 
song’s taking on an underground life as a popular party trick among a close circle of like-
minded males, to be “whipped out” past a certain point of inebriation as a means of collective, 
obsessive revelry—a sort of sonic phallus that ritualistically aids in the performance of toxic 
masculinity. But despite these performance directions, I could find no concrete evidence that 
the song was actually ever performed in a public or semi-private setting (whether at informal 
departmental gatherings or within the walls of campus frat houses). 
 This is how Blackwood characterizes rock music in private correspondence. [See The Easley 28
Blackwood Papers, Box 42 (in “Correspondence and Agreements, 1958–2005”).]
 Several of these can be found in The Easley Blackwood Papers, Box 44 (in “Notes, n.d.”).29
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 This is not the only instance of offensive “music for the drawer” in Blackwood’s archive. 
In addition to this puerile ode to the Clintons, he also penned insensitive “odes” to China and 
to the American South.  The pitch-class content in these last two odes is deliberately 30
complementary: the former uses only the black notes on the piano and is replete with parallel 
perfect fourths that caricature the pentatonic basis of traditional Chinese music in an 
egregiously exoticist/Orientalist manner, whereas the latter only uses the white notes on the 
piano in a not-so-subtle nod to the “whites only” mantra of the postbellum Jim Crow era 
(which was still in full force when Blackwood arrived in Chicago in 1958). There are also longer-
form works by Blackwood that demonstrate his unsettling fascination with racial, ethnic, and 
sexual difference. One of these, a single-scene satire entitled “Modern Music at the Museum,” 
was also likely never intended to see the light of day (outside of a few privately circulated 
copies that Blackwood sent to select friends).  On the surface, it is a lamentation of what 31
Blackwood has called the “nihilistic”  state of concert music in the third quarter of the 20th 32
century (and the sorts of things that have come to “pass as music” during that period). But it 
also doubles as an outlet for Blackwood to blow off some reactionary steam about the 
changing demographic and political landscape of the country at large during this same period. 
 Handwritten scores of these can be found in The Easley Blackwood Papers, Box 91 (curiously 30
buried within a folder labeled “Tuning Stuff: Correspondence and Publications, 1982–2011”).
 This work appears multiple times in The Easley Blackwood Papers: in Box 18, Box 28, Box 30 31
(where it is classified as an “opera”), Box 33 (here being a personal copy Blackwood made for 
Canadian music theorist Paul Rapoport), and Box 38. None of these copies is dated, though I 
surmise that Blackwood wrote the work sometime in either the 1970s or 1980s, in the midst of 
his stylistic turn back to neoclassicism.
 The Easley Blackwood Papers, Box 91 (in “Tuning Stuff: Correspondence and Publications, 32
1982–2011”).
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A few of the play’s characters are notable in this regard. There are two unnamed stagehands, 
for instance, who Blackwood specifies as being white, but who speak a bastardized version of 
African-American Vernacular English while chain-smoking joints throughout the scene.  There 33
is also a male character in the play who is presumably gay (though this is never stated outright) 
based on Blackwood’s insensitive stereotypical portrayal of him: as “well-dressed,” effeminate 
in mannerism, speaking with a high-pitched “nasal” voice, and overly gesticulating.   34
 Taken together, these compositions “for the drawer” present quite the revealing 
portrait of how Blackwood privately coped with a changing world (and the changing place of 
Western Euroclassical tonal music—as a proxy for white cis male supremacy—within it). If a 
person’s character, as the well-worn adage goes, is measured by what they do when no one 
else is looking (or listening), then Blackwood’s reputation as an eccentric, isolated genius is in 
need of some serious reconsideration, to say the least. As Philip Ewell writes, one cannot afford 
to excuse or ignore the “racist misconduct” of white-male “artistic ‘geniuses,’” nor can one 
continue to subscribe to the prevailing ideology that “geniuses deserve some kind of 
dispensation for their conduct because of their genius.”  Put plainly, Blackwood may be a well-35
respected composer (and in some circles, a highly revered musical mind), but this does not 
 One of Blackwood’s former colleagues, it is worth noting, recalls the frequent scent of 33
marijuana coming from inside his office—something that does not exactly square with 
Blackwood’s reported tendency to frequently (and emphatically) rail against marijuana use in 
casual conversation, associating the drug with people of color.
 Blackwood, “Modern Music at the Museum” (n.d.). These are actual explicit stage directions 34
given to the character, usually preceding his speaking lines.
 Ewell, “Beethoven Was an Above Average Composer—Let’s Leave It at That” (2020b). This is 35
the fourth blog post in a series of six entitled “Music Theory’s White Racial Frame: Confronting 
Racism and Sexism in American Music Theory.”
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give him a free pass to be racist, sexist, and homophobic. These qualities—which are latent in 
some of his archival materials but blatant in others—cannot be excused as merely “incidental 
to his music” or simply “a product of his time.” They must be called out for what they are. To 
do anything otherwise is to perpetuate the pernicious belief that art can be separated from its 
artist. 
* * * 
 Anita Sullivan has written that “[a] piano is full of suppressed desires, recalcitrance, 
inhibition, conflict.”  Was Blackwood’s world really so different from the instrument that gave it 36
voice? As I left the archive that week, still processing what I had found, I felt the focus of my 
project shifting under my feet. No longer could it simply be a project about music in the 
abstract—about unlocking the “mystery” of Blackwood’s microtonal compositions while 
protectively residing in the ether of abstraction and never making contact with the ground. 
Instead, it would be a project about the conditioning forces of culture and history, the 
“powerful inertia” of “art worlds,”  and the unavoidable ways that enculturation breeds 37
cognitive (and ideological) bias. It would be a project about fear, anxiety, and insecurity—a far 
cry from the conventional music-theoretic focus on objectivity, rationality, and coherence. And 
finally, it would be a project about embracing contradiction, rather than seeking to resolve it. 
Blackwood’s microtonal music is a fuzzy, messy contradiction in terms, in ways that I have been 
unraveling over the past few hundred pages. But perhaps the most pointed contradiction of all, 
and the one that most presently occupied my mind in the wake of my trip to Chicago, is that 
 Sullivan, The Seventh Dragon: The Riddle of Equal Temperament (2005), p.11.36
 Becker, “The Power of Inertia” (1995), p.301.37
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despite the outward appearance of equal temperament as an equitable, “democratic” tuning 
(and despite the outward appearance of microtonal composition as a radical act of musical 
boundary-expansion), we cannot afford to forget that “[t]he act of tuning is inherently a process 
of exclusion”  and that Blackwood’s neoclassical approach to microtonal composition is 38
ultimately a political act that reconstructs and refortifies the very walls he appears to be tearing 
down. Sure, his music may grab the attention of the musical layperson in a visceral way that 
most other music does not, but ultimately, this music is also the product of a worldview—and of 
a broader disciplinary “white racial frame” —that continues to keep out more than it lets in. 39
Closing Gambit 
I therefore wish to conclude this dissertation in a subversive vein. In what follows, I examine 
one final, summative musical example that synthesizes many of this project’s major themes and 
arguments while also lying squarely outside of the “white racial frame” that animates 
Blackwood’s thoughts and his compositional/aesthetic ideologies. In so doing, I demonstrate 
that the findings and conclusions of previous chapters are not merely applicable to tonal music 
conceived in the Euroclassical functional mold; they can also reveal a great deal about tonal 
music that consciously resists the Euroclassical functional model and deconstructs several of its 
 Malone, “Harmonic Space and Hegemonic Process” (2017), p.5. See also Carlos, “Tuning: At 38
the Crossroads” (1987) and Code, “[Not Equal]: Feminism, Tuning, and Theory 
Pedagogy” (1995).
 Of course, there is also a gendered (male) component to this frame that cannot be 39
overlooked, as Ewell discusses in his plenary talk, his subsequent article, and the first two of his 
intervening blog posts. [See Ewell, “Music Theory’s White Racial Frame” (2019); “Music Theory 
and the White Racial Frame” (2020a); “The Myth of Race and Gender Neutrality in Music 
Theory” (2020b); and “Race, Gender, and Their Intersection in Music Theory” (2020b).]
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central enabling premises. Indeed, Blackwood would likely bristle at the suggestion that his 
music might shed new light on something like free jazz. But here goes nothing. 
 Free jazz denotes a range of Black experimental musics that arose in the late 1950s and 
1960s as a reflection of (and reaction to) contemporaneous sociopolitical conditions in 
America.  It has been referred to by a variety of names, from “avant-garde jazz” to the “New 40
Thing,” but I choose to use the label “free jazz” to highlight the music’s intimate connections 
with particular notions of freedom that emerged in the era of civil rights and Black nationalism. 
In contrast to Euro-American ideas of freedom as something only attainable within a 
predetermined structure of rules and constraints, emergent Afrocentric conceptions of the term 
merged a freedom from predetermined constraints with a freedom to pursue one’s own path.  41
Free jazz can be considered a sonic enactment of these Afrocentric ideas of freedom. The 
music emphasizes collective improvisation, eclecticism, and pluralism while distancing itself 
from aesthetic euphemisms for hegemonic whiteness such as fixed chord changes, hierarchical 
metrical templates, and functional tonality. For those trained to regard Western Euroclassical 
systems of harmony and meter as normative defaults, encountering free jazz can be a jarring 
experience, to say the least. 
 For more on the sociopolitical contexts that gave rise to free jazz, see Kofsky, Black 40
Nationalism and the Revolution in Music (1970), Carles and Comolli, Free Jazz/Black Power 
(1971), and Wilmer, As Serious as Your Life: John Coltrane and Beyond (1992).
 On this point, see especially Anderson, This Is Our Music: Free Jazz, the Sixties, and 41
American Culture (2007), Chapters 2 and 3, and Monson, Freedom Sounds: Civil Rights Call 
Out to Jazz and Africa (2007), Chapter 4.
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 But free jazz is far from “unstructured chaos.”  Its organizational trajectory is simply of a 42
different kind—one that is not always describable by traditional metrics of “governing key,” 
“ensemble downbeat,” or “global tempo.” Indeed, much free jazz operates in a manner that 
exposes such alleged musical “facts” as matters of perspectival contingency. Individual 
ensemble members often approach these referential orienting devices in different ways, but 
crucially, no one is more “correct” than any other(s). The music thus demonstrates that 
moments of apparent ambiguity or interpretive plurality need not always be reckoned as 
instances of conflict (or competition) in which a “winner” must be selected; rather, they can 
profitably be regarded as instances of vital coexistence (or collaboration) in which the plurality 
is precisely the point. The remainder of this chapter will focus on one such track—Ornette 
Coleman’s “All My Life” (1971) —unpacking what I call its “duck-rabbit centricity.” This 43
concept, I argue, can be a useful tool for capturing free jazz’s foundational aesthetic of 
perspectival contingency and illustrating how music can still sound tonal even when it does not 
conform to traditional Western conceptions of “being in a key.” 
 Tymoczko, “The End of Jazz? Bebop at the Millennium” (1996), p.76.42
 A recording of this track is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zNtKJNgjq2g. All 43
recording times I cite in the ensuing discussion will be based off this link.
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 “All My Life” occupies a sort of transitional middleground between Coleman’s early 
Atlantic recordings and his later releases with Prime Time.  A linking element is the use of two 44
drummers at once: Billy Higgins and Ed Blackwell both play simultaneously on this track (as 
they did on Coleman’s 1961 album Free Jazz), and their interaction ranges from understated 
and metrically ambiguous (for the first minute or so) to urgent and duple-martial (beginning 
with singer Asha Puthli’s arrival on the last note of the second vocal strophe at 1:13, which 
ushers in the instrumental strophe at 1:17). The latter drum feel gradually usurps the former in 
prominence over the course of the recording, its exigency planing obliquely with the 
increasingly recitational ethos of the horns and vocals. The composite result is a subtle and 
gradual musical deconstruction of those temporal concepts that typically serve as shared 
orienting/anchoring frameworks among performers—such as 4/4 time, the downbeat, metrical 
regularity/periodicity, and even pulse itself. The recording begins by showcasing what Peter 
Niklas Wilson calls the “tendency in Coleman’s music to break through regular 4/4 time, to re-
group meter—while still maintaining a steady beat—in response to the demands of the 
melodic line, to move in irregular metrical units.”  But as the recording progresses, the 45
 Coleman remains with Charlie Haden on the double bass, here, not yet having made the 44
conversion of preference to the electric-bass sound that characterizes his Prime Time 
recordings from the later 1970s and 1980s. Perhaps the more “continuous” (i.e., non-fretted) 
layout of pitch space on the acoustic bass is a better match for Coleman’s characteristic 
microtonal inflections and “All My Life” singer Asha Puthli’s remarkable capacity for 
intonational nuance. Her own vocal part on this recording is enlivened with automatic double-
tracking, and the horn section is heaped with reverb almost to the point of timbral anonymity, 
creating an ethereality never found on the earlier Atlantic sides.
 Wilson, Ornette Coleman: His Life and Music (1999), p.74. Eric Charry, writing slightly earlier 45
than Wilson, also discusses this same tendency of Coleman’s music to “shatter the barline and 
eventually break free.” [Charry, “Freedom and Form in Ornette Coleman’s Early Atlantic 
Recordings” (1997–98), p.261.]
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relationship between drummers and horns/vocals sounds more and more like one of structural 
polytempo,  or in other words, an instance of “dual-track time”  in which the tracks, crucially, 46 47
do not subscribe to a shared metrical framework. ,  Much of the recording might therefore be 48 49
regarded as exhibiting an overarching “duck-rabbit meter.” 
 One of this dissertation’s most important through-lines is that tonal stability and metrical 
stability exist in a symbiotic relationship, and indeed, the metrical plurality just described in “All 
My Life” is a principal contributor to the tonal plurality of Puthli’s vocal part. As the below 
transcription of the first vocal strophe shows, her part can plausibly be heard in either a C-
centric (above each system) or a G-centric (below) tonal framework, and since neither hearing is 
dignified with particularly strong (hyper)metrical support, one could theoretically float back and 
forth between these two centricities.  This tonal dualism, as I will argue, takes on a new 50
 Cynthia Folio’s book chapter “An Analysis of Polyrhythm in Selected Improvised Jazz 46
Solos” (1995) contains a good discussion of an analogous polytempo relationship between 
drums and horns in Coleman’s earlier recording “Lonely Woman” (1959). See also Vickery and 
James, “The Enduring Temporal Mystery of Ornette Coleman’s Lonely Woman” (2017).
 This term was coined by Hao Huang and Rachel V. Huang in “Billie Holiday and Tempo 47
Rubato: Understanding Rhythmic Expressivity” (1994–95), p.188.
 This last bit runs counter not only to Huang and Huang’s original conception of the term but 48
also to several subsequent adaptations of the term, including a more recent one by William 
Bauer to Louis Armstrong’s swing solos. [See Bauer, “Expressiveness in Jazz Performance: 
Prosody and Rhythm” (2014), p.143.] Bauer (like Huang and Huang before him) regards “dual-
track time” in terms of microtiming discrepancies between soloist and accompanist in their 
articulation of a shared metrical frame.
 Bassist Charlie Haden plays a mediating role between both temporal “tracks,” acting as what 49
Jimmy Gomes calls a “pendulum player” in the overall interactional network. [Gomes, qtd. in 
Prögler, “Searching for Swing: Participatory Discrepancies in the Jazz Rhythm Section” (1995), 
p.47.]
 Though, of course, as I discuss in previous chapters, one cannot hear in both tonal 50
frameworks simultaneously.
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significance during the upcoming instrumental strophe—a moment that can be productively 
illuminated by putting ordered-triple scale-degree notation in conversation with Coleman’s
original philosophy of “harmolodics.” 
Ex. 6.2: A metrically underdetermined vocal melody that seems to straddle the line between C- 
and G-centricness; excerpt begins at 0:00 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zNtKJNgjq2g
 One can regard the scale-degree annotations above as furnishing a “choose your own 
adventure” interpretational gameboard of sorts, meant to correspond to the several 
(3̂,do,3)    (2̂,ti,2)(1,̂la,0)(7,̂si,11)(6̂,fi,9)(5̂,mi,7)     [<— aeolian]
 (7,̂ti,11)      (6̂,la,9)(5̂,sol,7)(4̂,fi,6)(3̂,mi,4)        (2̂,re,2)          (3̂,me,3)    (2̂,re,2)(1,̂do,0)(7,̂ti,11)(6̂,la,9)(5̂,sol,7)  [<— ionian]
(7,̂mi,11)     (6̂,re,9)(5̂,do,7)(4̂,ti,6)(3̂,la,4)         (2̂,sol,2)                                 (3̂,le,3)    (2̂,sol,2)(1,̂fa,0)(7,̂mi,11)(6̂,re,9)(5̂,do,7)  [<— lydian]
(5̂,mi,7)         (1,̂la,0) (3̂,do,3)(4̂,re,5)     (2̂,ti,2)    [<— aeolian]
(5̂,la,7)         (1,̂re,0)  (3̂,fa,3)(4̂,sol,5)   (2̂,mi,2)  [<— dorian] 
(7,̂mi,11)    (6̂,re,9)(5̂,do,7)(4̂,ti,6)    (5̂,do,7)(2̂,sol,2)     (4̂,ti,6)           (3̂,la,4)        (5̂,do,7)         (1,̂fa,0)  (3̂,le,3)(4̂,fe,5)    (2̂,sol,2) [<— lydian]
(6̂,fa,8)(7,̂sol,10)(5̂,mi,7)   [<— aeolian](1,̂la,0) (4̂,re,5)   
[G]: (6̂,mi,4)      (5̂,re,2)(4̂,do,0)    (4̂,do,0) (1,̂sol,7)            (3̂,ti,11)(2̂,la,9)             (4̂,do,0) (7,̂fa,5)              (2̂,le,8)(3̂,te,10)(1,̂sol,7)  [<— mixolydian]
            (3̂,ti,11)            (1,̂sol,7)
(4̂,la,0)  (7,̂re,5)   (2̂,fa,8)(3̂,sol,10)(1,̂mi,7) [<— phrygian]
 (3̂,mi,11)      (2̂,re,9)(1,̂do,7)(7,̂ti,6)(6̂,la,4)        (5̂,sol,2)                  (6̂,le,3)    (5̂,sol,2)(4̂,fa,0)(3̂,mi,11)(2̂,re,9)(1,̂do,7)[<— ionian]
 (3̂,ti,11)       (2̂,la,9)(1,̂sol,7)(7,̂fi,6)(6̂,mi,4)        (5̂,re,2)                           (6̂,me,3)    (5̂,re,2)(4̂,do,0)(3̂,ti,11)(2̂,la,9)(1,̂sol,7) [<—mixolydian]
 (6̂,do,3)    (5̂,ti,2)(4̂,la,0)(3̂,si,11)(2̂,fi,9)(1,̂mi,7)  [<— phrygian] 
(3̂,mi,11)    (2̂,re,9)(1,̂do,7)(7,̂ti,6)   (1,̂do,7)(5̂,sol,2)     (7,̂ti,6)           (6̂,la,4)        (1,̂do,7)         (4̂,fa,0)  (6̂,le,3)(7,̂fe,5)     (5̂,sol,2) [<— ionian]
(1,̂la,7)          (4̂,re,0)  (6̂,fa,3)(7,̂sol,5)    (5̂,mi,2) [<— aeolian]
(1,̂mi,7)         (4̂,la,0) (6̂,do,3)(7,̂re,5)      (5̂,ti,2) [<— phrygian]
[C]: (3̂,mi,4)      (2̂,re,2)(1,̂do,0)     (1,̂do,0)(5̂,sol,7)             (7,̂ti,11)(6̂,la,9)                                                
             (7,̂ti,11)             (5̂,sol,7)      (1,̂do,0) (4̂,fa,5)              (6̂,le,8)(7,̂te,10)(5̂,sol,7)    [<— ionian]
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conceivable tonal/modal frameworks in which Puthli’s vocal melody can be heard.  The range 51
of colors in Ex. 6.2—which includes all but the characteristic violet of locrian—demonstrates 
that while this passage is undeniably tonal (in the fuzzy heptatonic diatonic sense) regardless of 
how one hears it, it is also infused with a veritable rainbow of affective potential energy, 
seemingly possessing the ability to float among multiple modalities of tonality.  To that end, 52
whenever ordered triples are positioned directly on top of one another in Ex. 6.2 (whether on 
the same side of a given system or spanning both sides of it), this denotes multiple plausible 
modally situated intervallic interpretations of a given pitch. While this palette may look 
overwhelming at first, there is a purposive pattern to its layout. As stated previously, C-centric 
interpretations are always located above each system, and G-centric interpretations below. 
Furthermore, any vertically aligned modal interpretations for a given pitch within each centricity 
all share the same x (such as the (5̂,mi,7) and (5̂,sol,7) that both appear above the lyric “here” 
in m.6 as plausible C-centric interpretations). And likewise, any vertically aligned modal 
interpretations for a given pitch between centricities are arranged in a mirror-image format on 
either side of each system; these pairs all share the same y (such as the (5̂,mi,7) and (1,̂mi,7)—
in addition to the (5̂,sol,7) and (1,̂sol,7)—that appear both above and below that same lyric in 
 It should be noted here that my metrical interpretation in Ex. 6.2 is by no means the only 51
possible hearing of this passage—nor is it free from my own personal biases and implicit 
“preference rules” for metrical representation. Indeed, from m.7 onwards, my time signature 
shifts are chosen such that the agogic accents in Puthli’s melody (i.e., her longest-held notes) 
can occur on downbeats. While this is done to maximize the readability of Ex. 6.2, it goes 
without saying that divergent metrical interpretations are absolutely possible; indeed, in much 
free jazz, there is rarely such thing as a universally agreed-upon meter.
 Traditional scale-degree notation, forged as it is in the crucible of ionian bias, would simply 52
not be able to capture this range of commingling modal colors without necessarily distorting it 
in some way.
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m.6). My contention is that such a layout, while perhaps confusing at first in its seeming 
plurality for plurality’s sake, effectively captures something fundamental about what it is like to 
experience tonal/modal ambiguity. Whether switching among vertically aligned hearings on the 
same side of a system (i.e., a “parallel” shift) or switching among vertically aligned hearings in a 
mirror-image relationship on either side of a system (i.e., a “relative” shift), some aspect of 
scale-degree hearing is always preserved—x in the former case, y in the latter case (and of 
course, z in both cases). These linkages are the phenomenological bread and butter of tonal/
modal plurality, indicating exactly which aspects of scale-degree experience might be staying 
the same across potential hearings of the passage (and thereby unmasking the very conditions 
that create the sense of plurality in the first place). 
 While it is theoretically possible to flip between any two hearings on the same side of a 
given system—or between any two hearings that are mirror images on either side of a given 
system —simply by performing the requisite “mental ‘gymnastics,’”  there is not always a 53 54
practical payoff for doing so. Indeed, while I have thus far been considering Puthli’s vocal part 
on its own, it by no means exists in a vacuum that is void of other pitched material. Charlie 
Haden’s bass, the interactional “glue” of the ensemble, is crucially also present—and it is time 
to bring his heretofore ignored part into the discussion. Haden’s bass part, I argue, functions as 
 In principle, it is also possible to flip between two hearings on either side of a given system 53
that are not mirror images of one another—for instance, between C ionian and G phrygian 
during the lyrics “I knew you long ago” (mm.10–11). But such shifts preserve neither x nor y for 
any given z, and thus, because of the extra cognitive “work” they require to execute, they are 
arguably less plausible transformations than the x-preserving and y-preserving ones just 
mentioned in the main text.
 Arthur, “A Perceptual Study of Scale-Degree Qualia in Context” (2018), p.296.54
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an understated “influencer” that suggests certain hearings of Puthli’s vocal line, at certain 
points, to be more plausible than others. Generally speaking, his playing helps to clarify which 
parts of Puthli’s vocal line sound more C-centric, and which sound more G-centric. But because 
of Haden’s deliberate sparseness, coupled with the initial absence of other pitched instruments 
that could provide more precise macroharmonic cues, his bass playing does not necessarily tip 
the interpretational scales conclusively towards any one specific governing C-centric or G-
centric modal collection. This preserves and accentuates the vocal line’s baked-in ambiguity, 
suggesting that the song’s centricity may be an open question by design. 
 Haden’s playing suggests a gradual shift from C-centricness in the first system of Ex. 6.2 
(punctuated by his phrase-ending Cs in mm.6–7) to G-centricness in the third system—a shift 
that is accomplished during the “pivoting” second system (which begins as more C-centric but 
ends as more G-centric, thanks to Haden’s prolonged dwelling on octave-separated Gs in 
[most of] m.10 and [all of] m.11). This suggestion of a tonal transition by fifth is dignified by 
Puthli’s vocal line during the third system of Ex. 6.2, which is basically an exact fifth 
transposition of her part in the first system. Such a method of implying an alternate tonal 
center, Ekkehard Jost writes, is a hallmark of Coleman’s compositional style: “The[se] shifts do 
not arise from functional harmonic changes but from motivic chain-association, and are thus 
independent of any time-order.”  Indeed, while certain abstractions of harmonic-functional 55
behavior do emerge as a result of Haden’s bass part—such as the implication of falling-fifth 
motion in the outer systems, or the quasi–dominant pedal in m.16 that consolidates the G-
 Jost, Free Jazz (1974), p.51.55
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centric conclusion of the strophe —it is noteworthy that, in general, “All My Life” manages to 56
sound tonal without containing anything like traditional harmonies or harmonic functions. In 
other words, while scale-degree qualia appear to be a sine qua non for tonal hearing, 
regardless of idiom, harmonic function is not. Indeed, harmonic function seems to be a peculiar 
feature of musics derived from Western Euroclassical idioms (including some Western popular 
musics), whereas in other idioms (such as free jazz), it need not be present in order for tonal 
sensations to be possible. As Ewell writes, “function” (as in “‘functional’ tonality”) is a 
“euphemism for white and whiteness in music theory’s white racial frame”;  the conscious 57
eschewal of this regulative system in Black free jazz is no coincidence. It is a political act of 
resistance, a vindication of Jost’s remark that “[f]ree jazz shows precisely how tight the links 
between social and musical factors are, and how the one cannot be completely grasped 
without the other.”  58
 Because “All My Life” is strophic, the story of its tonal trajectory is not so simple as 
positing a linear, directional shift from initial C-centrism to eventual G-centrism. Such 
 That Ex. 6.2 comes out to a neat sixteen bars is merely a coincidence of my transcription; 56
“All My Life” is still a prime example of the following remark from Jost about modal jazz since 
the 1960s: “With vertical chordal movement reduced to a minimum, there was room for 
freedom in a horizontal direction, for the abolition of functional harmony made a schematic 
division into eight, twelve, or sixteen-bar patterns unnecessary.” [Jost, Free Jazz (1974), p.19.]
 Ewell, “Beethoven Was an Above Average Composer—Let’s Leave It at That” (2020b). 57
Ronald Radano has also characterized harmony as a metaphor for white cultural dominance, 
writing that “[h]armony was a sonic reconstruction of the chains that had bridled blacks, of the 
rationalism that had stifled African spiritualism.” [Radano, “Jazzin’ the Classics: The AACM’s 
Challenge to Mainstream Aesthetics” (1992), p.90.]
 Jost, Free Jazz (1974), p.9. In the words of Larry Neal, “[E]thics and aesthetics are 58
one.” [Neal, qtd. in Robinson, “The Challenge of the Changing Same: The Jazz Avant-Garde of 
the 1960s, the Black Aesthetic, and the Black Arts Movement” (2005), p.21.]
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teleological determinacy runs counter to free-jazz aesthetics, and indeed, the combination of 
progressive musical accumulation playing out over a circular form only intensifies the tonal 
dualism of Puthli’s vocal melody in the ensuing strophes. The G-leaning atmosphere that 
concludes the first strophe, for example, does not simply evaporate when the second strophe 
begins (0:34). Rather, it persists in a manner that challenges the original C-leaning nature of the 
strophe’s opening material (even despite the fact that Haden’s bass accompaniment to this 
portion essentially does not change between strophes). But one centricity never conclusively 
overtakes the other; even for those listeners who are inertially inclined to remain in a G-centric 
framework for the start of the second strophe, Haden’s emphatic phrase-punctuating Cs from 
0:45–0:48 (referentially corresponding to those in mm.6–7, but now in octaves) momentarily tip 
the scales back to C-centrism, before the remainder of the strophe ventures once again in the 
direction of G. This push and pull, though it may engender some pointed cognitive dissonance 
in those listeners who are accustomed to one tonal area’s “winning out” in the end, is 
deliberate—and the ensuing instrumental strophe beginning at 1:17 demonstrates rather 
poetically that tonal plurality is something that is aesthetically and ideologically built into this 
music on the most foundational level. 
 The opening line of this instrumental strophe—essentially a superimposition of Puthli’s 
vocal melody in mm.1–3 and mm.12–14 of Ex. 6.2—is transcribed below: 
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Ex. 6.3: Partial treble clef transcription of the instrumental strophe of “All My Life”;  
excerpt spans from 1:17 to 1:26 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zNtKJNgjq2g
As is the case in Ex. 6.2, the C-centric interpretation is located above the staff, and the G-
centric interpretation is located below the staff.  But unlike Ex. 6.2, I have chosen to represent 59
the strophe’s melody as unmoored from any governing metrical framework, since it is here that 
the sense of “dual-track time” is most pointed, with the horns recitationally floating above the 
emergent duple meter of the drums,  refusing to capitulate to their proposition of strictly 60
isochronous phrasing. As a result, the horns sound “out of time,” ,  and the rhythmic values in 61 62
my transcription are meant to be loose approximations of “long” and “short” durations, not 
Here, however, within each of these two interpretations, vertically aligned ordered triples 59
denote upper and lower voices in each of the passage’s dyads.
 The horn part here might be regarded as freely expressing what Justin London has 60
memorably called the “inner value of the notes.” [London, Hearing in Time (2012), p.174.]
I am reminded here of Charles Keil’s famous provocation that “[m]usic, to be personally 61
involving and socially valuable, must be ‘out of time’ and ‘out of tune.’” [Keil, “Participatory 
Discrepancies and the Power of Music” (1987), p.275.] Certainly, “All My Life” can be said to 
display elements of both.
 Of course, this label is a Eurocentric misnomer, and that is why I place it in scare quotes. The 62
recitational sensibility of the horns might instead be regarded as deconstructing the idea that 
there must be a notionally isochronous beat level that is shared by all performers in an 
ensemble—as if to expose this latter manner of musical organization as just one among many 
equally valid ways to play “in time.”
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rhythmically exact lengths.  Once again, the lack of clear metrical support for this melody 63
contributes to its ability to float between C-centric and G-centric anchorings.  64
 I want to frame this instrumental strophe as a sonic encapsulation of Coleman’s 
philosophy of “harmolodics,” which is part musicking approach, part compositional method, 
and part cultural ideology.  Harmolodic philosophy, which Coleman developed during the US 65
civil rights movement, is rooted in the idea of human equality and mobilized through music 
that enacts this fundamental equality—concretely, among performers and instruments in an 
ensemble, and more abstractly, among musical domains. It is marked by an “egalitarian spirit” 
in which no one thing dominates over any other; its end goal is to create a musical space “in 
which the partners [in a] dialogue can articulate their own worldview without any pressure to 
compromise.”  As Stephen Rush notes, “It makes complete sense that this approach to music 66
would emerge […] in parallel with the Civil Rights Movement,” since harmolodics is not just 
about respecting each and every voice “within [an] ensemble” (so as not to create “a 
 This transcriptional strategy matches the one found in Frink, “An Analysis of the 63
Compositional Practices of Ornette Coleman as Demonstrated in His Small Group Recordings 
During the 1970s” (2012), p.77 (specifically Fig. 12), and later in Frink, “Dancing in His Head: 
The Evolution of Ornette Coleman’s Music and Compositional Philosophy” (2016), p.111 
(specifically Fig. 7).
 Haden’s playing during this section, moreover, continues to subtly nudge the interpretational 64
scales without tipping them wholesale—closely mirroring the approach he takes in the 
preceding vocal strophes.
 The most detailed and sensitive treatment of this notoriously hard-to-define philosophy is 65
given in Rush, Free Jazz, Harmolodics, and Ornette Coleman (2017), which includes a lengthy 
interview with Coleman and makes a point of centering his own words and thoughts on the 
concept. Previous discussions of harmolodics can be found in Morris, Perpetual Frontier: The 
Properties of Free Music (2012), Kelley, “New Monastery: Monk and the Jazz Avant-
Garde” (1999), and Wilson, Ornette Coleman: His Life and Music (1999), among other sources.
 Wilson, Ornette Coleman: His Life and Music (1999), pp.68 and 70.66
341
preference or elevated function for any one instrument”), but also about empowering each and 
every human voice “more broadly, within society.”  Discussions of harmolodic philosophy that 67
focus on its musical particulars tend to note its theoretical commitment to giving “equal value 
in importance to harmony, movement (rhythm), and melody.”  Achieving this balance in 68
practice, however, actually entails more focus on certain musical parameters than others—
specifically, on melody as the ultimate musical wellspring, the source from which all else 
derives. By conceiving of melody as harmony (and as movement), harmolodic practitioners 
sought to break free from “the stranglehold that [euphemistically ‘white’ conceptions of] 
harmony had on Jazz by the end of the 1950s.”  69
 One distinctive feature of Coleman’s harmolodic philosophy is his expansive concept of 
“unison,” which explicitly “reject[s] the hierarchical notion of ‘concert pitch.’”  He would often 70
write out a melody and instruct each musician to play it as if it were written in the clef they were 
accustomed to reading. The result would be a unique kind of parallel motion that seemingly 
merges the qualities of polytonality and heterophony, as if suggesting multiple potential 
referential centricities while simultaneously acting as a unified elaboration of one basic, 
fundamental melodic line. 
 The instrumental strophe partially transcribed in Ex. 6.3 above can be conceived as a 
textbook example of Coleman’s “harmolodic unison.” Consider the opening B-E dyad, for 
 Rush, Free Jazz, Harmolodics, and Ornette Coleman (2017), p.3.67
 Morris, Perpetual Frontier: The Properties of Free Music (2012), p.86.68
 Rush, Free Jazz, Harmolodics, and Ornette Coleman (2017), p.8.69
 Harbert, American Music Documentary: Five Case Studies of Ciné-Ethnomusicology (2018), 70
p.149.
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instance. Even though it sounds as two separate notes, its constituent elements—a concert-
pitch B played by Dewey Redman on tenor saxophone and the concert-pitch E a fourth above 
played by Coleman on alto saxophone—would both read as the same C# on Coleman’s 
harmolodic clef. ,  Since most of the ensuing instrumental strophe proceeds similarly, in 71 72
parallel perfect fourths, this offers a clue that Coleman may have conceived of it as a single, 
unison melody in harmolodic terms. The transcription below reconstructs how Ex. 6.3 might 
have originally looked to the players in Coleman’s ensemble, written on his harmolodic clef:73
Ex. 6.4: Partial harmolodic clef transcription of the instrumental strophe of “All My Life”;  
excerpt spans from 1:17 to 1:26 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zNtKJNgjq2g
 For more on Coleman’s “harmolodic clef” concept, see Morris, Perpetual Frontier: The 71
Properties of Free Music (2012), pp.90–91, and Rush, Free Jazz, Harmolodics, and Ornette 
Coleman (2017), pp.20–22.
There may also be two trumpets playing this melodic line—as Carmine Fornarotto and 72
Gerard Schwarz are listed as playing trumpet on this track in the liner notes—but the heavy 
reverb makes it difficult to distinguish their parts from the more timbrally prominent 
saxophones. In any case, if the lower voice in each P4 dyad were played by a Bb trumpet, and/
or the upper voice by an Eb trumpet, then the “harmolodic unison” hypothesis would hold.
This clef was apparently shaped like a figure eight. In Ex. 6.4, it is meant to be read as a 73
treble clef, since this is the clef that alto saxophonists, tenor saxophonists, and trumpeters alike 
(i.e., all the horn players on the recording) are accustomed to reading. The literal sounding 
dyads in the instrumental strophe therefore result not from intra-group differences in referential 
clef, but from the fact that these horns are transposing instruments—and not all of the same 
type.
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 A few key differences from Ex. 6.3 are worth pointing out, over and above the change in 
clef. First, Ex. 6.4 is not color-coded, and no longer do my annotations above the staff 
correspond to a C-centric hearing and those below the staff to a G-centric hearing. Instead, 
these annotations now correspond to register: those above the staff represent the upper voice 
in the dyadic instrumental strophe, and those below the staff represent the lower voice. Notice 
that such annotations consist only of scale-degree y-components. This is intentional; my aim is 
to focus on the elements that unite the C-centric and G-centric potential hearings laid out 
previously in Ex. 6.3, not to focus on the elements that separate such hearings. For example, 
whether one chooses to hear the opening (literal) B-E dyad as 7-̂3̂ in C lydian or 3̂-6̂ in G 
ionian, both hearings correspond to a lower-voice mi and an upper-voice la. Ex. 6.4 therefore 
makes no claims about governing/competing centricities, nor does it feature any information 
about x. Instead, it showcases the fact that regardless of how one tonally situates the 
instrumental strophe, the associated y-component string always remains the same. Ordered-
triple notation thus captures exactly what makes this line feel so “unison” (outside of its 
monophonic appearance on the harmolodic clef): a fundamental qualitative equivalency that is 
the case not in spite of the line’s tonal multivalence, but precisely because of this very 
multivalence. In sum, the instrumental strophe (and with it, “All My Life” as a whole) is a 
musical microcosm of the central harmolodic credo: to always “respect and celebrate 
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differences within unity.”  To pigeonhole this music into the either/or confines of C-centrism 74
versus G-centrism, put plainly, is to miss its point.  75
 To be abundantly clear, I am not arguing that “All My Life” can be heard in both a C-
centric framework and a G-centric framework at the same time, by the same listener. But what I 
am arguing, simply, is that it is contrary to the spirit of harmolodics to force a choice between 
two tonal areas, to regard them as “competing,” and to feel the need to select an absolute 
“winner.” Instead, I have been framing the tonal multivalence of “All My Life” in collaborative 
terms, as furnishing a set of equally viable perspectival “hats” that a listener can try on for size, 
discarding one and switching to another at their own pace, in order to experience the same 
music in a variety of immersive modalities and affective frameworks. This aesthetic of 
complementarity is deeply rooted in the music’s performance. While a single listener can only 
hear one operative tonal center at a time, different musicians in an ensemble need not 
subscribe to the same shared referential orienting centricity. This is part and parcel of the 
deconstructive modus operandi of free jazz, in which the idea of a shared set of universally 
 Rush, Free Jazz, Harmolodics, and Ornette Coleman (2017), p.21.74
 Indeed, this subtle tonal interpenetration continues until the very end of the recording, never 75
settling definitively into C-centrism or G-centrism. In fact, just when a conclusive, final arrival in 
G seems imminent (hear especially Puthli’s rhetorically charged quasi–“cadential dominant” 
beginning at 3:44), Haden’s bowed bass moves deceptively from D to E (3:47), and the promise 
of an ultimate, satisfying tonal resolution is devastatingly thwarted at the last possible moment.
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agreed-upon musical “facts” is often supplanted in favor of a “multidominant”  array of 76
radically contingent perspectives. The way this aesthetic sensibility trickles down to affect 
harmolodic scale-degree consciousness is perhaps best described by Coleman’s longtime 
trumpeter Don Cherry: “If I play a C and have it in mind as the tonic, that’s what it will become. 
If I want it to be a minor third or a major seventh that has the tendency to resolve upward, then 
the quality of the note will change.”  Simply put, harmolodic playing, to bastardize a quote 77
from Gandhi, is about being the qualia you wish to feel in the world. That certain musicians 
may approach the same material from different qualitative perspectives, or from divergent 
angles of orientation, is not a bug in the system—it is an essential feature of the music (and of 
the aesthetic/ideological philosophy that empowers the music). Free jazz is fundamentally 
about choosing one’s own path. There is no such thing as an a priori wrong turn. 
* * * 
 Blackwood’s microtonal music and Coleman’s free jazz certainly make for strange 
bedfellows on the surface. But are they really as different as they may seem at first glance? 
Both are frequently described as “dissonant” for reasons that boil down to their flouting of 
culturally conditioned expectations about how music typically sounds. Both demonstrate, in 
their own idiosyncratic ways, how metrical stability and tonal stability are codependent 
 The idea of “multidominance” originates with Robert L. Douglas, whose notion of 76
“multidominant elements” forms a central part of his formalized “African-American 
aesthetic.” [Douglas, “Formalizing an African-American Aesthetic” (1991), passim.] In Douglas’s 
words, the term refers to “the multiple use of colors in intense degrees, or the multiple use of 
textures, design patterns, or shapes” (18); this, he argues, is a defining feature of African-
American art. For an application of this concept to free jazz, see Lewis, “Purposive Patterning: 
Jeff Donaldson, Muhal Richard Abrams, and the Multidominance of Consciousness” (2009).
 Cherry, qtd. in Litweiler, Ornette Coleman: A Harmolodic Life (1992), p.131.77
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phenomena, and how the loss or gain of one implies the loss or gain of the other. Both 
challenge the music-theoretically privileged qualities of fit, fixity, and exactitude through their 
foregrounding of sonic liminalities—those “micro-“elements that sound either colloquially “out 
of tune,” colloquially “out of time,” or both. Both are fundamentally tonal musics, despite all 
that seems not to fit. Both contain moments of ambiguity, in-betweenness, and puzzlement 
that can be illuminated by leveraging a scale-degree concept that separates generic scalar 
position from specific modal character (and that does not discriminate among the many viable 
modalities of fuzzy heptatonic diatonic tonality). And finally, though both musics could perhaps 
not be more different in the worldviews they articulate and the politics that motivate their 
creation, they serve as equally potent reminders that musical aesthetics are musical ideologies, 
full stop. In the words of Amiri Baraka, “The song and the people is the same.”78
 Baraka (then LeRoi Jones), “The Changing Same (R&B and New Black Music)” (1966), p.187.78
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